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ABSTRACT 
While the traditional agency model assumes managerial risk aversion and under- 
investment in high-risk opportunities, the behavioural agency model allows for risk 
seeking by managers leading possibly to over-risky investments. Corporate governance 
mechanisms through their disciplining roles can steer managers towards optimal risk 
and avoid value destruction from either risk-deficit or risk-excess on the part of their 
managers. None of the existing studies offer a complete picture of managerial risk 
taking by allowing for both managerial risk aversion and risk seeking. The painting of 
just such a picture is the primary focus of this thesis. This thesis aims to answer the 
following two research questions in the context of corporate acquisitions: 
1. What are the factors that drive managers to undertake risky projects? 
2. To what extent is firm performance related to the optimal or suboptimal risk level of 
an investment project? 
This thesis investigates 289 UK domestic high-tech acquisitions and 289 
matching low-tech acquisitions over the period 1993-2000. High-tech acquisitions are 
argued to be riskier than low-tech acquisitions. 
This thesis documents that fixed compensation, annual bonus, and LTIP cash 
provide few incentives for managers to conduct risky acquisitions. It finds significant 
evidence that equity-based wealth (such as LTIP shares, stock options and managerial 
shareholdings) which links managers' wealth to firm stock performance, has a nonlinear 
incentive effect on managers' selection of acquisition risk. At a low level, it encourages 
managers to pursue risky acquisitions. However, at high levels it discourages 
managerial risk taking. This nonlinear effect is mainly contributed to by managerial 
shareholdings. No evidence is found that stock options make managers select riskier 
acquisitions. Strong evidence is found that a high level of managerial wealth, which 
induces managerial risk aversion, can weaken the incentive alignment effect of equity- 
based wealth. This thesis finds significant evidence that managerial behavioural biases 
(such as overconfidence, over-optimism, and hubris) boosted by good past performance, 
firm glamour ratings by the stock market and a flattering media profile induce managers 
to engage in risky high-tech acquisitions. Corporate monitors are generally ineffective 
in disciplining managers' selection of acquisition risk. Overall, this thesis concludes 
that what makes managers take risky acquisitions appears to be the internal factors, i. e., 
factors that work within managers' inner selves and give them more confidence that 
they can control risks. External factors such as corporate monitoring devices that try to 
control managerial behaviour, do not necessarily boost managers' confidence in their 
risk managing capabilities. 
Regarding post-acquisition performance, this thesis documents that UK high- 
tech acquisitions in the 1990s do not bring any value to acquirer shareholders up to 
three years after acquisition completion. However, high-risk high-tech acquisitions do 
not necessarily destroy more shareholder value than low-risk low-tech acquisitions. 
Acquisitions that are identified as at 'optimal' risk level perform better than under-risk 
acquisitions. Indeed, more shareholder value is created in acquisitions that are over-risk 
than acquisitions that are either optimal-risk or under-risk. Therefore, this thesis 
suggests that many UK acquirer managers during the period over 1993-2000 have 
foregone valuable but high risk growth opportunities and destroyed shareholder value 
more by being excessively risk-averse rather than being adventurous in their risk 
choices. 
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Chapter 1 
Motivation, Objectives and Outline of the Thesis 
1.1 Introduction 
The separation of ownership and control has brought about an abundant stream 
of research in economics, finance and management literature (Berle and Means, 1932; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Marris, 1964). The centre of much of this research is the 
conflict of interests between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Managers as agents of shareholders may make investment and financing decisions that 
serve their own interests to the detriment of those of shareholders. To counter this 
conflict, shareholders rely on a range of corporate control devices to promote alignment 
of their interests with those of managers (Fama, 1980). Examples of these devices are 
executive compensation contracts, non-executive board of directors, remuneration 
committees, etc. 
One source of the conflict arises from the different risk 1 preferences of 
shareholders and managers in making investment and financing choices. By holding 
wealth in well-diversified portfolios, shareholders diversify away firm-specific risk (see 
footnote 1) and are therefore considered to be risk-neutral. On the other hand managers 
Risk refers to the variability in security returns (Markowitz, 1952). The risk of a security can be divided 
into market risk and firm-specific risk (Sharpe, 1964). Market risk is the variability of the security return 
caused by the whole market and therefore cannot be eliminated or reduced. Firm-specific risk is the risk 
that is unique to the security and can be reduced and nearly eliminated with a properly diversified 
portfolio. A more detailed discussion about risk and types of risk is provided in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2. 
whose human capital is invested in their own firm hold undiversified portfolios. In 
addition, when managers' money capital is invested in their company's stock, the 
degree of non-diversification is accentuated. Such a portfolio exposes managers to a 
high level of both market and firm-specific risk (Jin, 2002). This induces managers to 
be risk averse. A consequence of this risk aversion is that managers may spend 
excessive amount of resources on activities which reduce the riskiness of firm returns or 
pass up valuable but high risk investment opportunities thereby causing shareholders 
opportunity losses (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Guay, 1999). This is the risk-related agency 
problem as viewed by traditional agency theory. 
A compensation package or equity ownership (`equity ownership' and 
`shareholdings' used interchangeably hereafter) that enhances managers' wealth in line 
with increases in corporate performance or firm stock value has generally been thought 
of as a solution to the problem of managers pursuing their self-interests at the cost of 
shareholder value (Baker et al, 1988). Annual bonus and long-term incentive plans 
including LTIPs (cash or share awards)2 or stock options are rewarded to managers only 
when managers achieve pre-determined performance benchmarks over a pre-determined 
period. In addition, the value of LTIP shares and managerial shareholdings increase 
Z Readers should note that in this thesis 'LTIPs' is not the abbreviation for long-term incentive plans. 
Long-term incentive plans refer to the type of compensation that is tied to multi-year firm performance. 
LTIPs are a type of Tong-term incentive plans that are awarded either as cash or shares when directors 
achieve the performance objectives set in the LTIPs. The other common type of long-term incentive plan 
is stock options. See Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2 for the definitions of various types of executive 
compensation plans. 
1) 
with firm share value, thus giving managers an incentive to take growth-oriented risky 
investments to improve firm performance. 
In the 1990s, many companies, especially in sectors with high but uncertain 
levels of anticipated growth and value gains (e. g., Internet, Software). included stock 
options in their executive compensation plans (Ittner et al, 2003). An important 
characteristic of stock options is that they have a convex payoff structure. Managers 
who hold company stock options face no downside risk when the stock price falls below 
the benchmark performance level (i. e., the exercise price) but can reap enormous 
payoffs when performance far exceeds that benchmark. Stock options are thus intended 
to encourage managers to make high-risk investment and financing decisions, thereby 
offsetting managers' risk aversion to firm-specific risk (Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
The studies mentioned above imply that performance-related managerial wealth 
components3 can alleviate risk-related agency problems. However, other studies raise 
an opposite view. Annual bonuses whose performance criteria are based on yearly 
accounting profits, may induce managers to focus on projects that pay back quickly 
instead of inducing them to focus on growth-oriented long-term risky projects 
(Narayanan, 1985). Stocks 4 granted through LTIPs or held in managers' equity 
holdings have a linear payoff structure, that is, every dollar decrease (or increase) in the 
value of firm stock will cause the value of LTIP shares or managerial shareholdings to 
decrease (or increase) by one dollar. Such a linear pay-performance relationship may 
prevent managers from engaging in risky projects that may negatively affect firm stock 
3 Managerial wealth includes executive compensation and managerial shareholdings (see Section 2.3.1 of 
Chapter 2). 
a 'Stock' and 'share' are used interchangeably hereafter. 
prices (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Moreover, some researchers such as Marcus (1982) and 
Ross (2004) argue that a high level of performance-based compensation and managerial 
shareholdings even including stock options can intensify the concentration of managers' 
wealth in their own firms and consequently reduce their tolerance for additional firm 
risk. By and large, this group of studies suggest that the risk-related agency problem 
cannot be lessened or solved by linking firm performance to managerial wealth. 
In summary, it is not certain whether managers can change their attitude from 
risk aversion to risk seeking under the influence of performance-related compensation 
or equity ownership. Empirical studies do not provide consistent evidence in support of 
one view against the other. Therefore, in the traditional agency domain, the risk-related 
agency problem remains mostly unsolved. 
Whilst the traditional agency model focuses on solving the problem of 
managerial risk aversion and consequently underinvestment in risky projects, the 
behavioural agency view allows for the possibility that some managers may actually 
pursue over-risk investments even without a pecuniary incentive to do so. The 
behavioural agency view states that managers are prone to various psychological biases, 
for example, overconfidence, over-optimism, and hubris (Roll, 1986; Heaton, 2002; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2004). Managerial behavioural biases may be manifested in 
high-risk and speculative investments where managers underestimate the levels of risk 
involved. Such speculative investment decisions may end up destroying shareholder 
value. Therefore, in the behavioural finance domain, managers could be risk-seekers 
without the inducement of performance-related pay. 
Combining these two schools of agency theory. the risk-related agency problem 
can be considered to encompass both underinvestment in risky projects caused by 
4 
managerial risk aversion and overinvestment in risky projects induced by managerial 
excessive risk-seeking attitude. How do shareholders ensure that the above mix of 
managerial risk incentives leads to neither too much risk taking nor too little? Corporate 
monitoring mechanisms such as external blockholders, non-executive directors, the 
separate roles of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman of Board (COB), as well 
as the presence of a remuneration committee through their disciplining role can steer 
managers towards optimal-risk investments and avoid firm value destruction from either 
risk-deficit or risk-excess on the part of their managers (Wright et al, 1996; Hayward 
and Hambrick, 1997; Core et al, 1999; Gugler et al, 2003; Malmendier and Tate, 
2005a). 
None of the existing studies, however, offer a complete picture of managerial 
risk taking allowing for both risk aversion and risk preference in the attitudes of 
managers. The painting of just such a picture is the primary focus of this thesis. The 
most direct approach to examine managerial risk taking is to examine managers' 
investment behaviour, because risk-averse managers will select low-risk projects while 
risk-seeking managers will choose high-risk projects. Project risk thus captures 
managers' risk preferences. This thesis employs managers' selection of acquisition 5 
5 The terms `acquisition', `merger' and `takeover' are all part of the Mergers & Acquisitions terminology. 
In a merger, a new company is created by combining two firms. In an acquisition, the target firm is 
purchased by the acquirer and ceases to exist. A takeover is similar to an acquisition and also implies that 
the acquirer is much larger than the acquired. A detailed discussion of their definitions can be found in 
Sudarsanam (1995). This thesis does not distinguish between them, and the terms are used 
interchangcabIv. 
5 
risk as a context to examine these issues. The relationships between acquisition risk and 
various incentives are briefly discussed in the next sub-section. 
Determinants of high risk acquisitions 
This thesis employs acquisition decisions as the context to examine the impact 
of managerial wealth components, managers' behavioural biases and corporate 
monitoring devices on managerial risk taking. Acquisitions are large and visible 
corporate investments that can significantly alter the risk profiles of acquirers. 
Diversifying acquisitions are thought to be driven by managerial preference for firm risk 
reduction (Amihud and Lev, 1981). On the other hand, acquisitions of targets rich in 
intangible assets, such as R&D capability and patents obviously ratchet up the riskiness 
of the acquirers (Kohers and Kohers, 2001). 
The fifth merger wave in the USA and the parallel fourth merger wave in the 
UK that occurred over the period 1993-2000 was characterised by a large number of 
acquisitions of firms operating in high-technology ('high-tech' hereafter) areas such as 
the telecommunications, computers, the internet, biotechnology, etc. The key common 
characteristics of those industries are that they often reflect emerging industries that 
have a high level of intangible assets and focus on the development of new and 
innovative technology within their respective areas (Ittner et al, 2003; Stathopoulos et 
al, 2005). Many acquisitions of high-tech targets were driven by the vision of 
technology convergence. The value creation logic6 behind these high-tech acquisitions 
6 Sudarsanam (2003) identifies three broad sources of value: revenue enhancement, cost savings, and real 
options that create valuable growth opportunities. Their importance differs in different types of 
acquisition, for example, cost savings in mergers in mature industries, revenue enhancement in mergers 
6 
rests on new growth opportunities as well as revenue enhancements through, say. cross- 
selling of the merging partners' products and services. Such acquisitions are risk), 
given the large scope for valuation error as well as the uncertainty in the output of the 
high-technology products (Lev, 2001; Bannert and Tschirky; 2004). 
In contrast, low-technology ('low-tech' hereafter) acquisitions happened in 
industries with low levels of technology and intellectual assets such as R&D, patents 
etc, are considered to be much safer investments. Examples of low-tech industries are 
food, retail, and publishing. Value gains to be made by these acquisitions rely less on 
growth opportunities and more on cost reduction and revenue enhancement that exploit 
established products and established markets. Cost savings from such acquisitions can 
be immediately reflected in the profit & loss account in the year of, or subsequent to, 
the acquisitions. Revenue enhancement is more difficult to estimate than cost 
reduction. However when it is based on existing products or services, it is easier to 
evaluate the potential synergies than to calculate the potential gains from new products 
or services. Taken together, high-tech acquisitions are likely to be considerably more 
risky than low-tech acquisitions given the dominance of intangible assets and new 
growth opportunities in the former. 
Which firms make which types of acquisitions depends on managerial risk 
incentives and the discipline of corporate governance. Fixed compensation and annual 
bonuses may not be able to drive managers to pursue high-tech acquisitions with 
driven by enhanced market power or sharing of marketing capabilities, and real options in mergers of 
firms that share resources and capabilities, e. g., R&D, intellectual assets in high-tech sectors. These 
sources of value also differ in acquirers' ability to value acquisitions (valuation risk) and achieve effective 
post-acquisition integration. 
7 
uncertain payback periods but may rather make them favour low-tech acquisitions. 
Long-term incentive plans might be more successful since they lengthen managers' 
decision-making horizons to multi-year periods and managers with longer decision- 
making horizons are more likely to consider projects that have positive earnings in later 
periods and possibly negative earnings in earlier periods. This is more typical of the 
cash inflow of a high-tech acquisition than that of a low-tech acquisition. Therefore, 
long-term incentive plans may make managers favour of high-tech acquisitions than 
low-tech acquisitions. However not all long-term incentive plans have such an effect on 
managers. The convex payoff of stock options protects managers from downside 
investment risk (see previous section). In addition, the stock options are worth more if 
the firm is riskier7. Stock options therefore may drive managers to select high-tech 
acquisitions whose unpredictable outcomes could increase the volatility of firm stock 
performance. LTIPs and managerial shareholdings do not provide such an incentive 
given their linear payoff structure (see previous section). Managers may consider the 
safer choice, i. e., low-tech acquisitions if they hold a high percentage of LTIPs and 
ordinary shares in their wealth portfolio. A better explanation of the payoff structures 
of various managerial wealth components is provided in Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2 and 
a more detailed discussion with regard to the relationship between acquisition risk and 
managerial wealth components can be found in Section 5.4 of Chapter 5. 
High-tech acquisitions could also be a consequence of managerial 
overconfidence/over-optimism/hubris. High-tech acquisitions are more similar in 
nature to growth options than low-tech acquisitions, i. e., they are associated with 
7 This is based on the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model. The value of stock options is 
positively related to firm stock return volatility. 
8 
considerable uncertainty, the need to take a view of the future and the contingent nature 
of the subsequent investments (Smit, 2001). Paradoxically, the contingency of future 
investments may allow managers simultaneously to be overoptimistic about the upside 
potential and to downplay the risk because of the option not to make further investment. 
High-tech acquisitions offering such strategic flexibility may be `sold' by optimistic and 
overconfident managers to various internal constituencies, e. g., the board and external 
constituencies, e. g., analysts and institutional investors. Thus in environments 
characterised by optimism as was the case during dotcom bubble of the 1990s, many 
high-tech acquisitions may have been driven by managerial overconfidence/over- 
optimism/hubris. These behavioural biases may have compounded the problem of 
valuation risk associated with high-tech acquisitions leading to overpayment for targets 
and causing acquirer shareholder value losses. More detailed discussions about the 
relationship between managers' behavioural biases and acquisitions can be found in 
Chapter 3 and Section 5.5 of Chapter 5. 
Robust corporate monitoring can constrain managers to undertake high-risk 
high-tech acquisitions which will maximise shareholder value and to avoid them when 
they are considered as excessively risky. Efficient monitoring can also curb managerial 
risk avoidance through underinvestment in risky acquisitions. A discussion in respect 
of the relationship between acquisition risk and various corporate monitoring devices is 
provided in Section 5.6 of Chapter 5. 
Shareholder value gains through acquisitions are thus the consequence of the 
joint impact of managerial wealth, behavioural biases and corporate monitoring. When 
corporate governance is effective in curbing both managerial risk avoidance and 
excessive risk seeking, corporate acquisitions under such an influence could be optimal- 
9 
risk investments which maximize shareholder wealth gains. However. if the risk 
aversion factors dominate, and the monitors fail to exert a disciplinary function, the 
resulting acquisitions are likely to be under-risk investments. When behavioural biases 
dominate, the resulting acquisitions are likely to be over-risk investments. In the both 
latter cases, acquisitions are likely to be associated with shareholder value destruction. 
The theoretical framework of this thesis as discussed above is summarised and 
illustrated in Figure 1-1. This thesis presents a two-stage analysis. In the first stage, the 
impact that various components of managerial wealth, behavioural biases and corporate 
monitors have on managers' selection of acquisition risk is examined. This constitutes 
the risk model. The risk model emphasizes the interactive nature of those three major 
factors, which has often been ignored in previous studies. In the second stage, I 
establish a link between acquirer post-acquisition performance and the 
optimal/suboptimal levels of acquisition risk, which is derived based on the prediction 
of the risk model. 
10 
Figure 1-1: An illustration of the theoretical framework 
Compensation, Anr 
, LTIPs, Stock Optic 
lerial Shareholdings 
1.2 Objectives 
Having touched upon the broader issues associated with the thesis above. this 
section now introduces its specific objectives. Briefly, the aim of this thesis is to 
answer the following two research questions in the context of corporate acquisitions: 
Q1: What are the factors that drive managers to undertake risky projects? 
Q2: To what extent is firm performance related to the optimal or suboptimal risk 
level of an investment project? 
To answer these research questions, this study investigates the impact of 
managerial wealth, behavioural biases, and corporate monitoring on managerial risk 
taking in the context of UK high-tech and low-tech acquisitions over the period of 
1993-2000. More specifically, this thesis has five objectives. 
Firstly, it examines how each managerial wealth component, such as fixed 
compensation and annual bonuses, LTIP cash, LTIP shares, stock options, managerial 
shareholdings, as well as managers' total wealth can affect the levels of acquisition risk 
that managers choose to pursue. Various measures that are popular in the existing 
literature such as stock ownership, delta and vega are used to proxy for the incentive 
effects of the components of managerial wealth. 
Secondly, this study investigates how behavioural biases such as 
overconfidence, over-optimism, and hubris can affect managers' choices regarding 
acquisition risk. These biases are proxied by good past performance, glamour status 
and flamboyant media profiles. 
Thirdly, it demonstrates how corporate monitoring through external 
blockholdings, institutional blockholdings, non-executive directors, the separate roles of 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and chairman of board (COB). and the existence of 
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remuneration committees, can exert disciplinary pressure on managers' acquisition 
decisions. The above three objectives aim to identify the factors that influence 
managers choices regarding acquisition risk and to construct an empirical risk model to 
predict the `optimal' risk level of an acquisition. 
The fourth objective is to investigate the extent to which acquirer performance 
following acquisitions is related to the acquisition risk chosen by managers. The 
sample acquisitions used in this study are classified into categories of optimal-risk 
acquisitions, under-risk acquisitions, and over-risk acquisitions based on the predictions 
made by the empirical risk model. While optimal-risk investments are theoretically 
associated with shareholder value enhancement, such positive gains are unlikely to be 
found with any investment of a suboptimal risk nature. The empirical results for the 
long-term post-acquisition performance of each acquisition risk category generated 
based on the predictions of the empirical risk model therefore reflect the performance 
consequence of the dominant managerial risk preference. 
The fifth and final objective of this thesis is to perform a one-stage analysis of 
the relationship between firm performance and various factors that influence managers' 
investment behaviour. One-stage analysis is common in the existing finance literature. 
Examples are Datta et al (2001), and Kohers and Kohers (2001). The purpose of the 
one-stage analysis carried out as part of this thesis is to provide a comparable analysis 
with those studies which use one-stage analysis, and also to allow a comparison of one- 
stage and two-stage analyses performed on the same set of source data. To conduct the 
one-stage analysis, I simply run a regression of acquirer post-acquisition performance 
on the various risk incentives discussed in objective one to objective three above. A 
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comparison with the one-stage analysis gives visibility regarding the relative strength or 
weakness of the two-stage analysis used by this thesis. 
1.3 Contributions 
This thesis offers several contributions to the study of managerial risk taking 
behaviours in a corporate investment context. Its major contribution lies in the 
empirical examination of one of the fundamental assumptions of traditional agency 
theory, i. e., managers are risk averse. It incorporates the behavioural view of agency 
theory, i. e., that managers can be risk seeking. It provides empirical evidence to support 
the latter's view and that the risk aversion assumption of the traditional agency theory is 
inadequate. From the literature survey conducted as part of this thesis, it appears that, 
this is the only empirical study that provides a comprehensive analysis of managerial 
risk incentives by combining traditional finance variables with behavioural finance 
variables. 
Allowing for both managerial risk aversion and managerial risk seeking means 
that managerial risk taking is not always associated with firm value creation as assumed 
by traditional agency model8 since both managerial risk avoidance and excessive 
managerial risk seeking can lead to firm value destruction. This study proposes a two- 
stage analysis to include managers' selection of acquisition risk into the analysis of the 
8 Traditional agency theory assumes that managers are risk-averse and shareholders are risk-neutral. The 
divergence of interests between managers and shareholders creates agency costs that reduce shareholder 
value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managerial risk-seeking indicates a 
better alignment of interests 
between managers and shareholders, and therefore is associated with less agency costs and better firm 
performance (Wright et al, 1996). 
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relationship between acquirer post-acquisition performance and various risk incentives. 
A robustness check made against the one-stage analysis which is commonly used in the 
existing finance literature supports the view that the two-stage analysis adopted by this 
thesis is superior. 
This thesis also makes a number of other significant contributions to the field of 
agency theory. It contributes to executive compensation literature by providing 
empirical evidence regarding the efficiency of a variety of compensation components. 
Indeed, empirical studies are not consistent with regard to the incentive effect of equity- 
based compensation. This study shows that these incentives actually have considerable 
disincentive effects. In addition, it adds to the small body of literature, e. g. Mishra et al 
(2000), which suggests that managerial' equity holdings measured by the sensitivity of 
managers' equity holdings to the change of firm stock price performance, have a 
nonlinear incentive effect9. Moreover, it is the only study demonstrating empirically 
that a high level of managerial wealth, which intensifies managerial risk aversion, 
weakens the incentive alignment effect of managers' equity holdings, i. e., the argument 
put forward by Ross (2004). 
From the methodology perspective, this study has more complete data input for 
Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing model and therefore gives a more accurate 
estimation of the value of directors' option holdings than most of the existing studies. 
Existing research on executive stock option compensation is mainly based on US data 
(Stathopoulos et al, 2005). Until around 1998, executive pay research in the UK was 
hampered by poor data quality due to the lack of detailed company disclosure of 
9 Morck a al (1988), and McConnell and Servaes (1990) suggest the nonlinear incentive effect of 
managerial shareholdings measured by the percentage of shares 
held by managers. 
15 
executive remuneration details. Most of the UK-based research has focused only on the 
link between cash compensation and corporate performance. However, in response to 
the recommendations of the Cadbury Report (1992), Greenbury Report (1995), Hampel 
Report (1998) and other initiatives by official policy makers and other players, 
including institutional shareholders, the level of disclosure of UK compensation details 
in company annual reports has increased dramatically. UK annual reports since the 
1997 accounting year disclose prior option grants in addition to the current year's grants 
whereas US annual reports only disclose the current year's grants (Conyon and Sadler, 
2001). US studies such as Core and Guay (2002) have to use an approximation 
approach to estimating the value of historical grants. Therefore, UK data gives a more 
accurate estimation of the incentive impact of stock options than US data does. 
However, existing UK-based studies are still limited. Examples are Conyon and 
Murphy (2000), and Conyon and Saddler (2001), Stathopoulos et al, 2005). This thesis 
therefore provides more evidence to the extant literature regarding the level as well as 
the effect of stock options by using a more complete set of input data for estimating the 
value of stock options. 
This study is also one of the few UK studies10 that use the Core and Guay (1999) 
approach to calculate equity delta" 1 of directors' equity holdings, thus provides 
comparable statistics to those US studies It is the first UK study to report stock option 
10 The other study is Stathopoulos et al (2005). 
11 Equity delta is the sensitivity of the value of managers' equity holdings to the change of firm stock 
price. See Section 2.3.3 of Chapter 2 for more discussions. 
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vega12 of directors' stock option holdings. It probably is also the first study to disclose 
the level of LTIP cash awards in executive compensation. 
Moreover, unlike Conyon and Murphy (2000) and Conyon and Sadler (2001). 
who restrict their studies to the analysis of CEO compensation, this study extends the 
analysis beyond the level of CEO and includes data on members of the board. The 
board is the highest decision making entity within a company. Big corporate decisions 
such as mergers and acquisitions (M&As) need the approval of all or at least the 
majority of the board of directors. Focusing on only the CEO underestimates the 
influence that other board members have on corporate decision-making. 
This thesis contributes to the expansion of behavioural finance literature by 
applying behavioural finance theory to the field of corporate finance. Behavioural 
approaches are now common in asset pricing, but few studies in corporate finance to 
date have dropped the assumption that managers are fully rational (Heaton, 2002). One 
of the major difficulties in testing the behavioural finance theory propositions is the 
measurement of manager' psychological bias. This thesis addresses this issue by 
adopting three proxies for behavioural biases, i. e. good past performance, glamour 
status and media praise. The first two are measured using a quantitative approach and 
are based on existing literature (see Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 
1998; Kohers and Kohers, 2001), whereas the third is measured using a qualitative 
approach adopted from that of Hayward and Hambrick (1997). The results in this thesis 
show the significant influence that behavioural biases have on mangers' decision- 
12 Vega is the sensitivity of the value of managers' stock option holdings to the change of firm stock 
return volatility. See Section 2.3.3 of Chapter 
2 for more discussions 
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making. Recognising the difficulty in accurately measuring psychological biases, this 
thesis serves as an exploratory study in this field and a foundation for future research. 
Moreover, this thesis examines to what extent behavioural biases are linked to 
acquisition risk, which has been ignored in existing studies such as Roll (1986). 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997), and Malmendier and Tate (2004). These studies 
generally just assume that behavioural biases which induce managers to take excessive 
risk can only lead to value destruction of acquirer shareholders. This thesis however, 
shows that behavioural biases do make managers take more risks, and furthermore that 
this risk taking result in better firm performance. 
This thesis contributes to corporate governance literature by adding further 
empirical findings that shed light on the controversial issues of the efficacy of corporate 
monitoring mechanisms. This thesis investigates the role of monitors such as external 
blockholders, institutional blockholders, non-executive directors, a non-executive 
chairman of board (COB) as well as the presence of a remuneration committee and 
concludes that such monitors are generally ineffective in their disciplinary roles when it 
comes to managers' risk preferences in corporate acquisitions. 
This thesis contributes to M&A literature by examining long-run acquirer 
shareholder value gains in the most recent and also biggest M&A wave in UK history. 
One of the major puzzles in acquisitions is the long-run post-takeover 
underperformance of merged firms (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000). A vast amount of 
research has been conducted in an attempt to explain this phenomenon from a variety of 
perspectives such as acquisition motives, deal characteristics, and research methodology 
(Sudarsanam, 2003, Chapter 4). By investigating the most recent and biggest merger 
w aavve in UK history, this thesis again demonstrates that takeovers in general 
destroy 
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shareholder value. It also provides a new explanation for such underperformance. i. e.. 
excessive managerial risk avoidance intensified by the nondiversification of managerial 
wealth portfolio. 
In addition, this thesis adds to the limited number of studies on acquisitions of 
non-public target firms. Those studies such as Chang (1998), Fuller et al (2002) and 
Conn et al (2005) generally show that acquirers of non-public target firms if not gain 
value then at least do not lose value after acquisitions. This thesis however, shows that 
such acquirers can actually lose substantial amount of value after acquisitions. 
In summary, this thesis aims to investigate the impact of managerial wealth, 
behavioural biases and corporate monitoring on managerial risk taking in the context of 
UK high-tech and low-tech acquisitions between 1993 and 2000. It contributes to the 
agency theory by combining the view of both traditional and behavioural agency theory 
and by allowing for managerial risk seeking behaviour. In addition, it makes 
contribution to the empirical literature on executive compensation, behavioural finance, 
corporate governance and long-run post-acquisition performance. 
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature relating to the impact of managerial wealth 
components on managerial risk taking. This review discusses managerial risk 
preferences within the traditional agency framework and also how various components 
of the managerial wealth portfolios affect managerial risk preferences. It also presents 
the empirical measures for the risk incentives provided by these wealth components. 
Empirical evidence is provided for the impact of each managerial wealth component on 
managerial risk taking. A critique of the extant compensation 
literature is provided at 
the end of the chapter. 
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Chapter 3 presents the behavioural agency view that managers might be risk 
prone due to behavioural biases such as overconfidence, over-optimism and hubris. It 
addresses how behavioural biases may drive managers to take risky projects and 
provides the empirical evidence for the consequences of such risk taking. Empirical 
evidence in this area is limited to a very small number of US studies. Overall, these 
studies show that behavioural biases destroy shareholder value. 
Chapter 4 reviews the literature on how corporate monitors, such as external 
blockholders, institutional blockholders, board composition of non-executive directors, 
a non-executive COB as well as the existence of a remuneration committee, align the 
interests of managers to those of shareholders. Opposing perspectives are outlined for 
each monitor. 
Chapter 5 identifies the literature gap based on the previous three chapters and 
introduces acquisitions as the context for examining the determinants of managerial risk 
taking. It discusses the risk profile of high-tech acquisitions and develops a number of 
hypotheses concerning how managerial wealth, behavioural biases and corporate 
monitoring mechanisms affect managers to take more or less risky acquisitions, as well 
as how the optimal/suboptimal levels of acquisition risk influence acquirer post- 
acquisition performance. Summarising the hypotheses, two conceptual models are 
presented at the end of the chapter: the risk model and the performance model. 
Chapter 6 presents the data and methodology adopted in this thesis. Each 
variable in both the risk model and the performance model is defined and data sources 
are discussed. The sample selection criteria for both high-tech acquisitions and the 
matching low-tech acquisitions are presented. The sample distribution of acquisitions is 
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also described. The methodology consists of a five-step analysis. each of which is 
explained in this chapter. 
Chapter 7 provides answers to research question Q l. It first discusses the 
characteristics of the sample acquisitions and the descriptive statistics of each variable 
in the risk model. It then discusses the impact of each risk incentive on managers' 
selection of acquisition risk. Comparison with other related studies and a discussion of 
the generality of the findings are also provided in this chapter. 
Chapter 8 provides answers to research question Q2. It first classifies sample 
acquisitions based on their risk levels predicted by the empirical risk model reported in 
Chapter 7. It then presents the long-term post-acquisition performance of acquirers in 
the sample. The comparative performance of different acquisition risk groups is also 
discussed. It then uses multiple regression analysis to examine to what extent optimal 
or suboptimal risk is associated with post-acquisition performance. Finally, it presents a 
one-stage analysis of the relationship between post-acquisition performance and various 
risk incentives by running regressions of long-term post-acquisition performance on the 
risk incentives. 
Chapter 9 is a summary of the thesis. It also discusses the implications and 
limitations of this piece of research and suggests recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Managerial Wealth and Managerial Risk Taking: 
Theory and Empirical Evidence 
2.1 Introduction 
In 1932, Berle and Means discussed the evolving separation of ownership and 
control, and questioned whether managers would maximise shareholder wealth by 
undertaking growth-oriented risky projects in light of this separation. Shareholders, the 
owner, are risk neutral with regard to firm-specific risk (i. e. the risk that is unique to a 
company) 13 while managers, the agent, are risk averse because their human capital is 
concentrated in one firm. Risk-averse managers therefore are likely to under-invest in 
risky projects that would increase the volatility of company performance so as to secure 
their jobs, future income as well as human capital investment in their firms. This 
however is not in the best interests of shareholders because they want managers to 
undertake all positive net present value (NPV) projects regardless of their risk levels 
(i. e. the distributions of the expected returns of the projects) 14. This generates the risk- 
related agency conflict between shareholders and managers. 
A vast amount of research following Berle and Mean (1932) tries to explain the 
agency conflict and suggests that one way to mitigate the conflict is to provide 
managers with wealth incentives such as compensation contracts and share ownership. 
However, depending on the payoff structure, different wealth incentives have different 
13 Detailed discussions about firm-specific risk are in Section 2.2. 
14 The definition of `risk' is provided in the next section, Section 2.2. 
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risk incentive effects on managers. Empirical studies since Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
suggest that the sensitivity of managerial wealth to firm stock performance captures the 
risk incentive effect of the components of managerial wealth. Some researchers 
however, argue that increasing the proportion of managers' wealth associated with their 
employer firms intensifies the concentration of their wealth portfolios and consequently 
increases their risk aversion. 
This chapter presents the theory and empirical evidence related to the 
relationship between managerial wealth and managerial risk taking. It starts with the 
discussion of the risk-related agency problem in Section 2.2. The definition of risk is 
also provided in this section. Section 2.3 first lists the components of managerial 
wealth and discusses how the payoff structures of these various components can 
influence managers risk taking behaviour. The managerial incentives for risk taking 
provided by the components of managerial wealth are termed as wealth incentives. The 
empirical measures for the wealth incentives are discussed and their associations with 
managerial risk taking are addressed separately in subsections. Section 2.4 presents a 
different school of argument that states that whatever the payoff structures are like, 
executive compensation and equity ownership can only intensify the concentration of 
mangers' wealth portfolio and consequently increases their risk aversion. Section 2.5 
provides a critique of the extant studies and addresses an apparent literature gap in the 
area of studies relating to managerial risk taking and managerial wealth. Section 
2.6 
summarises the whole chapter. 
2.2 Risk-related agency problems 
Within the economic framework, risk is conceptualised as a probability 
distribution of returns. The larger the variance in expected returns, the larger the risk 
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(Markowitz, 1952). When faced with two choices having the same expected return, one 
with a certain outcome and the other without, risk-averse individuals are assumed to 
prefer the former. A corollary of this is that they demand higher expected returns to 
compensate for investments involving higher risk. 
In modern portfolio theory, the risk of a security is divided into market risk and 
firm-specific risk (Sharpe, 1964). Market risk, also referred to as systematic risk, 
encompasses interest rate risk, inflation risk, force majeure (e. g. the September 11`}' 
terrorist attack in the US), etc, and therefore cannot be eliminated or reduced by 
investors, no matter how well the investor diversifies his investment portfolio. Firm- 
specific risk, or non-systematic risk, is the risk that is unique to a particular security and 
can be associated with such risks as business, financial, and liquidity, etc. An investor 
can diversify away the firm-specific risk of a particular security by holding a 
sufficiently large basket of assets. Modern portfolio theory thus enables agency theory 
to relax the risk aversion assumption on shareholders. 
Agency theory of the firm presents a model of the conflict of interests between 
shareholders and managers following the separation of ownership and control in modern 
corporations' 5 (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Shareholders, as principals, are able to 
diversify their shareholdings across firms and as a result become neutral towards firm- 
15 Agency theory of the firm also models the relationships among other stakeholders such as debt holders, 
shareholders and managers 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This thesis only focuses on manager- 
shareholder conflicts and emphasizes the 
difference in risk preferences between shareholders and 
managers. 
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specific risk 16. However, managers, as agents, are still considered to be risk averse to 
not only market risk but also firm-specific risk. Given that a firm with higher firm- 
specific risk is associated with a higher probability of bankruptcy, managers are risk- 
averse to firm-specific risk since their employment security and income are tied to one 
firm (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). In addition, 
managers may also hold shares in their companies, but are constrained by company 
policies in their ability to diversify their equity portfolios outside their own firms (Jin, 
2002). This accentuates the concentration of managers' human and money capital in 
one firm and makes them more risk-averse to firm-specific risk. More discussion 
related to the nondiversification of managerial wealth portfolio is provided in Section 
2.4.1. 
This divergence of risk attitude in terms of firm-specific risk between 
shareholders and managers can give rise to risk-related agency problems (Smith and 
Stulz, 1985; Guay, 1999). Shareholders would like managers to invest in all positive 
NPV projects, irrespective of the risk associated with those projects. Managers, 
however, may choose to abandon some positive NPV projects that would increase firm 
risk and consequently increase the risk of firm bankruptcy. By doing so, managers 
secure their jobs, income and other pecuniary returns. The loss from valuable projects 
bypassed by managers due to their risk avoidance is a risk-related agency cost (Guay, 
1999). Persistent under-investment in risky projects'? is likely to make those firms 
16 Given that market risk or systematic risk cannot be diversified away, shareholders are still considered 
to be risk-averse to market risk. 
1' This underinvcstment problem is somewhat different from the underinvestment problem described by 
Myers (1977). In the model by Myers (1977), equity holders may forgo positive NPV projects if the 
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gradually lose competitive advantage. This problem is likely to be most severe in firms 
with abundant growth opportunities such as high-tech firms which rely on high-growth 
and high-risk investments to gain competitive advantages (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, 
Chapter 3). 
2.3 Managerial wealth components and risk incentives 
The previous section introduces the risk-related agency problem faced by firms 
with diversified owners and undiversified managers. To reduce this principal-agency 
conflict, shareholders employ several corporate control devices such as external 
blockholdings, non-executive directors, board subcommittees, etc. One of the corporate 
control devices is executive compensation. However, it is not universally agreed that all 
compensation contracts are effective in aligning the interests of managers and 
shareholders. This section describes how this issue has been dealt with in the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature. Following the identification of the components of 
managerial wealth portfolios in Section 2.3.1, Section 2.3.2 discusses how various 
payoff structures of these components can influence managers' attitude towards 
selecting risky projects. To examine the impact of wealth incentives, the empirical 
literature uses several measures for those incentives. These measures are explained in 
Section 2.3.3. Section 2.3.4 presents the empirical evidence on how the components of 
managerial wealth incentivise managers to pursue high-risk investment projects. 
gains accrue primarily to debt holders. The underinvestment problem described by Guav (1999) does not 
involve debt holders, but instead derives from risk-averse managers that are poorly diversified with 
respect to their firm-specific risk. 
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2.3.1 Managerial wealth components 
The separation of ownership and control creates information asymmetry 
between shareholders and managers. Shareholders, as outsiders, do not observe all 
managerial actions and details of investment opportunities. Therefore, they often do not 
know what actions managers can take or which of these actions will increase 
shareholder wealth. In this situation, shareholders' ability to monitor whether a project 
chosen by managers is optimal or suboptimal with regard to its risk level is limited. It is 
thus in the interests of shareholders to design appropriate corporate governance 
mechanisms to drive managers to select value enhancing risky projects (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Lambert, 1986). 
Executive compensation which links a portion of managerial wealth to firm 
performance, is a key corporate control device (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Baker et al, 
1988; Murphy, 1999; Core et al, 2003). There are mainly three types of compensation 
contracts. 
1. Fixed compensation (i. e. any contractually guaranteed pay), such as basic 
salary, fees paid to non-executive directors, pension contributions and other 
related benefits; 
2. Short-term incentive plans, such as annul bonuses which are tied to yearly 
accounting performance; 
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3. Long-term incentive plans, including LTIP cash or share awards (LTIPs) and 
stock options18. Long-term incentive plans are typically tied to multi-year 
firm performance, either accounting-based or stock market-based. 
More detailed discussions about each of those compensation contracts such as 
how they are awarded and what kind of incentives they provide are in Section 2.3.2. 
The following paragraphs mainly describe how each of these compensation contracts 
contributes to managerial wealth portfolio and the change of the structure of managerial 
wealth portfolios in the 1990s. 
Fixed compensation and annual bonus are mainly in the form of cash. They are 
also called `cash compensation'. This thesis uses the term `fixed compensation and 
annual bonus' and `cash compensation' interchangeably. Cash compensation is a major 
part of managerial compensation. Using a sample of 478 US companies, Hall and 
Leibman (1998) report that in 1980, the average CEO cash compensation was $0.66 
million as compared to $0.81 million total compensation. In 1989, cash compensation 
rose to $1.06 million and the total compensation rose to $1.6 million. The dominant 
position of cash compensation as part of total executive compensation, however, has 
been threatened by equity-based compensation (i. e. LTIP shares and stock options) in 
the 1990s given that equity-based compensation is believed to have a better incentive 
alignment effect than cash compensation. Briefly, equity-based compensation links 
managers' wealth to company's stock performance whereas cash compensation makes 
no such link. Managers who would like to increase the value of their equity holdings 
18 In this thesis, long-term incentive plans and L-I-IPs are two different concepts. Long-term incentive 
plans refer to all the compensation contracts that are tied to multi-year 
firm performance. LTIPs refer to 
LTIP cash and share awards, both of which are a part of long-term incentive plans. 
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are incentivised to improve their firms' stock performance. Thus equity-based 
compensation aligns the interests between shareholders and managers by turning 
managers into owners of their firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). More detailed 
explanations can be found in Section 2.3.2. 
In the US, executive compensation has grown by leaps and bounds over the last 
two decades mainly due to the dramatic growth in equity-based compensation, stock 
options in particular (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). Equity-based 
compensation has increased not only in terms of its value but also in terms of its 
proportion of total compensation. According to Hall and Leibman (1998). one-third of 
total CEO compensation was in the form of stock option awards as of the mid-1990s in 
the US, up from one-fifth during the 1980s. They report that between 1980 and 1994 
the mean value of stock option grants rose by 683% from $0.16 million to $1.2 million 
in contrast with a 97% growth in CEO cash compensation. For a total sample of 1,788 
firms included in three major stock exchanges in the US, New York Stock Exchange, 
NASDAQ and American Stock Exchange, Bryan et al (2000) document that equity- 
based compensation accounted for up to two-thirds of total CEO compensation in 1997, 
up from around half in 1992. In addition, they find that on average only 54% of their 
sample firms granted stock options in 1992 and the percentage increases to 72% in 
1997. Examining the compensation of the CEOs of the Standard & Poor ('S&P' 
hereafter) 500 Industrial firms, Hall and Murphy (2002) report that the increase of the 
median CEO compensation level from less than $2 million in 1992 to 
$6 million in 
1999 is mainly caused by equity-based compensation, which swelled from 30% to 56% 
of total compensation, i. e. from $0.6 to 
$3 million. This represents a six-fold increase 
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in dollar terms. Most of the increase in equity-based compensation reflects the growth 
in stock option grants, which grow from 23% to 47% over the same period. 
Bryan et al (2000) also report statistics for LTIP shares which they term as 
`restricted stocks' 19. Unlike stock options, LTIP shares did not experience a dramatic 
increase between 1992-1997. The average proportion of their sample firms that granted 
restricted stocks only rose 1% to 19% in 1997 as compared to 1992. The ratio of the 
value of restricted stocks to cash compensation remained around 0.16 from 1992 to 
1997. In comparison, the ratio for stock options increased from 0.84 to 1.88 over the 
same period. Hall and Murphy (2002) draw a similar conclusion to Bryan et al that 
LTIP shares did not grow as much as stock options in the 1990s. Hall and Murphy 
report that the value of LTIP shares as a percentage of total CEO compensation 
increased only slightly, 7.0% to 7.5%, from 1992 to 1999. The above evidence shows 
the growing popularity of equity-based compensation in the US in the 1990s, but the 
substantial increase of equity-based compensation is mainly contributed by stock 
options. 
The UK also experienced a dramatic increase in long-term incentive plans in the 
1990s compared to the 1970s. Main (1999) reports that in the 1997 accounting year, 
around 68% of the 510 largest UK companies offered stock option plans to their top 
executives, up from around 10% in 1978. Conyon and Murphy (2000) rely on the 
estimation of the Hemmington Scott database of the total number of options held by 
CEOs20. For a sample of 395 companies, Conyon and Murphy (2000) document that 
19 Different terms for describing LTIP shares in the US and UK are explained in Section 2.3.2.3. 
20 UK option data prior to 1997 accounting year are not publicly available. 
Section 6.2.1.2 of Chapter 6 
discusses the UK option disclosure requirements in company annual reports. 
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the median CEO option holdings 21 (measured as the number of shares under stock 
options as a percentage of outstanding common equity) increased from 0.09% in 1991 
accounting year to 0.11 % in 1997 accounting year. The above evidence shows that 
although equity-based compensation became more popular in the UK in the 1990s, its 
popularity however still falls far behind that in the US over the same period. 
Based on the 510 largest UK companies (ranked by market capitalisation) in the 
1997 accounting year when there were detailed option data available to calculate the 
value of CEOs' option holdings, Conyon and Murphy report the median (mean) CEO 
total compensation22 as £414,000 (£589,000). Stock option grants are on average only 
10% of the total compensation and LTIP shares are about 9%23. Therefore Conyon and 
Murphy state that equity-based compensation is still a very small part of CEO 
compensation in the UK. The major compensation component is still cash 
compensation, about 77% of the total pay. This forms a very big contrast with US 
compensation structures. The US sample in Conyon and Murphy (2000) is based on 
1,666 CEOs from S&P's ExecuComp database in 1997. The median (mean) US CEO 
total pay is £1 . 
524 million (£3.6 million). The value of stock option grants is on average 
42% of the total compensation and 4% for LTIP shares. Cash compensation is on 
average 46% of the total pay. Conyon and Murphy's US findings are similar to other 
21 Option holdings include not only options granted in the current year but also those granted in the past 
years but have not been exercised. 
22 According to Conyon and Murphy (2000), total compensation, or total pay is the sum of salaries, 
annual bonuses, benefits, share options 
(valued on date of grant using the Black and Scholes (1973) 
formula), LTIP cash and LTIP share awards granted in 1997 accounting year. 
23 Here both stock option grants and LTIP shares refer to those granted in 1997 accounting year only. 
Conyon and Murphy (2000) applied exchange rates varied 
between 51.61 SI£ and 1.65 S. 
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US evidence discussed above, indicating that equity-based compensation was the 
dominant executive compensation components in the 1990s. Moreover, the pay level of 
UK equity-based compensation fell substantially behind that of the US, contributing to 
an overall lower level of UK executive pay than in the US25. 
LITP cash award also contributes to managerial wealth portfolios, but is not as 
popular as any of the compensation types discussed above. LTIP cash is less common 
in the UK than in the US (Stathopoulos et al, 2005). My literature review has not found 
any studies reporting any statistics for the level of LTIP cash awards in the UK, or even 
in the US. 
The accumulation of executive compensation year by year contributes to 
managers' wealth portfolios. After exercising previously granted stock options or LTIP 
shares, managers can hold a large amount of company ordinary shares. These shares 
25 Conyon and Murphy (2000) provide explanations for this difference. It can be due to tax, economic, 
political and cultural factors. Firstly, different tax regimes in the US and UK affect the structures of 
executive compensation contracts in both countries. Under both tax regimes, executive stock option 
schemes are classified into `approved' or `non-approved'. Approval of a scheme allows the deferral of 
any personal tax liabilities, with option gains being taxed not at the time of exercise but only once the 
shares obtained through the option exercise are sold. `Approved' options are taxed at capital gain tax. 
The tax rate is as high as 40% in the UK while only 20% in the US. This high tax rate in the UK makes 
stock option grants less favourable to directors than in the US. Secondly, the US stock market performed 
better than UK stock market from 1990 to 1997. US stock market therefore created more demand for 
stock options than the UK market since stock options in the US were considered creating more incentives 
for directors to create value for shareholders. Thirdly, a variety of statutory and non-statutory 
arrangements in the UK discouraged stock option grants. For example, Greenbury Report (1995) 
encouraged companies to replace stock option grants with LTIP scheme. More detailed 
discussions with 
regard to those factors can be 
found in Conyon and Murphy (2000). 
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give managers voting rights and allow them to be more influential in executing 
corporate decisions that will protect their wealth in their firms26. Managers can also 
acquire these shares through the market, adding to their shareholdings or equity 
ownership of their firms. Conyon and Murphy (2000) provide statistics to show that 
managerial shareholding is a major part of managers' equity holdings. Based on a 
sample of the 510 largest companies (ranked by market capitalization) in the UK and 
1,666 companies in the S&P indices in the US, Conyon and Murphy report that the 
average value of the shareholdings for UK CEOs is £7 million and for US CEOs is £60 
million in 1997. Managerial shareholding of outstanding common equity for UK CEOs 
on average is 2.13% and for US CEOs is 3.10%. In comparison, the average option 
holding is only 0.24% for UK CEOs and 1.18% for US CEOs. In the UK, the level of 
LTIP share grants are about the same as the level of stock option grants, but the former 
is only a quarter of the latter in the US. These statistics show that managerial 
shareholding is the major component of managers' equity-based wealth in both 
countries, particularly in the UK. 
There are other components of managerial wealth portfolios such as property, 
shareholdings in firms other than the firm managers are working for, etc. Cash 
compensation from previous years may facilitate these investments. A complete 
analysis of managerial wealth should include all of those components. This however is 
in the main infeasible due to data availability limitations. Existing literature therefore 
generally does not include them in estimating the managerial wealth portfolio (Guay, 
26 Section 2.3.4.2 presents the argument that a high level of managerial shareholdings can lead to 
managerial entrenchment, 
i. e., the voting rights carried b- those shares give managers more power to 
execute corporate decisions to satisfy their own 
interests but may be to the detriment of shareholder value. 
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1999). The portfolio generally consists of cash compensation, LTIP cash awards, 
equity-based compensation and managerial shareholdings accumulated over time. The 
latter two are called `equity-based wealth' in this thesis given that both of their 
underlying assets are company shares. 
Equity-based wealth and annual bonus link managers' wealth to firm 
performance. This provides an incentive for managers to undertake high risk, positive 
NPV projects in order to improve their personal wealth. Some agency theorists believe 
that this can lessen the divergence of interests between shareholders and managers 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, others argue that the effect depends on the 
payoff structure of each component and therefore, not all wealth components may be 
equally effective in aligning the risk preferences of shareholders and managers (Smith 
and Stulz, 1985; Guay, 1999). In the next section, the payoff structure of each of the 
managerial wealth components is discussed. 
2.3.2 Payoff structure of managerial wealth components 
Following the argument raised in the last section this section explores the 
relationship between the payoff structures of various wealth components and the various 
effects they have on managerial risk incentive. 
2.3.2.1 Fixed compensation 
Fixed compensation mainly includes basic salary, fees, pension contributions 
and other benefits. Factors that determine the level of fixed compensation granted to a 
director include the director's responsibility and seniority, the market salary level for 
similar jobs in comparable companies, etc. 
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Fixed compensation is usually detached from firm performance. Therefore it 
has an almost flat payoff structure. It attracts managers to the firm and protects them 
from factors beyond their control, such as poor ex post outcomes from strategies that, ex 
ante, appear promising. However, such a payoff structure and protection function 
create zero incentive for managers to increase firm risk because they value preservation 
of assets more than creating new wealth. (Larcker, 1983; Bainbridge, 2005). A high 
level of fixed pay drives managers to avoid risk in order to safeguard their jobs and 
income (Lambert et al , 1991). 
Assessing and managing a risky project involves much more managerial effort 
than a safe project. If the risky project fails, managers may lose their jobs or at least 
acquire a bad reputation that will negatively affect their career progress as well as future 
income. If the project succeeds, their fixed pay does not increase substantially in 
relationship to the extra effort they exert or the increase in returns the project may bring 
to the company. Such an asymmetric outcome associated with fixed compensation can 
only exacerbate managerial risk avoidance. 
2.3.2.2 Annual bonus 
Annual bonus often ties managers' remuneration to yearly accounting numbers, 
such as profit, return on capital employed and earning per share. No bonus is paid until 
the threshold performance is achieved. 
The performance threshold embedded in annual bonus can encourage managers 
to undertake positive NPV projects that help managers to achieve their bonus awards. 
However, for senior managers who have strong decision-making power, annual bonus 
may actually induce counter-productive behaviour (Bebchuk and Fried. 2004. Part III). 
Given that the performance criterion is based on yearly accounting numbers, annual 
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bonus may drive managers to focus on projects that pay back quickly and sacrifice firm 
value enhancement brought about by long-term risky projects (Narayanan, 1985; 
Narayanan, 1996). 
Narayanan (1985) demonstrates in his theoretical model that managers select 
projects yielding short-term profits to improve the perception of their ability early on 
and hence their chances of earning higher bonuses. This potential advantage to 
managers could outweigh the fact that from the long-term point of view the project is 
not the one with the highest NPV and the not one that could enhance firm core 
competence. 
Narayanan (1996) proposes another theoretical model which compares the 
impact that all-cash compensation and all-stock compensation can have on the 
managerial decision horizon. As in his paper written in 1985, Narayanan concludes that 
cash pay drives managers to under-invest in the long run because the critical measure 
for awarding the cash pay is whether managers are able to improve the firm's annual 
profits. Managers however can boost the firm's annual profits by selecting projects that 
yield short-term profits, or simply by manipulating accounting numbers. This is less 
likely to happen with stock compensation since it is based on managers' performance as 
manifested in the stock price of the firm. Stock price reflects the expected value of the 
firm's future cash flow, and is thus less subject to the earnings management. 
2.3.2.3 LTIP (cash or share) awards 
A remedy to the short horizon problem raised by cash compensation is to 
provide managers with long-term compensation plans such as LTIP (cash or share) 
awards and stock options (see next section for the discussion about stock options) 
(Narayanan. 1996). Such plans lengthen managers' decision-making horizon to a 
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number of years since the compensation is deferred until the end of the vesting period 
(see below for more discussion). Thus managers will invest in projects whose payoff is 
long-term and hence likely to be more risky. 
In the UK, LTIPs are normally awards or grants of shares that become vested, 
i. e. ownership is transferred to directors, only upon attainment of a certain performance 
objectives over a period of time, generally three years (Martin et al, 1995; Conyon and 
Murphy, 2000). There are three conditions for the LTIP share awards ('LTIP shares' 
hereafter) before they can be transferred to directors. First condition relates to the 
performance objective, either accounting-based or stock market-based. The objective 
has to be achieved at the end of a specified period of time, i. e. vesting period. Vesting 
period therefore is the second condition. Ownership of the LTIP shares can only be 
transferred at the end of the vesting period. The third condition is the leaving 
constraint. Directors lose unvested LTIP shares if they leave voluntarily or 
involuntarily during the vesting period. These conditions make LTIP shares a rather 
contingent reward. 
LTIP share awards in the US take two primary forms, restricted stocks and 
multi-year bonus plans. The former have no performance criteria but vest with the 
passage of time. The unvested restricted stocks will be forfeited if managers leave the 
company (voluntarily or involuntarily) before the end of the vesting period (Bryan et al, 
2000). Multi-year bonus plans contain performance thresholds as LTIP shares do in the 
UK. They also have the same leaving constraint as restricted stocks. Empirical US 
studies generally do not distinguish between these two forms and use the term 
`restricted stocks' for both (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Bryan et al. 2000; Hall and 
Murphy, 2002, in, 2002: Coles ei al, 2004). 
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Once vested, directors become the owner the LTIP shares although the shares 
may carry some restrictions regarding resale or transfer (Bryan et al, 2000). The value 
of LTIP shares varies according to their underlying stock prices. With an LTIP share, 
every dollar increase (or decrease) in the value of the firm stock will cause managerial 
wealth to increase (or decrease) by one dollar. Therefore the value of LTIP share is 
positively related to the value of the firm stock. This linear payoff structure is 
illustrated in Figure 2-1 where K is the firm stock price when directors first acquire 
LTIP shares, i. e., when the LTIP shares are vested and transferred to directors. The 
value change of LTIP shares thus totally depends on firm's stock price. Such a linear 
payoff structure provides incentive alignment between managers and shareholders. 
However, the negative side of the linear payoff is that there does not exist any floor to 
protect managers from the downside risk of investments. Managers' wealth is totally 
exposed to the risk of project returns, which increases managerial risk aversion (Smith 
and Stulz, 1985; Core et al, 2003). More discussion of this risk aversion effect can be 
found in Sections 2.3.3,2.3.4 and 2.3.5. 
Figure 2-1: Payoffs from LTIP shares 
f 
0 
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LTIPs can also be awarded in cash. LTIP cash awards (`LTIP cash' hereafter) 
are more like annual bonus with a vesting period for more than one year. Once a 
director achieves the performance target at the end of the vesting period, he is awarded 
the cash. The cash reward can also be spread over several years to match the multi-year 
performance targets. Unlike LTIP shares which have a linear payoff structure as 
discussed above, the value of LTIP cash does not vary with the value of the company's 
stock price once the LTIP cash is vested. Therefore, LTIP cash does not create a risk 
aversion effect on managers as LTIP shares do. LTIP cash is common in the US 
although not as popular as LTIP shares or stock options, but is very rare in the UK 
(Stathopoulos et al, 2005). 
Although LITP shares may increase managerial risk aversion due to their linear 
payoff structure, Greenbury Report (1995) which provides the guidance on the structure 
of compensation packages in the UK, favours LTIP shares and calls for the substitution 
of executive stock option schemes by LTIPs because stock options are considered to 
encourage excessive managerial risk taking (see next section for a discussion). LTIP 
shares, which expose managers' wealth to the risk of companies' stock price fluctuation, 
can prevent managers from undertake excessive risk. While some argue that LTIP 
shares cause managerial risk aversion and others suggest that stock options bring 
managerial excessive risk taking, it is unclear which one can lead to optimal managerial 
risk-taking (Lee et al, 2004). One thing for sure is that this controversy depressed the 
executive stock option grants in the UK in the 1990s and made them less popular than 
in the US over the same period (see previous discussions about the levels of LTIPs and 
stock options in the UK and US in 1990s in Section 2.3.1). 
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2.3.2.4 Stock options 
The other type of long-term compensation schemes is stock options. A stock 
option is the right to purchase a stock at a pre-specified exercise price for a pre- 
specified term conditional on certain pre-determined performance benchmarks being 
achieved. In the UK, executive options have at least a 3-year vesting period starting 
from the option grant date before options can be exercised and they must be exercised 
within 10 years of issue or the options lapse (Conyon et al, 1995; Conyon and Murphy 
2000; Stathopoulos et al, 2005). Just as with LTIP shares, stock options are subject to 
three major constraints, i. e., performance objective, vesting period, and leaving 
constraints. During the vesting period, directors are not awarded the stock options. 
Instead, they are awarded the right to obtain the options at the end of the vesting period. 
If they meet the performance objective at the end of the vesting period, they are 
awarded the options. Once vested, directors have to exercise the stock options within 
10 years of the option grant dates. If a director leaves voluntarily or involuntarily 
during the vesting period, he will lose all the unvested stock options and may be forced 
to exercise unexercised but vested options before the expiry dates 
The value of a stock option is a convex payoff function of its underlying stock 
price. For a stock option, if it is above the exercise price, a dollar increase (or decrease) 
in firm stock value increases (or decreases) managerial wealth by one dollar, i. e., linear 
slope effect, but if it is below the exercise price, a fall in the firm stock value does not 
reduce managerial wealth, i. e., convexity. The convex payoff structure of stock options 
is illustrated in Figure 2-2. The convex payoff structure of stock options insures 
managers against losses and can motivate managers to invest in high risk projects 
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(Smith and Stulz, 1985; Core et al, 2003). The following papers provide support for 
this inference. 
Figure 2-2: Payoffs from stock options 
f 
0 
P= stock price 
X= exercise price 
Smith and Stulz (1985) present a theoretical analysis of what determines 
corporate hedging behaviour. They define hedging as the acquisition of financial assets 
that reduce the variance of a firm's performance. A risk-averse manager uses hedging 
to diversify firm risk and consequently the risk to his own human capital and money 
invested in the firm. This however may not be in the best interests of shareholders, as it 
may reduce firm value. Smith and Stulz demonstrate that stock options, by making the 
manager's wealth a convex function of firm value, can transform the manager from a 
risk-avoider to a risk-seeker. 
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Core and Qian (2002) enhance Smith and Stulz (1985)'s conclusion. In their 
model, a CEO is reluctant to evaluate and adopt a project that is associated with a high 
degree of uncertainty. Stock options can motivate him not only to evaluate and adopt 
such a project but also to exert extra effort to manage the risk in the project in order to 
maximise firm value. This is achieved by the combination of the convexity and linear 
slope effect with stock options. The convexity protects the CEO from the project failure 
risk. The upside gains from the slope effect encourage the CEO to make the right 
project choice. 
Nohel and Todd (2005) model a manager who has career concerns. The 
manager's ability is assumed to be evaluated by the managerial labour market via his 
firm's performance. His performance impacts the value of his future compensation and 
career development (i. e., the value of his human capital). The manager will not invest 
in a risky project for fear of putting the value of his firm and subsequently the value of 
his own human capital at risk. Their model suggests that the solution to such a problem 
is to provide the manager with call options whose convex payoff helps him to overcome 
his risk aversion and offers great potential rewards if a risky endeavour is pursued. 
While the above authors state that stock options encourage managerial risk 
taking and should be promoted as a means of executive compensation, they also neglect 
to say that stock options can also encourage managers to seek excessive risk, i. e., 
indulge in inordinate gambles. Again this is because of the convex payoff structure of 
stock options, which provides a substantial reward for success but little downside risk if 
an investment fails. Since the dotcom/telecom/internet bubble burst in early 2000, a 
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number of business journalists have criticised that excessive grants of stock options`', 
particularly in the US, turned directors into speculators and induced them to indulge in 
excessively risky projects to push up the stock prices during the bubble period of the 
late 1990s (Roberts, 2002; Elson, 2003; Plender, 2003; Schneider, 2005). Together with 
seeking excessively risky projects, directors use all kinds of other methods such as 
`cooking' the accounting books and engaging in takeovers to obscure the real economic 
picture of the firm and to boost the stock prices (Plender, 2003). In the case of Enron, 
directors exercised their options and sold their high-priced shares before the market 
realised that it was fooled by the `option game' played by the directors. These activities 
substantially increased firms' bankruptcy risk with victims including Enron, Tyco, 
Worldcom, etc. Moody, the credit rating agency, researched 43 companies that had 
been rated B3 or higher but defaulted between 1993 and 2003 and found that 22 of these 
firms offered their CEOs much larger than expected stock option grants (Schneider. 
2005). In their study expected level of stock option grants is measured against a 
company's size, past operating performance, industry conditions and long-term rating. 
Moody also investigated 214 companies that experienced downgrades of three or more 
rating notches within 12 months and found that the level of CEO stock option grants 
was higher than expected in 140 cases. 
`'' Stock options were not treated as an expense in a company's account and did not need shareholders' 
permission to grant to managers. Therefore, stock options appeared to be a type of compensation contract 
that has a low cost but may provide an incentive for managers to improve firm stock price. This 
encouraged excessive grants of stock options in 1990s (Murphy, 2003). Since the dotcom bubble burst 
in early 2000, proposals to record stock options as an expense in a company's Profit & Loss account have 
been endorsed by leading investors like Warren Buffett, regulators, and a growing number of business 
journalists and academics. 
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Existing literature on stock option repricing also recognises the possibility that 
stock options can induce excessive managerial risk taking. Studies such as Roger 
(2005) state that deep out-of-money options, i. e., current stock prices much lower than 
the exercise price of stock options, can drive CEOs to engage in excessive risk taking to 
push up own firm stock prices. To illustrate, assume a CEO for whom 90% of his 
potential income associated with his company is from stock options. If the stock goes 
down to $10 and the CEO's options have an exercise price of $100, the stock options 
are likely to be worth nothing. Under this circumstance, the CEO may undertake 
excessively risky projects to try to drive the stock back up at any company costs, which 
can be disastrous for the company. To prevent this, companies need to reprice the 
exercise price of the deep out-of-money stock options, i. e., to reset an exercise price 
closer to the current stock price, to lessen the CEO's incentive toward inordinate 
gambles. 
To sum up, the above literature argues that the convex payoffs of stock options, 
rewarding success but eliminating downside risk, can induce managers to take risky 
projects. It can also make managers indulge in excessive risk taking. 
2.3.2.5 Managerial shareholdings 
Just as with LTIP shares, managerial shareholdings have a linear payoff 
function. Their value is totally exposed to the variability of firm stock performance and 
therefore increases managerial risk aversion (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Core et al, 2003). 
More discussion about the risk aversion effect can be found in Sections 2.3.3,2.3.4.2 
and 2.4.1 
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2.3.2.6 Summary 
Section 2.3.2 discusses the payoff structure of each component in managerial 
wealth portfolio, and the impact of the wealth components on managerial risk incentive. 
In summary, fixed compensation has a flat payoff function and therefore will not drive 
managers to take risky projects. Although annual bonus has a convex payoff structure, 
its performance criteria are short-term-based and thus stop managers from pursuing 
long-term risky investments. A high level of fixed pay and annual bonus can exacerbate 
managerial risk avoidance. Equity-based managerial wealth may better align the 
interests of managers and shareholders since it links managers' wealth to firm stock 
performance. Both LTIP shares and managerial shareholdings have a linear payoff 
structure that is more likely to increase managers' risk aversion than decrease it. As a 
result of their convex payoff function, stock options appear to be the only wealth 
component that encourages managerial risk seeking. Stock options may even 
encourage managers to seek excessive risk, i. e., indulge in inordinate gambles. Such 
excessive risk taking may lead to investment and financing decisions that are too 
speculative and end up destroying firm value. 
To test above theoretical arguments, empirical literature has developed measures 
for managerial incentives provided by the wealth components. Those measures are 
discussed in the next section. 
2.3.3 Measurement of managerial wealth incentives 
This section focuses on the measurement of managerial risk incentives arising 
from various wealth components. The measurement problem 
is a common problem 
encountered in empirical studies. 
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While it is common for empirical studies to use the value of cash compensation 
as the measure for managerial incentive from cash pay (Lewellen et al, 1987; Bizjak et 
al, 1993; Coles et al, 2004), research on equity-based wealth has employed a variety of 
measures. Earlier measures include: 1) a dichotomous variable for presence or absence 
of compensation plans (DeFusco et al, 1990; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Conyon and 
Freeman, 2002; Richardson and Waegelein, 2003); 2) the number of options held by 
directors (Tufano, 1996); 3) the value of compensation (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; 
Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Datta et al, 2001; Ryan and Wiggins, 2002). However, 
none of these measures fully captures managers' incentive to alter firm risk28 (Core and 
Guay, 1999; Guay, 1999). 
Since Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Yermack (1995), many financial 
researchers have measured managers' incentive from equity holdings as managers' 
fractional ownership of their firms, which is the sensitivity of mangers' equity-based 
wealth portfolio to a dollar change of firm value. This sensitivity is called `delta'. A 
higher delta indicates a more sensitive relationship between managers' wealth and 
company stock performance, hence a better incentive from managers' equity holding. 
This approach is motivated by Jensen and Meckling (1976)'s agency model of the 
28 It is since 1992 the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began requiring firms to disclose 
detailed information on executive compensation in their proxy statement. Firms have to disclose 
executives' salary, bonus, stock options, restricted stock, etc (Bryan et al, 2000). In the UK, Greenbury 
(1995) and Hampel (1998) reports require disclosure of data comparable to those of available for US 
executives (Conyon and Murphy, 2000). Many earlier studies did not have detailed information available 
and were constrained by the data to measure stock option and restricted stock compensation in a simple 
way such as using a dichotomous variable for presence or absence of stock options, or using the number 
of stock options, thereby diminishing, the power of the empirical test. 
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firm29. In this model, managers own less than 100% of the firm and only bear a fraction 
of the agency costs through ownership claims. Agency costs are mitigated when 
managers own a larger percentage of the firm. Therefore, fractional ownership is used 
to measure the incentive from mangers' equity holding. 
To generate the delta for the whole managers' equity-based wealth portfolio, 
researchers first calculate the incentive from one unit of equity-based wealth, for 
instance one stock option, which is the dollar change of a stock option for a dollar 
change in the company stock price, i. e., Option delta. They then multiply managers' 
ownership of stock options as a percentage of the total outstanding ordinary shares by 
Option delta to generate the incentive of managers' portfolio of stock options. The 
same approach is used for the incentives from LTIP shares and managerial 
shareholding. The sum of the three incentives gives the total incentive from all of the 
managers' equity-based wealth components. This procedure is summarised in 
Equation 2-1. 
EQUITY DELTA = LTIP shares held as % of firm shares * LTIP delta 
+Options30 held as % of firm shares* Option delta Equation 2-1 
+ Shares held as % of firm shares * Share delta 
where LTIP delta, Option delta and Share delta are all measured as the change of 
the 
value of one LTIP share, one stock option or one managerial share with regard 
to one 
dollar change in share price. 
29 See Section 2.2 for a discussion of the principal-agent conflict. 
30 Shares covered by stock options. 
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The above approach ('JM' approach hereafter), however, is criticised by Hall 
and Liebman (1998) and Core and Guay (1999) as being not appropriate in reflecting 
managers' equity incentive. The assumption in the JM approach is that the incentive 
increases with a manager's fractional ownership of the firm. Hall and Liebman, and 
Core and Guay argue that when managers are risk averse, a large dollar holding of 
equity can have a powerful incentive even when the fractional share holding is small. It 
is common that modern large public companies have diffused share ownership. A 
manager generally does not hold a big percentage of company shares. However, a small 
proportion of share ownership can contain a large number of shares. In this case, a 
small fractional increase of the manager's shareholding can bring substantial increase in 
share numbers, which when multiplied by a high share price can lead to a large increase 
in a manager's dollar holding of firm equity. This can provide a strong incentive for 
managers to improve the share price. 
Core and Guay (1999) suggest an approach to measure managerial equity 
incentive by the dollar change in the value of managers' equity holding for a percentage 
change in firm value. This approach assumes that the incentive offered by managers' 
equity holding increases with a manager's dollar ownership of the firm. Core and Guay 
redefine the delta for one LTIP share, one stock option and one managerial shareholding 
as the change in value of each of these wealth components based on a 1% change in 
stock price (see Section 6.2.1.2 for a discussion about how to calculate those deltas). 
Multiply the delta generated above by the amount of corresponding equity holdings 
gives the value of the delta for the portfolio of LTIP shares, stock options or managerial 
shareholding. The sum of these three deltas is the value of the equity delta (EQUITY 
DELTA) of a manger's equity holdings of his firm. Equity delta is formulated as: 
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EQUITY DELTA = Number of LTIP shares * LTIP delta 
+Number of Options31 *Option delta 
+Number of Shares * Share delta 
Equation 2-2 
Whichever the approach is used to measure delta, delta still reflects the slope 
relationship between managerial wealth and firm stock performance. A high delta 
increases the expected payoff to managers, i. e., managers gain more by improving their 
companies' stock price when their equity holdings are more sensitive to firm stock 
performance. Therefore, managers have more incentive to engage in risk and positive 
NPV projects to improve firm value. However, a high delta also increases managers' 
risk exposure, i. e., managers lose more if their investments fail and pushes down the 
stock price. Researchers suggest that when exposed to too much risk, a manager may 
become overly risk-averse and forego profitable but risky projects. (Aggarwal and 
Samwick, 1999; Guay, 1999; Mishra et al, 2000; Jin, 2002; Coles et al, 2004). 
Therefore, a high slope of the wealth-performance relationship, i. e., a high delta, is 
likely to result in managerial risk aversion. The above discussion indicates that there 
may exist a nonlinear relationship between delta and managerial risk taking. 
Smith and Stulz (1985) and Guay (1999) suggest that the convexity of the 
wealth-performance relationship helps a manager overcome his risk aversion and induce 
him to make risky investments. When a manager's wealth is structured as a convex 
function of firm stock performance, for instance by adding stock options into executive 
compensation, the manager' wealth is to some extent (depending on the magnitude of 
31 Shares covered by stock options. 
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the convexity) protected from the downside investment risk. The manager thus exhibits 
a more risk-seeking attitude than when his wealth is not a convex function of firm 
performance, i. e., no protection of his wealth from investment failure. Guay (1999) 
names the convexity `vega', and measures it as the change of manager's wealth to the 
1% change of stock price volatility. The calculation of the vega for a director's option 
holding can be made as follows. The vega for a stock option is first measured by the 
change of a stock option value to a 1% change of the underlying stock return volatility. 
The vega for the whole option portfolio is then generated by multiplying the total 
number of options by the vega for one stock option32. A high vega, indicating a close 
association between the director's wealth and his firm's stock return variability, will 
incentivise the director to undertake risky projects to increase firm risk. 
The following sub-section presents the magnitude of delta and vega for different 
managerial wealth components reported by the empirical studies. 
2.3.3.1 Magnitude of delta and vega for managerial wealth components 
The delta and vega for fixed compensation and annual bonuses are negligible 
since neither of them is linked to firm stock price performance or volatility. 
Nevertheless, some empirical studies have examined their association with stock 
performance and proved that there is a weak connection. Using the Forbes sample of 
2,213 US CEOs' compensation from 1974 to 1986, Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that 
32 The above illustration only assumes that the director holds one tranche of stock options, i. e., options 
with the same grant date, exercise price, and expiry date. In reality, directors hold more than one tranche 
of stock options. See Section 6.2.1.2 of Chapter 6 for a discussion about how to calculate option vega 
when directors have more than one tranche of options. 
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on average, each $1,000 change in shareholder wealth corresponds to an increase in the 
current and the next year's salary and bonus of only 2 cents. They conclude that this 
incentive is far too low to motivate managers to engaging in growth-oriented risky 
projects to improve firm performance. For a sample of 478 large US firms from 1980 to 
1994, Hall and Leibman (1998) find that 10% change in a firm's market value of equity 
can only bring about $23,400 increase its CEO's salary and bonus, 53 times less than 
the increase in the value of CEO stock options and stockholdings. These results again 
show that the pay-performance link provided by cash compensation is far to weak to 
incentivize managers to engage in growth-oriented risky projects. Given that there is no 
direct association between cash compensation and stock price volatility, none of the 
existing studies on executive compensation has reported a vega value for cash 
compensation. 
As is the case with fixed compensation and annual bonus, delta and vega for 
LTIP cash compensation is difficult to calculate because the value of LTIP cash does 
not vary according to stock price (see Section 2.3.2.3 for a discussion on the payoff 
structure of LTIP cash). My literature review shows that there have been no empirical 
studies that examine the relationship between performance and LTIP cash. This is 
possibly because, as stated by Stathopoulos et al (2005), LTIP cash is less common than 
the other compensation components and it is very rare in the UK. 
It is, however, straightforward to calculate the delta for a managerial 
shareholding because whatever the change of the stock price, its value will change for 
the same amount (see the previous section). This means that a share held by a manager 
has a delta of 1. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, managerial shareholding is the major 
part of managers' equity-based wealth portfolio. Researchers 
have shown that 
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managerial shareholding contributes substantially to managerial risk incentive provided 
by total equity holdings. Using compensation data for 278 US corporate CEOs on 31 
December 1993, Guay (1999) find that for 1% change in stock prices, managerial 
shareholdings on average change $251,995 (see Equation 2-2 for their approach to 
calculate delta for managerial shareholdings). In contrast, the value of stock option 
holdings only changes $72,169 for the same percentage stock price change. The change 
could be even smaller for LTIP shares 33 
Although an LTIP share has a linear payoff structure in like manner to 
managerial shareholding, the delta for the former could vary between 0 and 1 due to its 
contingent nature. Its value depends on the probability that managers will remain 
employed long enough for all time-related restrictions to lapse and the probability that 
they will pass all the performance thresholds (see the previous section for a more 
detailed discussion). This is by no means known before these events happen. Therefore, 
for simplicity, empirical studies generally assume a delta value of 1 (i. e., independent of 
all contingencies) (Bryan et al, 2000; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Conyon and Sadler, 
2001; Rogers, 2002; Coles et al, 2004). Bryan et al (2000) report that from 1992 to 
1997 the CEO's LTIP shares changed on average around 14 cents for a $1,000 change 
in the market value of their firms' equity. 
33 Guav does not report the LTIP delta but he addresses that LTIP shares are much less significant than 
options and managerial shareholdings. For example, the average value of 
LTIP shares is $0.97 million 
for their sample, while it is $4.23 million and $24.23 million 
for stock options and managerial 
shareholdings separately. 
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Option delta for one stock option also varies between 0 and 1 depending on the 
moneyness34 of a stock option. Jenson and Murphy (1990) find that a $1,000 change in 
shareholder wealth corresponded to just a 15 cents change in CEO option holdings from 
1974 to 1986. Yermack (1995) reports a 59 cents change based on data from a sample 
of 792 US public firms from 1984 to 1991, a value nearly four times higher than that 
documented by Jensen and Murphy. Bryan et al (2000) report the even higher value of 
$1.8 from 1992 to 1997 for a total sample of 1788 firms listed in New York Stock 
Exchange, NASTAQ and American Stock Exchange. All of the three papers follow 
Jensen and Murphy's approach (see Equation 2-1) to calculate delta. Guay (1999) and 
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) follow Core and Guay (1999)'s approach (see Equation 2- 
2) to calculate delta. They also find that the change of stock price can have a great 
effect on CEOs holdings of their companies' stock options. Guay reports that CEO 
option holdings on average change $72,169 for 1% change in stock price and the 
median change is $36,407. For a sample of 117 CEOs of firms in oil & gas industries 
over 1993-1997, Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) document a mean change of $58,670 and 
a median change of $28,040 for a 1% change in companies' stock price. The increase 
of delta value for the managerial stock option portfolio is mainly due to growing 
; -' Moneyness refers to the relationship between the current market price and the exercise price of a stock 
option. If the stock price is higher than the exercise price, the option 
is in-the-money; if they are equal, 
the option is at-the-money; if the stock price 
is lower than the exercise, the option is out-of-the-money. 
The value of option delta increases as the stock option changes 
from out-of-the-money to in-the-money. 
The delta of an out-of-the-money option approaches 
0; the delta of an at-the-money option approaches 0.5 
and a delta of in-the-muneý option approaches 
I (Hull, 2000, Chapter 13). 
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popularity of stock options in executive compensation in 1990s (see Section 2.3.1 for 
statistics about the growth of stock options since 1980s in the US and UK). 
The sum of all three deltas, i. e., LTIP share delta, managerial shareholding 
delta and stock option delta, reflects the aggregate managerial incentive arising from all 
forms of equity claims (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Core and Guay, 1999; Guay. 1999). 
Core and Guay (1999) argue that the explanatory power of an incentive proxied by all 
equity-based wealth is higher than one proxied only by managerial shareholding. Hall 
and Leibmau (1998) find that a 10% increase in firm value increased the value of 
median CEO's stock and stock options by about $1.25 million. For 5,352 CEO-year 
observations from 1992 to 1996, Core and Guay (1999) report that the mean change in 
CEO equity claims for a 1% change in stock price is $558,000 and the median value is 
$117,000. Guay (1999) reports a mean of $324,164 and a median value of $38,784 for 
1% change of stock price. The mean value reported by Raj gopal and Shevlin (2002) is 
$155,890 and the median value is $89,150. Coles et al (2004) use a large sample of 
10,687 firms from S&P's ExecuCom database and report a mean delta of $599,609 and 
a median delta of $206,359 for CEOs over the period of 1992-2002. These US studies 
suggest that during the 1990's the value CEOs' equity holding was highly sensitive to 
firm stock price performance. 
Conyon and Murphy (2000) find that the equity delta for UK CEOs is much less 
than that for US CEOs. Based on a sample of the 510 largest (by market capitalisation) 
UK firms and 1,666 US firms from the S&P indices in 1997 and using Jensen and 
Murphy's approach to calculate delta (see Equation 2-1), they report that a£1,000 
change in shareholder wealth will 
bring an average change of £23.3 and a median 
change of £2.5 to CEOs' wealth, while a 
$1,000 change in shareholder wealth will bring 
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an average change of $41.8 and a mean change of $14.8 to the wealth of the CEOs in 
the US. Therefore, it appears that UK CEOs have significantly lower pay-performance 
sensitivity than their US counterparts. This is not surprising given that the level of 
equity holdings of UK CEOs is much lower than that of US CEOs (see Section 2.3.1 for 
evidence). 
As discussed in the last section, although a high delta increases the association 
between managers' wealth and firm performance, it also enhances managers' risk 
aversion because managers' equity claims are now at higher risk. While Coles et al 
(2004) examine US data and do find some evidence that high equity delta causes 
managerial risk aversion (see Section 2.3.4.2), it is still interesting to explore UK cases. 
Vega, the sensitivity of a manager's wealth to his company's stock return 
volatility, is zero for incentive schemes whose payoffs are a linear function of firm 
stock performance (Guay, 1999). This is because the change in the distribution of firm 
stock performance does not affect the expected value of those incentive schemes. 
Therefore, vega for managerial shareholdings is zero. Nevertheless, Guay (1999) 
calculates a value for managerial shareholding vega by subscribing to the view of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) that stock ownership can be viewed as a call option on the 
underlying firm value. Still, he finds this vega of little economic importance. The 
median change in the value of CEOs' common stockholdings for 1% change in stock 
return volatility is only $2.2, indicating that if CEOs exert extra efforts to increase their 
firm stock return volatility by 1%, the CEOs are only rewarded by $2.2 increase in their 
managerial holdings. By contrast, their stock option holdings can increase by 
approximately $30,000 for the same amount of change in stock return volatility. 
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Therefore, Guay concludes that vega of managerial shareholdings is of little economic 
importance. 
Drawing on the Guay (1999) conclusion and the fact that there is no 
straightforward approach to calculate vega for managerial shareholdings, empirical 
studies generally focus on option vega (Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al, 2004). 
Raj gopal and Shevlin (2002) report a median option vega of $17,660, lower than the 
vega value reported by Guay (1999) but still suggesting that CEOs can make their 
option holdings worth $17,660 more by only increasing the stock return volatility of 
their firms by only 1%. The vega values reported by both Guay (1999) and Raj gopal 
and Shevlin (2002) indicate that stock options are a powerful mechanism by which 
managers can be incentivised to take more risk. 
Just as it is difficult to estimate the delta for an LTIP share, it is also difficult to 
calculate its vega value due to the contingent nature of LTIP shares. As discussed 
earlier in this section, the value of an LTIP share depends on the probability that 
managers will remain employed long enough for all time-related restrictions to lapse 
and the probability that managers pass all the performance thresholds. This is by no 
means known beforehand. Empirical studies generally ignore all of these contingencies 
when estimating the delta for LITP shares. Similarly, empirical studies generally 
assume 0 for LTIP share vega (Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al, 2004). 
2.3.3.2 Summary 
Empirical studies generally use the change of managers' wealth to the change of 
firm stock performance, i. e., delta, and the change of managers' wealth to the change of 
firm stock return volatility, i. e., vega, to measure the incentives provided by managerial 
equity-based wealth. While v, ega directly reflects the association between managers' 
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equity holdings and firm risk, the risk incentive effect from delta is not as 
straightforward as vega. Delta can offer both risk preference and risk avoidance 
incentives depending on the level of delta. Empirical studies show that delta and vega 
in the US in the 1990s rose to historically high levels. The delta reported for UK CEOs 
appears to be significantly lower than those of their US counterparts. There are no 
prior studies that investigate vega value for the wealth of UK managers. 
2.3.4 Empirical evidence 
Section 2.3.2 presents theoretical arguments for risk incentives provided by 
various managerial wealth components as a result of their different payoff structures. 
The measures for those incentives are discussed in Section 2.3.3. This section outlines 
the empirical findings on how the components of managerial wealth incentivise 
managers to pursue higher risk investment projects. Section 2.3.4.1 focuses on fixed 
compensation and annual bonus and Section 2.3.4.2 focuses on equity-based wealth 
such as LTIP shares, stock options and managerial shareholdings. There are currently 
no separate empirical studies on the relationship between managerial risk taking or firm 
performance and LTIP cash. Therefore there is no a separate section for LTIP cash. 
Empirical evidence on the impact of managerial wealth on managerial risk 
taking is limited (Williams and Rao, 2000; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al, 
2004). There are even fewer studies examining both managerial risk taking and 
subsequent firm performance. This is because studies in the traditional agency domain 
simply assume that managers are risk avoiders and their risk-seeking behaviour will 
reduce agency costs for the firm and consequently improve firm performance. This risk 
assumption and the risk-related agency problem have been discussed in Section 2.2. 
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12.3.4.1 Fixed compensation and annual bonus 
Consistent with theoretical arguments, empirical studies show that fixed 
compensation and annual bonus have few alignment effects on the agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders. Coles et al (2004) provide one of the few sets of 
direct empirical evidence of the impact of cash compensation on managerial risk taking. 
They examine the relationship between managerial wealth and firm policies that 
increase firm risk profile. R&D expenditures are riskier investments than capital 
expenditures on tangible assets such as property, plan and equipment. One way for 
managers to increase firm risk is to reallocate investment funds away from those 
tangible assets toward intangible assets such as R&D. Another way that managers can 
increase firm risk is to reduce the level of diversification of their firms and to focus on 
firm core competence. Managers can also increase firm leverage to increase firm risk. 
Based on a sample of 1,500 firms over the period 1992-2002, Coles et at find evidence 
that cash compensation is negatively related to R&D investment and positively related 
to capital expenditure on tangible assets. They also find that cash pay is positively 
related to firm diversification and the reduction of firm leverage ratio. Therefore, they 
conclude that cash compensation can increase managerial risk aversion. 
Some other studies which although do not demonstrate a direct causal 
relationship between cash compensation and managerial risk taking, they do show that 
cash compensation and firm risk are connected. Lewellen et al (1987) perform a study 
using the five highest-paid executives of 49 large corporations over the period 1964 to 
1973. They find that salary and bonus are significantly negatively related to firm risk as 
measured by the variance of 60 monthly stock returns prior to the year each executive's 
pay is ex mmined. For a sample of 430 
CEOs of large US firms from 1975 to 1989, 
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I Bizjak et al, (1993) document that salary and bonus (as a percentage of total pay) 
I decline with growth opportunities measured as firm market value to book value of 
I assets, and as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets. Growth opportunities are 
I associated with greater firm risk (Smith and Watts, 1992), and from the above it appears 
that cash compensation is negatively related to firm risk. 
2.3.4.2 Equity-based managerial wealth components 
This section first outlines empirical studies in the existing literature regarding 
equity-based compensation as a whole and then subsequent subsections discuss each 
component separately. 
Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) examine how managers' equity holdings affect 
managers' investment and financing decisions to increase firm risk. Firm risk is 
measured by changes in the variability of returns on the firm's assets following 
acquisitions or selloffs, and by changes in debt-equity ratio. Following the Black and 
Scholes (1973) option pricing model that an increase of firm risk can increase the value 
of firm's common stock35, Agrawal and Mandelker expect that when managers hold 
common stocks and options in their firms, they are likely to make a risky investment to 
increase the value of their equity holdings. Agrawal and Mandelker also expect that 
managers may increase firm's leverage ratio, i. e., debt-equity ratio, through acquisitions 
35 Black and Scholes (1973) observe that equity can be regarded as a call option on the firm value with 
the exercise price equal to the level of debt in the firm. While the price of this option increases with the 
firm value, the option price is bounded from below by zero. Importantly, the value of this call option 
(equity position) will increase with the variance or risk of the firm. Managers who are more aligned with 
shareholders through an equity ownership will undertake 
decisions which increase the risk of the firm. In 
fact, as the risk increases, wealth is transferred 
from debt holders to stockholders. 
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I or selloffs to increase firm risk and, consequently, the value of their equity holdings. 
Agrawal and Mandelker measure managers' equity holdings by the value of stock and 
I options holdings deflated by total annual compensation. They use a simplified Black- 
Scholes (1973) model to value stock options. For a sample of 153 acquisitions and 294 
I selloffs over 1974 to 1982, they find that managerial equity holdings in firms for which 
I the return variance increases upon an investment announcement are larger than for firms 
for which it decreases. They also find that equity holdings of managers of firms with a 
debt-equity ratio that increases around the announcement of the acquisitions or selloffs 
are larger than those for which this ratio decreases. Therefore, they conclude that 
managerial equity-based wealth can enhance managerial risk taking. This risk-seeking 
effect outweighs the risk aversion effect carried by equity holdings due to wealth 
nondiversification (see Section 2.4 for a discussion of the risk aversion effect of equity 
holdings). 
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, a measure of managerial wealth incentive 
represented by the value of compensation contracts does not fully capture managers' 
incentive to alter firm risk. Therefore, the conclusion by Agrawal and Mandelker 
(1987) is questionable because they use an inappropriate measure for the incentive 
provided by managerial equity holdings. In addition, when Agrawal and Mandelker 
change the measure of managerial equity holdings from the value of equity holdings 
deflated by total annual compensation to the value of equity holdings deflated by cash 
compensation, the result also changes. They no longer 
find that managerial equity 
holdings have any impact on the change of firm risk profile. Therefore, it seems that the 
conclusion regarding the impact of managerial equity-based wealth 
depends on the 
measures employed to make the assessment. 
As discussed in the previous sections, the 
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sensitivity of managerial wealth to firm performance, i. e., delta or the sensitivity of 
managerial wealth to the change of firm risk, i. e., vega, appear to be more appropriate 
measures for managerial risk incentive. Those measures have been employed in some 
recent empirical studies to examine the relationship between firm investment risk and 
managerial equity-based wealth. 
In addition to analysing the relationship between managers' choices of firm 
policies that increase firm risk and managers' cash compensation (see Section 2.3.4.1), 
Coles et al (2004) also examine how equity delta affects managers' decisions regarding 
firm policies that increase firm risk including higher R&D investments, reduced capital 
expenditure on tangible assets, more focus on firm core competencies (i. e., less firm 
diversification), and higher firm leverage. They expect that delta can have mixed 
effects on managerial risk taking. On one hand, a high delta can increase managerial 
risk seeking because managers need to take risky and positive NPV projects to enhance 
firm value and consequently the value of their equity holdings. On the other hand, a 
higher delta exposes managers' wealth to more risk because managers' wealth is more 
closely linked to the fluctuation of firm stock price. Managers therefore could choose 
less risky projects. Coles et al (2004) report mixed results for the relationship 
between 
managerial risk taking and equity delta. Some of their models 
disclose a negative 
association while others indicate a positive or a statistically 
insignificant result. 
Therefore, it is not clear what effect an equity delta has on managerial risk incentive. 
This is an interesting area worth further investigation. 
Rogers (2002) investigates the degree to which the incentive from CEO's 
options and shareholdings 
is related to the corporate interest rate or foreign currency 
derivative usage, i. e., a hedging strategy. Hedging 
is used to achieve the reduction of 
61 
I firm risk, in this case, arising from the fluctuation of interest rates or foreign exchange 
I rates. So if equity delta increases managerial risk taking, it should discourage corporate 
I hedging. Otherwise, it should encourage managers' hedging behaviour. Rogers' 
I sample consists of 569 randomly selected US firms whose accounting year ended 
I between December 15,1994 through to October 31,1995, and which disclosed the 
I notional value of their derivative holdings. Rogers does not find a significant 
relationship between the degree of derivative hedging and equity delta. Therefore, it is 
unclear whether equity delta drives managerial risk seeking or risk avoidance. 
The above studies try to demonstrate a cause-effect relationship between equity 
delta and managerial risk taking, but they fail to do so. Interestingly, Coles et al (2004) 
imply a nonlinear concave relationship between equity delta and managerial risk taking. 
That is, a low equity delta encourages managerial risk taking. But when equity delta 
grows higher, it can induce managerial risk aversion. This is consistent with the 
argument addressed in Section 2.3.3. If the effect of equity delta is concave, it is not 
surprising that the above studies do not find any significant results because they only 
assume a linear relationship between equity delta and managerial risk taking in their 
models. 
The nonlinear effect of equity delta is also addressed by Mishra et al (2000) in 
their study of the effect of equity delta on firm performance. Mishra et al argue that a 
low delta can improve firm performance because it links managers' wealth with 
company stock price. However, a high delta, particularly in high-risk firms can be 
counterproductive because they expose managers' wealth to too much risk and cause 
them to take projects to reduce firm risk. Those risk reduction projects can destroy 
shareholder value. Mishra et al use a squared 
delta to capture the concave relationship. 
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Using the sample from Jensen and Murphy (1990), Mishra et al find the coefficient for 
delta is positive (significant at the 5% level) and the coefficient for delta2 is negative 
(significant at the 5% level) in the regression of firm performance measured by 
industry-adjusted return on equity. Mishra et al's result in effect supports the argument 
above suggesting the concave effect of equity delta on managerial risk taking. 
There are more empirical studies that separately examine the delta of LTIP 
shares, stock options or managerial shareholdings. They are discussed in the following 
subsections. Existing studies generally only consider option vega when calculating 
vega for equity-based wealth because vega value for LTIP shares and managerial 
shareholdings are assumed to be zero (see the previous section for the explanation). 
These studies are also discussed below. 
LTIP shares 
To my knowledge, there has been no empirical study examining the effect of 
LTIP share delta on managerial risk taking. Ryan and Wiggins (2002) and Richardson 
and Waegelein (2003) use different measures of LTIP shares (or restricted stocks) 
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examine its impact on managers investment decisions. Their conclusions however are 
mixed. 
Ryan and Wiggins (2002) investigate the impact of restricted stocks on 
managers' decisions regarding R&D investments. R&D investments are 
long-term and 
are associated with a high degree of uncertainty. Restricted stocks 
have linear payoffs, 
which expose managers' wealth to downside 
firm investment risk. Ryan and Wiggins 
therefore hypothesize that restricted stocks could negatively 
influence R&D 
36 LTIP shares are called restricted stocks 
in the US (see Section 2.3.2.2) 
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I investments. They measure restricted stock incentive as the dollar value of restricted 
I stocks (provided by S&P ExecuComp database) deflated by total annual compensation. 
I Based on a sample of 1,088 Stand & Poor's firms in 1997, Ryan and Wiggins (2002) 
I find that the value of restricted stocks as a percentage of CEO total compensation is 
I significantly (at the 1% level) negatively related to R&D investments. 
Richardson and Waegelein (2003) also examine the effect of LTIP shares on 
firms' R&D investments. They argue that LTIP shares can lengthen managers' 
I investment horizons to multi-years to match the vesting period of LTIP shares. 
Therefore, managers can invest in some long-term and risky projects such as R&D. 
They examine the change of firms' R&D expenditure following the adoption of an LTIP 
share plan. For a sample of 134 US firms that adopted LTIP share plans from 1979 to 
1999, Ryan and Wiggins find that firms' R&D intensity (R&D expenditure deflated by 
assets) significantly increased four years after the adoption of the plan as compared to 
the R&D intensity one year before the adoption. The result suggests that LTIP shares 
do increase managerial risk taking. 
The above studies draw opposite conclusions with regard to the effect of LTIP 
shares on managerial risk taking. Moreover, neither of the studies use LTIP share delta 
to measure the risk incentive. As discussed in Section 2.3.3, measures that do not take 
managers' wealth sensitivity to the change of firm value into account do not capture 
managers' incentive to alter firm risk. More studies on the risk incentive effect of LTIP 
shares therefore are needed. 
Stock options 
There is more consensus regarding the positive risk-taking incentive arising 
from stock options. Core et al (2004) conduct a thorough literature review on equity 
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I compensation and managerial incentives. They conclude that the convexity embedded 
I within stock options can make managers select projects that increase firm risk. 
Guay (1999) explores the relationship between firm's risk level and the vega of 
I stock options held by its CEO. Firm risk level is proxied by stock return volatility over 
1240 trading days around the compensation measurement date, a window of (-120, 
1 +120). The event date, i. e. the compensation measurement date, is 31 December, 1993. 
Guay finds that the vega of stock options significantly positively contributes to firm 
I risk. This result is robust after controlling for variables that affect stock return volatility 
I such as growth opportunities and after using an alternative measure of firm risk by 
estimating the stock return volatility over different time periods such as (+1, +120) and 
(+1, +240). 
Williams and Rao (2000) investigate the relationship between firm risk taking 
and stock options using two different methods. The first method is to examine the 
influence of CEO stock option holdings on risk profile changes associated with 
corporate mergers. The second approach investigates the relationship between firm risk 
level and CEO stock option holdings based on a broader range of cross-sectional firms. 
For both approaches, Williams and Rao use two proxies for the risk incentive driven by 
stock options ('option incentive' hereafter): vega adjusted by firm assets and stock 
option value adjusted by firm assets. 
In the first method, Williams and Rao's merger sample consists of 127 mergers 
between 1994 and 1996. Firm risk profile change throughout the period of a merger is 
measured in two ways. The first is the market-adjusted change of the variance of 
acquirer stock returns over an event window of (+11, +180) days after the completion 
date of the mergers to the event window of (-180. -30) days before the announcement 
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date of the mergers. The second measure is the acquirer' leverage change from before 
an acquisition to after an acquisition. Both variance increasing and leverage-increasing 
mergers are considered as enhancing the acquirer's risk profile. CEOs' option holdings 
are based on their holdings prior to acquisition announcement. Williams and Rao find 
that for NASDAQ-listed acquirers, variance-increasing and leverage-increasing mergers 
are associated with greater CEO option incentive whichever way the option incentive is 
measured, by vega or option value. Nevertheless, they do find that vega as a measure 
has a stronger explanatory power than option value as a proxy. 
In the second approach, Williams and Rao's cross-sectional sample consists of 
1,225 firms from S&P 500, S&P 400 Mid Cap and S&P Small Cap for 1993 and 1995. 
Firms' stock return volatility is regressed against option incentive after controlling for 
firm size and leverage. Williams and Rao again find that option incentive is 
significantly associated with increased corporate risk taking particularly for NASDAQ- 
listed firms. Summarising the two sets of analyses, the authors conclude that stock 
options, as a result of the embedded convexity, are useful in aligning the risk 
preferences between CEOs and shareholders. 
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) investigate the influence of stock options on 
actions that CEOs of oil and gas firms take to manage the risk of uncertain success in 
exploring for new oil and gas reserves. They hypothesize that if stock options mitigate 
the risk-related incentive problem by motivating managers to make high-risk 
investments, there should be a positive association between option vega and the 
riskiness of exploration activities as measured by the variation in future cash 
flows from 
exploration activity. For a sample of 121 CEO-year observations 
from 1992 to 1997 in 
the US oil and gas industry, they find a significantly (at the 1% level) positive 
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relationship between the level of ex post exploration risk taken by the firm and option 
vega. In addition, they discover that vega is negatively (significant at the 1% level) 
associated with the extent of oil price hedging designed to reduce firm risk exposure. 
The coefficient is significant at the 1% level. Overall, they conclude that stock options 
incentivise CEOs in oil & gas firms to take on riskier exploration projects aimed at 
increasing firm risk, and make CEOs reduce the hedging of oil & gas risk exposure. 
Coles et al (2004) find that vega of CEO option holdings is significantly 
positively related to R&D intensity and significantly negatively related to capital 
expenditure on tangible assets. This implies that CEOs with a higher vega allocate 
investment dollars away from less risky capital expenditure on tangible assets such as 
property, plant and equipment towards more risky investments on R&D and other 
intangible assets. Moreover, they report that vega is significantly positively related to 
firm focus (i. e. less firm diversification) as measured in two different ways: the 
Herfindahl index of concentration of sales across various business segments, and the 
logarithm of the number of reported business segments. Thirdly, they discover that 
vega is significantly positively related to firm leverage even after controlling for other 
determinants of firm leverage, such as R&D, Z-Score37, etc. See Section 2.3.4.1 for a 
discussion of how R&D investments, capital investments on tangible assets, firm focus 
37 In the 1960's, Edward Altman using Multiple Discriminant Analysis combined a set of five financial 
ratios to come up with the Altman Z-Score (Altman, 1968). This score 
is used to predict a company's 
probability of failure. The Altman Z-Score uses eight variables 
from a company's financial statements to 
generate the financial ratios: earnings 
before interest & tax, total assets, net sales, market value of equity, 
total liabilities, current assets, current liabilities, retained earnings. 
Coles et al (2004) use Altman 
(1968)'s approach to calculate Z-Score. 
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I and firm leverage are related to firm risk. In summary, Coles et al demonstrate that 
I stock option vega provides an incentive for CEOs to adopt firm policies that increase 
company risk. 
Section 2.3.3 has introduced measures other than vega for the risk incentive 
I from stock options in the existing literature. Studies employing those measures 
I generally show that stock options encourage managerial risk taking. By examining 641 
I instances of firms' voting on stock option plans from 1978 to 1982, Defusco et al 
I (1990) find that the variance of a firm's stock returns increases 2 years following the 
I approval of an executive stock option plan as compared to the stock variance 2 years 
before the announcement. They conclude that stock options induce executives to 
undertake more investments that increase a firm's risk profile. Ryan and Wiggins 
(2002) find that the value of stock options deflated by CEOs' annual compensation 
significantly positively affects firms' R&D intensity. Tufano (1996) examines the 
corporate risk management practice in the gold mining industry. Given that the output 
of such an industry is a globally traded and volatile commodity, firms in this industry 
are considered to have high risk profiles. By investigating 48 North American Mining 
firms from 1990-1993, he finds that management teams that hold more options tend to 
conduct less hedging against gold price risk. 
Datta et al (2001) conduct an analysis of firm risk taking within the context of 
corporate acquisitions. For a sample of 1,719 completed acquisitions during the period 
1993 to 1998, they report that acquirers with a higher level of stock options granted to 
their top five executives in the year prior to acquisition announcement buy targets with 
higher growth opportunities as proxied by targets' book-to-market ratio. In addition, 
Datta cl al find that the change of the standard deviation of companies' daily stock 
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I returns at (+11, +70) days period over (-120, -60) days period (day 0 is the effective 
date) is also significantly higher for acquirers with a higher level of stock options, even 
after controlling for the acquirers' leverage change around the acquisitions. Therefore, 
I Datta et al conclude that stock options encourage corporate executives to undertake 
I riskier acquisitions. 
Moreover, they discover that these riskier acquisitions do not underperform their 
benchmarks (i. e., size, book-to-market, and momentum matched firms) 3 years after 
I acquisitions, whereas less risky acquisitions on average do underperform their 
benchmark firms by -28.91% (median -22.78%) over the same period. Both values are 
significant at the 1% level. Collectively, these results imply that stock options are 
effective in shaping long-term corporate investment policies and encourage managers to 
make decisions more closely aligned to the interests of shareholders. 
Roger (2002), however, does not find that option vega has any significant 
impact on corporate hedging, indicating that stock options have no impact on 
managerial risk taking. Roger's paper has been discussed earlier in this section. 
Overall, the above studies examine the impact of stock options on firm risk 
investment, i. e., William and Rao (2000), Ryan and Wiggins (2002) and Datta et al 
(2001) and Coles et al (2004), also risk management, i. e., Tufano (1996), Rajgopal and 
Shevlin (2002) and Roger (2002), and firm risk level, i. e., Defusco et al (1990), Guay 
(1999), William and Rao (2000) and Datta et al (2001). These studies generally show 
that stock options encourage managerial risk taking due to the convexity in the payoff 
structure of stock options. 
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I Managerial shareholdings 
While there are a substantial number of empirical studies on managerial 
I shareholdings, the number of studies that deal with the impact of equity ownership on 
I managerial risk taking is limited, and the evidence presented is mixed. 
Both Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) and Chen and Steiner (1999) argue that 
I managerial shareholdings have a positive impact on firm risk. They employ Black and 
Scholes (1973) argument that equity can be regarded as a call option. The value of the 
I call option, i. e., equity, increases with the firm risk. Managers who hold company 
I shares, would like to increase firm risk so as to increase their share value. For a sample 
of 153 acquisitions from 1974 to 1982, and 294 selloffs over the same period, Agrawal 
and Mandelker (1987) do not find consistent evidence that managerial shareholdings 
contribute to the risk profile change in an acquiring firm, or in a divesting firm around 
the period in which a merger decision or a selloff decision is announced. Chen and 
Steiner (1999) however, report a significantly positive (significant at the 1% level) 
impact of equity holdings on firm risk as measured by the natural logarithm of the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns from 1991 to 1993. Their sample consists of 
785 firms listed on New York Stock Exchange. 
Hill and Snell (1988) argue that increased managerial ownership aligns the 
interests of managers and shareholders. Managers will then adopt corporate strategies 
which meet shareholder interests, such as more corporate innovation and less corporate 
diversification. Corporate innovation is considered as firm risk enhancing and 
corporate diversification contributes to firm risk reduction. They use R&D intensity to 
measure firm innovation and firm industry sectors to measure firm level of 
diversification. For a sample of 94 firms from the Fortune 500 list, they find that a 
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I nigher managerial ownership contributes to less firm diversification but that managerial 
I ownership does not have significant impact on firm innovation level. 
Some studies, however, show that managerial shareholdings have negative 
I impact on managerial risk taking. Ryan and Wiggins (2002) argue that the linear 
I payoffs of managerial shareholdings, exposing managerial wealth to the downside 
I investment risk, induce managerial risk aversion. They find that CEO shareholdings 
I significantly negatively affect firm's R&D investment. Some studies suggest that the 
I risk aversion effect of high managerial shareholdings comes from the nondiversification 
I of managerial wealth portfolios, i. e., managers have a personal portfolio which is 
undiversified due to their commitments of human and financial capital in one firm. 
Managers would therefore conduct projects to reduce firm risk so as to diversify the 
personal wealth risk associated with their firms. Tufano (1996) finds that in gold 
mining firms, management teams which have a higher level of managerial 
shareholdings conduct more corporate hedging to reduce gold price risk. 
Wright et al (1996) incorporate both the interest alignment and the wealth 
nondiversification arguments, and argue that the relationship between firm risk and 
managerial ownership is concave. Wright et al (1996) state at a low level of share 
ownership, managers would like to carry out risky and positive NPV projects to 
increase firm value and consequently their own wealth. A high level of managerial 
shareholdings will cause managers to have nondiversified wealth portfolios, managers 
therefore are more likely to undertake projects that reduce firm risk. This can be 
facilitated by the power given by the high equity ownership which gives managers more 
voting rights, i. e., the chance of getting entrenched (Morck et al, 1988; Stulz, 1988: 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990). The wealth nondiversification argument and empirical 
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results are discussed in more detail in Section 2.4. Briefly, Wright et al (1996) prove 
that the relationship between managerial shareholdings and firm risk taking is concave. 
2.3.5 Summary 
Exiting literature only contains a limited number of empirical studies on the 
relationship between managerial risk taking and the components of managerial wealth. 
Overall, these studies suggest that fixed compensation and annual bonus provide few 
risk incentives for managers. However, those studies do suggest that equity-based 
wealth encourages firm risk taking. This seems mainly attributed to the convexity of 
stock options. There are no consistent results regarding LTIP shares and managerial 
shareholdings. Empirical studies also suggest that the impact of equity delta or 
managerial shareholdings on managerial risk taking is nonlinear. 
provides further explanations for this nonlinear relationship. 
2.4 Managerial wealth and managerial risk avoidance 
The next section 
Section 2.3 presents the schools of thought which argue that managerial wealth 
components can be structured in a way that will reduce the divergence of interests 
between managers and shareholders for firm-specific risk. This section provides two 
arguments together with the supporting empirical evidence that concentration of 
managerial wealth portfolios may intensify managerial risk avoidance. 
1 2.4.1 Non-diversified managerial wealth portfolios 
Some studies argue that compensation plans can only intensify the concentration 
of managers' wealth in their own 
firms and consequently reduce their tolerance to 
additional firm risk. 
Marcus (1982) models the impact of the profit-sharing 
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1 characteristics of managerial compensation on firm risk behaviour. When monitoring is 
I costly and managerial effort is discretionary, shareholders impose a binding constraint 
I on managers' wealth diversification decisions, such as restricted stocks that must be 
I held until the end of the vesting period to make sure managers can invest in long-term 
I projects to enhance firm value. Such a binding constraint however, will lead managers 
I to underinvest in risky projects and to spend excessive amounts of corporate resources 
I on activities which reduce variability in firm profits, such as conglomerate 
I diversification. This seemingly suboptimal behaviour thus induced is in fact optimal 
from managers' point of view given the constraint imposed. 
Another consequence of not being able to hedge their wealth portfolio is that 
managers substantially discount the value of their performance pay. Lambert et al 
(1991) develop a model for assessing the value of a compensation contract from a 
manager's perspective. The model demonstrates that when the risk aversion parameter 
for the manager is 4.0 (the most risk-averse level in his illustration), 10,000 call options 
are valued by the manager at $189,400 if 10% of his other wealth is tied to the firm's 
stock price, but only $47,700 if 90% are. Following Lambert et al (1991), Meulbroek 
(2001), Hall and Murphy (2002), and Tian (2004) all develop theoretical models to 
estimate the difference between the market value of stock options (estimated using the 
Black and Scholes (1973) formula) and option value considered by managers. 
Consistent with the argument of Lambert et al (1991), these studies conclude that it is 
normal for managers to value their option holdings less than the shareholders, the 
discount rate can be as high as 90% in some cases. 
While the non-trading constraint on compensation contracts causes risk 
avoidance. lifting the trading barrier also makes equity 
incentives ineffective (Hall and 
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I Murphy, 2002). Lower-skilled and more risk-averse executives could simply accept 
I and immediately re-sell all options offered (or short-sell equivalent options), thereby' 
I reducing or even eliminating the incentive provided by stock options. If managers 
I choose to exercise stock options to buy shares, the incentive carried by the options also 
I diminishes because unlike stock options, there is no performance criterion attached to 
I managerial shareholdings. The above literature suggests that equity incentives are 
bound to be inefficient, particularly at a high level as they intensify managerial wealth 
non-diversification. 
The non-diversification argument has been addressed or implied in Section 2.3.3 
and Section 2.3.4 with regard to the impact of equity delta or managerial shareholdings 
on managerial risk taking. Non-diversification of managerial wealth portfolio causes a 
nonlinear relationship between pay-performance sensitivities from various types of 
equity holdings on managerial risk taking. 
2.4.1.1 Empirical evidence 
There exists a considerable amount of empirical evidence showing that 
managers pursue firm risk reducing projects in order to protect their own human capital 
in the firm. Amihud and Lev (1981) find such evidence in conglomerate mergers 
which, according to their view, are a type of mergers that allow acquirers to diversify 
business risk across different sectors but do not necessarily add value for shareholders. 
But managers can benefit from the decreased firm-specific risk since it can secure their 
jobs and future income. Based on a sample of acquisitions conducted by 309 
large US 
firms from 1961 to 1970, Amihud and Lev find that management-controlled firms 
where there are no single shareholders that own 10% or more of the outstanding stocks 
of' a firm are more likely to conduct conglomerate mergers than owner-controlled 
firms. 
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May (1995) extends the work of Amihud and Lev (1981). He constructs three 
I alternative measures for diversification level through acquisitions by using the 
I covariance between bidder and target stock returns. These measures capture the 
I combined total risk, firm specific risk prior to acquisitions, and the change of firm total 
I risk resulting from acquisitions. The lower the covariance between bidder and target 
stock returns, the more diversifying the acquisition. For a sample of 184 acquisitions 
between 1979 and 1990, he finds that CEOs tend to pursue risk reduction diversification 
acquisitions when they have higher proportions of their wealth invested in firm equity. 
Wright et al (1996) demonstrate a nonlinear relationship between managerial 
shareholdings and managerial risk taking. The latter is defined as `the analysis and 
selection of projects that have varying uncertainties associated with their expected 
outcomes and corresponding cash flows' (p. 442). They argue that at a low level of 
managerial equity ownership, the relationship between managerial shareholdings and 
managerial risk taking is positive because managerial wealth benefits from the growth- 
oriented risky projects that increase firm value. However, when managers obtain a 
higher level of equity ownership, they may not necessarily increase corporate risk 
because of the potential risk aversion due to wealth non-diversification. They use a cut 
off point of 7.5% for managerial shareholdings, below which the equity ownership is 
considered low and above which it is considered high. They use boards of directors to 
proxy for firms' managers. Firm risk is proxied by the standard deviation of analysts' 
forecasts of earnings per share. They explain that uncertainty of analysts' forecasts 
should be highly correlated with the unpredictability in cash flows generated by a firm's 
assets, which are a result of managerial risk taking behaviour. Using a sample of 358 
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i firms for 1986, and 514 firms for 1992, Wright et al find the results consistent with their 
hypothesis. 
Taken together, the above literature suggests that compensation plans can be 
I ineffective because inter alias they reduce the diversification of the managerial wealth 
portfolio. 
1 2.4.2 Risk aversion - total wealth 
Recently theoretical papers by Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004) suggest 
I another reason why incentive contracts can be ineffective. Managers' risk attitudes vary 
I according to their individual utility functions at different levels of wealth. High levels 
I of wealth make managers more risk averse. The impact of equity incentive thus 
diminishes as managers' total wealth increases. 
Carpenter (2000) argues that the convex nature of stock option payoff38 does not 
necessarily encourage managerial risk taking. He demonstrates through his theoretical 
model that the effects of options on a manager's behaviour depend on his utility 
function. When a manager is highly risk averse, granting him more stock options that 
he cannot hedge increases the volatility of his personal wealth portfolio. To offset this, 
he reduces the volatility of the underlying asset of his stock options. Although 
Carpenter models a fund manager, the principle applies to a corporate manager who 
cannot hedge his options in the firm. 
Ross (2004) argues that it is far too simple to assume that the shape of the payoff 
structure can alter managers' attitude towards risk. This assumption neglects that 
managers' utility function can engender greater or lesser degrees of risk aversion. Take 
38 The convex payoff of stock options has been defined in Section 2.3.2.4. 
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a new option grant for an example. The grant has two immediate effects on a manager's 
wealth. First is that it adds more convexity into the manager's wealth portfolio. The 
manager should be less risk averse than before if there are no other factors changing his 
utility function. However, this is unlikely to happen because the option grant also 
increases the manager's total wealth level, i. e., the second effect, which in turn, alters 
the manager's utility function. The manager is now likely to be more risk averse than 
before. Ross states that a manager can have a very different attitude toward risk at a 
higher level of wealth than at a lower level. The manager is likely to be much more risk 
averse at a high level of wealth than at a low level of wealth. Ross's argument implies 
that the impact of an incentive contract on a manager's attitude towards risk is affected 
by the total wealth of the manager. 
Taken together, the above literature implies that to assess the impact of equity- 
based wealth components, researchers need to consider the influence of managerial total 
wealth. From the survey of the existing literature in the preparation of this thesis, there 
appears so far to be no empirical study exploring the effect of total wealth on equity 
incentives. 
2.4.3 Summary 
Section 2.4 presents two arguments for why equity-based wealth components 
can be ineffective in aligning the interests of managers towards that of shareholders. 
The first is that equity-based wealth reduces the diversification of managerial wealth 
portfolios and the second is that the incentive provided by managers' equity-based 
wealth is affected by the level of managers' total wealth. 
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2.5 Critique of extant studies 
Section 2.3 and 2.4 present alternative theories and related empirical evidence 
regarding the impact of managerial wealth portfolio on managerial risk taking. This 
section provides a critique of the studies discussed in Section 2.3 and 2.4, and identifies 
the literature gaps within this area of research. 
Summarising the empirical literature, managerial risk taking is usually measured 
in two ways, ex post measures and ex ante measures. The ex post measures use firm 
risk as a proxy for managerial risk taking. The logic is that firm risk is a function of 
managerial risk taking. Managerial risk seeking results in higher firm risk whilst 
managerial risk reduction such as corporate diversification decreases firm risk. Firm 
risk is captured by stock return volatility (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; Lewellen et 
al, 1987; DeFusco et al, 1990; Guay, 1999; Williams and Rao, 2000; Datta et al, 2001), 
by book-to-market ratio (Biziak et al, 1993), and by analysts' forecast of earnings per 
share (Wright et al, 1996). However, an ex post measure is not a direct measure of 
managerial risk taking. Such a measure captures some other events that occur after 
managers' investment decisions have been executed. For example, the war in Iraq 
depressed the stock price, and increased the stock price volatility of airline companies. 
If this period is included in calculating an airline company's stock volatility, it will 
deliver a wrong impression that the increase of the firm risk is because of a project 
undertaken by the managers prior to the war even though the managers only initiated the 
project to reduce the firm risk. Now let's use the same example but consider a book-to- 
market ratio being used to measure firm risk. The airline company's book-to-market 
ratio will increase because of its stock price decreases. A lower book-to-market ratio 
indicates lower firm risk. This implies that managers conducted risk reduction projects 
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to reduce firm risk before the war started. Therefore, for the same company over the 
same period, two ex post measures lead to two opposite conclusions about managerial 
risk taking behaviour. 
The above illustration has shown that ex post measures of managerial risk taking 
are problematic. Ex ante measures are superior to ex post measures because the former 
is not subject to the problem discussed above. The Ex ante measures use investment 
risk as a proxy for managerial risk taking because investment risk level directly reflects 
managers' risk preference in project selection. Existing studies have used the following 
proxies for investment risk: corporate risk diversification (Amihud and Lev, 1981: Hill 
and Snell, 1988; May, 1995), corporate hedging (Tufano, 1996; Rogers, 2002), R&D 
investment (Hill and Snell, 1988; Richardson and Waegelein, 2003; Coles et al, 2004), 
oil & gas exploration activities (Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002). The first two proxies 
focus on firm risk reduction and the last two focus on firm risk enhancing. Empirical 
studies on how managerial equity holdings affect managers' choice of risky projects, in 
particular risk enhancing projects are very limited. Moreover, none of the empirical 
studies has examined excessive managerial risk taking brought by stock options in the 
1990s, an issue that has caught the attention of business journalists, regulators, etc (see 
Section 2.3.2.4). More academic studies therefore are needed to investigate managerial 
risk taking behaviour. 
In addition to the problem for an appropriate proxy for managerial risk taking in 
the empirical literature, empirical studies have a number of other areas that need 
improving. Firstly, none of them considers the effect of managerial total wealth on the 
risk incentives provided by equity-based wealth components. Thus those studies 
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neglect a potentially important determinant of managers' risk taking behaviour. This 
has been discussed in Section 2.4.2. 
Secondly, extant studies either focus on managerial risk taking or on firm 
performance. Only a few studies examine both. Defusco et al (1990) examine stock 
return volatility changes as well as market reaction following the approval of stock 
option plans. Hill and Snell (1988) examine firm innovation, firm diversification and 
firm performance. Datta et al (2001) include the risk profile of acquisitions as well as 
post-acquisition performance in the analysis. Except Hill and Snell (1988), none of the 
other studies, however, establishes an explicit link between firm performance and 
managerial risk taking. The analysis for firm performance and the analysis for 
managerial risk taking are two separate analyses and do not interact with each other. 
Moreover, both Defusco et al (1990) and Datta et al (2001) use an ex post 
measure, stock return volatility, as a proxy for managerial risk taking, which as 
discussed earlier in this section does not reflect the direct relationship between 
managers' choice of risky projects ex ante and managerial wealth. Hill and Snell (1988) 
establish a link between firm performance and firm innovation (i. e., managerial risk 
taking), between firm performance and firm diversification (i. e, firm risk reduction). 
However, their study is limited to managerial shareholdings. 
Overall, while traditional studies recognise that firm performance is a function 
of managers' ownership of their firms manifested in mangers' wealth attached to their 
firms, these studies generally neglect that firms' performance is affected by mangers' 
wealth through managerial risk taking. Specifically, the components of managers' 
wealth such as stock options first affect managers' risk attitude, which determines the 
risk level of investments managers would like to pursue. The outcomes of these 
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investment projects then affect firm performance. Therefore, to properly detect how 
managerial wealth affects firm performance, researchers should incorporate managerial 
risk taking into the analysis. 
One possible reason why the above traditional agency studies do not investigate 
the performance consequence of managerial risk taking is that the traditional agency 
model recognises that managerial risk taking is associated with lower agency costs and 
consequently better shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Traditional agency 
theory assumes managers to be risk-averse and shareholders to be risk-neutral. This 
divergence of interests in their risk preferences creates agency costs for a firm and thus 
reduces shareholder value. Managerial risk taking can reduce the divergence of 
interests between managers and shareholders and thus increase firm value. This risk- 
related agency problem has been discussed in Section 2.2. This line of reasoning is 
reflected in the argument of Hill and Snell (1988). They state that firm innovation that 
is a result of managerial risk taking is positively associated with firm performance, 
while firm diversification which reflects managerial risk aversion is negatively related 
to firm performance. However, these studies, published before the dotcom bubble of 
1990s during which period excessive amounts of stock options were granted to 
stimulate managers to take risks, do not take excessive managerial risk taking into 
account (see Section 2.3.2.4 for a discussion of how stock options cause excessive 
managerial risk taking). 
Even without the inducement of stock options managers may be risk-seekers 
rather than risk-avoiders as postulated by the traditional agency model. Behavioural 
finance theory argues that the risk aversion assumption about managers' risk attitude is 
wrong and that managers may exhibit excessive risk preference under the influence of 
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behavioural biases such as overconfidence, hubris, and over-optimism (behavioural 
biases are discussed in Chapter 3). Excessive managerial risk taking can lead to 
negative firm performance. If this is true, high risk does not always mean a better return 
and the traditional agency model is too simple to capture the incentives that motivate 
managers to take risk. This again implies that the traditional approach of examining 
risk incentive alignment effect by investigating the relationship between executive 
compensation and firm performance is not appropriate or adequate. 
Overall, the above discussion has demonstrated that managerial risk taking 
should not be neglected from the wealth-performance analysis. To properly assess the 
impact of the components of managerial wealth on firm performance, researchers need 
to conduct a two-stage analysis. The first stage is to examine the impact of managerial 
wealth on managerial risk taking and the second stage is to analyse firm performance 
conditional upon the risk taken. This thesis develops this two-stage analysis and the 
selected methodology is explained in Chapter 6. 
Summarising the empirical compensation literature, I also find that most of the 
existing studies are based on US data and only few studies are about UK executive 
compensation. The study on the impact of UK executive compensation on managerial 
risk taking is a vacuum area. The major reason is data availability. Until around 1998, 
executive pay research in the UK was hampered by poor quality data due to the lack of 
detailed company disclosure of executive remuneration details. Most of the UK-based 
research focused only on cash compensation. For example, Cosh (1975), Meeks and 
Whittington (1975), Main (1971), Gregg et al (1993) and Cosh and Hughes (1997) who 
all study the determinants of UK CEO cash compensation. Following the Greenbury 
Report (1995) and HHampel Report (1998). the level of disclosure of compensation 
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details in annual reports has increased dramatically, and from the 1997 accounting year. 
UK annual reports disclose directors' stock option holdings. This makes the 
examination of the whole executive compensation package feasible. 
Moreover, there is a growing controversy over top management pay level in the 
UK about whether company directors are overpaid to do their jobs (Conyon and 
Murphy, 2000). An opinion poll commissioned by Financial Times shows that 78% of 
the 1,002 adults aged 16 and over across the UK regard the directors of UK companies 
as overpaid (Blitz, 2003). Shareholder rebellions over executive pay packages have hit 
Barclays, Abbey National, and GlaxoSmithKline (Financial Times, 30 June 2003). The 
continuing debate with regard to the executive remuneration, coupled with enhanced 
data availability through the new disclosure requirement presented in the Greenbury 
(1995) and Hampel (1998) reports, has made research into UK executive pay critically 
important. Main et al (1995), McKnight and Tomkins (1999), Conyon and Murphy 
(2000), Conyon et al (2000), Conyon and Sadler (2001), Conyon and Freeman (2002), 
Stathopoulos ei al (2005) all consider the whole executive compensation package and 
examine the pay-performance link. None of those studies, however, has explored the 
impact of executive compensation on managerial risk taking. 
In addition, Conyon and Murphy (2000) find a substantial pay difference 
between US and UK executives. This they suggest may be due to the differences in 
firm hierarchical management structures, taxes, culture, etc. It is therefore questionable 
whether the conclusions drawn from studies into US corporate compensation are 
applicable to the UK. Therefore, a separate UK study is needed to contribute to the 
body of UK corporate compensation literature. 
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Taken together, the extant studies into managerial wealth and managerial risk 
taking need to be supplemented so that they include analyses of 1) an ex ante measure 
of managerial risk taking such as a risky investment project; 2) the influence of 
managerial total wealth, 3) managerial risk-seeking behaviour. In addition, more UK 
evidence is required. 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter outlines a review of relevant literature relating to managerial wealth 
components, managerial risk incentive and managerial risk taking. It first introduces 
the risk-related agency problem, and then separately discusses the risk incentives 
provided by different managerial wealth components given their different payoff 
structures. Prior empirical analysis of such wealth incentives is also presented. 
Consistent with theoretical arguments, empirical studies find that fixed compensation 
and annual bonuses have little incentive alignment effect. Equity-based wealth 
encourages managerial risk taking, but this appears to be due to the convexity of stock 
options. There exists some evidence that the impact of pay-performance sensitivity, i. e., 
equity delta, or managerial shareholdings on managerial risk taking could be nonlinear. 
At a high level, equity-based wealth seems to discourage managerial risk taking because 
it results in non-diversified managerial wealth which causes managers to diversify firm 
risk in order to protect their own wealth. 
There are three major gaps with existing models and empirical investigation of 
managerial wealth and managerial risk taking. These gaps relate to 1) limited studies 
using ex ante measures of managerial risk taking. 2) the influence of managerial total 
wealth on equity incentives. 3) managerial risk-seeking behaviour. In addition, more 
UK studies are required. This research endeavours to fill these gaps. 
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Chapter 3 
Behavioural Biases and Managerial Risk Taking: 
Theory and Empirical Evidence 
3.1 Introduction 
Starting from the mid-1950s, researchers began questioning the traditional 
finance theory. They argue that it is not feasible for individuals to be fully rational and 
to consider every alternative when making a decision. Instead, individuals operate 
under conditions of `bounded rationality', which limits the alternatives under 
consideration (Barberis and Thaler, 2002). Individuals are thus subject to behavioural 
biases. The behavioural agency theory, developed from the traditional agency theory39 
but incorporating behavioural biases of human behaviour, attempts to describe and 
predict firm behaviour (Cyert and March, 1963). This is of critical importance in 
corporate finance research because behavioural agency theory recognises that business 
is transacted through actions and decisions which are influenced by the psychology of 
the decision maker. By understanding the psychology of the decision maker it will be 
possible to better understand his behaviour and the decisions he makes. This helps 
explain firm behaviour that is inconsistent with the assumptions of the traditional 
agency model. 
Managerial risk attitude is one area of divergence between behavioural agency 
theory and traditional agency theory. In the traditional agency model, risk is defined as 
39 Se` Section 2.2 of Chapter 2 for a discussion of the traditional agency theory. The traditional agency 
theory assumes that managers are fully rational. 
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the distribution of returns and managers who have their financial capital and human 
capital attached to one firm are considered to be risk-averse to firm-specific risk in 
addition to market risk (see Section 2.2 of Chapter 2 for more detailed discussions). 
Behavioural agency theory challenges both the definition of risk and the assumption 
about managerial risk attitude associated with the traditional agency model. 
Behavioural agency theory states that it is improper to disregard human behaviour when 
defining risk since any investment project is conducted by humans (Sitkin and Pablo, 
1992). Combining managers' perception with the potential outcome of projects they 
invest in, behavioural agency theory gives risk a richer definition. A project is 
considered risky when the expected outcome is uncertain, the goal is hard to achieve or 
else the outcome is associated with some extreme consequences. The same project may 
have a larger distribution of returns (i. e., higher risk) when supervised by a manager 
who is new to an area, while having a smaller distribution of returns (i. e., lower risk) 
when by a manager who is an expert in that area and has successfully managed many 
similar projects before. 
After stating that project risk varies among individual managers, behavioural 
agency theory then suggests that managers are not homogeneously risk averse. Instead, 
managers' risk attitudes are influenced by their behavioural biases that arise when they 
form beliefs, and as a consequence of their preferences (March and Shapira, 1987; 
Kahneman and Lado, 1993; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Wright et al, 2001). 
Managers can be risk-seeking as well as risk-averse. From the extant studies it appears 
that three behavioural biases are commonly argued to have influences on managers' risk 
attitudes. They are overconfidence, over-optimism and hubris, all of which cause 
managers to underestimate project risk and can lead to excessive managerial risk taking 
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(Taylor and Brown, 1988; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). To measure managers' 
behavioural biases is by no means an easy task. Nevertheless, starting from Hayward 
and Hambrick (1997), researchers have employed several proxies such as past 
performance, media profile, etc. In this way researchers have been able to incorporate 
the behavioural agency model into the area of traditional corporate finance. 
This chapter presents the theory and empirical evidence with regard to how 
managerial behavioural biases influence managerial risk taking. Section 3.2 outlines the 
theoretical arguments and Section 3.3 provides empirical evidence. Section 3.4 
summarises this chapter and discusses the implications of the behavioural agency model 
for the study of managerial risk taking in general and corporate acquisitions in 
particular. 
3.2 Behavioural biases and managerial risk taking: theory 
Behavioural agency theorists argue that managerial risk seeking is not a mere 
deviation from the traditional agency model's assumption of rational risk aversion. 
They criticize the risk aversion assumption as being too restrictive and an unrealistic 
presentation of human behaviour (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Wright et al, 
2001). Instead, they argue that managers may be `irrational' and, under psychological 
influences, exhibit different attitudes towards risk in different situations. Therefore, 
incentive alignment mechanisms, designed on the assumption that managers are rational 
and risk averse, are unlikely to influence irrational and risk-seeking managers in the 
desired direction (Barberis and Thaler. 2002). "These managers think that they are 
maximizing firm value, even if in reality. they are not. Since they think that they are 
already doing the right thing, stock options or debt are unlikely to change their 
behaviour. " (Barberis and Thaler, 2002, p. 58). Such a managerial attitude may be due 
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less to a fraudulent intent than it is to behavioural biases such as overconfidence, hubris 
and over-optimism. Existing literature has shown that these three behavioural biases 
induce managerial excessive risk taking. In the following subsections. I discuss these 
three behavioural biases separately. 
Overconfidence 
Extensive evidence shows that people are often overconfident in their judgments 
(Shiller, 2001; Barberis and Thaler, 2002). In one experiment conducted by those 
studies to demonstrate individual overconfidence, participants were asked to read about 
the general information in a multiple-choice format and are then asked to choose the 
most likely answer and assign the probability of their being correct to it. Researchers 
found that respondents often describe themselves as "90% sure" while only being 
correct on about 80% of cases. 
Researchers have found that managers, particularly senior managers are prone to 
display overconfidence (March and Shapira, 1987; Goel and Thakor, 2000). March and 
Shapira (1987) find that managers view risk as controllable and modifiable and that they 
themselves are able to clearly distinguish between gambling - where the chances of 
winning or losing are uncontrollable - and risk taking - where uncertainty can be 
reduced by skill or information. This can be illustrated by the words of the president of 
a successful high technology company: In starting my company I didn't gamble; I was 
confident we were going to succeed. " (March and Shapira, 1987, p. 1410). Goel and 
Thakor (2000) develop a model in which managers' ability are judged relative to each 
other to determine who should be appointed the leader of the group. Managers make 
unobservable choices about the payoff distributions of the projects they will manage, 
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and their abilities are inferred ex post from observed project outcomes. Goel and 
Thakor find that all managers choose higher levels of project risks when they are 
competing for leadership. They also find that an overconfident manager - one who 
underestimates his project risk - has a higher probability of being chosen as the leader 
than an otherwise identical manager. 
Over-optimism 
Overoptimistic individuals underestimate the likelihood of hazards affecting 
them personally, and entertain the unlikely belief that the future will be great for them 
(Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). Taylor and Brown (1988) suggest that over-optimism 
may come from 1) unrealistic, positive self-evaluations, 2) unrealistic optimism about 
future events, and 3) an illusion of control40. People tend to exaggerate their control 
over events, and the level of the skills and resources they possess in ensuring desirable 
outcomes. Over-optimism is similar to overconfidence in that both behavioural biases 
make individuals overestimate their own capability of delivering successful results. 
Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) state that a substantial degree of risk to which 
managers willingly expose themselves is unlikely to reflect the true acceptance of these 
risks, but is because they misjudge the odds, or they rely on overly optimistic forecasts. 
Heaton (2002) argues in his theoretical models that over-optimism causes managers to 
ovver-estimate their ability to generate returns, to perceive their own firm stocks to be 
undervalued by the market. Overoptimistic managers prefer using internal funds to 
issuing firm stocks to finance investment projects because they believe firm stocks are 
undervalued by the stock market. Moreover, optimistic managers often show an 
4" "1'his may also lead to overconfidence. 
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upward bias in forecasting the cash flows of investment projects. This causes such 
managers to overvalue their firms' investment opportunities and to undertake projects 
that may even have negative cash flows. Both cases will cause firm value destruction. 
Based on Heaton's argument, Malmendier and Tate (2005b) hypothesize that 
overconfident/over-optimistic managers invest more when they have internal funds at 
their proposal. For a sample of 477 large US firms from 1980 to 1994, Malmendier and 
Tate find a strong positive correlation between the sensitivity of investment to cash flow 
and CEO overconfidence/over-optimism41, therefore proving Heaton's argument that 
managerial over-optimism lead to suboptimal investment behaviour. 
Hubris 
Hubris, is `exaggerated pride or self-confidence, often resulting in retribution' 
according to Webster Dictionary. Hubris is derived from Greek mythology (Hayward 
and Hambrick, 1997). In Greek mythology, those who are excessively confident, or 
blindly ambitious are ruthlessly struck down by the gods. Roll (1986) develops a hubris 
hypothesis of corporate takeovers that is further developed and tested by Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997). When managers consider taking over another firm, they conduct a 
valuation analysis of that firm. They will launch a bid if their valuation exceeds the 
market price of the target, but hubris can cause managers to underestimate the risk 
inherent in the takeover, leading to the overvaluation of the target. Hubris-affected 
" Malmendier and Tate (2005b) classify CEOs as overconfident if CEOs repeatedly do not exercise their 
firm stock options even tirm stock prices exceeds the option stock prices, or if CEOs habitually acquire 
stocks of their company. 
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managers may pay excessive takeover premiums, and consequently cause value 
destruction for acquirer shareholders. 
Summarising the discussions of overconfidence, over-optimism, and hubris, it 
appears that all three cause managers to overestimate their capabilities and 
underestimate investment risk, therefore potentially causing firm value destruction. It is 
therefore very difficult to distinguish the three effects on managerial risk taking from 
each other. Empirical studies have already mixed these concepts together. For 
example, the theoretical model developed by Heaton (2002) describes the behaviour of 
overoptimistic managers. Malmendier and Tate (2005b) test the Heaton (2002) model 
but refer to the behaviour of overconfident managers. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) 
also mix hubris and overconfidence in their paper. More empirical studies are listed in 
the next section. As discussed earlier in earlier subsections, there exist subtle 
differences between these three behavioural biases even though they all induce 
excessive managerial risk taking. In many prior empirical studies these differences tend 
to be blurred. Therefore, this thesis uses the term `behavioural biases' to refer to their 
common character, i. e., they cause managers to underestimate project risk and 
encourage excessive risk taking. 
In contrast to the argument of the papers discussed earlier in this section that 
behavioural biases lead to firm value destruction, Goel and Thakor (2000) theorise that 
overconfidence can enhance firm value. An overconfident CEO, because of his strong 
conviction in the success of his projects, is quite adept at motivating the workers around 
him. His `cheerleading' may in fact be an asset to the corporation. This theory however 
so far has not been empirically tested. 
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Collectively, the above studies quite plausibly explain the existence of 
behavioural biases in managers' psychology and that behavioural biases encourage 
managers to pursue excessively risky projects, leading to firm value destruction. Only 
one study states that some behavioural biases may enhance firm value. 
3.3 Empirical evidence 
Following the theoretical arguments presented in Section 3.2, this section 
reviews the related number of empirical studies and discusses some empirical issues 
relating to quantifying behavioural biases. Whilst none of the studies presents empirical 
evidence on how managerial behavioural biases affect the process by which managers 
go about choosing over-risky projects, all of the studies do associate behavioural biases 
with firm performance. This section therefore presents the empirical evidence on the 
relationship between firm performance and managerial behavioural biases. 
A difficult task faced by empirical behavioural studies is the qualification of 
behavioural biases. Take overconfidence for example, a measure of managers' 
overconfidence requires data that discloses each manager's psychology. This is 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. In addition, how to define the borderline that 
distinguishes 'over' confidence and `normal' confidence is another big obstacle. These 
problems place real limits on empirical studies of managers' behavioural biases in 
corporate finance. There are however, a few notable exceptions and they are discussed 
in the following paragraphs. 
Roll (1986) examines hubris in the context of corporate takeovers and suggests a 
hubris hypothesis. Hubris causes bidder managers to believe that their own valuation of 
the target firm is correct while the market does not fully reflect the full economic value 
of the target firm as Nvell as the value of the combined bidding and target firm. Bidder 
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managers are therefore likely to pay higher acquisition premiums, causing value transfer 
from bidder shareholders to target shareholders. The hubris hypothesis implies that if 
there are absolutely no gains available to an acquisition, the average increase in the 
target firm's market value should then be more than be offset by the average decrease in 
the bidding firm's market value. The acquisition costs should make the acquisition a 
net loss. Moreover, the target market value should increase when an unanticipated 
acquisition is announced, and it should go back to the original level when the bidding is 
unsuccessful. Roll conducts a thorough prior empirical literature review of value gains 
from corporate acquisitions and finds evidence consistent with the predictions of the 
hubris hypothesis. He therefore concludes that managers' hubris is one of the reasons 
for corporate mergers. Roll's way of identifying hubris is based on the assumption that 
financial markets are efficient in reflecting all the information about individual firms, 
i. e., strong-form market efficiency. Following the Roll (1986) approach and based on a 
sample of 330 US tender offers made during 1963-1988, Elazar and Narayanan (1993) 
draw the same conclusions as Roll (1986). 
However, these studies do not use proxies for managerial hubris other than 
suggesting or implying its existence in acquisitions. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) do 
find some plausible empirical measures and in their paper reporting their investigation 
into how hubris affects value destruction in mergers. They use four proxies: 1) 
acquiring company's recent performance as measured by acquirer stock price 
momentum 1 year prior to acquisition announcement; 2) recent media praise; 3) CEO's 
self-importance42 4) a factor based on a combination of the first three factors. Further 
42 Hayward and Hambrick (1997) also use self-importance measured by CEOs' pay level as a proxy for 
hubris (see Section 6.2.1.3 of Chapter 6). 
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discussions of how these proxies are associated with managerial hubris or other 
behavioural biases can be found later in Section 6.2.1.3 of Chapter 6. Using a sample of 
106 large US acquisitions, Hayward and Hambrick find that all of the proxies they use 
are highly positively associated with the size of acquisition premiums paid while 
acquisition premiums are significantly negatively related to one-year post acquisition 
cumulative abnormal returns. Hayward and Hambrick conclude that managerial hubris 
destroys acquirer shareholder value. 
Hletala et al (2003) try to infer the market's estimates of synergies, bidder 
overpayment, and changes in bidder and target values from the stock prices around a 
takeover announcement. They use the takeover contest for Paramount in 1994 as an 
example. They find that Viacom, the acquirer, overpaid by more than $2 billion when it 
agreed to purchase Paramount. This overpayment occurred despite the fact that 
Summer Redstone, the CEO of Viacom, owned roughly two thirds of Viacom. Hletala 
et al state that this substantial ownership means the overpayment is less likely to be due 
to the agency problem, but is more likely to be due to the overvaluation of Paramount 
by Summer Redstone, a sign of his overconfidence or hubris. Hletala et al also analyse 
other factors that contribute to Summer Redstone's overconfidence/hubris. They 
suggest that the great success Summer Redstone, and Viacom itself had enjoyed prior to 
that acquisition fostered his hubris which led to overpayment for the acquisition. As 
I lay ward and Hambrick (1997), Hletala et al imply that good past performance 
contributes to overconfidence/hubris. 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998). Kohers and Kohers (2001) and Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2003) suggest that the ratio of acquirer book value of equity to market value of 
equity ('book-to-market ratio' hereafter) indicating glamour or value status contributes 
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to managers' hubris/over-optimism. The stocks of firms with low book-to-market ratios 
are called `glamour stocks' or `growth stocks'. A low book-to-market ratio indicates 
that the market thinks the firm has high growth opportunities. The market's perception 
may come from that the firm consistently producing rising sales or earnings. Opposite 
to glamour stocks are value stocks which have high book-to-market ratios, indicating 
that the market thinks the value of those firms is mainly from real assets which have 
been recorded on accounting books and the firms have limited growth potential. The 
glamour or value status of firm stocks may affect bidder managers' acquisition 
strategies. The glamour status can make bidder managers over-optimistic about the 
future investment prospects of their firms and it is likely that this over-optimism will 
lead to a risky acquisition strategy, overpayment of acquisition premiums and value 
destruction of acquirer shareholders. By contrast, bidder managers of value firms may 
be more prudent in estimating an acquisition benefits and therefore are less likely to 
substantially overpay for target firms. 
For a sample of 3,169 mergers and 348 tender offers from 1980 to 1991 in the 
US, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find that glamour bidders underperform value bidders 
in both mergers and tender offers during the three years after the acquisitions are made. 
In the merger sample, glamour acquirers have cumulative abnormal stock returns of 
-17.26% (significant at the I% level) as compared to 7.64% (significant at the I% level) 
for value acquirers. In the tender offer sample, glamour acquirers achieved a 
statistically insignificant 4.25% abnormal stock returns as compared to 15.53% 
(significant at the 1% level) achieved by value acquirers. Kohers and Kohers (2001) 
investigate 304 US high-tech mergers from 1984 to 1995 and find that on average 
glamour bidders underperform value bidders by 71.38% (significant at the 1% level) 
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over 3 years following the acquisition. For a sample of 519 UK acquisitions from 1983 
to 1995, Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) find that on average glamour bidders 
underperform value bidders by 1.7% (significant at the 10% level) 750 days after 
acquisition announcement. 
Malmendier and Tate (2004) investigate how CEO overconfidence can affect 
corporate acquisitions. They employ two measures for CEO overconfidence, the time at 
which CEOs exercise the options of their company stocks and press coverage. CEOs 
have undiversified wealth portfolios (see Section 2.4.1 of Chapter 2), which is likely to 
expose CEOs' wealth to too much firm-specific risk. CEOs therefore are likely to 
exercise options early, given a sufficiently high stock price to reduce their risk 
exposure. However, if CEOs constantly hold back from exercising their options even 
after the firm's stock price exceeds the option strike price, i. e., options are in-the- 
money, it implies that CEOs are persistently bullish about their companies' future 
prospects. This could be because CEOs are overconfident in their capability to improve 
firm performance. Malmendier and Tate also classify CEOs as overconfident if the 
press describes them as "overconfident" or "optimistic". Analysing a sample of 477 
large publicly-traded firms from 1980 to 1994, they find that overconfident CEOs are 
more likely to conduct mergers, in particular, value-destroying mergers, than are 
rational CEOs. In addition, they also find that the market reacts significantly more 
negatively to takeover bids by managers perceived to be overconfident. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005a) analyse the impact of winning a high-profile 
tournament on the subsequent behaviour of the winner in the context of CEOs of US 
corporations. Malmendier and Tate state that the "superstar" status gives rise to CEO 
hubris which makes CEOs' performance decline. They construct a sample of superstar 
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CEOs which covers all CEOs who received CEO awards from Business Week, 
Financial World, Chief Executive, Forbes, Industry Week. Morningstar. com, Time, 
CNN, Electronic Business Magazine, and Ernst & Young between 1975 and 2002. 
Malmendier and Tate find that superstar CEOs spend significantly more time and effort 
on public and private activities outside their company, such as assuming board seats or 
writing books. Superstar CEOs are more likely to manage earnings and their firms are 
more likely to experience negative earnings after several years have elapsed following 
their last award. 
Collectively, the above studies show that managerial behavioural biases, which 
cause many managers to overestimate their ability and underestimate project risk, lead 
to shareholder value destruction. Typical examples are found in M&As. 
3.4 Implication of behavioural agency model on managerial risk 
taking 
This chapter presents the behavioural agency view that managers can exhibit a 
risk-seeking attitudes due to behavioural biases such as overconfidence, over-optimism 
and hubris. Under the influences of these biases, managers are likely to overestimate 
their abilities and under-estimate project risks. Managerial excessive risk taking is 
common and often associated with negative firm performance. The behavioural agency 
model casts doubt on the traditional agency studies discussed in Chapter 2 which do not 
recognise managers' 'irrational' behaviour and simply assume that managers are 
universally risk averse and that managerial risk taking, regardless the degree of risk 
taking, aligns the interests of shareholders and managers and can improve firm 
perforiance. As discussed in Section 2.5 of Chapter 5, traditional agency studies 
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generally do not emphasize managerial risk taking when estimating the risk incentive 
effect of executive compensation on firm performance. The behavioural agency model 
has made the examination of managerial risk taking critically important because it 
suggests that managers' excessive risk taking, as managerial risk avoidance, can also 
lead to firm value destruction. 
Interestingly, although risk is at the core of the behavioural agency model, 
empirical finance studies based on the behavioural agency model do not examine to 
what extent those behavioural biases are associated with managerial risk taking. As 
with the traditional agency studies discussed in Chapter 2, those behavioural agency 
studies simply examine the link between firm performance and behavioural biases, 
assuming that those biases can cause negative firm performance. They also do not 
consider the effect of managerial wealth in their model. During the bull market of the 
late 1990s, equities were highly overvalued; excessive amounts of stock options were 
granted to give managers more incentive to seek risks; companies, particularly internet 
and telecom companies, enjoyed excessively `good' stock price performance; many 
superstar CEOs were created by the media for their `substantial' contribution to such 
performance. For instance, Jean-Marie Messier, the CEO of Vivendi Universal, became 
one of these superstars and tried to establish a world's leading media empire, on the 
foundation of a 150-year-old French water company, within 8 years from 1994 (Johnson 
and Orange, 2003). This is an era full of managerial risk taking activities driven both 
by behavioural biases and by executive compensation in the form of equity and stock 
options. It is hard to tell which of these factors induced managers to pursue excessive 
investment risk, which, in turn, might have caused the stock market crash of earl' 2000. 
It is therefore critically important to combine the views of the traditional agency model 
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and the behavioural agency model to investigate managerial risk taking behaviour in the 
1990s 
How do shareholders ensure that the mix of risk incentives from managerial 
wealth and behavioural biases leads to neither too much risk taking nor too little? 
Corporate monitoring mechanisms through their monitoring role can steer managers 
towards optimal risk and avoid value destroying risk-deficit or risk-excess on the part of 
their managers. In the next chapter, I discuss theories and empirical evidence related to 
corporate monitoring mechanisms. 
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Chapter 4 
Monitoring Mechanisms and Managerial Risk Taking: 
Theory and Empirical Evidence 
4.1 Introduction 
We have seen in Chapter 2 that some managerial wealth components can induce 
managerial risk aversion while others can encourage managers to seek more risk. 
Chapter 3 suggests that behavioural biases can drive managers to indulge in excessively 
risky investments. Risk incentives from wealth components together with behavioural 
biases may result in managers pursuing suboptimally risky investments. Therefore, 
shareholders may need other levers to ensure managers pursue neither too little nor too 
much risk. 
Monitoring is one of the key corporate control devices. Monitors such as non- 
executive directors, or external blockholders, directly observe and evaluate managers' 
behaviour, the results such behaviour produces or both, to ensure that managers' 
decisions are consistent with shareholder objectives (Fama and Jensen, 1983). A strong 
remuneration committee can attempt to structure executive compensation packages in 
such a way that they will motivate managers to maximise firm value. A good corporate 
control system can also constrain managers with behavioural biases from indulging in 
excessive risk-seeking activities (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier and Tate, 
2004. Malmendier and Tate, 2005a). In summary, optimal monitoring can curb 
suboptimal risk avoidance and excessive risk preference among managers and this 
should be associated with shareholder value enhancement. 
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This chapter presents theories of how various corporate monitors may align 
managers' interests with those of shareholders and related empirical evidence. Section 
4.2 discusses four types of monitoring mechanisms: external blockholders, board 
independence, separation of CEO and chairman of board roles and remuneration 
committees. Empirical evidence is also provided in each subsection. Section 4.3 is the 
chapter summary. 
4.2 Monitoring mechanisms and firm risk taking 
In the presence of the principal-agent problem, shareholders develop corporate 
monitoring mechanisms to ensure that managerial decisions safeguard their own 
interests against the hazards of managerial self-interest. Many studies have shown that 
firms with weaker governance structures have greater agency problems and that firms 
with greater agency problems perform worse (Core et al, 1999; Gugler et al, 2003). 
Jong ei al (2005) use Royal Ahold as an example to illustrate what a corporate 
governance failure can bring to a company. Royal Ahold was one of the world's largest 
international retail grocery and food service companies. It was a family business owned 
by the Hejin Family, operating primarily in Netherlands for over 100 years. In 1989, 
Ahold was transformed from a family-controlled business to a management-controlled 
firm. It then adopted an expansion strategy via a series of large-scale acquisitions and 
turned into a global giant with a market capitalisation of ¬30.6 billion and operating 
5,155 stores in 27 countries by November 2001. However, in 2002, Ahold was charged 
with: hidden contractual obligations, manipulation through the consolidation of joint 
ventures and fraud involving vendor rebates. In 2003, Ahold suffered a complete 
meltdown and went to liquidation. Poor corporate governance, specifically, the absence 
of internal as well as external supervision of managers' strategy and implementation, 
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was a significant factor in Ahold's collapse. Managers were in effect in total control of 
the firm. Van der Hoeven, the CEO, put voting control of the institutional investors' 
holdings in a foundation, whose board was strongly influenced by Ahold's 
management. This deprived shareholders of the ability to monitor managers on a daily 
basis. Management also controlled two boards, the supervisory board and the 
management board. The supervisory board was where growth objectives and strategy 
should have been debated, implementation of strategy monitored and oversight 
maintained. The management board established the incentive compensation system. 
The management board then granted incentive plans that rewarded earnings growth, 
which in turn, provided a direct motivation for managers valuing growth over 
shareholder value. Ahold pursued a quick growth strategy by engaging in a series of 
acquisitions. Those `bad' acquisitions combined with accounting fraud and loss of 
investor confidence eventually led to the collapse of the company. 
Drawing upon the extensive corporate monitoring literature, this thesis focuses 
on four mechanisms that are likely to have impact on managerial risk preferences: 
external blockholders, board independence, the separation of the roles of chief executive 
officer and chairman of board and the presence of a remuneration committee. Each of 
these components is discussed in the following subsections. 
4.2.1 External blockholders 
External blockholders have stronger economic incentives than small atomistic 
external shareholders to undertake effective monitoring. This is because the former are 
able to capture a large fraction of the wealth gains arising from corporate value 
enhancement, whereas the latter cannot bare the costs associated with effective 
monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny. 1986). External blockers can exert a corporate 
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monitoring function by promoting an appropriate management compensation structure, 
by strengthening shareholders' voice on the board, by forcing managers to revise project 
proposals that may harm shareholder value, etc. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) present a 
model in which a takeover can be successful only when the bidder has already acquired 
a large minority ownership position in the firm. The potential takeover threat that large 
outside shareholders can exert works as an effective device for monitoring management. 
Thus, Shleifer and Vishny predict that, all else being equal, the presence of a large 
outside shareholder will have a positive effect on shareholders' wealth. 
An important component of external shareholders is institutional investors 
(Brickley et al, 1988). Institutional shareholders collectively are the largest owners of 
shares in the US and the UK. They perform high quality research in order to identify 
efficient firms in which to invest funds. Some institutional shareholders communicate 
directly with senior managers and thus may influence the terms of investments so as to 
maximise shareholder returns. Gillan and Starks (2000) demonstrate that institutional 
investors are the key players in shareholder activism. Using a sample of 2,042 
shareholder proposals submitted to 452 company boards from 1987 to 1994, Gillan and 
Starkes find that activism by institutional shareholders and coordinated groups brings 
about significantly more favourable voting outcomes than activism by uncoordinated 
groups of shareholders. Malmendier and Tate (2005a) argue that institutional 
shareholders may prevent behavioural biases from inducing CEOs to conduct corporate 
activities that are not in the best interest of shareholders and that destroy shareholder 
value. 
Other authors however argue that external blockholders can be ineffective. 
Family and individual shareholders are quite often descendents of the corporate founder. 
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They hold the shares purely as a passive investment, taking little interest in corporate 
activities (McConnell and Servaes, 1990). Institutional investors such as banks and 
insurance companies, frequently derive benefits from lines of business which fall under 
the control of managers of firms in which they hold a stake. Therefore, they are often 
subject to management influence (Brickley et al, 1988). Public pension funds are often 
managed by officials with their own personal agendas such as campaigning for public 
office, their goals may not be consistent with maximizing shareholder value (Woidtke, 
2002). These things are less likely to happen to mutual fund and foundations. 
Nevertheless, Franks et al (2001) report that when institutional shareholders are 
dissatisfied with management, instead of taking an active role in the decision-making 
process, they just sell shares43. If institutional shareholders sell a large block of shares, 
the selling activity may push down the stock price thereby adversely affecting 
shareholder value. 
Taken together, whether or not external blockholders are effective in 
disciplining management behaviour is debatable. Empirical evidence is provided in the 
following section. 
4.2.1.1 Empirical evidence 
Although a vast amount of empirical research has been conducted on the topic of 
external blockholders or institutional shareholders as a corporate control device, there 
43 Parrino et al (2003) however argue that institutional selling can influence board of directors' decision 
about whether or not to force a badly-performed CEO from office and select a new CEO. The forced 
CFO turnover is positively related to firm performance. They provide empirical support for this 
argument based on a sample of 583 CEO turnovers at large US public corporations over 1982 -1993 
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are only a limited number of studies that address their influence on managerial risk 
taking. There are however a small number of empirical studies on how external 
blockholders or institutional shareholders affect acquisition decisions as well as the 
value creation from acquisitions. 
Hill and Snell (1988) examine innovation strategy in research-intensive 
industries such as the Chemicals, Electrical and Electronics, Computers, Industrial and 
Farm Equipment and Pharmaceutical industries. In such industries, research-based 
innovations are regarded as high-risk/high-return investments. For a sample of 94 
Fortune 500 firms, Hill and Snell find that external blockholdings are significantly (at 
the I% level) positively related to firm R&D intensity, while R&D intensity is shown to 
significantly (at the 1% level) contribute to firm performance as measured by return on 
asset. This implies that external blockholders encourage managerial risk taking. 
Zahra (1996) examines the impact of corporate governance on entrepreneurial 
risk taking in large US industrial corporations. Zahra states that corporate 
entrepreneurship such as innovation aimed at business creation and venturing, can 
enhance shareholders' value by creating a work environment that supports individual 
and corporate growth and by bringing competitive advantage to the company. 
However, managers try to avoid corporate entrepreneurship because of their risk averse 
attitude (see Section 2.2 of Chapter 2 for a discussion of managerial risk aversion). 
Institutional shareholders can curb this managerial risk avoidance and support corporate 
entrepreneurship. Zahra measures corporate entrepreneurial activities by using 
activities linked to R&D investment, patents, new products, new markets, etc. For a 
sample of 138 firms from 1988 Fortune 500 list, Zahra finds that only long-term 
institutional shareholders such as mutual funds and pension funds are positively 
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associated with innovation and venturing, and that short-term institutional shareholders 
such as investment banks and private funds are not. Zahra explains that long-term 
institutional shareholders are generally large and have long investment durations. 
Managers of such funds are interested in their portfolios' long-term value. In contrast, 
short-term institutional funds are evaluated quarterly, which may promote short-term 
investment horizons. That's why managers of such funds do not favour corporate 
innovation and venturing which has a long investment horizon. 
Tufano (1996) examines corporate risk management activities in the North 
American gold mining industry. Given that the output of such an industry is a globally- 
traded volatile commodity, firms in this industry are considered to have high risk 
profiles. By investigating 48 North American Mining firms from 1990-1993, Tufano 
finds that corporate hedging activities against gold price risk are conducted mainly due 
to managers' risk aversion. When managers of gold mining firm hold a large 
investment in their firms' common stock, they hedge more against gold price risk. 
"l'ufano finds that the existence of external blockholders can make managers hedge gold 
price risk less. 
Wright ei al (1996) investigate how external blockholdings affect managerial 
risk taking. Firm risk is proxied by the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts of 
earnings per share. They explain that uncertainty of analysts' forecasts should be highly 
correlated with the unpredictability in cash flows generated by a firm's assets, which is 
a result of managerial risk taking behaviour. Managers are risk averse and are not 
willing to undertake more risky investments (see Section 2.2 of Chapter 2 for a 
discussion of risk-related agency problem). Managerial risk aversion is more harmful in 
firms with rich growth opportunities than in firms with few growth opportunities. 
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External blockholders or institutional shareholders should exert effective corporate 
control and prevent managers' avoidance of growth-oriented risky projects. Using a 
sample of 358 firms for 1986, and 514 firms for 1992, Wright et al find results 
consistent with their arguments. They find a positive association between managerial 
risk taking and institutional equity ownership for companies with considerable growth 
opportunities, but find an insignificant association for firms without such opportunities. 
Viewing external blockholders as a whole, they do not find any significant relationship 
between firm risk level and external blockholdings. Wright et al explain that this may 
be because some of the external blockholders, such as family and individual 
shareholders, may be passive investors. When passive investors dominate the external 
blockholders, the monitoring role of external blockholders may indeed be small. 
Collectively, the above relevant studies report mixed results for the monitoring 
effect of external blockholders on managerial risk taking. Expanding the discussion to 
studies that investigate the impact of external blockholders on acquisition decisions and 
value creation through acquisitions, the results are even more controversial. Cosh et al 
(1989) examine the role of institutional shareholders in acquisitions during the 1980s. 
I'hey expect that institutional shareholders, as the principal blockholders in the UK 
during the 1980s, ought to influence acquisition decisions such that the acquisition 
increases shareholder value. Under the control of institutional shareholders, acquiring 
companies will be discouraged from making acquisitions in pursuit of managers' empire 
building or other managers' self-interests at the expense of shareholder value. Cosh et 
al use a dichotomous classification for the influence of institutional shareholders. 
Acquirers who have a financial institution shareholding of 5% or more in the year prior 
to acquisitions are classified as potentially subject to influence from financial 
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institutions. Acquisition performance is measured by profitability (i. e., pre-tax returns 
on average net assets), or share returns (i. e., post-tax returns on shares). For 59 mergers 
in the low acquisition period of 1981-1983, Cosh et al find that the shareholders of 
acquirers which have institutional shareholder control experience significantly higher 
profitability and share returns following acquisitions. However, such evidence is not 
found in the sample of 77 acquisitions in 1986, the bull acquisition activity period. 
Cosh et al therefore suggest that the impact of institutional shareholders on acquisition 
performance is inconclusive and needs more examination. 
Using a sample of 846 corporate acquisitions from the period from 1978-1988, 
Martin (1996) finds that the likelihood of stock financing, which typically reduces the 
wealth of acquiring firm's shareholders, decreases with the level of external 
blockholdings associated with the acquirer. This finding implies that external 
blockholders discipline managers in their decisions to use stock financing in 
acquisitions because such a means of payment reduces shareholder value. 
Sudarsanam et al (1996) examine the impact of external large shareholders on 
acquirer shareholder wealth gains through acquisitions. They argue that if large 
shareholder monitoring of managers' behaviour is efficient, acquirer shareholders 
should experience wealth gains following the acquisitions. Where monitoring is 
inefficient, bidder managers may make value-destroying acquisitions or pay excessive 
premiums as a result of hubris and cause wealth loss for their shareholders. For a 
sample of 429 UK domestic acquisitions from 1980 to 1990, they find a significantly (at 
the 5% level) negative relationship between the acquirer announcement period 
cumulative abnormal returns and the shareholdings of external blockholders. 
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Sudarsanam et al conclude that monitoring the acquisition decisions of acquirers by 
large shareholders is ineffective. 
Duggal and Millar (1999) employ corporate takeover decisions to investigate the 
impact of institutional ownership on corporate performance. They postulate that if 
institutional shareholders are active corporate monitors who support (oppose) managers' 
firm value enhancing (reducing) policies and decisions, then their presence should 
increase acquirer shareholder value. Such a positive relationship between acquirer 
shareholder value and institutional ownership is unlikely to be found if institutional 
shareholders are passive investors who just sell their holdings in poorly performing 
companies rather than expend their resources in monitoring and improving firm 
performance. For a sample of 120 US firms who conducted acquisitions over the 1985- 
1990 period, Duggal and Millar find no relationship between bidder gains as measured 
by bidders' announcement period cumulative abnormal returns and institutional 
ownership. They therefore conclude that institutional investors do not exercise effective 
corporate control to enhance bidder shareholder value. 
Kohers and Kohers (2001) examine the agency problem in high-tech mergers 
over the period 1984 to 1995. They postulate that, as acquiring risky high-tech 
companies might quickly and greatly stimulate the growth of the buyers, this would be 
especially appealing to self-interested managers who are susceptible to agency 
problems. Institutional shareholders in such firms should check managers' self- 
interests. Acquisitions taken under the control of institutional shareholders should 
enhance shareholder value. For a sample of 304 US takeovers, Kohers and Kohers find 
that institutional ownership is positively related to the bidder's 3-year post-acquisition 
performance as measured by buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns. Kohers and Kohers 
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conclude that institutional shareholders contribute to better post-acquisition 
performance of high-tech mergers. 
Overall, the studies of the impact of external blockholders on takeover decisions 
and value creation of acquirers' shareholder value show inconsistent results for the 
efficiency of the monitoring function of external blockholders. 
There also exist other studies that examine the effectiveness of large outside 
shareholders. Briefly, Boubakri et al (2004) report that external blockholdings are 
significantly positively related to post-privatisation firm performance. McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) report a positive relationship between Tobin's Q and the fraction of 
shares owned by institutional investors. Huson et al (2004) document that institutional 
shareholdings are significantly positively related to post CEO turnover performance. 
Uang et al (2004) find that institutional shareholders can prevent managers of 
financially distressed companies from not truthfully reporting companies' going 
concern status44. Core et al (1999) suggest that the existence of external blockholdings 
can control the excessive pay granted to CEOs. However, Cosh and Hughes (1997) in 
their UK-based study, find that the presence or absence of institutional shareholders 
makes no difference to the levels of CEO pay or CEO dismissal, implying that 
institutional shareholders are passive investors rather than active investors, who do not 
engage in designing remuneration packages that align the interests of shareholders and 
managers, and do not dismiss CEOs who perform badly. 
Sudarsanam et al (1996), Franks L't al (2001). and Weir et al (2002) all 
conducted UK studies. Franks et al (2001) investigate to what extent corporate control 
 Going concern is bad news for companies. It shows bad management in those companies. Therefore 
managers try to cover it up. 
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devices serve to discipline of poorly performing management. For a UK sample of 243 
firms over 1988-1993, they find that large UK external shareholders exert little 
disciplining effect on managers. An alliance of the five biggest shareholders can on 
average control more than 30% of company shares. However, there is little evidence to 
suggest that they unite to perform their corporate control function. On the contrary, the 
main source of large shareholder control comes from that which lies in the hands of 
inside managers and these are used to entrench rather than to discipline management. 
Weir et al (2002) examine the impact of external blockholdings on firm performance. 
They argue that the existence of external blockholders should enhance firm performance 
because external blockholders reduce agency costs. They use Tobin's Q measured by 
market capitalisation plus total debt divided by total assets as a proxy for firm 
performance. They find little relationship between performance and external 
blockholdings for a sample of 311 large UK public firms over the period 1994-1996. 
Sudarsanam et al (1996) find that acquirer's large shareholders are ineffective in 
monitoring acquisition decisions. Overall, the above studies are inconclusive as to 
whether or not large outside shareholders perform disciplinary functions on managers in 
the UK. 
4.2.1.2 Summary 
Some studies suggest that external blockholders as well as institutional investors 
can provide efficient monitoring of managers' behaviour. Those large outside 
shareholders are argued to be able to curb both managerial risk avoidance and excessive 
managerial risk taking influenced by behavioural biases. Other studies however argue 
that external blockholders do not provide efficient monitoring of managers' behaviour. 
l. mpirical studies provide inconsistent results. While there are a limited number of 
empirical studies reporting the impact of external blockholders on managerial risk 
avoidance, there are no such studies showing that they prevent managerial excessive 
risk seeking. Studies are needed in these areas. 
4.2.2 Board independence 
One of the roles of a board of directors is to ensure separation of decision 
management and control since the board always has the power to hire, fire and 
compensate the top-level decision managers and to ratify and monitor important 
decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Corporate boards in the UK and several other 
countries, like the US, are generally comprised of both executive directors and non- 
executive directors. As professional managers themselves, the interests of executive 
directors are theorized to be aligned with the other managers in the firm. As Mace 
(1971) notes, executive directors believe that they are being evaluated by the insiders, 
and thcy often are, as potential candidates for the CEO's successor. 
Non-executive directors are theorised to be aligned with those of stockholders. 
1'hey act as arbiters in disagreements among internal managers and carry out tasks that 
involve serious agency problems between internal managers and external shareholders 
(1: to a, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). A second role of non-executives is to review the 
performance of the board and of the executives (Cadbury Report, 1992). Non-executive 
directors possess three characteristics that enable them to fulfill their monitoring 
function. First, they have certain legal obligations to shareholders and they can be held 
liable for damages if they fail to meet these obligations. Second is their independence. 
Third, they Neill have some desire to maintain or establish their reputations as good 
monitors and competent business people. Successive UK corporate governance regimes 
from the Cadbury Report in 1992 to the most recent Higgs Report in 2003 have 
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emphasised the critical role of non-executive directors and laid down guidelines for 
ensuring their independence. 
Therefore, the ability of the board to act as a guardian of stockholder welfare is a 
function of board composition (Mizruchi, 1983). If management dominates the board, 
then even in the event of deteriorating performance, managers' position should remain 
secure. If, on the other hand, the board has control over management, then top 
management may be ousted by the board. Ranft and Neill (2001) suggest the existence 
of narcissistic leaders who isolate themselves from the advice of others, interpret 
criticism as threat, and frequently become myopic in their views. This narcissistic 
behaviour fosters hubris. Ranft and Neill state that a board dominated by non-executive 
directors will guide executive directors through the varied problems a narcissist 
perspective might cause. 
Another group of studies, however, argues that non-executive directors are 
ineffective monitors. Firstly, many of the non-executive directors are executive 
directors of other firms. They are busy people and unlikely to become intimately 
involved in the affairs of the host company (Mace, 1971). Secondly, CEOs are involved 
in the selection of new non-executive directors. The board may become little more than 
a `rubber stamp' which serves only to legitimise executive management decisions 
because top management both select and dominate the board (Pfeffer, 1972; Shivdasani 
and Yermack, 1999). Thirdly, the monitoring role depends on the identity of the non- 
executive directors. Representatives of financial institutions or major customers are 
likely to have more power than representatives from universities, civil rights groups. or 
others referred to as 'public' directors (Mizruchi, 1983). 
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From the above it can be seen that there are two opposite views with regard to 
the monitoring role of non-executive directors. The related empirical evidence is 
provided in the following section. 
4.2.2.1 Empirical evidence 
Direct empirical evidence for the impact of non-executive directors on 
managerial risk taking is limited. Hill and Snell (1988) is one of the few studies that 
provide direct evidence. They find that the percentage of outside directors on the board 
is negatively related to firm R&D expenditure (risk taking), but positively related to 
firm diversification (risk reduction). This supports the view that non-executive 
directors can be inefficient in monitoring managers in their risk taking behaviour. 
Managers prefer reducing firm risk to decreasing their exposure to firm specific risk. 
When outside directors are selected by inside directors, outsiders are likely to follow 
insiders' corporate strategy of firm risk reduction. 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) examine how non-executive directors can stop 
excessive managerial risk taking induced by managerial hubris. Hubris causes 
managers to over-pay acquisition premiums. Non-executive directors can place more 
checks on CEO's acquisition decisions and prevent overpayment to the target 
shareholders. For a sample of 106 large US acquisitions, Hayward and Hambrick report 
that when the acquirer's board has a high proportion of outside directors, acquirers pay 
much lower acquisition premiums for targets than when the acquirer board is dominated 
by insiders. 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006) examine the impact of non-executive directors 
on acquirer shareholder value gains through acquisitions. For a sample of 519 UK 
acquisitions during 1983-1995, Sudarsanam and Mahate find that a high proportion of 
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non-executive directors on the board enhances acquirer shareholder value 3 years after 
acquisitions. 
The above studies show that non-executive directors are effective in disciplining 
managers' acquisition decisions. Other studies on the effectiveness of board 
independence report inconsistent results. Weisbach (1988) finds that outsider- 
dominated boards are significantly more likely to respond to poor performance by 
dismissing CEOs. This CEO turnover is accompanied by improvements in firm 
performance (Huson et al, 2004). Byrd and Hickman (1992), Bhagat and Black (1999) 
and Ilermalin and Weisbach (2003) report that boards with a higher proportion of 
independent directors make major decisions that support shareholder interests such as 
replacing a poorly-performing CEO, consideration of tender offers from other 
companies that can bring in a better management team than the existing one, and 
adoption of poison pills45 to prevent executive directors from selling the company for an 
unfairly low price. Brickley et al (1994) and Cotter et al (1997) also find that 
independent boards are more likely to use resistance strategies such as poison pills to 
enhance target shareholder wealth in tender offers. 
Mehran et al (1998) document that the more outside directors a board has, the 
more likely it is to conduct voluntary liquidation. In liquidation, CEOs forego the 
present value of future compensation and the consumption of perks in their current firm 
in exchange for severance pay, and/or compensation from future employment. etc. If 
the incremental costs to CEOs from liquidation exceed the benefits, CEOs may oppose 
'` Poison pill is a strategy used by corporations to discourage a hostile takeover by another company. It 
includes allowing existing shareholders to buy more shares at a discount, allowing shareholders of the 
target firm to buy the acquirer's share at a discounted price after the merger, etc. 
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voluntary liquidation even though the liquidation enhances shareholder value. The 
existence of outside directors can make voluntary liquidations more likely to happen. 
Uang et al (2004) find some weak evidence that the control of non-executive directors 
makes managers of financially distressed companies report fairly about companies' 
going-concern status which is bad news for companies and which managers try to cover 
up. 
While the above studies document a positive effect of board independence, other 
studies provide evidence to the contrary. Baysinger and Butler (1985), Mehran (1995), 
Yermack (1996), Klein (1998), Agrawal and Knoeber (2001), Bhagat and Black (2002) 
and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), all find no relationship between board 
independence and firm performance measured by Tobin's Q, book-to-market ratio, 
stock returns, return on equity, return on asset, etc. Core et al (1999) do not find that 
non-executive directors are effective in controlling excessive CEO compensation. 
Bhagat and Black (1999) even identify a negative correlation between percentage of 
non-executive directors on the board and firm stock and accounting performance. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) survey the research on boards of directors in the 
economic and finance literature. They conclude that board composition as measured by 
the insider-outsider ratio is not correlated to firm performance as measured by Tobin's 
Q. Although board actions do appear to be related to board structure, firms with higher 
proportions of outside directors and those with smaller boards tend to make arguably 
better decisions, ceteris paribus, concerning acquisitions, poison pills, executive 
compensation, and CEO replacement, from the perspective that shareholder value can 
be enhanced. 
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The above studies are based on US companies. The evidence relating to UK 
companies is also mixed. Cosh and Hughes (1997) conducted a UK-based stud}, and 
find that the presence of non-executive directors on the board makes no difference to the 
level of CEO pay or CEO dismissal, implying that UK non-executive directors only 
have a transient interest in company affairs and do not engage in designing 
remuneration packages that align the interests of shareholders and managers, and do not 
dismiss CEOs who perform badly. For a sample of 460 industrial firms from 1989 to 
1996, Dahya et al (2002) find that the sensitivity of management turnover to firm 
performance is significantly stronger following the adoption of the recommendation of 
Cadbury Report (1992), particularly in firms which increased non-executive directors in 
line with the recommendation. Dahya and McConnell (2003) investigate UK public 
company performance changes over the years surrounding the issuance of the Cadbury 
Report (1992). Using a sample of 1,124 industrial firms listed on London Stock 
Exchange over the period 1989 -1996, they find that companies that added directors to 
conform with the Cadbury recommendation (i. e., a minimum number of 3 outside 
directors on the board) exhibited a significant increase in average return on assets 
(ROA) of 2.5% from one year before to two years after the adoption. Over the same 
time interval, the adopting companies' industry peers experienced an insignificant 
increase in average ROA of just 0.33%. 
In contrast, Weir (1997), Weir and Laing (2000), Franks et al (2001) and Weir et 
al (2002) do not find that non-executive directors in the UK perform a disciplinary 
function. Franks et al (2001) explain that this is to do with UK regulations. The 
powers to enforce fiduciary responsibilities on directors in the UK are weak, while in 
the US. directors have a duty of care to shareholders and can be sued for failing to fulfil 
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their fiduciary responsibilities. Therefore unlike non-executive directors in the US who 
perform an active governance function, they only perform an advisory role in the UK. 
It is thus not surprising that the above studies do not find significant corporate control 
from UK non-executive directors. 
Overall the empirical studies are controversial with regard to the effectiveness of 
non-executive directors' monitoring role on managers. Nevertheless there does exist 
evidence that non-executive directors can curb managers' excessive risk taking in 
acquisitions and help create value for acquirer shareholders. 
4.2.2.2 Summary 
It is suggested that non-executive directors can safeguard shareholder value 
against managers' self-interest. However, it is also argued that non-executive directors 
can be ineffective in corporate monitoring because they are under the control of 
executive directors, because they are far too busy to take care of company affairs, or 
because who they are, i. e., whether they are a university professor or represent an 
institutional shareholder. Empirical evidence is mixed. Based on the limited number of 
studies into the impact of non-executive directors on managerial risk taking, while it is 
not ccrtain whether non-executive directors can curb managerial risk avoidance, it 
seems that they can prevent managerial excessive risking induced by managers' 
behavioural biases. 
4.2.3 CEO-COB non-duality 
Duality refers to the CEO also holding the chair of the board (COB) position 
thereby diluting the monitoring and oversight function of the board (Fama and Jensen. 
1983, Nlorck et al, 1987). In the UK. the Cadbury Report (1992) on corporate 
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governance has advocated separation of the two roles (i. e., non-duality). Duality 
impairs the ability of the board to ensure that the firm pursues goals consistent with 
shareholder value enhancement. Dominant CEOs who are also COBs may be prone to 
behavioural frailties such as hubris, which may go unchecked by a weak and 
subservient board. This has been voiced by Benjamin Rosen, Chairman of Compaq. 
"When the CEO is also chairman, management has de facto control. Yet the board is 
supposed to be in charge of management. Checks and balances have been thrown to the 
wind" (Brickley et al, 1997, p. 190). 
The other perspective is that a combined role of CEOs and COBs gives CEOs 
more authority to run the company, which in some cases is better for firm management 
and performance (Ranft and Neill, 2001). Ranft and Neill illustrate this by using CEO- 
COB conflict in Value America, the Internet superstore. Craig Winn, the founder of the 
company became the COB and hired Thomas Morgan as the CEO just before the firm's 
IPO. Winn said that he found it difficult to transfer the decision making power to the 
new CEO who did not have sufficient knowledge of the new industry. However, 
Morgan stated that Winn cannot let go of his baby. The company lost millions and the 
stock value declined. Both Winn and Morgan were replaced. The boardroom fight 
between the top two decision makers of the firm, CEO and COB, is one of the major 
reasons for the deteriorating performance of Value America. 
4.2.3.1 Empirical evidence 
Empirical evidence on CEO-COB nonduality is also mixed. Hayward and 
I lamhrick (1997) and Malmendier and Tate (2004) examine how a non-executive COB 
can curb a CEO's behavioural biases in the context of corporate acquisitions. Hayward 
and Hambrick (1997) find that non-duality weakens the relationship between CEO 
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hubris and acquisition premiums paid for targets. Malmendier and Tate (2004) expect 
that a non-executive chairman can exercise regular checks on a CEO's corporate 
investment decisions and ensure that CEO proposed acquisitions are less influenced by 
CEO's overconfidence and therefore may create value for shareholders. For a sample of 
477 large US companies from 1980 to 1994, Malmendier and Tate find that separation 
of the role of CEO and COB is associated with higher acquirer cumulative abnormal 
returns over (-1, +1) day, day 0 being the acquisition announcement day. 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006) examine the impact of CEO-COB duality on 
acquirer shareholder value gains through acquisitions. For a sample of 519 UK 
acquisitions during 1983-1995, they find that CEO-COB duality only has a weak 
negative impact on acquirer post-acquisition value creation. Other studies on the 
concentration of power of CEOs and COBs also report mixed results. Core et al (1999) 
report that duality encourages excessive CEO pay. Examining 1,018 US firms in 1997, 
Ryan and Wiggins (2004) document that CEOs who are also chairmen are less likely to 
replace cash pay with equity. They suggest that powerful CEOs use their positions to 
make their compensation less sensitive to stock price performance and thus put their pay 
at less risk. Brickley et al (1997) examine the impact of duality on company 
performance. For a sample of 661 Forbes' firms for the 1988 accounting year, Brickley 
et al find that the non duality of CEO and COB has no influence on corporate 
performance as measured by Tobin's Q, stock returns, return on capital, etc. Similarly, 
Weir et al (2002) and Dahya (2003) also show that the combination of the positions of 
CEO and chairman has no influence on corporate performance. For a sample of 179 
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non-financial companies receiving an audit going concern modification46 in the UK 
between 30 June 1994 and 3 January 2000, Uang et al (2004) find that excessive 
concentration of power as proxied by the combination of the roles of CEO and COB 
does not reduce the quality of management reporting of going-concern uncertainties. 
implying that combing the roles of CEO and COB does not intensify agency problems. 
4.2.4 Remuneration committee 
A remuneration committee exercises its corporate control function by 
determining, on behalf of the board and the shareholders, the company's policy on 
executive remuneration and specific remuneration packages for each of the executive 
directors (Greenbury Report, 1995; Hampel Report, 1998). Greenbury Report (1995) 
states that remuneration committees should consist exclusively of non-executive 
directors who are independent of management and free from any business or other 
relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of their independent 
judgment. Remuneration committees could prevent the tendency of executive 
management to increase its compensation and/or design compensation contracts that 
misalign the interests of managers and shareholders. 
An alternative view is that remuneration committee could be ineffective due to 
the control on them by managers (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004, chapter 5 and chapter 6). 
Managers can exert influence on remuneration committees and distort the compensation 
process. Managers are involved in the selection of the members of a remuneration 
committee. The remuneration package set by the remuneration committee is 
46 Going concern modification indicates company's financial distress and is bad news for a company. 
Company directors have incentives not to report it fairly. 
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unavoidably affected by managers' preferences, for instance, for more cash pay but less 
performance-linked pay, or more stock option grants when the stock market is rising. 
Bebchuk and Fried state that managers essentially set their own compensation. A 
compensation package designed in such a way is not likely to align the interests of 
managers and shareholders. 
4.2.4.1 Empirical evidence 
Empirical evidence on remuneration committee is limited. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers conducted a survey in May 1999 to examine the remuneration 
of UK listed companies' directors. The survey covers companies in the FTSE All-Share 
Index for financial periods ending between 26 December 1998 and 31 March 1999. The 
survey finds 281 companies out of 298 (94%) whose remuneration committees are 
dominated by independent47 non-executive directors. With such a high compliance with 
the recommendation of Greenbury Report (1995), the survey implies that remuneration 
committees should be able to exert an effective monitoring on directors remuneration 
policy. 
Main and Johnson (1993) find that the existence of a remuneration committee is 
positively related to firm performance. However, Klein (1998) only finds a weak, 
47 the non-executive director is non-independent if any of the following apply: 
S 
S 
S 
S 
The individual is an ex-employee of the company, another company in the group or a predecessor 
company; 
fie or she works for an advisor of the company; 
I le or she has been on the Board for more than nine years; 
Any other material relationship or contract between the non-executive director and company is 
disclosed. 
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positive link between these two. Weir and Laing (2000) report some UK evidence from 
a sample of 200 randomly selected quoted large UK companies each year from 1992 to 
1995, they find that the presence of a remuneration committee has a positive effect on 
firm performance. 
4.3 Summary 
Corporate monitors such as external blockholdings, non-executive directors, 
CEO-Chairman non-duality, and the remuneration committees discipline management 
behaviour, and ensure that managers take corporate actions to maximise shareholder 
value. In the case of managerial risk taking, efficient corporate monitors should curb 
both managerial risk avoidance and excessive managerial risk taking induced by 
behavioural biases. This chapter presents the theoretical arguments as well as the 
empirical evidence on how each of these monitors plays a monitoring role and how 
cffcctive the monitoring is. 
It is arguable whether or not external blockholders as well as institutional 
investors provide efficient monitoring of managers' behaviour. Empirical studies into 
the impact of external blockholders on managerial risk taking, value creation of 
acquisition, and various other firm behaviours show a mixed result. It is also 
controversial as to whether or not a board with a high proportion of non-executive 
directors can be a more effective monitor than a board with a low proportion of non- 
executi\'c directors. No consistent conclusion has been drawn on the impact of the 
combination of the role of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of Board on 
managerial risk taking, or shareholder value. While some studies report that the 
remuneration committees help improve firm performance, others state that they simply 
become a `rubber stamp' under the control of top managers. Overall, existing corporate 
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governance literature does not show with any certainty that any of the four corporate 
monitors discussed in this chapter play a disciplinary role on management behaviour. 
Thus more empirical studies are recommended. 
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Chapter 5 
Determinants of Acquisition Risk and Post-acquisition 
Performance: Research Questions and Hypotheses 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous three chapters discuss the theories and empirical evidence related 
to managerial risk taking. Combining the traditional agency literature and behavioural 
agency literature, the thesis identifies three major factors that affect managers' risk 
preferences. They are the components of managerial wealth portfolio, behavioural 
biases and corporate monitoring mechanisms. These factors are discussed separately in 
Chapter 2,3 and 4. Their impact on managerial risk taking is illustrated in Figure 1-1 in 
Chapter 1. 
During this review process it became apparent that the research on the 
determinants and performance consequence of managerial risk taking is quite limited. 
Traditional agency studies only assume that managers are risk avoiders and try to 
suggest incentive plans to drive managers to conduct risky projects to maximise 
shareholder value. On the other hand, the behavioural agency literature criticizes the 
risk assumption for managers in the traditional agency model as being far too restricted. 
Managers can be risk seeking as well as risk averse. Therefore, the behavioural 
theorists ignore the solutions proposed by the traditional agency model and suggest that 
traditional agency studies are not able to solve the puzzle of managerial risk taking since 
the model assumption is not correct. However, no empirical studies have integrated 
these two views in one model to comprehensively analyse the determinants of 
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managerial risk taking. This literature gap along with other issues that have been 
neglected by the existing literature will be discussed in section 5.2. T« o research 
questions are raised in Section 5.2, the first relates to an examination of the 
determinants of managerial risk taking, and the second relates to associating firm 
performance and managerial risk taking. 
Acquisitions are used as a context for the investigation of managerial decision- 
making. The different risk profiles associated with high-tech acquisitions as compared 
to low-tech acquisitions are described in Section 5.3. In accordance with the research 
questions and the discussion of the risk profile of acquisitions, Section 5.4 hypothesizes 
the relationship between acquisition risk and various managerial wealth components. 
The hypothesized relationships between acquisition risk and managers' behavioural 
biases are presented in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 covers the postulated association 
between acquisition risk and various corporate monitors. Summarising all the above 
hypotheses, Section 5.7 reports the conceptual model of managerial risk taking 
presented in this thesis. Section 5.8 postulates on relationship between acquirer's post- 
acquisition performance and the risk level of acquisitions, and describes the 
performance model presented in this thesis. Section 5.9 is the chapter summary. 
5.2 Literature gap and research questions 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature written on the impact of the components of 
managerial wealth portfolio on managers' risk incentive as well as managerial risk 
taking. Chapter 3 presents the view of how behavioural biases such as overconfidence, 
over-optimism and hubris, can drive managers to conduct excessive risk taking resulting 
in shareholder value loss. Chapter 4 shows how corporate monitors can discipline 
managers' suboptimal corporate behaviours or align their behaviour with shareholder 
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interests. Summarising the studies in those three chapters, this section discusses the 
apparent literature gap in the field of managerial risk taking. 
In traditional agency studies managers are assumed to be risk averse. Wealth 
incentives such as compensation contracts including LTIP share awards, stock options, 
and equity ownership are provided to managers to reduce their degree of risk avoidance. 
I lowever, evidence is inconclusive as to whether or not any of these incentive plans are 
effective in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. Depending on the 
payoff structure, these incentive plans can have different impacts on managers risk 
attitudes. The behavioural agency literature argues that the risk assumption for 
managers in the traditional agency model is far too restricted. Managers can be risk 
seeking as well as risk averse. Managerial behavioural biases which may be encouraged 
by managers' good past performance or media praise can lead to excessive managerial 
risk taking resulting shareholder value loss. These managerial behavioural biases 
however are not considered by the traditional agency studies which examine the 
determinants of managerial risk taking behaviour. Corporate monitors such as external 
blockholders, non-executive directors, and remuneration committees are suppose to 
discipline managers and make sure that managers take neither too much nor too little 
risk. Studies of the impact that corporate control devices have on managerial risk taking 
are te \ý 
Taken together, no empirical studies has incorporated the views of traditional 
agency, theory and behavioural agency theory into one model and conducted a 
comprehensive study of managerial risk taking. The question of what drives managers 
to take risk remains a puzzle in the empirical literature. This is what this thesis aims to 
explore. The first research question is as follows: 
127 
Q1: What are the factors that drive managers to undertake risky projects? 
This question will be answered mainly from the perspective of managerial 
wealth, behavioural biases, and corporate monitoring mechanisms. The major 
difference between this thesis and the other studies on managerial risk incentive is that 
this thesis does not restrict its assumption on managers' risk attitudes. Managers can be 
risk averse, risk neutral or risk seeking. Their risk preferences are affected by their 
wealth portfolio, their psychological biases, and corporate control devices. A relaxed 
assumption regarding managerial risk attitude can better explain firm's business 
behaviour. 
A proxy for risky projects is needed in order to answer research question Q1. 
Section 2.5 of Chapter 2 has summarised the major proxies for managerial risk taking in 
the existing literature. They can be mainly categorised into firm risk (an ex post 
measure) and investment risk (an ex ante measure). Firm risk is measured by firm stock 
return volatility, book-to-market ratio, analysts' forecast of earnings per share, etc. 
Investment risk is measured by corporate risk diversification, corporate hedging, R&D 
investment, oil & gas exploration activities, etc. As discussed in Section 2.5 of Chapter 
2, an ex time measure is superior to an ex post measure because the latter is not a direct 
measure of managerial risk taking while the former is. An ex post measure captures 
soiiic other events that occur after managers' investment decisions have been executed 
while an ex ante measure such as investment risk directly reflects managers' choice of 
project risk. Therefore, this thesis employs an ex ante measure of investment risk, 
managers' choice of high-risk, high-tech acquisitions as a proxy for managerial risk 
taking 
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Acquisitions are large and visible corporate investments that can significantly 
alter acquirer risk profiles (Smith and Triantis, 1995). They accentuate agency conflicts 
more than other internal capital investment projects such as R&D investment because 
acquisitions involve much more time, people and corporate resources than any other 
internal capital investments. Acquisitions generally require the active participation of 
all decision makers, namely, managers, directors and shareholders. Managers usually 
negotiate acquisitions, directors have to endorse them and are sometimes involved in the 
negotiations, and shareholders have to vote on them. There exists significant 
divergence of interests among these parties regarding acquisition decisions. 
Shareholders would like managers to conduct acquisitions that yield synergies and 
create firm value (Manne, 1965; Sudarsanam, 2003, Chapter 4). Managers may pursue 
size via acquisitions in order to accelerate their wealth accumulation, secure their jobs 
and increase their power but at the cost of shareholders (Firth, 1980; Jensen, 1986). 
Managers may spend corporate resources to buy rapidly growing companies to create 
attractive job opportunities for young managers and to assure the survival of the 
company regardless of whether the acquisitions can bring value to shareholders or not 
(Shleifler and Vishny, 1989; Morck el al, 1990). Boards of directors representing 
shareholders try to control managers' pursuit of self-interest and to ensure that 
acquisition decisions are in line with shareholder value enhancement (Sudarsanam et al, 
1996). Acquisitions therefore are a suitable context in which to examine the conflict of 
interests among managers, shareholders, and boards of directors. 
While diversifying acquisitions are thought to be driven by managerial 
preference für risk reduction (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Amihud ei al, 1986; May, 1995), 
acquisitions of targets rich in intangible assets such patents or R&D, obviously ratchet 
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up the risk faced by the acquirers (Kohers and Kohers, 2001). The background of high- 
tech acquisitions as well as the reasons why they are riskier than low-tech acquisitions 
are discussed in the next section. There is extensive evidence that acquirer firm 
shareholders do not gain from acquisitions in the short term and experience value losses 
in the longer term (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2001; Sudarsanam, 2003, chapter 4; Moeller et 
al, 2004). Whether such value losses are due to skewed risk incentives that managerial 
wealth components provide or are encouraged by behavioural biases such as 
overconfidence, over-optimism, or hubris is an interesting question to resolve 
empirically. In this thesis therefore acquisitions are considered to be an appropriate 
corporate decision-making context in which to explore the relationship among wealth, 
behavioural biases, monitoring mechanisms, investment risk profile, and shareholder 
value gains. Corresponding to research question Q1, Section 5.4 to Section 5.6 propose 
specific hypotheses which are subsequently tested in this thesis. 
So far the first research question has been raised and the context in which 
investigate this question has been discussed. The second step is to examine the 
performance consequence of managerial risk taking. This investigation is usually 
neglected in traditional agency studies. Traditional agency theorists consider 
managerial risk aversion to be the norm, managerial risk taking is always regarded as an 
activity that can reduce the principal-agent conflicts arising from such risk aversion, and 
consequently increase firm value. See Section 2.5 of Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion 
of this issue. This thesis allows for both managerial risk aversion and managerial risk 
seeking. high-risk projects brought about managerial behavioural biases can cause 
shareholder value destruction just as low-risk investments undertaken due to managerial 
risk avoidance. This highlights the importance of examining the relationship between 
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managerial risk taking and subsequent firm performance and implies that an optimal- 
risk project that can maximise shareholder value can neither be at too high risk nor at 
too low risk to the firm. It is therefore necessary to identify the level of suboptimality 
of investment project risk and to investigate the association between firm performance 
and the level of suboptimality of the project. This is not examined in the existing 
literature. The second research question therefore is: 
Q2: To what extent is firm performance related to the optimal or 
suboptimal risk level of an investment project? 
In the case of acquisitions, research question Q2 relates to an exploration of the 
association between acquirer post-acquisition performance and the 
optimality/suboptimality of acquisition risk. To investigate this relationship, the first 
step is to determine the optimal risk level of acquisitions. However, none of the 
existing theoretical models provides a formulation of the optimal risk level of an 
investment project which combines the perspectives of the traditional agency, 
behavioural agency, and corporate governance frameworks. This thesis aims to 
establish an empirical risk model to predict such a level. The model is introduced in 
Section 6.5 of Chapter 6. Specific hypotheses corresponding to research question Q2 
are presented in Section 5.8. 
Betöre any hypotheses regarding acquisition risk are provided, the next section 
first discusses the risk profile of high-tech and low-tech acquisitions. 
5.3 Risk profile of high-tech acquisitions 
The fifth merger wave in the USA and the parallel fourth merger wave in the 
UK that occurred between 1993 and 2000 was characterised by a large number of 
acquisitions of firms operating in high-tech areas such as the telecommunications, 
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computers, the internet, biotechnology, etc. A common characteristic of those 
industries is that they often reflect young, emerging industries that have a high level of 
intangible assets and focus on the development of new and innovative technology 
within their respective areas (Ittner et al, 2003). Saura Diaz and Gomez-Mejia (1997) 
based on the assessment of several researchers summarise the unique features of high- 
tech firms. In brief, they are as follows: 
1. Tasks are highly uncertain and tend to have a long time horizon. 
2. Research projects, as well as business plans, may have to be altered overnight as 
a result of a new product release. 
3. There is a need to channel resources to R&D, the core function of the firm, and to 
reduce expenditures in other areas. 
4. There exists high outcome uncertainty given the difficulty of establishing 
unambiguous cause-effect linkages between R&D and products. 
5. Whether or not technical success will lead to commercial success is uncertain at 
best, with most patented inventions failing to generate sufficient revenues to 
cover the development costs. 
6. Firms are willing to take risk and have a high tolerance for ambiguity. 
7. Firms promote entrepreneurial activities and have a high tolerance for failure. 
Acquisitions of such high-growth companies may enhance the capabilities of the 
acquirer to move into a new growth area and achieve technological breakthroughs and 
thereby gain sustainable competitive advantage. Such acquisitions are called `high-tech 
acquisitions' (Kohers and Kohers, 2001). High-tech acquisitions are in nature similar to 
a growth option. i. e., "an early investment (e. g.. R&D, lease on undeveloped land or oil 
reserves, strategic acquisition, information network/infrastructure) is perquisite or link 
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in a chain of interrelated projects, opening up future growth opportunities (e. g., new 
generation product or process, oil reserves, access to new market, strengthening of core 
capabilities)" (Smith and Triantis, 1995, p. 4). If the post-acquisition integration is 
successful, the enhanced resources and capabilities of the merging firm may create 
many more growth opportunities, e. g., to develop new generations of products or 
processes, the potential to access new market niches. 
However purchasing high-tech firms is also associated with high-risk and is 
vulnerable to failure (Bannert and Tschirky, 2004). Firstly, the scope for estimation 
error is large. Serious information asymmetry exists in intangibles-intensive companies 
between insiders and outsiders (Lev, 2001). This increases the difficulty for target 
identification, valuation and post-acquisition integration. To make things worse, it is 
reported that technologists are rarely involved in the valuation process (James et al, 
1998). 
Secondly, some studies have reported that acquisitions undermine the 
development of technology capabilities by diverting resources and management 
attention away from the existing business (Hitt et al, 1991; Chakrabarti et al, 1994; 
Gerpott, 1995; Hitt et al, 1996; James et al, 1998). Dyer (2002) analyses the 
performance of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) following the merger in 2000 and reports that 
research often grinds to a halt when mergers are announced because people wonder if 
the), \v ill have a job and if their projects will be continued. GSK has lost probably 
around five years' research time due to a series of merger activities and four out of 
twelve top scientists in their R&D group have left since the merger in 2000. The 
company, seems to have suffered greatly from faltering innovation. 
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Thirdly, uncertainty exists as to whether or not the acquired technology can lead 
to a commercially successful product or service. Many of these high-tech firms pursue 
untested products, markets, and business models. Hence, more uncertainty and longer 
investment horizons characterize the growth opportunities of high-tech firms and the 
payoffs from technology investments are often highly negative (Chan et al, 2001; 
Kothari et al, 2001). 
Low-tech acquisitions, i. e., acquisitions of low-tech firms, are far less risky than 
high-tech acquisitions. Low-tech firms such as those in the retail industry primarily 
invest in real assets (e. g., infrastructure and inventory). This results in observable 
performance benchmarks (for instance, inventory turnover) that are relatively easy to 
estimate. Acquisitions of such firms are much easier to value and the integration 
process is more controllable than acquisition of high-tech firms. Let's compare buying 
a supermarket with buying a software firm. The former is a low-tech acquisition and 
the latter is a high-tech acquisition. The performance of a supermarket is much more 
predicable than the performance of a biotechnology firm. It is because the sales of a 
supermarket rely on consumer demand and do not fluctuate dramatically year-by-year 
Nv! hereas it is hard to tell whether or not the software under development in a software 
firm will have a commercial success. In the software firm, employees are encouraged to 
generate new ideas to develop new software to gain more market share. In the 
supernmarket, inventory turnover is one of the important performance criteria. The faster 
the turnover, the more goods are sold and the better the sales. Therefore, there are more 
entrepreneurial activities in software firm than in a supermarket. The value of a 
software firm relies on new products generated by technical expertise. This creates 
difficulty in post-acquisition integration because this expertise may leave the company 
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and take away the core assets of the target firm if the leavers do not like the culture of 
the acquiring firm. This is less likely to happen with buying a supermarket because its 
core asset is the stores. Therefore buying a software firm poses more challenges in 
target valuation and post-acquisition integration to acquirers than does buying a 
supermarket. 
Harrison (2000) illustrates how a low-tech firm could be different from a high- 
tech firm by comparing a firm in the commodity chemicals sector to a firm in the life 
sciences sector. The former is a low-tech firm while the latter is a high-tech firm. The 
commodity chemicals sector is a traditional and mature business segment with a low 
level of growth. Acquisitions in commodity chemicals mainly aim to achieve 
economies of scale by increasing acquirer firm capacity. Life sciences however, such as 
pharmaceuticals, biological products, diagnostic substances, nutritional substances, and 
crop protection products, enjoy the prospect of high levels of long-term growth. 
Acquisitions in this segment mainly aim to access new technology, products or 
processes which are not easily duplicable or may be shielded by patents. 
In summary, although high-tech acquisitions may bring acquirers substantial 
benefits when successful, to achieve success is difficult. The combination of 
acquisition-related risks and intangibles-related risks create a unique risk profile for 
such acquisitions, making them far riskier than low-tech acquisitions. The following 
three sections hypothesize the relationship between acquisition risk and each of the 
incentive drivers as discussed in the last three chapters. 
5.4 Wealth incentives 
This section presents the hypotheses for the relationship between acquisition risk 
and each component of managerial wealth portfolio. 
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5.4.1 Fixed compensation and annual bonuses 
As discussed in Section 2.3.2.1 of Chapter 2, fixed compensation does little to 
incentivise managers to overcome their risk aversion. A high level of such 
compensation creates the incentive for managers to avoid risk and protect their existing 
income. Buying a high-tech firm is risky for the acquirer. The bidder manager must 
exert extra effort to obtain more information about the target before the deal in order to 
reduce the risk associate with the acquisition. Even if the manager has succeeded at this 
stage, it is not certain whether or not the target technology can be successfully 
transferred to the acquirer and lead to a commercially successful product or service. 
An acquisition failure may damage the acquiring managers' career progress and 
future income. This can be illustrated by the $183 billion48 merger between Internet 
giant American Online (AOL) and media conglomerate Time Warner in 2000. The 
logic behind this merger is that Time Warner, the traditional media company in radio, 
cable television and publishing, could utilise the technological savvy of AOL to expand 
their media business into a new area, online media services, and AOL could have access 
to Time Warner's 21 million cable customers and the broadband system (Badakhshan et 
a!, 2005). This union would allow both companies to increase their customer bases and 
enhance their market shares. However, one year after the deal, the merged company 
. COL Time Warner wrote off $54 billion. Three and a half years after the merger in 
2001, the firm dropped `AOL' from its name, indicating the reversal of the mega- 
merger. One of the reasons for this merger failure is that there was a wrong estimation 
'A This value is based on the day when the merger was made public. 
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of the technology capabilities Time Warner could offer to AOL49. The chairman of the 
merged company, Mr Steve Case, who was seen as the driving force behind the merger, 
stepped down in May 2001, following pressure from shareholders (BBC News, 13 
January 2003). 
Fixed compensation is unlikely to motivate managers to seek high-risk high-tech 
acquisitions which can put managers' stable income, reputation and future careers at 
risk. It appears that fixed pay can only intensify managerial risk avoidance and make 
them avoid high-risk acquisitions. 
As addressed in Section 2.3.2.2 of Chapter 2, an annual bonus scheme gives a 
manager the incentive to turn down a positive NPV project with a long payback period. 
l'ehranian et al (1987) give an illustration using a merger as an example. When a firm 
with great marketing resources acquires a small firm owning a patent relating to the 
development of a positive NPV product, high development expenses in the early years 
ofthe product's life imply that short-term profits will be low. Such a merger could be 
turned down by `quick profit' oriented managers. This cash flow pattern is typical of 
investment projects in high-tech companies. Buying such companies means that the 
acquiring managers have to accept long payback horizons and uncertainty in realizing 
the targets' growth opportunities. This however, does not match the short-term nature 
of the annual bonus. Hence, managers with a high level of annual bonus are not likely 
to select high-risk targets for acquisitions. 
49 Time Warner's broadband system was relatively geographically limited and its infrastructure of the 
cable network did not allow for easy expansion of coverage. Thus AOL could not get what it expected 
from the merger. 
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In light of the above, it follows that there exists a negative relationship between 
cash compensation (i. e., fixed compensation and annual bonus) and the riskiness of 
acquisitions pursued by managers. Therefore it is hypothesized that: 
Hl: Acquisition risk is negatively related to the level of cash compensation, i. e., 
fixed compensation and annual bonus. 
5.4.2 Equity-based managerial wealth components 
The arguments for the relationship between managerial risk taking and equity- 
based wealth are provided in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2. The measures for the incentive 
provided by equity-based wealth, delta and vega, are discussed in Section 2.3.3 of 
Chapter 2. In summary, existing compensation literature suggests that the incentive 
from the pay-performance relationship, i. e., equity delta, is nonlinear. At a low level, 
equity delta (or LTIP delta, option delta, share delta) aligns the interests between 
managers and shareholders. Therefore equity delta (or LTIP delta, option delta, share 
delta) will encourage managers to take more risky projects to increase firm value. 
I lo\v ever, when the delta value is high, it exposes managers' wealth to more firm- 
specific risk. This increases managerial risk aversion to high-risk projects. 
Based on the above argument, it is expected that a small delta can drive 
managers to undertake risky acquisitions since managers can benefit from the success of 
the acquisitions. whereas acquisition failure will not make managers lose a significant 
amount of personal wealth. However, as the magnitude of the delta gets bigger, 
nmanagers' \\-ealth is more vulnerable to acquisition failure. This will make managers 
more cautious in choosing risk), acquisitions. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
N'. - There is a concave relationship between acquisition risk and the level of 
equity- delta. 
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Both the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence discussed in Section 
2.3.2.4 and Section 2.3.4.2 of Chapter 2 suggest that stock options encourage 
managerial risk taking. This is mainly attributed to the convexity (i. e., vega) of the 
stock options. Stock option vega can eliminate managers' concern about the downside 
risk of risky acquisitions since managers' wealth is protected from the failure of the 
acquisitions but increases with the stock price gains brought by the acquisitions. 
Therefore, stock option vega is expected to encourage managers to take risky 
acquisitions. It is hypothesized that: 
113: Acquisition risk is positively related to the level of stock option vega. 
According to the literature review in Section 2.4.2 of Chapter 2, managers' risk 
attitude varies when they are at different wealth levels. As managers' wealth increases, 
they do not have much of an appetite for high risk projects that may yield high returns 
because the marginal utility of any increase in wealth is diminishing. Therefore when 
managers are very wealthy they are not keen to take high risk. If managers have a large 
amount of wealth attached to their employer firms, managers, who do not want to put 
their wealth at risk, are risk averse to firm-specific risk, and therefore may avoid risky 
projects. Overall, a high level of managerial wealth does not encourage managerial risk 
taking. This study uses managers' wealth attached to their firms to proxy for managers' 
total wealth because it is impossible to obtain data for managers' wealth invested 
outside of their firms. A high level of managerial wealth intensifies managerial risk 
aversion to their firm risk. This risk aversion effect can diminish the incentive 
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alignment effect from delta or vega and make managers less likely to undertake risky 
acquisitions50. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
H4: Acquisition risk is not positively related to equity delta at a high level of 
managerial wealth. 
H5: Acquisition risk is not positively related to stock option vega at a high level 
of managerial wealth. 
5.4.3 L TIP cash 
According to Chapter 2, there exist few theoretical arguments and very little 
empirical evidence proving any kind of incentive effect from LTIP cash. Given that 
I. I'IP cash is one of the long-term incentive plans with investment horizons of at least 
three years and with performance thresholds, managers need to invest in growth- 
oriented risky projects to improve firm performance in order to obtain the rewards from 
L TIP cash. Unlike LTIP shares which expose managerial wealth to 100% of firm risk, 
L"1 IP cash awards do not introduce such high risk to managers' wealth and therefore 
will not intensify managerial risk aversion as LTIP shares do. In the case of 
acquisitions, I. TIP cash is expected to encourage managers to pursue risky acquisitions 
so that firm performance can meet the performance thresholds set in the LTIP cash 
re ards and managers can then obtain their rewards. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
H6:: lcquisition risk is positive/v related to the level of LTIP cash. 
30 I'he above argument also suggests that acquisition risk is negatively related to the level of managerial 
wealth. The reason why this thesis does not develop a hypothesis for wealth is that it is impossible to test 
this hypothesis using the sample data of this study. The major component of wealth is managerial equity 
holdings. As discussed in Section 7.4 of Chapter 7, the wealth variable is highly correlated to the equity 
ariable. 
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5.4.4 Summary 
Section 5.4 presents the hypotheses for the relationship between the riskiness of 
acquisitions pursued by managers and the components of managerial wealth portfolio. 
Collectively, Section 5.4 predicts a negative relationship between acquisition risk and 
the level of fixed compensation and annual bonuses, and predicts a concave relationship 
between acquisition risk and the level of equity delta (or LTIP delta, stock option delta, 
share delta). 
It predicts a non-positive relationship between acquisition risk and the level of 
the following: 
" equity delta (or LTIP delta, stock option delta, share delta) at a high level of 
managerial wealth 
" stock option vega at a high level of managerial wealth 
It predicts a positive relationship between acquisition risk and the level of the 
following: 
" LTI P cash 
" stock option vega 
5.5 Behavioural biases 
Chapter 3 illustrates that behavioural biases such as overconfidence, hubris and 
over-optimism which cause many managers to overestimate their ability and 
underestimate acquisition risk, lead to acquirer shareholder value destruction. As 
discussed in Section 5.3, an acquisition of a high-tech target is similar in nature to a 
growth option, i. e., it is associated with considerable uncertainty and the need to take a 
N iexv of the future. Ifa high-tech acquisition is successful, it allows the acquirer to 
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quickly transfer the target's technology to itself and rapidly gain market power. Aware 
of the challenges and substantial benefits embedded in high-tech acquisitions, managers 
with hubris are particularly attracted to such acquisitions because they provide them 
with greater opportunities to demonstrate their capability in `creating miracles', i. e.. 
they can successfully complete high-tech acquisitions and realise the great benefits 
embedded in the acquisitions (Kohers and Kohers, 2001). Thus in environments 
characterised by optimism, as was the case during the dotcom bubble of the 1990s, 
many high technology acquisitions may have been driven by managerial over-optimism, 
overconfidence and hubris. These biases may have compounded the problem of 
valuation risk associated with high-tech acquisitions leading to overpayment for targets 
and to acquirer shareholder value losses. 
The case of Vivendi illustrates such adventurous tendencies (Johnson and 
Orange, 2003). Vivendi was originally in the water supply and sewage treatment 
business in France and was struggling with financial difficulties. Jean-Marie Messier 
successfully turned the firm around. He was, however, not satisfied with the humble, 
down-to-earth business of Vivendi but was excited by high-tech businesses. Therefore, 
he transformed the company through a succession of acquisitions into an international 
high-tech conglomerate engaged in activities such as fibre optic cable manufacture, 
cable television, mobile telephony, and the running of movie studios. He was granted 
the title of the `perfect Frenchman' by the French media. However, after the telecom 
bubble burst in ? 000, Vivendi fell into substantial financial difficulties. Jean-Marie 
Nlcssicr was sacked and convicted of fraud. Johnson and Orange comment that 
"Without his (Jean-Marie Messier's) vision and personality -a strange blend of French 
technocratic arrogance, wannabe Hollywood showmanship and investment banker 
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charm - Vivendi Universal would never 
have come into existence. Without Jean-Marie 
1essier's weakness -a love of deal-making, self-promotion, obfuscation and risk - the 
dream of a French champion might have survived" (Johnson and Orange, 2003, p. 3). 
Another example is Jack Welsh, the CEO of General Electric (GE) for around 
twenty years. GE is a conglomerate with businesses from jet engines to power 
generation, financial services to plastics, and medical imaging to news and information. 
In his book of 2001, Jack Welsh describes that his decision to acquire Kidder, Peabody 
in 1986 was affected by hubris. Kidder, Peabody was one of the Wall Street's oldest 
investment banking firms. Buying Kidder was opposed by three GE board members 
who warned that Kidder's business was far too different from GE and the acquisition 
was far too risky. However, encouraged by his success of past acquisitions, Jack Welsh 
deeply believed that he could make anything work. Eight months after the acquisition, 
he regretted his decision. The top management of Kidder was charged with insider 
trading and was arrested. As the new owner of Kidder, GE was saddled with the legal 
responsibility. "There's only a razor's edge between self-confidence and hubris. This 
time, hubris won and taught me a lesson I'd never forget", says Jack Welsh (Welsh, 
2001, p. 229). 
Based on the above arguments, it is expected that there exists a positive 
relationship between acquisition risk and managerial behavioural biases such as 
overconfidence, over-optimism and hubris. As discussed in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, 
the boundaries between these three types of behavioural bias are blurred. However all 
of them cause managers to overestimate their abilities and underestimate investment 
risk. Therefore, this thesis uses the term `behavioural biases' to capture this common 
characteristic of these three behavioural biases. It is hypothesized that: 
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H7: Acquisition risk is positively related to behavioural biases. 
5.6 Monitoring mechanisms 
This section presents the hypotheses for the relationship between acquisition risk 
and monitoring devices such as external blockholders, institutional blockholders, board 
independence, non-duality of CEO and COB, and remuneration committees. 
5.6.1 External blockholders 
Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4 suggests that external blockholders have strong 
economic incentives to undertake effective monitoring. In the case of high-risk 
acquisitions, large outside shareholders can force acquirer managers to examine 
carefully their acquisition strategies. Managers will have to conduct more scenario 
analyses corresponding to the uncertainties embedded in high-risk acquisitions. They 
will have to exert more effort and spend more time estimating and reducing the 
downside risk associated with the acquisitions. As a result, management forecasts of 
acquisition synergies are likely to be less optimistic than when there is no control from 
external blockholders. The same logic applies to institutional blockholders. As 
discussed in Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4, institutional shareholders have more incentive 
to monitor management than the other types of external shareholders because 
institutional shareholders are collectively the largest owners of shares in the UK and 
US. Overall, it is expected that external blockholders as well as institutional 
blockholders may cure the excessive risk-seeking problem demonstrated by 
ovverconiidence/over-optimism/hubris stricken managers. On the other hand, they can 
also fine-tune their monitoring to ensure that managers do not pass up valuable but 
nonetheless high risk acquisitions because of managerial risk aversion. Thus it is 
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expected that strict large external shareholder monitoring can help ensure optimal risk 
acquisitions. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
I-I8: the higher the level of external blockholdings, the more likely the 
acquisition risk is at an optimal level. 
5.6.2 Board composition 
Section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4 presents the views on board composition. In the case 
of acquisitions, non-executive directors are certain to be involved in the approval of 
such attempts. They are likely to be more objective in evaluating the costs and benefits 
of an acquisition than the executive directors who propose the takeover. The objectivity 
of outside directors is particularly important in monitoring the acquisition process when 
managers' empire-building ambitions or hubris conflicts with shareholder interests. 
Non-executive directors can monitor managers' tendency towards over-risk or under- 
risk investment arising from their risk attitudes and wealth incentives. A board with a 
high proportion of non-executive directors is likely to monitor acquisitions robustly and 
ensure that they create shareholder value. Therefore it is expected that a high 
proportion of non-executive directors will have a positive impact on aligning 
shareholder and managerial risk preferences and will be likely to discourage suboptimal 
risk taking and thereby ensure that acquisitions have an optimal risk profile that 
enhances shareholder value. Consequently, it is hypothesized that: 
H9: The higher the proportion of non-executive directors on the board, the more 
liken' the acquisition risk is at an optimal level. 
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5.6.3 Non-duality 
As discussed in Section 4.2.3 of Chapter 4, duality, i. e, the combination of the 
roles of CEO and COB, impairs the ability of the board to ensure that firms pursue goals 
consistent with shareholder value enhancement. Dominant individuals who hold both 
C1: 0 and COB positions may also be prone to the behavioural frailties such as 
overconfidence, over-optimism, or hubris if unchecked by a weak and subservient 
board. Therefore, it is expected that CEO-COB non-duality will have a positive impact 
on aligning shareholder and managerial risk preferences. Such alignment of goals will 
help managers select acquisitions of optimal risk levels that maximize shareholder 
value. Consequently, it is hypothesized that: 
H10: When there is non-duality of CEO and COB, it is more likely that the 
acquisition risk is at an optimal level. 
5.6.4 Remuneration committee 
As discussed in Section 4.2.4 of Chapter 4, remuneration committees design 
compensation contracts that align the interests of managers and shareholders and 
prevent the tendency of executive management to `grow' their own compensation 
packages. As discussed in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 of Chapter 2, an excessive grant 
of cash compensation can make managers more risk averse, whilst an excessive grant of 
stock options can induce managerial excessive risk taking. A remuneration committee 
comprised of non-executive directors who are independent of management could set 
executive compensation at a level so as to encourage managers to conduct optimal-risk 
projects. Therefore, it is expected that the presence of remuneration committees on 
company boards will have a positive impact on managers' selection of acquisitions that 
aligns shareholder and managerial risk preferences. It is hypothesized that: 
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HI I: When there is a remuneration committee of the company board, it is more 
likely that the acquisition risk is at an optimal level. 
5.6.5 Summary 
Section 5.6 hypothesizes that external blockholders, institutional blockholders, 
board composition of non-executive directors, CEO-COB non-duality and the existence 
of a remuneration committee can all induce optimal risk acquisitions that maximise 
shareholder value. 
5.7 A conceptual model of managerial risk taking 
Based on the above discussions, the following conceptual model of managerial 
risk taking is formulated: 
Acquisition risk =f (Wealth, Behavioural biases, Monitors) Model 5-1 
where Acquisition risk is the risk level of an acquisition; Wealth constitutes the bundle 
of various managerial wealth elements including fixed compensation and annual 
bonuses, L"I'IP cash, LTIP shares, stock options and managerial shareholdings; 
Behavioural biases refer to managerial overconfidence, hubris and over-optimism; 
I1onitor. s include external block shareholding, institutional blockholding, board 
composition of non-executive directors, CEO-COB non-duality and the presence of a 
remuneration committee on the board. An empirical risk model containing all of these 
variables and some control variables is discussed in Section 6.5.1 of Chapter 6. 
147 
5.8 Acquisition risk and post-acquisition performance 
Model 5-1 builds a conceptual model of `optimal-risk' acquisitions as a function 
of managerial wealth incentives, behavioural biases and corporate monitoring 
mechanisms. If all the empirical corporate governance devices are optimal and 
effective51, the acquisition risk level predicted by this model should be the optimal level 
that maximises shareholder value for each investment project. Any acquisitions risk 
that deviates from the predicted level is 'suboptimal'. The level of `suboptimality' has a 
negative impact on acquirer post-acquisition performance and hence shareholder value. 
In the case of `under-risk' investment (i. e., the actual risk level of an acquisition 
is lower than the predicted one), managers pass up the opportunities of investing in a 
more profitable positive NPV project. Persistently passing up risky acquisitions would 
make those firms gradually lose competitive advantage to their competitors. Over the 
long run, these firms will have poor profitability and underperform their competitors. 
I: N, idence of value destruction from low risk diversifying acquisitions is consistent with 
this argument (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Rajan et al, 2000; Graham et al, 2002). 
`Over-risk' investment (i. e., the actual risk level of an acquisition is higher than 
the predicted one) is like gambling. While high return projects are likely to be risky, 
high-risk projects do not necessarily yield high returns. This latter is particularly true 
when mana ers choose high-risk acquisitions only because managers underestimate the 
51 There may exist some other factors influence managers' choice of risky projects. In the empirical risk 
model discussed in Section 6.5.1 of Chapter 6, some of these factors are included. I acknowledge that 
there may exist some other factors that are not included in the empirical risk model (see Section 9.2 of 
Chapter 9.4 of Chapter 9). This \\ ill be an area for future research to enhance the rigor of the empirical 
risk model. 
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risks embedded in those acquisitions. Empirical evidence presented in Chapter 3 
suggests that such acquisitions destroy shareholder value (Roll, 1986; Berkovitch and 
Narayanan, 1993; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Kohers and Kohers, 2001; Hletala et 
a!. 2003). 
It is therefore expected that, both types of suboptimal risk investment will lead 
to acquirer shareholder value destruction and underperform the optimal risk investment 
group. The hypothesis is as follows: 
H12: Both under-risk and over-risk acquisition lead to negative post-acquisition 
performance. 
The relationship can be formulated in the following conceptual performance 
model (Model 5-2). 
Optimal - risk 
Post - acquisition Performance =f Under - risk 
Over - risk 
acquisition (+) 
acquisition (-) Model 5-2 
acquisition (-) 
The signs indicate that optimal-risk acquisitions can increase shareholder value. 
Both under-risk acquisitions and over-risk acquisitions may destroy shareholder value. 
Post-acquisition performance is negatively associated with the degree of suboptimality 
of acquisition risk. The performance model establishes an association between firm 
performance and managerial risk taking resulting from the joint impact of the various 
drivers embodied in the conceptual risk model (Model 5-1). The empirical performance 
model containing the defined variables for the conceptual model (Model 5-2) and some 
control variables is presented in Section 6.5.4 of Chapter 6. 
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5.9 Summary 
This chapter identifies the literature gap, raises research questions and develops 
two conceptual models, the risk model (Model 5-1) and the performance model (Model 
5-2). This chapter interprets the pursuit of risky acquisitions such as buying high-tech 
targets as a manifestation of managerial risk preference. This chapter also develops 
hypotheses regarding the relationship between acquisition risk and the various drivers 
for managerial risk taking such as managerial wealth incentives, behavioural biases and 
corporate monitors, and thus formulates the conceptual risk model (Model 5-1). This 
conceptual model is then translated into an empirical model for predicting `optimal-risk' 
or 'suboptimal-risk' acquisitions. The empirical model will be discussed in Section 
6.5.1 of Chapter 6. Any deviation from the predicted level, i. e., `suboptimal-risk' 
acquisitions will cause acquirer shareholder value destruction as predicted by the 
performance model (Model 5-2). These two models thus establish a relationship 
between firm performance and managerial risk taking resulting from the joint impact of 
the various risk incentive drivers derived from managerial wealth, behavioural biases, 
and corporate monitoring mechanisms. 
1-S0 
Chapter 6 
Data, Methodology and Other Related Issues 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter resolves a number of issues relating to the data and methodology 
issues used in the analysis in later chapters of this thesis. Section 6.2 lists and defines 
the variables in the empirical risk model and the empirical performance model which 
are presented in Section 6.5. The data sources are presented in Section 6.3. The sample 
selection criteria are addressed in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 lays out the methodology 
comprising five steps analyses. All the relevant statistical analyses and event study 
related methodology are explained in this section. The proposed empirical risk and 
performance models are based on the conceptual models of Chapter 5 (see Section 5.7 
and 5.8 of Chapter 5) and the variable definitions in Section 6.2. Section 6.6 provides 
the chapter summary. 
6.2 Data 
1'his section lists and provides definitions for the variables in the empirical risk 
model (Model 6-1) and the empirical performance model (Model 6-4)52. A summary of 
all of the variables is listed in Table 6-5. In addition to the factors such as managerial 
wealth, behavioural biases and corporate monitors that are discussed in the conceptual 
models, a number of other factors shown as control variables are added to both the 
`ý T\\ o empirical models are discussed later in Section 6.5. 
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empirical risk model and the empirical performance models separately in order to make 
the models more comprehensive. 
6.2.1 Variables in the risk model 
The dependent variable in the conceptual risk model is Acquisition Risk. As 
shown in the conceptual model, Model 5-1 (see Section 5.7 of Chapter 5), there are 
three main categories of independent variables: managerial wealth components, 
behavioural biases and monitoring mechanisms. The structure of the empirical risk 
model (see Section 6.5.1) remains the same as the conceptual risk model except that the 
empirical model contains some control variables that may also have some impact on 
managers' acquisition risk choices but that do not fall within the domain of the 
managerial wealth, behavioural biases and corporate monitoring literature. These 
variables are acquirer financial leverage, acquirer size and relative size of acquirer to 
target. The argument and definitions for these variables are discussed in this section. 
6.2.1.1 Acquisition risk 
As discussed in Section 5.3 of Chapter 5, high-tech acquisitions are risky 
investments. The inherent uncertainty associated with the rich intangible-assets 
embedded in high-tech targets presents the possibility that the attractive growth 
prospects of high-tech target may never be actually be realised by the acquirers. The 
combination of acquisition-related risks and intangibles-related risks create a unique 
risk profile for high-tech acquisitions. making them far riskier than low-tech 
acquisitions. High-tech acquisitions as a proxy for high-risk investment has been 
adopted by Kollers and Kohers (2001). 
I 5? 
Some studies have found systematic differences in technology investments 
across industries, e. g., R&D spending is heavily concentrated in technology and 
science-oriented industries such as Biotechnology, Internet, Electronics (Francis and 
Schipper, 1999; Chan et al, 2001). These researchers however have not reached an 
agreement about what constitutes high-tech industries although it is commonly accepted 
that high-tech industries have higher intangible-asset levels than low-tech industries. 
Based on this criterion, Securities Data Company (SDC) provides a list of high-tech 
industries and this list has been used by some studies such as Kohers and Kohers (2001) 
and Fuller et al (2002) in their studies of high-tech acquisitions 53. Table 6-1 lists the 
53 Conn et al (2005) define UK industries as high-tech if the R&D expenditure to industry output is 
substantially above average. If the ratio is above, but not substantially above average, a second measure 
is employed based on the proportion of scientists, professional engineers and technicians in the labour 
force. They generate the following high-tech industry list: Chemicals, Plastics, Machinery and 
f: quipment, Office Machines and Computers, Electrical Equipment, Electronics, Medical Instruments and 
Control Equipment, Telecommunication and Post, Software and R&D. As compared to the high-tech 
acquisition list in this thesis (see Table 6-1), the list by Conn et al contains more industries, including 
those industries which have both high-tech sectors and low-tech sectors. This can be illustrated by the 
example given by Harrison (2000). Harrison states that not all the sectors in Chemicals are high-tech. 
The commodity chemicals sector is a low-tech sector while the life science sector is a high-tech sector 
(more discussions can be found in Section 5.3 of Chapter 5). The high-tech industries defined in this 
thesis, e. g., biotechnology, computers, telecommunications, electronics, although not as broad as those by 
Conn ct a1 (2005), are the typical high-tech sectors recognised by both researchers such as Francis and 
Schipper, 1999, Chan ei a/, 2001, Kohers and Kohers (2001), Fullers et al (2001), and the market as 
reflected in the stock prices of those industries during the internet'telecom bubble period of late 1990s. 
Moreover, the nature of those industries is consistent with the description of high-tech firms in Section 
2. of Chapter 2. 
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Table 6-1: High-tech industry sectors defined by SDC 
High-tech industry sectors SDC high-tech industry code 
Biotechnology 
1. In-Vivo diagnostic products 111 
2. In-Vito diagnostic products 112 
3. Genetically Eng. Prod (human) 113 
4. Genetically Eng. Prod (animal) 114 
5. Vaccines/Specialty Drugs 115 
6. General pharmaceuticals 116 
7. Over-the-counter drugs 117 
8. Nuclear medicines 118 
9. Medicinal chemicals 119 
10. Drug delivery system (not IV system) 120 
11. Blood derivatives 121 
12. Research & development firm 122 
13. Other biotechnology 129 
14. Medical lasers 131 
15. Medical imaging systems 132 
16. Surgical instruments/equipment 133 
17. Lab equipment 134 
18. Rehabilitation equipment 135 
19. Artificial organs/limbs 136 
20. Medical monitoring systems 137 
21. General Med. Instruments/Supp. 138 
22. Healthcare services 140 
Computer equipment 
1. Mainframes & Super Computers 211 
2. Workstations 212 
3. Micro-computers(PCs) 213 
4. Portable computers 214 
5. 'T'urnkey systems 215 
6. ('AD/CAM/CAE/Graphic systems 216 
7. Other computer systems 219 
8. Printers 221 
9. Disk drives 222 
10. CD ROM drives 223 
11. Networking systems (LAN, WAN) 224 
12. Monitors/Terminals 225 
11. Scanning devices 226 
14. Modems 227 
15. Other peripherals 229 
16. Database software/programming 231 
17. Operating systems 2 32 
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High-tech industry sectors SDC high-tech industry code 
18. Applications software (business) 
19. Applications software (home) 
20. Desktop publishing 
21. Communication/network software 
22. Utilities/file Mgmt. Software 
23. Other software (incl. games) 
24. Programming services 
25. Computer consulting services 
26. Data processing services 
27. Other computer-related services 
Electronics 
1. Semiconductors 
2. Superconductors 
3. Printed circuit boards 
4. Process control systems 
5. Precision/measuring test equipment 
6. Search, detection, navigation 
7. Other electronics 
Communications 
1. Telecommunications equipment 
2. Telephone interconnect equipment 
3. Messaging systems 
4. Cellular communications 
5. Satellite communications 
6. Microwave communication 
7. Alarm systems 
8. Facsimile equipment 
9. Data Communication (exclude 
networking) 
10. Other telecommunications equip 
11. Internet services& software 
Others 
233 
234 
235 
236 
237 
239 
241 
242 
243 
249 
311 
312 
313 
314 
315 
316 
319 
401 
411 
412 
413 
414 
415 
416 
417 
418 
419 
420 
1. Robotics 511 
2. Lasers (excluding medical) 512 
3. Nuclear (excluding medical) 513 
4. Propulsion systems 514 
5. Satellites (non-communications) 515 
6. Advanced materials 516 
7. IDefence related 517 
8. Advanced manufacturing sv stems 518 
9. Other 519 
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high-tech industries defined by SDC. According Kohers and Kohers (2001) and Fuller 
et al (2002), if an acquisition target is in a high-tech industry classified by SDC, the 
acquisition is a high-tech acquisition. I adopt the same approach to define a high-tech 
acquisition. When an acquisition target is not in the high-tech industry classification 
defined by SDC, the acquisition is termed as a `low-tech acquisition'. Table 6-2 
provides an illustration of the low-tech industry sectors that appears in the sample54 of 
this thesis. This definition of acquisition risk generates a 2-category dependent variable 
for the empirical risk model (see Section 6.5.1), high-tech acquisitions and low-tech 
acquisitions. 
Table 6-2: An illustration of low-tech industry sectors in SDC 
Sector name I Sector name 
Agriculture 
Business Support Services 
Builders Merchant 
Education and Training 
Food and Drug Retail 
Gambling 
household Products 
Mining 
Publishing and Printing 
Restaurant 
l'ransport 
Auto Parts 
Building Materials 
Clothing and Footwear 
Environmental Control 
Food Processors 
Hospital Management 
Media Equipment and Supplies 
Paper 
Steel 
Textile and Leather Goods 
TV, Radio and Film 
The shortcoming of this categorical classification of acquisition risk is that it 
misses out the technology differences across industries and firms. Although high-tech 
54 Section 6.4 describes the selection of the sample used in this thesis. 
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industries in general have a higher technology level than low-tech industries, there exist 
differences in technology levels among different high-tech industries. For example, 
biotechnology industry generally is considered have higher R&D capability than 
electronics (Francis and Schipper, 1999; Chan et al, 2001). Even within the 
biotechnology industry, different firms have different technology levels. An alternative 
approach to the two-category classification of acquisition risk is to use target industry or 
firm technology level data such as R&D intensity, patents, etc. This results in a 
continuous data type, which contains more information than a simple two-category 
classification. However, given that more than 90% of the sample targets are unlisted 
companies whose accounting information on intangible assets is not available from 
public sources55, it is impossible to employ target firm level data. This also limits the 
use of other measures for target intangible assets such as book-to-market ratio, Tobin's 
Q ratio56, goodwill, etc. 
R&D Scoreboard provides industrial R&D intensity (R&D expenditure/sales 
ratio) for UK companies each year since 1990 (Tubbs, 2002). All its data is extracted 
directly from company annual reports and key ratios are calculated for each sector based 
55 1 also checked with FAME which contains private company data only to discover that FAME has 
incomplete data for intangible assets for most of the sample firms. 
sO Tobin's Q is calculated by dividing the market value of a company by the replacement value of its 
assets. According to Chung and Pruitt (1994), the market value of a company is the sum of market value 
of equity, the liquidating value of the company's outstanding preferred stock, and the value of the 
company's current liabilities minus current assets plus the book value of long-term debt. The 
replacement value of the assets is based on the book value of total assets of the company. A high Tobin's 
Q indicates that the company has rich growth opportunities considered by the market and a low Tobin's Q 
indicates a lack ot'growth opportunities. 
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on the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) actuary system. R&D Scoreboard 
includes both listed and non-listed companies57. This is also true of the sample used in 
this study. I therefore use industry level R&D intensity in the accounting year prior to 
acquisition announcement from R&D Scoreboard as the measure for the target industry 
R&D technology level. This approach also allows me to examine whether the high-tech 
industries as defined by SDC has significantly higher R&D capability than low-tech 
industries, a test of SDC's `high-tech' definition. 
Studies such as Fuller et al (2002) consider both acquire and target technology 
levels. Following Fuller et al's approach would give rise to a four-way classification of 
acquisition risk: 
1. high-tech acquirers versus high-tech targets; 
2. low-tech acquirers versus high-tech targets; 
3. high-tech acquirers versus low-tech targets; 
4. low-tech acquirers versus low-tech targets 
(However, it is hard to judge whether a low-tech acquirer buying a high-tech target 
(category 2) is riskier than a high-tech acquirer buying a high-tech target (category 1). 
One can argue that a low-tech acquirer' relative lack of expertise in managing and 
valuing high technology growth businesses exposes it to a high risk of acquisition 
failure. On the other hand, combining two high-tech firms compounds risk and 
therefore is more risky than the former. Any demarcation of the acquisition risk in such 
acquisitions is very ambiguous. A similar ambiguity arises in differentiating between 
57 Most of the publicly available databases such as Datastream, Company Analysis etc generally report 
data only for listed companies. Discussions of these databases are in Section 6.3. 
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category 3 and category 4. Therefore this study does not use a four-way classification 
of acquisition risk based on both acquirer and target technology level. 
To summarise, this study uses two proxies for acquisition risk. The first is a 
categorical measure classifying acquisitions into high-tech acquisitions and low-tech 
acquisitions based on target high-tech industry status. The second is a continuous 
measure based on target industry R&D intensity in the accounting year prior to 
acquisition announcement. 
6.2.1.2 Managerial wealth components 
Managerial wealth components include cash compensation granted in the 
accounting year prior to an acquisition announcement, and all the holdings of LTIP cash 
or shares, stock options, and ordinary shares of the acquirer. Empirically, it is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obtain all the cash compensation data for 
managers ever since they started working in a firm. This study therefore uses one year 
data to proxy for the general level of cash compensation. In contrast, it is possible to 
obtain data for the remainder of the components that are granted in years before the 
acquisition announcement and still not cashed in by their holders. This is because 
Greenbury Report (1995) and Hampel Report (1998) state that UK companies need to 
disclose directors' holdings of LTIPs, stock options and company shares in annual 
reports, not only the ones granted in the current year but also those accumulated over 
time. Managerial wealth data in this thesis is based on the annual report in the 
ý1CCounting , ear prior to acquisition announcement. 
Company board of directors is used to proxy for top management. The board 
usually includes firm's top managers and non-executive directors. It determines a 
firm'` strategic direction. Any big corporate decisions involve inputs from all of the 
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board members and also need the approval of the board. It is also common for existing 
UK studies to use board of directors to proxy for top management58. Examples are 
Cosh and Hughes (1987), Sudarsanam et al (1996), Cosh and Hughes (1997), Dahya et 
al (2002), Weir et al (2002), Dahya and McConnell (2003), Sudarsanam and Mahate 
(2006), etc. 
Fixed compensation and annual bonus 
As defined in Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2, fixed compensation is the sum of basic 
salary, fees, benefits-in-kind and pension contributions. Fixed compensation for 
acquirer directors is the total fixed pay of the whole board of directors in the accounting 
year before the acquisition announcement. Similarly, annual bonus for the acquirer 
directors is the total cash bonuses for the board of directors over the same time period. 
The total impact of both components is based on the sum of both values59, bo 
The reason why I consider the combined impact of fixed pay and annual bonus 
(FAB) is not only because they both discourage managerial risk taking (see Section 
58 US-based studies such as Hall and Leibman (1998), Guay (1999) and Coles et al (2004) generally use 
CEO to proxy for top management. This however neglects the influence of other board members on 
corporate decision making and exaggerates the power of CEOs. Therefore this thesis uses board of 
directors as a proxy for top management. 
59 the sample period of this thesis is from 1993-2000. The inflation in the UK was very low during this 
period (the annual change in Consumer Price Index on average was just 2%). Therefore, this study does 
not adjust variables in £s assuming that the impact of inflation during this period is negligible. 
60 Empirical studies such as Williams and Rao (2000) adjust cash compensation by firm size or total 
compensation to allow for cross-sectional firm difference. This study uses both unadjusted cash pay (i. e., 
value term) and adjusted cash pay (by acquirers' total assets) in the regression analysis. This applies to 
all the wealth variables. 
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2.3.2 of Chapter 2), but also because of the limit on data availability. Prior to 
Greenbury Report (1995), annual reports generally do not disclose each individual 
component of directors' remuneration but only disclose the total emoluments including 
fixed compensation and annual bonus. Therefore, empirically it is impossible to test 
fixed pay and annual bonus separately for the majority of acquisitions conducted prior 
to 1996. Studies that examine the executive compensation prior to 1996 such as Cosh 
and Hughes (1975) and Main et al (1999) generally examine cash compensation as a 
whole. Although it is more likely to get separate data for fixed compensation and 
annual bonus from company's annual report since 1996, for consistency over time I use 
the combined measure throughout the analysis. 
LTIP cash 
LTIP cash (LTIP CASH) is measured by its cash value held by the acquirer 
board of directors up until the accounting year prior to acquisition announcement. After 
the Greenbury Report (1995) and Hampel Report (1998), annual reports in the UK 
generally disclose LTIP cash awards that remain outstanding, i. e., directors are yet to 
prove that they can meet the performance criteria set in the LTIP cash awards, in the 
year the annual reports are based upon. This includes the LTIP cash awards granted in 
the current year as well as those granted in past years but have not expired. 
Equity' delta 
As discussed in Section 2.3.3 of Chapter 2, since Jensen and Murphy (1990), 
researchers use the sensitivity of a manager's wealth to a given change in stock price to 
measure the managerial risk incentive arising from managers' equity-based wealth 
components. This sensitivity is called 'equity delta'. Equity delta (DELTA) is in fact 
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the slope of the relationship between a manager's equity-based wealth and stock price. 
A higher delta indicates a more sensitive relationship. Equity delta consists of the sum 
of the deltas from LTIP shares, options and managerial shareholdings. Section 2.3.3 of 
Chapter 2 introduces two ways to measure equity delta, the Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
approach (see Equation 2-1) and the Core and Guay (1999) approach (see Equation 2- 
2). The former is less popular than the latter because the former is argued to fail to 
appropriately reflect the equity incentive for a small increase of managers' 
shareholdings (see Section 2.3.3 of Chapter 2 for more details). This thesis therefore 
adopts the Core and Guay (1999) approach, a simplified version of which is given as 
Equation 2-2 in Chapter 2. The full equation for measuring equity delta (DELTA) is 
given below: 
DELTA = N, 77P share* 
LTIP delta 
+ 
M. 
* M, * Option delta; Equation 6-1 
Nophon 
+ N.,. hare * Share delta 
where NLT/P share , Noptio, js and Nshare are the number of LTIP shares, options and 
managerial shareholdings respectively, which are based on the accounting year prior to 
an acquisition announcement. M; is the number of options in tranche i. Q is the total 
number of tranches. Because directors usually hold many tranches of options61, to 
61 l'he reason w by directors hold many tranches of options is because stock options may be granted in 
different 'ears with different expiry dates, or because stock options are granted via different executive 
compensation schemes such as Employee Sharesave Schemes, Executive Share Option Schemes, etc. 
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accurately, estimate the total 
impact of options, empirical studies generally calculate the 
option delta for each tranche, 
(i. e., Option delta; ) separately and then take a weighted 
sum of all the tranches to get a total option 
incentive (Core and Guay, 1999). In the 
following subsections, I discuss the measurement of LTIP delta, Option delta, and Share 
delta for one LTIP share, one stock option and one managerial shareholding following 
Core and Guay (1999)'s approach. 
LTIP delta 
As shown in Section 2.3.3.1 in Chapter 2, empirical studies generally assume 
that an LTIP share changes by the same amount as the change in share price. Applying 
Core and Guay (1999)'s concept, LTIP delta for a one LTIP share is calculated as: 
LTIP delta=1* 
P Equation 6-2 
100 
where P is acquirer share price (Datastream code UP62) at the end of month -2 (where 
the acquisition announcement month is coded as month 0). There are two major reasons 
why I use this day. Firstly, allowing one to two months gap can avoid acquisition 
rumours that affect stock price movement prior to acquisition announcement. This is 
common practice in M&A literature. Secondly, using the stock prices based on the last 
day of month -2 prior to the event month helps with data collection from the 
Options granted via different schemes generally have different characters such as their exercise price 
and/or expiry date. This information is apparent from reading of the annual reports of the sample firms. 
°' This is the closing price that has not been historically adjusted for bonus and rights issues. This figure 
therefore represents actual or 'raw' prices as recorded on the day, which is what people use to estimate 
their stock \ alue for a certain day. 
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Datastream63 and the subsequent data sorting and calculationsM. Rau and Vermaelon 
(1998) also use the month end of the month prior to the acquisition announcement 
month, 065. For the same reason, all the stock market data is based on this time period. 
1-he LTIP delta for the whole LTIP share holding (LTIP DELTA) is the number of LTIP 
shares times LTIP delta as expressed in the first part of the right-hand side of Equation 
6-1 
Option delta 
Option delta is a partial derivative defined as the change in option value to a I% 
change in the underlying stock price. Before introducing the equation for estimating 
option delta, I first present the valuation model for stock options. The Black and 
Scholes (1973) formula for European call options adjusted for continuously paid 
dividends (Merton, 1973) has become standard practice in executive compensation 
literature to estimate the value of executive options (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; 
Conyon and Sadler, 2001)66. The equation is as follows: 
63 See Section 6.3 for a discussion about Datastream. 
`'' In fact any day of the month can achieve the same effect as the last day of the month as far as the day is 
the same for all the sample companies. 
0, rhe existing M&A studies use different days. Some use the end of a month that is several months, 
usually one or two months, before an acquisition announcement month. Others use a fixed number of 
days, for instance 60 days, prior to an acquisition announcement day. There is no fixed rule but 
generally these studies allow for a few days before an acquisition announcement so that the stock price is 
least atlected by the influence of acquisition rumours. 
66 fluwwever, using the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model to calculate the value of executive 
stock options is not without problems. See Section 7.4.1.1 for a discussion. 
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C= Pe-Wl+d)TN(z) - Xe-ýi+T)TN(z -a 
J) 
ln(P / X) + [ln(1 + r) -1n(1 + d) +a2/ 2]T 
ZaVT 
where, 
C= option value 
Equation 6-3 
P= month end stock price (Datastream code UP) at month -2 prior to acquisition 
announcement month, 0 
X= exercise price of the option 
T= remaining time to maturity of the option, in years. It is measured by dividing 
number of days 67 from the end of month -2 prior to the acquisition announcement 
month, 0, to the expiry day of the stock option by 365. 
d= the annualised dividend yield of the stock. It is calculated as the average of the 
prior 4768 monthly annualised dividend yields (Datastream code DY) based on the 
percentage of gross dividend per share69. 
67 Some annual reports only disclose the expiry month and year of the options. In this case, last day of 
that month is assumed to be the expiry day. Since the unit of T is in years, this assumption does not have 
major impact on option value. 
" Month -48 to month -2 prior to the acquisition announcement month, 0.1 use month end value to be 
consistent with other stock related variables such as stock price P, and stock return volatility, Q. 
69 Conyon and Murphy (2000) argue that abnormal historical dividend yields are poor predictors of yields 
over the term of the option. Stated differently, firm's dividend yields, or in fact, firm performance are not 
always sustainable over time. Therefore they `trim' dividend yields above 5% to 5%. This is also a way 
to mitigate the effect of outliers. This study follows their approach to reduce outliers. 
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Q= expected annualised stock return volatility over the life of the option. It is estimated 
as the standard deviation of monthly continuously compounded returns70 over the prior 
47 months? 1, multiplied by 
412 72. 
r= risk free annual discount rate. It is either the middle price (Datastream Code IR) of 
UK Treasury Bills73 or the average redemption yield of UK gilts74 depending on the 
remaining life of the stock option75. 
"The monthly continuously compounded returns are calculated as Mr = ln(1 +R), where Mr is monthly 
continuously compounded return and R is the discrete monthly return. 
71-48 month to -2 month prior to the acquisition announcement month, 0. 
72 Conyon and Murphy (2000) argue that abnormal historical volatilities are poor predictors of volatilities 
over the term of the option. Therefore, they trim the volatilities outside the range of 20% to 60%. This is 
also a way to mitigate the effect of outliers. This study follows their approach. 
73 There are two types of UK treasury bills, bills with one month to maturity (Datastream Code 
LDNTB 1 M) and bills with three months to maturity (Datastream Code LDNTB3M). 
74 Datastream provides government bond indices based on the European Federation of Financial Analysts 
revised calculation methods since 1985. There are 9 series of UK benchmark indices based on maturity 
band: 2 year maturity band (Datastream code BMUK02Y), 3 year maturity band (Datastream 
BMUK03Y), 5 year maturity band (Datastream code BMUK05Y), 7 year maturity band (Datastream code 
BMUK07Y), 10 year maturity band (Datastream code BMUKIOY), 15 year maturity band (Datastream 
code BMUK 15Y), 20 year maturity band (Datastream code BMUK20Y) and `All' (i. e. indefmite) 
maturity band (Datastream code BMUKALL). The redemption yield for bond i is calculated as 
N 
P_V 
CF 
where P= Gross price, CF,. = ith cashflow, Y= redemption yield, N= the total [1 + YJ'ý 
number of cashflows. The weighted average redemption yield of a list of bond is calculated as follows: 
1: Ys * Vs * ALS 
J where YS is redemption yield of a bond, V. is value of the bond (holding time price * VJ * ALJ 
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. V'() = cumulative 
normal distribution 
Delta for an option is then calculated as: 
option Delta = 
IOC *P 
ap 100 
= e-inc]+i)T * N(z) *P 100 
Equation 6-4 
The option delta for each tranche of options is the number of options in each 
tranche times the delta for an option in that tranche. The delta for the total option 
holding (OPTION DELTA) is the weighted sum of option delta for each tranche of 
options as expressed in the second part of Equation 6-1. 
divided by nominal value). ALS is average life of the bond. The above information is taken from 
Datastream user manual. 
"Unlike Conyon and Sadler (2001) who use 3-, 5-, or 7-year interest rate, this study adopts a more 
accurate match. If an option matures in no more than 2.5 months, the 1 month T-bill rate is used as the 
risk fine rate. If it matures between 2.5 months and I year and 3.5 months (included), then the 3 month T- 
bill rate is used as the risk free rate. If it matures between 1 year and 3.5 months and 2.5 years (included), 
the average redemption yield of 2-year gilts is used as the risk free rate. If between 2.5 years and 4 years 
(included), the average redemption yield of 3-year gilts is used as the risk free rate. If between 4 years and 
6 years (included), the average redemption yield of 5-year gilts is used as the risk free rate. If between 6 
years and 8.5 years, the average redemption yield of 7-year gilts is used as the risk free rate. If between 
8. J \ ears and 12.5 years, the average redemption yield of 10-year gilts is used as the risk free rate. The 
maximum time to maturity period in our sample is 12 years. The rate is based on the end of month -2 
prior to acquisition announcement. 
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Current UK compensation disclosure requirements for directors are contained in 
the Greenbury (1995) report and are predicated on the expert opinion of the UK's 
Accounting Standard Board. UK companies are required to disclose, individually for 
all directors the full details of their option holdings including the number of shares 
under option, the exercise price of all the options, the dates from which the options may 
be exercised and the expiration dates, etc. However, the Greenbury (1995) also makes 
provision for less than complete share option information disclosure in certain 
circumstances and allows companies to opt for a more concise form of disclosure. In 
short, this requires companies to provide, again individually for all directors, (1) the 
total number of share options held, (2) the weighted average exercise price for the stock 
of unexercised options held, and (3) the maturity date of the longest dated unexercised 
options. A full disclosure will provide the data for all the inputs to the Black-Scholes 
model. Researchers have to make some assumptions if companies followed the concise 
disclosure. The data in this study show that only a minority of companies adopt the 
concise disclosure condition, an observation also made by Conyon and Sadler (2001). 
For those companies, this study assumes the portfolio average exercise price to be the 
exercise price of each tranche of options, and take the maturity date of the longest dated 
option to be the maturity date of each tranche of options. 
chi", ý , 1, /,,, 
As discussed in Section 2.3.3.1 of Chapter 2, the value of managerial 
shareholdings changes in line with changes in share price. Applying the Core and Guay 
(1999) definition. share delta is calculated as: 
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Share delta= I* 
P 
100 
Equation 6-5 
where P is acquirer stock price at the end of month -2 prior to acquisition 
announcement month, 0. 
The delta for managerial shareholdings (SHARE DELTA) is the total number of 
shares multiplied by Share delta as expressed in the third term of the right hand side of 
Equation 6-1. 
Option vega 
Following the approach used by Guay (1999), option vega is the partial 
derivative of Black-Scholes (1973)'s option value to 1% change in stock price volatility. 
It is formulated in Equation 6-6 below: 
Vega = 
ac 
*0.01 
ea 
= e-ln(l+a)T *N(z)*P*T(1/2 *0.01 
Equation 6-6 
As with option delta, vega for the total option holding (VEGA) is the weighted 
sum of vega for each tranche of options. 
Concave impact of equity delta 
Following Mishra et al (2000), the concave impact of equity delta is captured by 
a linear term and a squared term of equity delta76. The linear term reflects the impact of 
76In addition to the measure for equity delta suggested above, Mishra et a! (2000) use some cut off points 
to divide equity delta into different levels and examine the incentives provided by the delta at different 
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equity delta when it is at a low level and the squared term captures the 
impact of equity 
delta when it is at a high level. This approach has been commonly used in the existing 
literature to capture the concave impact of managerial equity ownership on firm 
performance or managerial risk taking (see Sudarsanam et al, 1996; Wright et al, 1996; 
Kohers and Kohers, 2001; Weir et al, 2002). 
Interaction of equity delta and total wealth 
The measurement of equity delta (DELTA) has been discussed in the last 
section. Total wealth (WEALTH) is the sum of the value of fixed pay and annual 
bonuses, LTIP cash, stock options, LTIP shares and managerial shareholdings. The 
measurement for the first three have been presented is the last section. The calculation 
of'the value of L'I'IP shares and managerial shareholdings is discussed below. 
The vesting of the LTIP shares depends on whether directors can meet the 
performance criteria embed in the LTIP shares or whether directors can remain in their 
companies until the end of the vesting period. To take account into the contingency 
nature of LTIP shares, Conyon and Murphy (2000), Conyon and Sadler (2001) and 
Stathopoulos et al (2005) estimate the value of LTIP shares by taking a discount of 20% 
of the ordinary share value as follows: 
LTIP 
. sharc valise = Number of LTIP shares *P* 80% Equation 6-7 
where the P is the underlying stock price at the end of month -2 prior to acquisition 
announcement month, 0. This study follows this approach but I am aware that the 20% 
lc% els. This thesis is not in favour of this approach because the cut off points are selected arbitrarily. The 
measure used in this thesis is more objective. 
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discount is highly arbitrary. Those authors do not provide a justification for why they 
use 20% instead of 10%, 30% or any other number. 
However, it is also difficult to 
reject the 20% and use any other percentage without sound theoretical or even 
statistically support which again is difficult to obtain due to the contingent nature of 
LTIP shares. 
The value of managerial shareholdings is simply the number of managerial 
shareholdings times the share price at the end of month -2 prior to acquisition 
announcement month, 0. 
6.2.1.3 Behavioural biases 
As discussed in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3, a measure of behavioural biases 
requires data from which it is possible to infer each manager's psychology. This is by 
no means easy to capture let alone quantify for empirical purposes. Given the obvious 
difficulty of collecting such data, this study uses the three indirect measures used by the 
empirical studies presented in Chapter 3, i. e., firm past performance, stock market 
glamour rating, and media praise for the firm board of directors77. 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) also use self-importance measured by CEOs' pay level as a proxy for 
hubris. I agree that CEOs with strong self-importance may be infected with hubris. However, I do not 
agree that CEO pay is an appropriate proxy for self-importance in this setting. As discussed in Section 
2.4 of Chapter 2, a high pay can be associated with managerial risk-aversion. This weakens Hayward and 
I lambrick (1997)'s argument that a high level of CEO pay can enhance CEOs' self-importance leading to 
hubris. Therefore this study does not incorporate their measure of self-importance as a measure for CEO 
hubris. Malmendier (2004) uses the time when CEOs exercise their stock options as a proxy for CEO 
oNerconfidence. This study does not use this measure because UK annual reports generally do not 
disclose when directors exercise their options. 
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Past performance 
Good past performance has argued to encourage overconfidence/hubris by 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997), Welsh (2001), Hletala et al (2003). These studies argue 
that successful past performance may make managers believe that they are capable of 
doing anything. This is how Jack Welsh felt about himself before the acquisition of 
Kidder, Peaboy in 1986 (see Section 5.5 of Chapter 5 for a discussion of GE's 
acquisition of Kidder, Peaboy). The acquisition failure of Kidder, Peaboy gave Jack a 
lesson of how people can be easily affected by hubris after a successful performance. 
f Iayward and Hambrick (1997) state that successful past performance can make 
managers develop too much faith in the efficacy of their leadership skills and 
overestimate their own ability to manage an acquisition. Moreover, success reinforces 
managers' authority in the company and their decisions remain unchallenged. Such 
managers thus have an opportunity to exploit their superior managerial magic in more 
challenging businesses adventures. 
Following Hayward and Hambrick (1997), past performance (PAST) is 
measured as the return of an acquirer's stock price at month -2 relative to the stock 
price at month -12 (month 0 is the acquisition announcement month). Stock return data 
is calculated from stock data from return index78 (Datastream code, RI). 11 months 
stock return is calculated by applying the following formula: 
Return Index, RI, on [)atastream represents the theoretical aggregate growth in value of a share holding 
over a specified period, assuming that dividends are re-invested to purchase additional unites of an equity 
or unit trust at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date. From 1988 onwards, RI is constructed 
as follows: 
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R 
R1I, t-12 
,,, Rl, ý-, 2 
Equation 6-8 
where R,, is the monthly return for firm i in month t, RI is discussed 
in footnote 78. 
Glamour status 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Kohers and Kohers (2001), and Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2003) suggest that a firm's glamour status contributes to managers' over- 
optimism. The glamour status can make bidder managers over-optimistic about the 
future investment prospects and it is likely that this over-optimism will lead to a risky 
acquisition strategy (see Section 3.3 of Chapter 3). Following these studies, this thesis 
uses the ratio of acquirer book value of equity to its market value as a negative proxy 
(III ; MI; ) for acquirer glamour status. 
Market value of equity (Datastream code, MV) refers to the value at the end of 
month -2 prior to the acquisition announcement month, 0. Book value of equity 
(I)atastream item, 305) is shareholders' funds less preference stock 79 . 
Given that 
accounting data is released several months after the accounting year end, empirical 
studies usually take several months accounting lag when matching the book value with 
the market value. For example, Fama and French (1992) take 6 months accounting lag. 
RI, 
,= RI, , _i x 
'' 1ý I'l where P is the price on ex-date and D dividend payment associated with 
., (-I 
e\-date. Gross dividends are used and the calculation ignores tax and re-investment charges. 
In company analysis, the codes are {eq} for shareholders' equity and {eq. s. ps} for preference shares. 
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The sample data in this thesis shows that company accounts are usually released 3-5 
months after the accounting year-end. Therefore in this study a minimum80 of 5-month 
lag is used. 
Media praise 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997), Ranft and Neill (2001), Johnson and Orange 
(2003), and Malmendier and Tate (2005a) argue that top managers' ego may be 
massaged and inflated by a high and flattering media profile. The media tends to 
attribute firm performance to directors. They write approvingly of successful directors 
and often portray them as `heroic' and larger than life. They set up awards to create 
`superstars', such as `Best Manager and Best Entrepreneur' by Business Week, 'CEOs 
of the Year' by Financial World, `Best Performing CEOs' by Forbes, `Person of the 
Year' by Time, etc (Malmendier and Tate, 2005a). `Heroic' media portrayal may in 
10 The lag varies across different acquiring companies depending on which month is acquisition 
announcement month and when is the accounting year-end. 5-month is the minimum period for the 
accounting lag. Specifically speaking, because the market value of equity is based on the month -2 prior 
to acquisition announcement month, 0, the accounting year-end should be no earlier than month -7. If 
the year-end is earlier than month -7, say month -6, the accounting lag then is 4 months. This breaches 
the rule of a minimum of 5-month accounting lag. In those cases, the second accounting year prior to 
acquisition announcement is used. I acknowledge that this way of matching accounting data with market 
data introduces some misalignment between these two types of data. This has also been pointed out by 
Fama and French (1992) and Strong and Xu (1997). However, this misalignment is inevitable for 
whichever the approach is used unless the researcher knows exactly when the accounting data is released 
to the market. This day should be used to calculate the accounting lag. This however, is extremely 
difficult for a large sample analysis like this thesis and probably is impossible if companies do not draw 
much media attention. 
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turn influence the directors' self-image, fostering the impression that those directors are 
in control, or they are `miracle workers'. Due to the advertising effect of media, 
employees and also large audiences outside the firm tend to believe in the directors' 
managerial magic. This then reinforces the directors' inter- and intra-organizational 
power, enhancing their perceptions of self-importance and self-esteem. The speculative 
nature of high-tech acquisitions and the glamour associated with operating in high-tech 
businesses are likely to appeal to those managers, a typical example is Jean-Marie 
'Messier of Vivendi Universal (see Section 5.5 of Chapter 5 for a story of Jean-Marie 
Messier). 
This study uses media praise (MEDIA) as a measure of the media profile of 
acquirer directors in the run-up to the acquisitions based on the approach suggested by 
I layward and IHambrick (1997). Directors' media profile is determined through content 
analysis of major, nationally distributed newspaper articles about the directors for the 
three years prior to an acquisition announcement. As argued by Hayward and Hambrick 
(1997), hubris is more likely to be activated by favourable press from nationally 
prestigious publications with high circulation than other publications. A favourable 
article in, say The Financial Times, is obviously read by more people and is more 
prestigious than an article in a locally distributed or trade newspaper. 
Only articles specifically attributing a firm-related outcome to board of directors 
or otherwise commenting on directors' performance are considered in this study81. To 
obtain newspaper- articles, I set the following search criteria in Factiva: 
,l See Section 6.3 beloN% for a discussion of Factiva. 
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9 sources of information: key newspapers with significant business coverage e. g. 
Financial Times, Sunday Times, the Times, the Guardian, the Independent, Wall 
street Journal Europe; 
" article publication dates: from month -37 to month -2 to acquisition 
announcement month, 0; 
article subjects: analysis, commentary/opinion83 , people profile84, 
interview85, 82 " 
survey/poll86, management issues87, output/production88, performance89, and 
profiles of companies90; 
82 According to Factiva, `analysis' is an in-depth examination of the issues within a news item by the 
writer, including incorporation of comments from recognized experts. It does not include the personal 
opinion of columnists expressed in their regular columns or the editorial standpoint of a publication. 
83 According to Factiva, `commentary/opinion' is writings which express the personal point of view of the 
writer. It includes regular columnists and guest columnists. It excludes editorials and letters to the editor. 
" According to Factiva, `people file' is biographical profiles of people in the news, including key 
management personnel. 
13 According to Factiva, `interview' is an article based predominantly on an interview with a person or 
persons, or article presented in question and answer format. 
66 According to Factiva, `survey/poll' is a story that reports, or is primarily based on the results of a 
survey, poll or questionnaire. It includes surveys of analysts and economists, public opinion polls, 
employee and employer surveys etc. 
87 According to Factiva, `management issues' is management philosophy and techniques, executive 
compensation and bonuses, corporate governance 
88 According to Factiva, 'output/production' is stories about the output of a company or industry, 
including production figures 
89 According to Factiva, `performance' is corporate and industrial performance 
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" article text contains the phrases: -executive*91 or 
director* or CEO or chairman 
or board and' company name. 
I then read the articles generated by Factiva to filter out the ones that contained 
no commentary likely to induce hubris/overconfidence, such as: 
9 quotes from (direct or indirect) directors without any comment or opinion, 
" share reactions to a new director without describing the directors' performance, 
0 forecasts, 
9 announcements of director nomination only. 
Finally following Hayward and Hambrick (1997), 1 coded each remaining article by 
using the following scale: 
93 points: the article is unequivocally favourable toward the directors; 
"2 points: the article is on balance favourable toward the directors but did contain 
some critical remarks; 
01 point, the article is on balance neither positive nor negative about the 
directors; 
0 -1 point, the article is on balance negative about the directors but did contain 
some positive comments; 
0 -2 points, the article is unequivocally negative about the directors. 
00 points is given to those acquirers who have no relevant articles. 
' According to Factiva, 'profiles of companies' is stories containing historical information about a 
rompaný, including an in-depth description of its products and markets. It includes stories providing an 
overN icww of a company's management, competitors and financials. 
91 """ means words starting with executive, such as executives. 
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Table 6-3 and Table 6-4 illustrate the criteria used to classify comments as either 
positive or negative. The articles that Table 6-3 
is based on focus on company profile 
changes and how directors are associated with the company's profile change. For 
instance, a company's accounting performance has been substantially improved and this 
improvement is mainly attributed to the company directors' leadership. Table 6-4 
focuses on articles commenting on director profiles, for example, interviews about 
director's success stories. 
I acknowledge that this content analysis approach is quite subjective. While it is 
easy to tell those articles which are unequivocally favourable (coded 3), and which are 
unequivocally negative (coded -2), it is much more difficult to give the appropriate 
coding to those articles with both positive and negative comments. A degree of 
judgement is necessary. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) use 2 researchers to 
independently read and code each of the 138 articles used in their study. Any coding 
disagreement was discussed until the two researchers reached an agreement about their 
codings. This can to some extent reduce the subjectivity of the content analysis. 
I lowever, given the large number of articles read in this thesis (14,053 articles were 
read in total, of which 1,287 were read in detail and assigned an appropriate code), help 
i ronn other researchers was not forthcoming. Section 7.4.2 of Chapter 7 discusses how 
tüture research can reduce the subjectivity of this content analysis. 
l'he weighted sum of scale points for all the articles about the board of directors 
tier one acquisition is the measure of media praise (MEDIA) for the acquisition. The 
weighting is determined by the number of articles in each scale versus total articles 
identified relevant to a given acquisition. As shown in Table 7A-2 of Chapter 7, some 
. lequirers have articles as many as 45 whilst some do not have any relevant articles. 
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Weighting is adopted to reduce the skew of data distribution. Equation 6-9 explains 
how to calculate the points for an acquisition. 
t1ED1A =IM' *M, *P, N 
Where 
V -- total number of articles quoted for an acquisition; 
i= scale i; 
1', = points for scale i; 
; 11, = number of articles for scale i. 
6.2.1.3 Monitoring mechanisms 
Equation 6-9 
This section discusses measures for the monitoring mechanisms such as external 
blockholdings, institutional blockholdings, board independence, non-duality and the 
presence of a remuneration committee. 
External blockholdings and institutional blockholdings 
According to the UK Companies Act 1985, shareholdings in excess of 5% of the 
relevant share capital92 must be disclosed in the firm's annual report. Following this 
rule, UK empirical studies such as Sudarsanam et al (1996) generally use 5% as the 
criteria for distinguishing large shareholders from small shareholders. From 1990 when 
Q' According to section 198 (2) of the Part VI of Companies Act 1985, `relevant share capital' means 
company's issued share capital of a class carn'ing rights to vote in all circumstances at general meetings 
of the company. 
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the Disclosure of Interests in Shares (Amendment) Regulations amended the percentage 
to 3%, researchers such as Weir et al (2002) redefine the criteria as 3%. In line with 
these studies, I measure external blockholdings (LARSHR) as the percentage of issued 
ordinary share capital in excess of 3%, beneficial and non-beneficial, held by 
shareholders other than board members and their close relatives93 in the accounting year 
prior to the acquisition announcement year. 
Following Brickley et al (1988) and Cosh et al (1989), institutional blockholders 
are comprised of unit trusts, investment trusts, pension funds, banks, and insurance 
companies94. Institutional blockholding (INSTSHR) is proxied by the percentage of 
issued ordinary share capital in excess of 3%, beneficial and non-beneficial, owned by 
held institutional investors in the accounting year prior to acquisition announcement. 
93 Close relatives refer to directors' spouses and children. If both directors and their spouses hold shares 
in the company (may be because the company used to be their family business), the shares held by the 
directors' spouses are not included in the calculation of external blockholdings. Cases like this are not 
very common in the sample used in this thesis. I am aware that some annual reports may not disclose this 
type of shareholding, and I can only take those annual reports which disclose this type of shareholdings 
into account. This is to reduce the noise contained in external blockholdings as much as possible. 
" Institutional shareholders are identified by 1) judging from their names, for instance NatWest, Barclays 
are banks in the UK; 2) checking on the FAME database (see Section 6.3 for a discussion of the database) 
to find the nature of their business; 3) checking on their companies' websites to see whether or not they 
are institutional shareholders. The above approaches can identify most institutional shareholders. Any 
companies that are unidentifiable particularly some foreign companies are excluded from the institutional 
shareholders' list. Although unidentifiable companies are very limited, I acknowledge that the level of 
institutional shareholding reported in this thesis is probably lower than it should be. Further research 
should use a more reliable database for institutional shareholders in the UK. 
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In some cases, there are duplications in the shareholdings of directors and 
external shareholders, for example, a director's shares held by an investment trust. 
In 
this situation, this holding is not considered part of external blockholdings, or 
institutional shareholdings because the investment trust may be influenced by directors. 
Board composition 
Consistent with the empirical literature discussed in Section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4, 
board independence (NEXE) is measured by the percentage of non-executive directors 
on the board prior to the acquisition announcement date9s 
CEO-COB Non-duality 
Consistent with the empirical literature discussed in Section 4.2.3 of Chapter 4, a 
dummy variable is allocated to non-duality (NONDUAL) which equals 1 if the acquirer 
combines the posts of COB and CEO into one person prior to the acquisition 
announcement 96, and 0 otherwise. 
Remuneration committee 
95 If the data is frone the PWC Corporate Register (see Section 6.3 below), board composition is based on 
the quarter prior to the announcement since PWC Corporate Register is issued every quarter. When the 
company can not be identified from the PWC Corporate Register, the annual report is used as the source 
of information. Board composition is then based on the date of Annual General Meeting prior to the 
announcement. See Section 6.3 below for a discussion of why two data sources are used for the same 
data. 
% As ww ith board composition, if the CEO-COB data is from the PWC Corporate Register, it is based on 
the quarter prior to the acquisition announcement; if from annual reports, it is based on the Annual 
General Meeting day prior to the acquisition announcement. 
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Consistent with the empirical literature discussed in Section 4.2.4 of Chapter 4, a 
dummy variable is allocated for the presence of a remuneration committee. The dummy 
equals I if the acquirer has a remuneration committee prior to the acquisition 
announcement 
97, and 0 otherwise. 
6.2.1.4 Control variables 
Drawing upon the existing literature, I introduce three control variables into the 
empirical risk model (see Section 6.5.1 for a model discussion), financial leverage, 
acquirer size, relative size of acquirer and target98. 
Financial leverage 
It is argued that debt provides an effective corporate control mechanism (Jensen, 
1986; Weir ei al, 2002; Nohel and Todd, 2005). Increased debt intensifies a firm's 
financial stress. This is threatening to managers because they may lose control of their 
firms or even lose their jobs. Therefore as a result, managers may use the excess funds 
in the firm more efficiently, or to service the debt in order to reduce the chance of 
bankruptcy. An alternative argument is that managers may accept high risk projects 
aller taking on debts since some of the business risk will be borne by lenders - to the 
benefit of shareholders (Myers, 1977; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Leland, 1998). This is 
97 \s ww ith board composition and CEO-COB nonduality, if the remuneration committee data is from the 
f\VC Corporate Register, it is based on the quarter prior to the announcement; if from annual reports, it is 
based on the Annual General Meeting Day prior to the announcement. 
°e I acknowledge that there may exist some other variables that may also have an impact on managerial 
risk taking. 
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supported by Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002)'s 
finding that highly leveraged firms take on 
greater exploration risk in oil & gas industry. 
Both views suggest that debt level affects managers' project selection. 
Therefore, this study includes acquirer financial leverage (LEV) as a control variable. It 
is measured as the percentage of total liability over total assets in the accounting year 
prior to acquisition announcement. 
Acquirer size 
Moeller et al (2004) postulate that firm size affects the risk an acquiring firm is 
willing to bear. Large firms can take more risk by conducting bigger acquisitions, 
securing the acquisition by paying higher premium and quickly complete an offer. 
Using a sample of 12,023 US acquisitions from 1980 to 2001 from SDC database, 
Moeller et al find evidence supporting this argument. They investigate various reasons 
behind the size factor and speculate that managerial hubris is the driving factor since 
directors in big firms are more subject to hubris. 
This study therefore includes acquirer size as one of the risk incentives. 
Acquirer size (MV) is measured by natural logarithm99 of acquirer market value of 
cquity at the end of month -2 prior to acquisition announcement month, 0100 
Relative size of acquirer to target 
914 Take the natural logarithm of acquirer size can normalise the distribution of this dependent variable in 
the empirical risk regression model (Model 6-1). 
10" Section 6.2.1.2 has explained why market-related variables such as stock price, market value of equity 
are based on the end of month -2 prior to acquisition announcement month, 0. 
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Relative size of acquirer to target may also be one of the factors that influence 
managers' decision whether or not to take on risky acquisitions. When a target is small 
relative to its acquirer, the acquisition will have less of an impact on the acquirer's 
financial performance. When the target is big relative to the acquirer, if the acquisition 
fails, then it is likely to cause significantly more financial distress to the acquirer. The 
smallness of a target can also facilitate the integration of the target with the acquirer and 
help realize the expected synergies underpinning the takeover, therefore reducing the 
risk of the acquisition (Sudarsanam et al, 1996). Thus acquirer managers are more 
likely to buy targets which are small relative to the acquirer's size even if the chance of 
acquisition failure is high. 
Therefore, the relative size of acquirer to target (RELSIZ) is included as a 
control variable. Relative size is measured as the natural logarithm'0' of the ratio of 
market capitalisation of an acquirer at the end of month -2 month prior to the 
acquisition announcement month, 0, over either the market capitalisation of the target 
firm at the same time or the transaction value of the acquisition if the target is a non- 
listed company. 
6.2.2 Variables in the performance model 
The dependent variable in the empirical performance model is acquirers' post- 
acquisition stock return performance. The independent variables include the level of 
101 lake the natural logarithm of the relative size ratio can normalise the distribution of this dependent 
variable in the empirical risk regression model (Model 6-1). 
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-suboptimality' in acquisition risk and a control variable102, payment method. Each of 
these variables is discussed in the following subsections. 
6.2.2.1 Post-acquisition performance 
M&A literature generally employs two approaches to measure post-acquisition 
performance: a stock-based approach and an accounting based approach. The latter is 
less popular because accounting data contains much more noise and is subject to 
earnings management (Healy et al, 1997). The former has become more widely 
accepted and is now the dominant approach in assessing listed-firms' performance, 
since the efficient market hypothesis of Fama (1970) states that share price should fully 
incorporate all available information regarding the security and thus provides accurate 
signals for corporate performance. Studies that employ a stock-based measure include 
Barber and Lyon (1997), Gregory (1997), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and 
Vermaelen, 1998, Lyon et al (1999), Datta et al (2001), Sudarsanam and Mahate 
102 Existing literature also suggests that the relative size of acquirer to target, mode of acquisitions (such 
as tender offers or mergers), and deal attitude (such as hostile or friendly takeovers) may have impact on 
post-acquisition performance (Sudarsanam et al, 1996; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Cosh and Guest, 
2001). Fhe impact of relative size of acquirer to target on acquisition decisions has been captured in the 
empirical risk model. Mode of acquisitions and deal attitude do not have much impact on this study. 
Fender offers in the UK are governed by the City Takeover code which almost exclusively applies only to 
bids f'or listed company targets (Sudarsanam, 1995, Chapter 6). Hostile takeovers are impossible with 
unlisted targets which are about more than 90% of the sample in this thesis (see Section 6.4). The data in 
this study sho%N s only I tender offer and no hostile takeover. Therefore, these two variables are not 
included in this study. 
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(2003), Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006). This study uses a stock-based approach 103 and 
focuses on acquirer's 3-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) following 
acquisitions as a performance measure. The definition of BHARs and the method used 
to calculate them are discussed in Section 6.5.3. 
6.2.2.2 Levels of optimal/suboptimal acquisition risk 
The conceptual performance model (Model 5-2) discussed in Section 5.8 
suggests the concepts of optimal-risk investment and two types of suboptimal 
acquisition risk, i. e. under-risk investment and over-risk investment. Empirically, two 
proxies are used for the level of suboptimality of acquisition risk. The first is a three- 
group classification of acquisition risk: under-risk (UNDINV), over-risk (OVEINV) and 
optimal-risk (OPTINV). The definition and method for generating these variables is 
described in Section 6.5.2. A dummy variable is allocated to indicate a UNDINV 
acquisition with a value of 1 for such an acquisition and 0 otherwise. The OVEINV 
group is similarly coded. The optimal-risk acquisition group is used as the reference 
group in the regression analysis to avoid perfect collinearity arsing from the dummy 
coding (Gujarati, 2003, Chapter 9),. The impact of either of the `suboptimal-risk' 
acquisition groups is thus compared to the `optimal-risk' acquisition group. 
The second proxy for suboptimality of acquisition risk is a continuous variable. 
It is generated when the acquisition risk is proxied by target industry R&D intensity and 
103 1 acknoww led,, Z, e that stock-based measures for post-acquisition performance is not superior because they 
are influence by the stock market fluctuation. Some studies therefore prefer accounting-based measures 
such as Cosh and Guest (2001), Bild et a! (2002). Measuring the post-acquisition performance is one of 
the difficult issues in the M&A literature. 
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is calculated as the difference between the actual target R&D 
intensity and the predicted 
target industry R&D intensity, i. e. optimal acquisition risk. It is coded as RESID. The 
definition and method for calculating (RESID) are discussed in Section 6.5.2. 
6.2.2.3 Payment method as a control variable 
Previous literature argues that payment method has a signalling effect (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984; Travlos, 1987; Sudarsanam et al, 1996; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; 
Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Cosh and Guest, 2001; Cosh and Hughes, 2001; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003; Sudarsanam, 2003; Conn et al, 2005). If managers are better informed 
about the long-term aspects of their own firm than the market, they will tend to pay for 
acquisitions with stocks when they believe that their own firm's stocks are overvalued. 
A cash offer may indicate that managers have no such private information. Loughran 
and Vijh (1997) report that in the long run, bidding firm shareholders suffer a loss in 
wealth if the acquisition payment is made in equity, but a positive excess return if the 
acquisition involves a cash payment. For a sample of 1,970 acquisition from 1984-2000 
covering the historically high market valuation period in the late 1990s, Akbulut (2005) 
finds that overvalued firms are more likely to conduct mergers involving stock payment. 
These firms are found to have high pre-merger but negative post-merger abnormal 
returns within 3 years after acquisitions. 
Martin (1996) suggests that managers tend to offer equity when they are buying 
targets with high growth opportunities, since such acquisitions typically involve 
considerable information asymmetries, paying with equity helps reduce the valuation 
risk. In high-tech acquisitions with large scope for valuation errors, equity financing is 
more likely- to minimise the valuation risk to acquirers than is payment with 100% cash. 
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Therefore this study includes payment method as a control variable. NONCASH is a 
dummy variable coded 1 for noncash payment, and coded 0 for 100% cash payment' 04. 
6.2.3 Summary 
This section discusses the variable definitions in the risk model and performance 
model. A summary of these variables is listed in Table 6-3. 
10' Some studies such as Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) use three-way classification, i. e., 100% stock 
offers, 100% cash offers and mixed offers. The data in this thesis shows that equity is a major 
component of mixed offers. Therefore I use a two-way classification of payment method, i. e., noncash 
and cash instead of using a three-way classification. Studies use a two-way classification include Kohers 
and Kohers (2001), Conn et al (2005), etc. 
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Table 6-5: Variable definitions 
Variable Description Proxy for: 
Empirical risk model (Model 6-1)105: 
Dependent variables: 
Target high- Dichotomous variable equal to 1 for acquisitions of Acquisition risk 
tech industry targets in high-tech industries and 0 for acquisitions 
status of targets in low-tech industries 
Target industry Target industry R&D intensity level (R&D Acquisition risk 
R&D intensity expenditure/sales) 
Independent variables: 
FAB The sum of fixed compensation and annual bonuses Managerial risk incentive 
for acquirer board of directors from fixed and short-term 
compensation 
LTIPCASH LTIP cash awards held by acquirer board of directors Managerial risk incentive 
from LTIP cash 
compensation 
DELTA The sum of the delta values of LTIP shares (LTIP Managerial risk incentive 
DELTA), options (OPTION DELTA) and ordinary from the change in 
shares (SHARE DELTA) held by acquirer board of company value 
directors. 
DELTA The squared term of DELTA Nonlinear managerial risk 
incentive from change in 
company value 
DELTA * Interaction of DELTA and managerial total wealth Joint impact of managers' 
WEALTH wealth and their risk 
incentive 
VEGA Vega value of options held by acquirer board of Managerial risk incentive 
directors from change in company 
stock volatility 
'EGA * Interaction of VEGA and managerial total wealth Joint impact of managers' 
WEALTH wealth and their option- 
based risk incentive 
PAST' The return of an acquirer's stock price at month -2 Managerial behavioural 
relative to the stock price at month -12 (month 0 is biases 
the acquisition announcement month 
IýN'11E Acquirer book value of equity to market value of Managerial behavioural 
equity biases (negative proxy ) 
103 Model 6-1 is under Section 6. ý. I 
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Table 6-5 (continued) 
Variable Description Proxy for: 
MEDIA Media praise in UK key newspapers for acquirer Managerial behavioural 
board of directors from month -37 to month -2 prior biases 
to acquisition announcement month, 0 
LARSHR % of ordinary shareholdings (beneficial and non- Shareholder monitoring 
beneficial), greater than 3%, held by non-board and control of managers 
members and institutions 
NEXE % of non-executive directors on the acquirer board Board monitoring and 
control of executive 
directors 
NONDUAL Separation of acquirer CEO and chairman roles Board monitoring and 
control of managers 
REM Existence of remuneration committee of an acquirer's Board monitoring and 
board control of managers' 
remuneration 
LEV % of acquirer total liability to total asset Lender monitoring 
MV Acquirer market value of equity at the end of month Size effect 
-2 prior to acquisition announcement month, 0 
RELSIZ Acquirer size relative to target size Capacity for risk taking 
Empirical Performance Model (Model 6-4)'06: 
UNI)INV Actual acquisition risk level lower than predicted risk `Under-risk' acquisition 
level 
OVEINV Actual acquisition risk level higher than predicted `Over-risk' acquisitions 
risk level 
RESID Residuals of the risk model when the dependent `Suboptimal' acquisition 
variable is target industry R&D intensity risk 
NONCASH Acquisition currency not in 100% cash Signalling; reduction in 
valuation risk 
106 Model 6-4 is presented under Section 6.5.4.2. 
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6.3 Data sources 
The M&A data used in this study are taken from the Securities Data Company 
Merger &Acquisition database ('SDC' hereafter). SDC provides detailed quantitative 
information about M&As worldwide. It is the most comprehensive source of mergers 
and acquisitions worldwide (Ang and Kohers, 2001) and the major source of data for 
acquisition-related empirical studies such as Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Datta et al 
(2001), Kohers and Kohers (2001), Sudarsanam (2003), Conn et al (2005)107. However, 
SDC doesn't provide information about firm name changes following acquisitions. To 
match SDC database information with the information from other databases, Financial 
Analysis Made Easy (FAME) and Perfect Analysis are used to track for firm name 
change history. The FAME database provides company information such as accounting 
data, stock price data, company fundamentals and activities, etc. on 1.65 million UK 
and Irish public and private companies. Perfect Analysis provides similar information 
as I'AMF but on a global base and for listed companies only. 
The stock data and accounting data are taken from Datastream database 
(`I)atastrearn' hereafter). Datastream contains a vast number of economic, company, 
107 Another source of UK M&A data is Acquisitions Monthly. It is a monthly magazine summarising the 
major acquisitions happened during the month. Both Acquisitions Monthly and SDC belong to the same 
company, Thomson Financial. Conn et al (2005) collect M&A data from both data sources and find a 
large number of overlap between these two databases, but SDC reports over 50% more acquisitions than 
Acquisitions Monthly and covers most of the acquisitions reported by Acquisition Monthly. However 
Sl)C still neglects some acquisitions which are picked up by Acquisitions Monthly. While relying on 
SDC as the only data source, this thesis acknowledges this data source bias, although the influence might 
he small. 
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and financial data for global companies. 
It is the major source of data for stock-market- 
related and accounting-related 
UK company research. When accounting data is missing 
in Datastream, the Company Analysis database (`Company Analysis' hereafter) is used. 
Company Analysis specialises in providing accounting data for UK and other 
international companies. Managerial wealth data is taken from company annual reports 
provided by Thomson Research, one of the biggest financial database providers in the 
world. 
Board structure and remuneration committee data is extracted from the PWC 
Corporate Register (published by Hemmington Scott). This database discloses board- 
related information once a quarter. Therefore it provides more up to date data than is 
provided by annual reports. However, the PWC Corporate Register has incomplete 
board sub-committee data, especially prior to 1996. Hence, Thomson Research is used 
as the reference database. Media praise for directors is from newspaper articles 
provided by Factiva. Factiva provides business news and information. It uses more 
than 9,000 sources including the Wall Street Journal, and the Financial Times, etc. 
Fxecutive compensation and equity-ownership data is extracted from 
Remuneration Committee Reports or Directors' Reports in firms' annual reports. These 
reports typically contain a breakdown of the remuneration packages provided to 
employees of the company in general, and detailed information on the compensation of 
indiN idual executive directors. In particular, they disclose salaries and bonuses paid to 
individual directors, and give details of any stock options and LTIPs granted to the 
directors. In the past, one difficulty in using the Black-Scholes' approach (see Section 
6.2.1.2) has been the unavailability of data on crucial parameters in the formula. 
Conyon and Sadler (2001) examine the likely biases introduced by the need to 
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approximate or assume values 
for some key variables due to incomplete information 
disclosure by companies in the US. Contrasting US disclosures with that in the UK, 
they argue that due to the publication and implementation of the Greenbury (1995) and 
llampel (1998) reports, the level of disclosure of compensation information in UK 
annual reports is now such that there exists sufficient information in the UK company 
annual reports to analyze the design of British CEO compensation contracts. 
Consistent with their assessment, I find that the data in UK annual reports indeed allows 
observation or inference of information regarding the Black-Scholes parameters from 
annual reports - not only for CEOs but also for all directors. 
Data relating to target industrial R&D intensity is taken from R&D Scoreboard. 
R&D scoreboard has become the recognized international tool for benchmarking R&D 
investment (Cookson, 2002). It is prepared for the Department of Trade and Industry 
by Company Reporting in Edinburgh and is published online108. All its data is extracted 
directly from company annual reports and key ratios are calculated for each company 
and sector. 
6.4 Sample selection 
Using SDC, I identify all the UK domestic M&As during the period 1993-2000. 
This sample period follows the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992 which 
rccommends that companies adopt a rigorous corporate governance regime. The sample 
period also covers the internet/telecom bubble period of the late 1990s during which 
mangy acquisitions were accompanied by stunningly elevated market valuations for high 
teclinoloiv firms all around the world, as well as the excessive grant of stock option 
104 The website is NvN%-%ww. innovation. gov. uk 
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grants in the corporate world. Included in this study's sample are acquisitions that meet 
the following criteria: 
1) acquisitions are announced and completed within the sample period; 
2) acquirers are listed companies with stock price data available in Datastream; 
3) neither acquirers nor targets are in the regulated `financial industry' or `utility 
industry' 109; 
4) acquirers bought more than a 50% stake in their target firms 110 
There are 459 acquisitions whose targets are in the high-tech industries defined 
by SDC (Table 6-6), and there are 3243 low-tech acquisitions. The 459 high-tech 
acquisitions form the initial high-tech sample. This study then excludes those 
acquisitions in which acquirers do not have positive book value of , equity"' 
acquisitions in which acquirers have stock return data which does not extend to more 
than one year prior to acquisition announcement 112, and acquisitions in which acquirers 
109 Companies in these industries are excluded since they face different regulatory environments from 
those of companies in other industries. 
110 Although effective control may be achieved through a holding of less than 50% of a firm's issuing 
shares, the constraint set will ensure that bids examined are only those where it is unambiguously clear 
that control of the target has passed to the acquirer. 
111 See Section 6.5.3.3. below for the reason why firms with a negative book-to-market ratio are excluded 
from analysis. 
1 "To obtain the data for past performance (PAST) and the data for acquirer momentum (one of the 
criteria for finding a control firm to calculate BHARs, see Section 6.5.3.3), acquirers' one-year stock 
return data prior to acquisition announcement is required. 
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do not have annual reports available, or those for which SDC reports no transaction 
v-alue113. This leaves the final high-tech sample at 
289114 
The next step is matching each high-tech acquisition with a low-tech acquisition 
according to the following five criteria. 
1) Target firms have the same public status. A growing body of literature, e. g. Chang 
(1998), Ang and Kohers (2001) Fuller et al (2002) and Cosh et al (2005) report that 
buying private companies is different from buying public companies. One of the 
differences is that there is being more cooperation between bidding and target firms 
in acquisitions of privately held companies than in acquisitions of publicly held 
companies. Buying a publicly held company can be conducted via hostile takeover 
if managers of the target company are not willing to sell. The Acquirer thus will 
have to pay a large acquisition premium and may have negative post-acquisition 
performance. In contrast, an acquirer of a private firm not buy the firm without the 
consent of the target firm's shareholders who, in many cases, may also be the 
managers. There may be even better cooperation if the target shareholders are 
111 All these constraints are to ensure that there are valid data for each observation included in the 
regression analysis and to achieve consistency cross different analyses in terms of sample size. I 
acknowledge that this creates the sample selection bias. 
114 Some studies e. g. Gregory (1997) impose size constraint upon acquisitions, i. e., any acquisitions with 
a transaction sire less than the constraint is not included. These studies argue that when the acquisition is 
small, it NN -ill not have a significant impact on acquirer stock returns. The threshold however, is an 
empirical issue and varies across studies. It can be £lOmillion, £50million, or others. I do not impose any 
sire threshold because of the sample size concern. A £10 million restriction would result in only 91 high- 
tech acquisitions while a £50 million cut off point would reduce the size of high-tech acquisitions to 30 
obserNtit ions. 
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willing to accept the acquirer' shares as a payment for the acquisition. This means 
that target shareholders believe in the prospect of the joint firm and may exert 
efforts in helping the acquirer to improve the joint firm's performance. The 
cooperation between acquirers and targets can substantially reduce information 
asymmetry between the two companies and consequently decrease acquisition risk, 
which helps create value for the joint firm"" Therefore, acquisitions of private 
targets have different risk profile and post-acquisition performance than acquisitions 
of public targets. Given that the high-tech acquisitions in the sample are dominated 
by private and public (but unlisted) target companies, it is necessary to use target 
public status as one of the criteria to find matching low-tech acquisitions. 
2) Acquiring firms are in the same industry as defined by Datastream INDC4 (see 
Section 6.5.3.3 below for a discussion of Datastream industry classification). The 
logic behind finding matching low-tech acquisitions is to investigate what drives 
acquirers of similar characteristics to go for high-risk acquisitions rather than low- 
risk acquisitions. Industry affiliation is an important firm characteristics and has 
long been incorporated in constituting benchmarks for different purposes, such as 
calculating acquirers post-acquisition abnormal returns (Barber and Lyon, 1996; 
Kohers and Kohers, 2001). Therefore, acquiring firm industry affiliation is used as 
one of the matching criteria. As will be discussed in Section 6.5.3.3, the industry 
classification Datastream INDC4 is not so specific that it can make other matching 
criteria or filters invalid. It is also not so general that it will looses its filtering 
effect. "Therefore, the industry filter is based on Datastream INDC4. 
113 More discussions about the differences between buying a publicly held firm and buying a privately 
held firm can he found in Conn et al (2005) 
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3) Acquiring firms are roughly of similar size. Firm size has long been argued as one 
of the key factors that determine firm risk profiles (Banz 1981; Fama and French, 
1992; Fama and French, 1995; Ikenberry et al, 1995; Strong and Xu, 1997). As 
discussed earlier in Section 6.2.1.4, firm size affects the risk an acquiring firm is 
willing to bear. Therefore, size is included as a matching criterion. 
A size filter of 70% to 130%116 is introduced. Specifically, if the closest size 
of an acquirer in the low-tech acquisition group is not within the size filter of 70%- 
130% of the acquirer of the sample high-tech acquisition, then the industry filter is 
based on a more general industry classification, Datastream INDC3. If a matching 
low-tech acquisition is still not found, then the industry filer is relaxed to allow all 
industries except the financial and utility industry. If still no suitable matching low- 
tech acquisition is identified, the 70%-130% size filter can be relaxed to the closet 
match in acquirer size. Size is measured by the market capitalisation of the acquirer 
at the end of month -2 prior to acquisition announcement month, 0. 
4) The same low-tech acquisition can only be used once as a matching acquisition, i. e., 
there are no duplicate low-tech acquisitions in the low-tech acquisition group. This 
is to ensure that both the high-tech acquisition group and the low-tech acquisition 
group have similar sizes so that they are comparable to each other. 
116 The 709, o- I 301o size filter is based on Barber and Lyon (1997). They acknowledge that the scope of 
the sirr filter, i. e. 701 ° and 1 30%, is set without theoretical adjustment but is only an empirical issue. I 
also acknowledge this limitation of using the size filter with no strong theoretical justification. An 
alternative scope of she filter, however, is equally theoretically unjustifiable. Therefore I still use 70% - 
1 30° o the si cf ilter following the study by Barber and Lyon (1997). 
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5) Acquirers of the low-tech targets do not conduct high-tech acquisitions 3 years prior 
to or after the matching high-tech acquisitions. This study exams 3-year post- 
acquisition performance which assumes a market efficiency of 3 years(see Section 
6.5.3 for details). If an acquirer conducts two acquisitions, one high-tech 
acquisition and the other low-tech acquisition within 3 years, the calculated acquirer 
performance following the acquisition that is conducted earlier will be contaminated 
by the later acquisition. This does not help identify the factors that distinguish these 
two different types of acquisitions from each other. 
6) All the criteria set for high-tech acquisitions are imposed upon the selection of low- 
tech acquisitions. 
This generates a low-tech acquisition group consisting of 289 low-tech 
acquisitions. Among these acquisitions, 93 acquisitions are matched on INDC4,119 are 
matched on INDC3 and 60 are matched on all industry (excluding the financial and 
utility industries). The size filter is relaxed for 17 of the acquirers to the closest acquirer 
size match. 
Table 6-6 shows the distribution of M&As for the high-tech acquisition group 
and the matching low-tech acquisition group for the period 1993-2000. Both 
acquisition groups are composed of 289 observations. High-tech acquisitions mostly 
cluster between 1997 and 2000. Only 11 acquisitions take place in 1993, but 91 occur 
in 2000. In contrast, low-tech acquisitions are relatively evenly distributed' 7 
117 It could be because low-tech acquisitions are not matched by the announcement or completion year of 
the high-tech acquisitions. The reason why year filter is not imposed is because there are already five 
matching criteria on identit\ ing a matching low-tech acquisition. As discussed in the main text, industry 
and sire filters have lost their constraints on some of the acquisitions, e. g. 60 out of 289 high-tech 
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Table 6-6 Sample distribution by calendar year, 1993-2000 
High-tech acquisitions Low-tech acquisitions 
Year % of high-tech % of low-tech N 
acquisitions 
N 
acquisitions 
1993 11 3.81 21 7.27 
1994 26 9.00 43 14.88 
1995 18 6.23 29 10.03 
1996 24 8.30 31 10.73 
1997 45 15.57 37 12.80 
1998 34 11.76 54 18.69 
1999 40 13.84 36 12.46 
2000 91 31.49 38 13.15 
Total 289 100 289 100 
The whole sample is then split into two subsamples: acquisitions over 1993- 
1997 and acquisitions over 1998-2000. The two subsamples are then examined 
separately. Starting from the 1997 accounting year, following Hampel Report (1998) 
UK companies disclose the full details of the individual director's option holdings 
including the number of shares under options, the exercise price of all the options, the 
6tcs from which the options may be exercised and the expiration dates, etc. The 1998- 
2000 sample thus has more complete director wealth data than 1993-1997 sample and 
therefore facilitates a more detailed analysis of the impact of managerial wealth on 
managerial risk taking. In the 1993-1997 sample, there are 124 high-tech acquisitions 
and 161 low-tech acquisitions. In the 1998-2000 sample, which captures the peak of the 
telecom and Internet bubble, there are 165 high-tech acquisitions and 128 low-tech 
acquisitions. 
acquisitions do not have the industry filter and another 17 acquisitions do not have size filter. Adding one 
more filter, \ear filter, NN iII make other filters have little effect. 
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6.5 Methodology 
This section discusses the methodology that is used in the subsequent analyses. 
The analyses consist of five steps. 
1. The construction of an empirical risk model. 
2. Identification of optimal-risk, over-risk and under-risk acquisitions. 
3. Estimation of 3-year post-acquisition wealth gains to acquirer shareholders. 
4. Estimation of the impact of optimal and suboptimal acquisition risk on shareholder 
wealth gains. 
5. Additional tests on the relationship between acquirer shareholder wealth gains and 
various risk incentives. 
Steps one to four involve examining the two conceptual models: Model 5-1 and 
Model 5-2. The purpose of step five is to provide a comparison against the one-stage 
analysis of the relationship between firm performance and factors that influence 
managers' investment behaviour. Each step involves different statistical analysis 
methods which are explained in the following sections. 
6.5.1 Empirical risk model 
Stage one involves a regression analysis using empirical proxies for wealth risk 
incentives, behavioural biases, monitoring mechanisms and control variables as set out 
in Model 6-1 below. 
-1&'j isiticm Risk, = a0 +a1F,. 1B, +a2LTIPCASI-i +a3DELTT + a4 DELTT2 
+asi'EG. -ý +a6DELT-ý * IVEALTH, 
+a_1'EGA, *«EALTH, 
+a8P. "IST, +a9BEAIE, +a, oA1ED14 
+ a,, LARSNý + a, 2 VEXE, + a, 3: 'FONDU 11, + a, 4 REA1, 
+a, 5LEr, ' +a16. Aft' +aRELSIZ,, + p, 
Model 6-1 
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where i is the ith acquisition. The variable definitions are listed in Section 6.2.1. a is the 
coefficient of each variables. p is the statistical error term. 
Model 6-1 is the empirical risk model. It is estimated based on two types of 
regression models - logistic regression and OLS regression. A logistic regression relies 
on a broad categorisation of acquisition risk into just two levels (i. e., target high-tech or 
target low-tech) whereas an OLS model relies on a wider and continuous measure of 
acquisition risk (i. e., target industry R&D intensity across both high-tech and low-tech 
acquisitions). The latter measure involves less loss of information that may be 
potentially of value in determining `over-risk' or `under-risk' acquisitions. The 
following two subsections discuss these two types of regressions separately. Logistic 
regressions are a special form of OLS regressions. 
discussed first in the next section. 
6.5.1.2 OLS regression 
Therefore OLS regressions are 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions are used to predict the variance of the 
dependent variable from linear combinations of interval, dichotomous, or dummy 
independent variables by applying an ordinary least squares approach (Gujarati, 2003, 
Chapter 3). The dependent variable in an OLS regression is of a continuous data type. 
An Ol. S regression can establish the significance level of a set of independent variables 
explaining a proportion of the variance in a dependent variable (significance test of R2), 
and can establish the relative predictive importance of the independent variables 
(comparing coefficient weights). The Student's t-test is used to assess the significance 
of individual coefficients. R2 explains the percent of the variance in the dependent 
variable explained uniquely or jointly by the independent variables. F tests are used to 
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test the significance of R2, i. e., model significance. However, R2 increases with the 
number of independent variables thus may give a false impression of the explanatory 
power of the model. To mitigate this effect, adjusted R2 is introduced, which is the R2 
adjusted for the number of degrees of freedom. Therefore, adjusted R2 instead of R2 
will be reported in the regression model output. 
To properly perform OLS regressions, researchers need to follow certain rules. 
A violation of these rules may introduce severe biases into the model. Common 
violations in cross-section regressions include the outlier problem, multicollinearity and 
heteroscedasticity. The econometrics literature has developed some remedial methods 
to correct these data problems (Gujarati, 2003, Part II). 
An outlier is an observation that is very different from other observations in the 
sample. The inclusion or exclusion of such an observation, especially if the sample size 
is small, can substantially alter the results of the regression analysis. Common 
approaches to eliminate outlier problems are deleting them, or winsorizing them. The 
winsorizing process involves setting the tail values equal to a certain lower percentile 
value, thus reducing the impact of some extreme outliers (Cowan and Sergeant, 2001). 
As compared to deleting outliers, the winsorizing approach can avoid reducing the 
sample size, and therefore is more popular with researchers. Following Sudarsanam 
and Mahate (2003), this study sets all values beyond 2 standard deviations away from 
the mean to 2 standard deviation away from mean. 
Multicollinearity, where several predictors are highly correlated, also causes a 
violation. The use of a variance inflation factor (VIF) is a common way of detecting 
multicollincarity. As a rule of thumb, if the VIF of a variable exceeds 10, then that 
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variable may seriously correlated to another variable 
in the model (Gujarati. 2003, 
Chapter 10). 
Another typical violation is heteroscedasticity, which occurs when the error 
terms change depending upon the value of one or more of the independent variables. 
White (1980) develops a test for detecting heteroscedasticity and recommends the 
White (1980) heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics in place of student's t-statistics in 
OLS regressions. 
6.5.1.3 Logistic regression 
While linear regression is robust in many cases, several instances exist in which 
the failure of some linear regression assumption leads to unreliable estimates. Such a 
cast may exist when the dependent variable is categorical. A range of techniques have 
been developed for analysing data with categorical dependent variables, such as 
discriminant analysis, and logistic regression. Discriminant analysis has strict 
assumptions with regard to the characteristics and distributions of independent 
variables, for instance, they need to be jointly normal with equal covariance matrices. 
Logistic regression is not restricted by such assumptions and can incorporate 
independent variables of any type. It applies a maximum likelihood estimation after 
transforming the dependent into a logit variable (the natural log of the odds of the 
dependent variable occurring or not). In this way, logistic regression estimates the 
probability ofa certain event occurring (Gujarati, 2003, Chapter 5). 
Logistic regression has many analogies to OLS regression: it has logit 
coetlicients for every independent variables, a pseudo R2 statistic (i. e., a measure 
similar to a R`' in OLS regression) is available to summarize the strength of the 
relationship. Outliers and multicollinearity can lead to biased estimation. Therefore in 
205 
the logistic regression performed, I apply a winsorizing approach to replace the outliers 
with the values equal to 2 standard deviations from the mean. A VIF test is also 
conducted to diagnose any multicollinearity. Unlike OLS regression, however, logistic 
regression does not assume linearity of the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables, and in general has less stringent requirements on normality or 
homoscedasticity of the variables. The success of the logistic regression can be 
assessed by looking at the classification table which shows correct and incorrect 
classifications of the dependent variable. Also, in logistic regression, goodness-of-fit 
tests such as model chi-square are available as indicators of model appropriateness, as is 
the Wald statistic to test the significance of individual independent variables. 
However, unlike OLS regression whose coefficient reflects how much an 
independent variable has an impact on the dependent variable, the logit coefficient of a 
logistic regression can only deliver the message whether the change of an independent 
variable is in favour of or against the event of interest happening. The logit coefficient 
L is expressed as: 
L, = In( 1 P, 
) Equation 6-10 
- 
where 
1', = the probability of an event i happening; 
P 
= the odds ratio of an event i happening, i. e., the ratio of the probability that the 1-1' 
event i happening to the probability that it will not happen. 
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L, is therefore the log of the odds ratio. If it is positive, it means that when the 
value of the independent variable increases, the odds that the dependent variable is 
equal to I (meaning that event i happens) increases. If L; is negative, it means the odds 
that the dependent variable being equal to 1 decreases as the value of the independent 
variable increases. L, can be transformed into an odds ratio by taking an exponential 
form. An Odds ratio reflects the magnitude of the odds of an event i happening with 
respect to a unit change in the independent variable. 
6.5.2 Identification of optimal/suboptimal-risk acquisitions 
Step two involves the identification of optimal/suboptimal acquisition risk levels 
based on the prediction of the empirical risk model (Model 6-1). When the risk model 
is estimated using logistic regression, the unbiased Lachenbruch holdout procedure 
(Lachenbruch and Mickey, 1968) is used to estimate the probability of a sample 
acquisition belonging to the high risk or low risk group. The logistic model's 
classificatory accuracy may be positively biased when the test sample used to estimate 
the model and the prediction sample are the same. One way to minimise this bias and 
enhance classificatory accuracy is to estimate the model with the test sample and then 
use the model classify a different, hold-out sample. This increases the sampling 
requirement. An alternative and efficient procedure is the Lachenbruch hold-out 
procedure that estimates the logistic model using the test sample minus one observation 
which is then classified. This procedure is iterated by holding out one observation at a 
time. re-estimating the model and then using the model for classification. The 
classificatory rate is no\\- free of upward bias. The procedure estimates the probability 
of the held-out observation belonging to one of the groups and then classifies it to the 
grotip %% ith the highest probability. This is the predicted group for that observation. All 
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the acquisitions thus have a predicted risk group using this Lachenbruch hold-out 
procedure. 
The following test in Model 6-2, is applied to determine different categories of 
acquisition risk: 
Type of acquisition risk = UNDINV, if Risk; < Risk; 
OPTINV, if Risk; = Risk; 
OVEINV, if Risk; > Risk, 
Model 6-2 
An acquisition is considered an UNDINV when its actual risk group (Risk; ) is 
lower than the predicted group, Risk, . An acquisition 
is considered an OPTINV when 
its actual risk group is equal to the predicted risk group. An acquisition is considered an 
OG'EINI' when its actual risk group is higher than the predicted risk group. 
When the risk model is estimated by OLS regressions, the same acquisitions can 
be classified into 2 categories by comparing the predicted target R&D intensity to the 
actual. 'I'he residuals in the OLS regression represent the suboptimal risk level of 
acquisitions (RESID). If the actual risk level, Risk;, is not as the same as the predicted 
risk Risk,, the acquisition risk is considered to be `suboptimal' as shown in model 6-3 
Rh''ID, = Risk, - Risk, Model 6-3 
:A positive (negative) RESID represents an over-/under-risk acquisition. The 
magnitude of RESID is a measure of risk `suboptimality' in the acquisition decision. 
'08 
6.5.3 Estimating acquirer long-term post-acquisition performance 
Step three involves estimation of the acquirer shareholder wealth gains over 
three post-acquisition years using the standard event study methodology that 
incorporates a range of benchmarks suggested in the literature. 
Event study methodology is widely used and well documented in the financial 
economic literature. It is used to assess the impact of an economic event or a firm- 
specific event on the value of a firm. The earliest work on the event study methodology 
is probably by Dolley (1933) who used it to examine stock splits. The event study 
approach has been widely used in studies examining the valuation impact of a corporate 
events such as M&As. The event study methodology can be seen as a five-step process: 
event definition; sample selection; calculation of the expected and abnormal returns; 
aggregation of abnormal returns and testing the significance and presentation and 
interpretation of the empirical results. The following section discusses several 
controversial issues relating to event study methodology. 
6.5.3.2 Event window 
The event window in this study is three years after the acquisition effective 
month, 0. The reason why a 3-year horizon is adopted is because firstly, acquisitions 
have a strong and extended impact on firm profile and this can be reflected in multi-year 
f rti performance. Secondly, evidence shows that short-term measurement of abnormal 
returns does not capture the full stock market reaction to an event (Rau and Vermaelen, 
1995, \grawti-al and Jaffe, 2000). Some studies have extended the event window to 3 
ears and only a few to 5 years to test market efficiency. However, the longer the 
horizon is, the more sensitive is the long-term performance test to the methodology 
employed and the more controversial is the reliability of the results. Furthermore, long 
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event windows also are vulnerable to the impact of confounding events (see 
Sudarsanam, 2003, Chapter 4). Therefore, following the majority of long-term event 
studies, e. g. Barber and Lyon (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Kohers and Kohers 
(2001), Datta et al (2001), Sudarsanam and Mahate 2003 and Conn et al (2005), this 
study adopts a 3-year event window. 
6.5.3.3 Benchmark model 
To assess whether a firm is performing unusually well or poorly under the 
effects of a corporate action, researchers need to specify the performance they expect in 
the absence of such an event, thus providing a benchmark against which sample firm 
performance can be compared. To be specific, the event period expected return on 
stock i conditional on an event is expressed as follows: 
E(r, (t)I event) =J + E(r, (t)) Equation 6-11 
where 6 is the component of return attributable to the event and E(r; (t)) is the 
unconditional t-period expected return on stock i. Event studies estimate the magnitude 
of 6 to evaluate the valuation effect of the event. In event studies in which the event 
window t is short, the value impact of the event is likely to be large. The estimate of 6 
is typically not sensitive to the choice of asset pricing model used to determine E(r; (t)). 
1: '(r, (ß)) is larger in long-horizon event studies and it is difficult to sharply divide average 
realized returns into two components: the expected return, and the corporate event 
specific return. 
There are mainly two approaches to model expected performance: normative 
models such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), and positive models such as 
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the control portfolio model and control firm model. Positive models predict post-event 
performance based on event firms' pre-event characteristics. Both approaches are 
employed in extant empirical studies. 
Fama (1998) argues that asset pricing models do not completely describe 
expected returns. For example, if an event sample is tilted toward small stocks, using 
CAPM which only adjusts for market risk as a benchmark can produce spurious 
abnormal returns. Fama (1998) recommends firm-specific models that capture pre- 
event characteristics of sample firms. Barber and Lyon (1996) state that pre-event 
characteristics of firms can lead researchers to expect that sample firms will experience 
above (or below)-average performance after an event, even before they consider the 
impact of the event under consideration. For example, if certain industries have 
experienced unusual growth in return on asset (ROA) during the sample period, it might 
be reasonable to expect the sample firms in those industries to experience a similar 
growth in ROA after the event. 
Barber and Lyon (1997) document that a control firm approach which uses one 
firm of similar characteristics as the sample firm as a benchmark yields better specified 
test statistics than the control portfolio approach which uses a portfolio of firms of 
similar characteristics as a benchmark, and yields better results than asset pricing 
models since the control firm approach alleviates new listing"8. rebalancing 119, and 
1e New listing bias arises because in event studies of long-run abnormal returns, sample firms generally 
have a long post-event history of returns, while firms that constitute index (or control portfolio) typically 
include new firms that begin trading subsequent to the event month. This is less likely to happen with a 
control firm approach since both the sample and control firm must be listed in the identified event month 
(Barber and Lyon, 1997). 
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skewness biases120 while the other two approaches cannot. This stud}, therefore adopts 
a control firm approach 
121 
Summarising the existing literature, this study uses four firm characteristics: 
industry, size, BEME, and momentum. Industry is considered an important factor 
because as Kohers and Kohers (2001) state, that high-tech firms have a distinctive high 
growth nature which is only captured by industry classification. Size and book-to- 
market effect have been argued to capture much of the cross-section of average stock 
returns (Banz, 1981; Fama and French, 1992; Fama and French, 1995; Ikenberry et al, 
(1995); Barber and Lyon (1997); Strong and Xu, 1997). 
119 Rebalancing bias arises because the compound returns of a control portfolio, such as an equally 
weighted market index, are typically calculated assuming periodic (generally monthly) rebalancing, while 
the returns of sample firms are compounded without rebalancing. This is less likely to happen with the 
control firm approach since both sample firms and control firms are calculated without rebalancing 
(Barber and Lyon, 1997). 
'`0 Skewness bias arises because long-run abnormal returns are positively skewed (see Barber and Lyon, 
1997 for more discussions). This is less likely to happen with the control firm approach since both 
sample and control firms are equally likely to experience large positive returns (Barber and Lyon, 1997). 
'''The control firm approach is not without any problems. For example, like any other benchmark 
models, it is subject to model misspecification problem (Lyon et al, 1999). If the benchmark model is not 
properly specified, for instance, some important pre-event characteristics are not included in the 
berichniark, the resulting abnormal returns could still be spurious. Cowan and Sergeant (2001) state that 
the control firm approach is not able to eliminate the bias from the interaction of skewness bias and 
sample we bias. A large sample is more likely to have normally distributed returns than a small sample. 
I'he test statistics for a non-normally distributed stock returns arising from a small size are more likely to 
h mis-specified. This creates sample size bias. 
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A few studies, such as Carhart (1997), find persistence in stock prices, which 
they call -momentum'. They find that stock momentum could partially explain the 
post-event abnormal returns up to 3 or even 5 years. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) note 
that the market has a tendency to extrapolate the bidder's past performance into the 
future. Therefore, this study uses industry, size, book-to-market and momentum to 
identify matching firms. 
Industry classifications are based on Datastream industrial classifications which 
exist at six levels122. For individual firms, Datastream has industrial classification level 
6 (coded as INDC6), level 5 (coded as INDC5), level 4 (coded as INDC4), and level 3 
(coded as INDC3)123. The most specific and least general level is level 6 (Datastream 
code INDC6). In this thesis, industry classification is based on INDC4. INDC6 or 
NZZ Level 1, is the total market. 
Level 2 comprises 5 sectors: total non-financials; total non-financials, excluding mineral extraction; 
mineral extraction; financials; investment trusts 
Level 3 comprises 7 sectors: mineral extraction; general manufacturers; consumer goods; services; 
utilities; financials; investment trusts. 
Level 4 classification, comprises up to 38 sectors, based on the FTSE-Actuaries system. 
Level 5 comprises up to 76 FTSE-Actuaries sub-sectors. Various level 4 sectors are broken down at this 
level into more detailed descriptions used by the London Stock Exchange. 
Level 6 comprises up to 83 Datastream sub-sectors. These level 6 groups have been devised by 
Datastream to contain more detailed descriptions about industry sectors than those provided at level 4 and 
level S. 
123 Datastream indicates that at levels 4,5 and 6, the number of sectors and sub-sectors will vary over 
time. I therefore download each level for each year over 1990-2002 for all the sample firms in this thesis 
as well as the universe of firms that are used to construct benchmarks. The result shows none of those 
tirms chances industr\ classification. 
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INDC5 are more specific than INDC4. If industry classification were to be based on 
INDC6 or INDC5, it is unlikely that many firms would be left to choose from in some 
sectors once the industry filter had been applied. This would have made size, BEIM 
and momentum filters invalid for many sample firms. Therefore, this study uses the 
more general industry classification INDC4. 
Size is based on the market value of equity (Datastream code `MV') at the end 
of month -2 prior to acquisition announcement month, 0. BEME has been defined in 
Section 6.2.1.3. Briefly, it is the ratio of acquirers' book value of equity in the 
accounting year prior to acquisition announcement relative to market value of equity at 
the month end of month -2 prior to acquisition announcement month, 0. A five-month 
accounting lag124 is considered when matching the book value to the market value. 
Following Carhart (1997), stock price momentum is calculated as the 11-month 
average monthly returns lagged by one month (month -12 to month -2). 
To incorporate all the firm characteristics with equal weight, Jegadeesh (2000) 
employs a distance metric. Datta et al (2001) also use distance metrics to find matching 
firms for their sample of acquirers. The following equation formulates the distance 
metric for one sample firm: 
ý)1 1)i. v lance =N 
1Xsample x( 
- 
1=1 ar 
where 
.1= 
jth universe firm which is used to construct the benchmark; 
124 See Section 6.2.1.3 for discussions about accounting lag. 
Equation 6-12 
ß14 
i= ith characteristic of a sample firm, such as size, book-to-market and momentum; 
N= total number of matching characteristics for a sample firm; 
X 
sample 
(i) = value of the characteristic i for a sample firm; 
Xý (i) = value of the characteristic i for a universe firm, j; 
a, = cross-sectional standard deviation of characteristics i of universe firms. 
I'his thesis employs acquirer industry classification, size, BEME and stock price 
momentum as the characteristics. Given that it is impossible to apply industry 
classification to Equation 6-12, the sample firm is first matched on industry factor, and 
then distance metrics are calculated to identify the best-fit matching firm. For example, 
consider a sample firm i from the biotechnology industry with values for its size, book- 
to-market ratio and stock price momentum being, 10 million, 0.5 and 0.3. The universe 
of firms, which are used to construct the benchmark are all the firms in Datastream. 
Firstly, all the universe firms that are in the biotechnology industry are identified (let's 
say there are 120 firms excluding the sample firm). After imposing all the constraints 
that are discussed below, there are 100 firms left to construct the benchmark. The 
standard deviations of size, BEME and momentum for the 100 firms are 0.1,0.2 and 
0.4. We then randomly choose one firm, j, out of these 100 firms and firm i's size, 
E3EME and momentum ratio are 15 million, 1.1 and 0.5, respectively. The distance 
metric of the sample firm i relative to the universe firm, j, is as follows: 
- 
I10-1 10.5-1.11 10.3-0.51 
Dis tan CC's 
0.1 
+ 
0.2 
+ 
0.4 
= 53.5 
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Similarly, the distance metrics for all the rest of the remaining 99 firms are 
calculated. The one with the lowest distance metric value indicating closest match to 
the sample firm is picked as the benchmark firm, or the matching firm. In line with 
most of the existing studies on long-term acquisition performance, such as Barber and 
Lyon (1997), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), the matching firm is re-identified once a 
year to control for the changing risk characteristics of the sample firm with time. Given 
that this study examines acquirers' 3-year post-acquisition performance, an acquirer will 
have altogether 3 matching firms to compare with their own stock return performance 
for the whole 3 years after the acquisition. 
The universe of firms used to construct the various benchmarks are all of the 
Uatastream firms, both UK and International, listed on the London Stock Exchange. In 
this study several constraints determine whether or not universe firms are included in 
the benchmark portfolios or considered as matching firms. 
1. Firms have to have valid characteristic data in the effective month of the 
corresponding sample firm. In particular, firms have to have size data at the end of 
month -2 prior to the acquisition announcement month, 0. 
2. Following Fama and French (1992) and Fama and French (1993), firms without 
positive market value of equity or positive book value of equity (BEME) are 
excluded from the analysis. This is because the interpretation of negative BEME is 
problematic. For the same market value, a higher book value of equity (BE) 
signifies a lack of growth opportunities. However, it is impossible to impose the 
same interpretation on the BEME ratio when the BE is negative. 
? 16 
3. Firms with stock return data which does not extend to more than one year prior to 
acquisition announcement are excluded. This is to avoid new listing bias 
125 and 
gives us a fair data for an assessment of momentum. 
4. Furthermore, a firm is excluded if it is already in the sample and has an acquisition 
between -36 months and 36 months of the effective month of the sample acquisition. 
This is to avoid contamination of the influence of prior or later acquisitions on stock 
performance (see Lyon et al, 1999 for more discussions). 
Having identified the matching firm, the next step is to calculate the stock 
returns. As discussed above, each acquirer will have three matching firms for 3 years 
after the acquisition, i. e., one for 12 month starting from acquisition effective month 
(month 0), one for 12 month starting from month +12 and the other for 12 month 
starting from month +24. Monthly returns for the following 12 months are then 
calculated for each of these matching firms. The method of calculating the stock returns 
is described in the next section. 
6.5.3.4 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
Monthly return data is argued to be more appropriate than daily return data in 
long-term event studies because it can reduce many of the problems encountered using 
daily return data, such as overstatement of the magnitude of abnormal returns because 
returns are compounded daily (Roll, 1983; Kennedy and Limmack, 1996). 
There are three main ways of calculating long-term stock returns: buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs), cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and the calendar time 
approach. BHARs give the actual investment returns an investor would achieve from 
I. ' I See footnote 118 for the definition of new listing bias. 
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buying equal dollar amounts of N securities and holding the shares for a period of time 
T (Roll, 1983), while CARs assumes portfolio rebalancing every month 126. Since 
monthly rebalancing is so costly this is not a realistic strategy. Furthermore, Barber and 
Lyon (1997) argue that CAR gives a biased estimate of long-run buy-and-hold 
investment returns, which is termed as `measurement bias' by Barber and Lyon 
(1997)127. Measurement bias can lead to incorrect inferences regarding investment 
strategy 128. The calendar time approach tracks the performance of an event portfolio in 
calendar time relative to either an explicit asset-pricing model or some other 
126 When calculating CARs, the portfolio return for every month is generated by taking the average of all 
the stock returns in the portfolio. The monthly portfolio returns are then used to calculate the portfolio 
holding period return. The monthly averaging indicates that the portfolio is rebalanced every month in 
actual stock investment by selling securities with positive returns and buying securities with negative 
returns to achieve a portfolio structure the same as when it was first constructed. 
12' It is argued that bad model problems are more acute with long-term BHARs because of the 
compounding effect of the BHAR approach (Fama, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). If a benchmark 
model is not appropriate, i. e., a bad model, compounding the expected returns can exacerbate the error. 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) state that BHARs can give false impressions of the speed of price 
adjustment to an event because BHARs can grow with the return horizon even when there is no abnormal 
return after the first period. 
128 Barber and Lyon (1997) illustrate that a sample of firms that all have 0 annual buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns calculated relative to a market benchmark has a corresponding 12-month mean CAR of +5%. 
Barber and Lvon suggest that researchers who restrict their analysis to CARs and ignore the analysis of 
13IIARs could conceivably conclude that the sample in question earned long-term abnormal returns when 
in fact it did not. 
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benchmark129(Fama, 1998). By aggregating the returns on sample firms into a single 
portfolio, calendar time approach does not precisely measure investor experience as 
precisely as BHARs (Lyon et al, 1999). Loughran and Ritter (2000) suggest that 
calendar time abnormal returns lack power because they weigh each month equally 
regardless of the number of observations in the month. They recommend BHARs. This 
study uses BHAR130. BHAR, is calculated as: 
129 Suppose the event window is three years. For each calendar month, calculate the abnormal return on 
each stock that had an event in the last three years. Then average the abnormal returns for the calendar 
month across stocks to generate the abnormal return for the month on the portfolio of stocks with an event 
in the last three years. The portfolio is reformed once a month by dropping the stocks that reach the end 
of 3-year period and adding all new stocks that just start their 3-year period. The average abnormal return 
for the entire sample is the time series average (CTAR) and the t-test is calculated using the standard 
deviation of the time series. 
1J0 As pointed out by Fama (1998), estimating statistical significance with BHARs and CARs are 
problematic because the standard t-statistic do not adequately account for potential cross-sectional 
dependence in returns. Cross-sectional dependence means that the returns of sample firms are correlated, 
which can lead to mis-specified test statistics. Cross-sectional dependence is likely to happen when 
sample firms exhibit calendar time clustering or there are overlapping periods of return calculation for the 
same sample firm. Lyon et al (1999) recommend that calendar time approach can eliminate cross- 
sectional dependence of sample firms by aggregating the returns on sample firms into a single portfolio 
thus avoiding the problem of the correlation of returns. Conn et al (2005) use all three approaches and 
lind that they produce similar results both in terms the magnitude of abnormal returns and statistical 
significance. In Conn et al's sample, there are 87% (3340 out of 3842 acquisitions) acquisitions are 
multiple acquisitions. Given such a high ratio of multiple acquisitions in the sample, Conn et al still find 
that BFIARs and CTARs zenerate similar results. In the sample of this thesis, 41% (235 acquisitions out 
of 578 acquisitions) are multiple acquisitions, much less than that in Conn et al's sample. It is therefore 
expected B}Ii\Rs reported in this thesis may not be significantly biased. 
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BHAR, =rl (1+R,, )-[1(1 + Rbeflchmark, g) 
1=1 1=1 
Equation 6-13 
where month t=1 is the first month following the effective month, R, 1 
is the return on 
stock i on month t, and T is the three-year anniversary month of the effective month. If 
the sample firm is delisted before T, this causes survivorship bias to the portfolio BHAR 
at T because the delisted companies are not included in the portfolio to calculate 
portfolio BHAR at T. The BHAR thus generated does not reflect real portfolio 
performance. Baker and Limmack (2001) suggest three ways of dealing this 
survivorship bias problem: excluding those firms which do not survive the whole 
examination period, replacing delisted firm returns following delisting with `proxy 
returns' such as returns of the benchmark, and replacing with a zero return. The first 
approach decreases the sample size and brings more survivorship bias. Therefore the 
later two approaches are more favoured by researchers than the first. Baker and 
Limmack find that the two approaches do not generate results that are significantly 
different from each other. This study uses both approaches and also finds that these two 
approaches yield portfolio returns that are not significantly different from each other. 
Because the second approach appears more complicated than the third, I explain the 
second approach and report the acquirers' post-acquisition returns calculated using this 
approach. If the sample firm is delisted before T, the return from the benchmark is 
imputed. However, if the benchmark firm is delisted before T, the return from the 
F I'SE All Share index (Datastream code `LFTALLSH') is used in substitution. 
[he Bl IAR for the portfolio of sample firms is then calculated as: 
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ABHAR,. =1 BHAR, T N ;., 
Equation 6-14 
where ABHART is the equally weighted BHARs'31 for firm i over time period T. a' is 
the total number of stocks in the portfolio. 
6.5.3.5 Significance testing 
When the distribution of returns is not normal, one solution is to emphasize the 
results of non-parametric tests, including those that emphasize median values for tests 
of proportion (Limmack, 2003). The null hypothesis in testing for abnormal returns is 
that the given event has no impact on the behaviour of security returns, i. e., the 
abnormal return is 0. This study applies three test methods including both parametric 
and non-parametric tests for significance testing of the long-term abnormal returns: 
Student's t-test, Fisher's sign test, and Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Student's t-test 
Student's 1-test is used to test the null hypothesis that the population mean of 
1311ARs 132 is equal to zero. The usual assumptions for Student's t-test are 
III An alternative approach is to calculate value-weighted returns (Fama 1998). These two approaches 
have different implications. Equally-weighted returns reflect whether on average event firms experience 
abnormal returns while value-weighted returns indicate whether an investor holding the value-weighted 
portfolio of event firms will earn abnormal returns. This thesis aims to find out the average performance 
of acquirers in a certain risk group. Hence, an equally weighted approach is adopted. 
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independence 133 and normality of BHARs134. Independence of the BHARs implies no 
correlation across the BHARs of different securities. This will generally be the case if 
there is no clustering, and there is no overlap in the event windows of the included 
securities (Campbell et al, 1997, Chapter 4). Given the BHARs for a sample of N event 
firms, the student t-statistics is computed as follows: 
BHARh 
Q(BHARh) l 
Equation 6-15 
where BHARh is the mean of the sample abnormal returns, h is the holding period, and 
a(BHARh) is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the abnormal returns for the 
sample of N firms. 
Fisher's sign test 
'32 Student's t test can test not only BHARs but also other types of returns. So can the other statistics 
discussed below. The reason why BHARs is used here is because this thesis uses BHARs as a 
performance measure. 
133 Footnote 130 has explained that cross-sectional dependence can cause mis-specified t-statistics and a 
remedy to it is using the Calendar time approach. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) also recommend an 
approach to adjust t-statistics to incorporate the cross-sectional dependence of returns. 
131 A remedy to this is to use skewness-adjusted t-statistics. Johnson (1978) develops skewness-adjusted 
t-test to correct the misspecification error found in the student's t-test that is caused by the skewness of 
the population distribution. This thesis calculates both student's t-statistics and Johnson's skewness- 
adjusted t-statistics and finds no significant difference between these two. Therefore only student's t-test 
is reported in the thesis. 
1) 1) 1) 
Fisher's sign test is a nonparametric test which is free of specific assumptions 
concerning the distribution of returns. It requires that the BHARs are independent' 
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across securities and follow a continuous distribution, and that the expected proportion 
of positive BHARs under the null hypothesis is 0.5, i. e., the median of the BHARs is 0. 
The basis of the test is that under the null hypothesis it is equally probable that the 
abnormal returns will be positive or negative. The test statistic is calculated as follows: 
B= I(BHAR; > 0) 
l=I 
Equation 6-16 
where the indicator, I (BHAR; > 0), equals 1 if the BHAR on the ith firm is greater than 
0,0 otherwise. N is the total number of firms in the sample. At the chosen significance 
level a, the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative of a non-zero median 
if B >_ b(a / 2, N, 0.5) or B <_ b(a / 2, N, 0.5) in a two tail test, or in favour of a positive 
median if B >_ b(a, N, 0.5) , or in 
favour of a negative median if B: 5 b(a, N, 0.5) in one- 
tail test. The constant b(a, N, 0.5) is the upper a percentile point of the binomial 
distribution with sample size N and type 1 error probability of 0.5. 
A weakness of Fisher's sign test is that it may not be well specified if the 
expected proportion of positive BHARs is not 0.5 (Campbell et al, 1997, Chapter 4). 
This does not meet the assumption of this test that the median of the BHARs is 0. A 
nonparametric rank test may overcome this shortcoming. 
"` As discussed in footnote 130, cross-sectional dependence of stock returns is one of the problems in 
long-term event studies. Correlated BHARs lead to mis-specified test statistics for Student's t test. I 
suspect that correlated BI1ARs can also create biases for the nonparametric test statistics. 
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Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
As noted in the previous section, a rank test may overcome the shortcoming of 
the sign test that the expected proportion of positive abnormal returns can differ from 
one half even under the null hypothesis. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test also requires 
the mutual independence of abnormal returns' 36 In addition, it requires the distribution 
of the abnormal returns to be symmetric, but Fisher's sign test does not. In this sense, 
the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is considered as more stringent than Fisher's sign test 
(Hollander and Wolfe, 1999, chapter 3). The test statistic is calculated as follows: 
N 
W= LR, I, (BHAR, > 0) Equation 6-18 
where R, is the rank given to BHAR, 1, I; is the indicator which takes on the value of 1 
if BHAR, is positive and 0 if negative. At the chosen significance level of a, the null 
hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative non-zero median if W >_ to/2 or 
It, 
N(N + 1) 
_ ta12 in a two-tail test, or in favour of positive median if W >_ ta , or 
in 
favour of negative median if W< 
N(N + 1) 
_ tQ where the constant ta is chosen to make 2 
the type I error probability equal to a. Its value can be found in a statistics table. 
In addition to the above three commonly used significance tests, empirical 
studies also employ the bootstrapping approach. Ang and Zhang (2002) document that 
Fisher's sign test has higher power than computation-intensive bootstrapping-based 
116 See footnote 130. 
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tests do for longer time horizons. This study therefore does not employ the 
bootstrapping approach but rather uses the three tests described above. 
6.5.4 Estimating the impact of optimal/suboptimal acquisition risk on 
acquirer shareholder wealth gains. 
Step four involves performing univariate and multiple regression analyses of the 
differences in wealth gains among acquisitions of different risk categories generated in 
stage two. 
6.5.4.1 Univariate analysis 
To analyse the BHARs of different acquisition risk groups, I conduct a 
univariate analysis. Such an analysis explores each variable in a data set separately 
(Kachigan, 1986). It looks at the range of values, as well as the central tendency of the 
values. It describes the pattern of response to the variable. 
Specifically, I analyse 3-year BHARs of different acquisition risk groups and 
compare their differences to examine whether suboptimal-risk acquisitions 
underperform optimal-risk acquisitions as predicted by the empirical risk model 6-1. 
Following Model 6-2 or Model 6-3, acquisitions can be classified into under-risk 
investment (UNDINV), optimal-risk investment (OPTINV) and over-risk investment 
(OVLINV). The BHARs for each group are calculated and differences of BHARs 
between under-risk acquisitions (UNDINV) and optimal-risk acquisitions (OPTINV), 
and between over-risk acquisitions (OVEINV) and optimal-risk acquisitions (OPTINV) 
are calculated. When acquisition risk as measured by target industry R&D intensity, 
acquisition risk may be very close to but not exactly the same as that predicted by, the 
empirical risk model (Model 6-1). Therefore, a range of (-10%, + 10%) is allowed for 
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statistical noises. This means that if the actual acquisition risk as measured by target 
R&D intensity is within the [-10%, 10%] range of the value of the predicted acquisition 
risk, this acquisition is still considered as an optimal-risk acquisition. 
Student's t test is used to test the mean of the 3-year BHARs of each acquisition 
risk group. Fisher's sign test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test are employed to test the 
median of the 3-year BHARs of each risk group. Student's t test is again applied to test 
the mean difference between the 3-year BHARs of the two acquisition risk investment 
groups. Wilcoxon rank sum test is used to test the median difference between the 3- 
year BHARs of the two groups. 
Wilcoxon rank sum test is used in place of a two-sample t test when the 
populations being compared are not normal (Hollander and Wolfe, 1999, Chapter 3). 
When there are two samples of size of nl and n2 respectively, the test combines the two 
samples into one sample of size n1 + n2, sorts the result, and assigns ranks to the sorted 
Values. Letting T be the sum of the ranks for the observations in the first sample, if the 
two populations have the same distribution then the sum of the ranks of the first sample 
and of those in the second sample should be close to the same value. The null 
hypothesis is that the two distributions are the same. The test statistic is calculated as 
follows: 
nln2 +nl(n1 + 1} 
2 
n lný 
rnl + na + 1} 
27 
l 
12 
Equation 6-19 
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6.5.4.2 Multiple regression analysis 
Univariate analysis provides some evidence with regard to the impact of 
optimal/suboptimal acquisition risk on post-acquisition performance. However, such an 
analysis does not isolate other factors that may also have influence on firm performance. 
To obtain more robust results, a multiple regression analysis is adopted. Multiple 
regression analysis allows the assessment of the relationship between one dependent 
variable and several independent variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996, Chapter 5). It 
gives the impact of each independent variable on the dependent variable while isolating 
the influences of other independent variables. Given that BHARs data is continuous 
data, an OLS regression is adopted in this study to estimate the empirical performance 
model (Model 6-4) as shown below. The characteristics of OLS regression have been 
discussed in Section 6.5.1.2 
BHAR, = ßo + ß, UNDINV,. + ß20VEINVi + ß3NONCASH; 
Or Model 6-4 
BITAR; = ßo +, 6, RESID, + ß2 NONCASH, + E; 
where BHAR; is 3-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns for acquirer i. The variables have 
been defined in Table 6-1 in Section 6.2.2, as well as in Table 6-1. 
6.5.5 Additional test of post-acquisition performance on risk incentives 
As has mentioned in Chapter 2,3,4 and 5, conventional empirical finance 
studies tr\ to establish a direct link between firm performance and executive wealth, or 
corporate monitoring mechanisms without much consideration of manager decisions on 
project risk. Even those behavioural finance studies such as Hayward and Hambrick 
(1997) that argue that managers can have excessive risk taking behaviour but only 
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examine the relationship between firm performance and the degree of behavioural 
biases. To produce results comparable with those studies and further prove that the 
two-stage analysis suggested by this study discloses better information with regard to 
the efficiency of corporate governance, this section adopts the conventional approach. 
Following the existing literature, the arguments for the relationship between post- 
acquisition performance and each risk incentives are as follows. 
Fixed compensation is not tied to firm performance and provides little incentive 
for managers to align their interests to those of shareholders. Summarizing six papers 
which cover the sample period from 1974 to 1993, Conyon et al (1993) conclude that 
the relationship between cash compensation and stock market performance is very weak 
in both UK and US. A recent literature summary by Bebchuk and Fried (2004, Part III) 
generally reports a weak association between firm performance and fixed pay. Annual 
bonus can be manipulated by the choice of accounting techniques that managers can use 
to shift income from future to the current accounting period. Managers may set 
undemanding performance targets, they may lower performance targets when it appears 
that management will not achieve the targets necessary for the bonuses to be paid, etc. 
In summary, accounting-based annual bonus can actually induce counter-productive 
behaviour. Therefore, acquirer post-acquisition performance is expected to be weakly 
associated with cash compensation. 
As discussed in Section 2.3.2.3 of Chapter 2, LTIP cash rewards managers when 
they meet the performance targets within the specified multi-year time horizon. 
I'herefore, theoretically LTIP cash can motivate managers to improve firm performance. 
The logic behind LTIP shares and stock options is that the firm only pays for 
performance. For an option vesting in two years with a two year exercise period and a 
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strike price of £20 per share, assuming a current stock market price of £ 10 per share, the 
CEO must double the firm's stock price during the next four years in order to reap any 
returns from the options. Stock options can thus contribute to better firm performance 
by offering managers incentives to improve firm performance. Datta et al (2001) find 
this evidence by examining the relationship between post-acquisition performance and 
executive equity-based compensation. Therefore, equity delta and option vega, 
measures of the incentive provided by equity-based wealth as discussed in Section 2.3.3 
of Chapter 2, are expected to be positively related to firm performance. As discussed in 
Section 2.3.4.2, Mishra et al (2000) suggest a nonlinear relationship between firm 
performance and equity delta. A low equity delta is positively linked to firm 
performance while a high equity delta is negatively linked to firm performance. Mishra 
et al's argument is consistent with Morck et al (1988)'s argument that the relationship 
between firm performance and equity ownership is nonlinear. Ross (2004) argues that a 
high-level of managerial wealth intensifies managerial risk aversion and diminishes the 
incentive alignment effect provided by equity-based wealth (see Section 2.4). It is 
therefore expected that a high level of managers' wealth attached to their employment 
firms do not positively linked to firm performance. 
As argued in Chapter 3, managerial behavioural biases lead to value destruction 
for acquirer shareholders. The proxies for behavioural biases such as past performance, 
glamour status, and media praise to be negatively related to acquirer post-acquisition 
performance. 
As suggested in section 6.2.1.4 of Chapter 6, debt provides a degree of corporate 
control over managers. Increased debt reduces free cash flow and so limits the 
managerial discretion of wasting corporate resources and thus decreases agency costs 
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(Jensen 1986; Weir et al, 2002; Novaes, 2003). For a sample of 990 acquisitions 
between 1962 and 1990, Maloney et al (1993) find that bidders with higher leverage 
ratios have higher announcement period abnormal returns. Therefore, financial leverage 
is expected to be positively related to firm performance. 
Moeller et al (2004) report that larger acquirers pay more for acquisitions than 
small acquirers do. The premium paid increases with firm size after controlling for firm 
and deal characteristics. Consequently, large firms make large acquisitions that result in 
large dollar losses. They find that small acquirers, although making small and less risky 
acquisitions, gain value for their shareholders. Roughly, shareholders from small firms 
earned $9 billion from acquisitions made during 1980-2001, whereas shareholders from 
large firms lost $312 billion. 
There are different views with regard to the impact of relative size of acquirers 
to targets (Sudarsanam et al, 1996). Bidder shareholders gain more when the firm takes 
over a relatively small target. The smallness of the target facilitates integration of the 
target with the bidder and helps realize the expected synergies underpinning the 
takeover. The alternative argument is that bidders are more generous in their bid 
premiums for small targets and, thus transfer more acquirer's wealth to the target, 
causing acquirers to loose value. 
The argument that noncash payment can affect acquirers' post acquisition 
performance has been discussed in Section 6.2.2.3. The above arguments generate a 
model which directly examines the relationship between post-acquisition performance 
and various risk incentives without considering managers' choices regarding acquisition 
risk. The model is formulated as below: 
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BHA« =ao +a, FAB, +a2LTIPCASI« +a3DELTA +a4DELT, 12 
+ a5VEGG +a6DELT4 * WEALTH, 
+a7VEG4 * WEALTH, 
+agPAST, +a9BEME, +a, oMEDIA. 
+a,, LARSH« +a, 2NEXE; +a13NONDUAIf +a14REM, 
+ a15LEV, + a16MV,. + a RELSIZ. + a, 8NONCASH +, u, 
Model 6-5 
where BHAR; is acquirer 3-year buy and hold abnormal returns. See Section 6.5.3 for a 
discussion of how to calculate the BHARs. All the independent variables have been 
discussed and defined in Section 6.2. 
6.5.6 Other statistical test: Pearson's Chi-square test 
Pearson's Chi-square test is used to examine the differences between the 
following variables for the high-tech acquisition and the low-tech acquisition groups: 
the CEO-COB non-duality variable (NONDUAL), the remuneration committee variable 
(REM), and wealth components as a percentage of the total wealth. 
Pearson's Chi-square test is used to assess the relationship between 2 discrete 
variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996, Chapter 3). The null hypothesis tested is that 
the variable on the row is independent of the variable on the column 
statistic (x2) is computed as: 
2 (fo-Fe)2 
x-ý 
Fe J 
The chi-square 
Equation 6-19 
where fib is observed frequency and Fe represents the expected frequency in each cell. 
Summation is carried out over all of the cells in a two-way table. The expected 
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frequencies for a cell are generated from dividing the multiplication of the row sum and 
the column sum by the grand total. If the x2 is larger than the critical value, this test 
rejects the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative hypothesis of general association. 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter defines variables and describes data sources used as well as sample 
construction. It also describes how the high-tech acquisition group is constructed and 
what criteria are used for the selection of the matching low-tech acquisition group. The 
distribution for both high-tech acquisitions and low-tech acquisitions in the sample of 
this thesis is also reported. 
The research methodology used in this study includes five steps of analyses. 
They are: 
l. Estimation of an empirical risk model 
2. Identification of suboptimal-risk acquisitions 
3. Estimation of acquirer long-term post-acquisition performance 
4. Estimation of the impact of optimal/suboptimal acquisition risk on acquirer 
post-acquisition performance 
5. Testing of the relationship between acquirer shareholder wealth gains and 
various risk incentives. 
In this chapter, empirical models are proposed which correspond to the 
conceptual risk model (Model 5-1) and conceptual performance model (Model 5-2). 
Various analysis methods, such as statistical tests, logistic and OLS regression models, 
univariate analysis, as well as the event study methodology are explained and their use 
in the analysis justified. 
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Chapters 7 and 8 present and discuss the results of the five-stage analysis. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the results produced by the risk model and Chapter 8 focuses on 
results produced by the performance model. 
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Chapter 7 
Determinants of Acquisition Risk 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to answer research question Ql raised in Chapter 5. The 
research question is: 
Q1: What are the factors that drive managers to undertake risky projects? 
The literature review chapters (i. e. Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) suggest that 
managers' wealth, behavioural biases and corporate monitoring mechanisms may have 
some influence on managers' risk taking behaviour. Using corporate acquisitions as a 
context, Chapter 5 develops hypotheses concerning the association between the 
acquisition risk and various factors that may impact on managers' attitudes towards it. 
Briefly, fixed compensation and annual bonus are postulated to be negatively related to 
the riskiness of acquisitions pursued by managers. It is hypothesized that there is a 
concave relationship between acquisition risk and equity delta (or LTIP delta, stock 
option delta, share delta). The following factors are predicted to have a non-positive 
relationship with acquisition risk: 
" equity delta (or LTIP delta, stock option delta, share delta) at a high level of 
managerial wealth 
" stock option vega at a high level of managerial wealth 
The following factors are hypothesized to be positively associated with acquisition risk: 
" LTIP cash 
" stock option vega 
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" behavioural biases measured by good past performance. acquirers' glamour 
status and media praise 
In addition, under the control of corporate monitoring devices such as external 
blockholders, institutional blockholders, a board dominated by non-executive directors. 
a non-executive chairman of board, as well as a remuneration committee, the selected 
acquisitions are more likely to reflect the optimal risk level. 
Chapter 6 defines the above variables and formulates the empirical risk model 
(Model 6-1) as well as the methodology used test this model. This chapter reports the 
results of the empirical analyses. The sample distribution of high-tech acquisitions and 
low-tech acquisitions has been presented in Section 6.4 of Chapter 6. Section 7.2 
analyses the characteristics of both high-tech acquisitions and low-tech acquisitions 
over the two sample periods 1993-1997 and 1998-2000. Section 7.3 then proceeds to 
report the descriptive statistics for managerial wealth variables, behavioural bias 
variables, and corporate monitoring variables for the two sample periods. Section 7.4 
describes the output of the regression estimation of the empirical risk model, Model 6-1, 
and gives an overview of the factors that drive managers to select risky acquisitions. 
Section 7.5 provides the chapter summary. 
7.2 Sample characteristics for acquisitions 
This section discusses the following characteristics of acquisitions: target 
industry R&D intensity (TRD), acquirer size (MV), transaction value (TV), relative size 
of acquirer versus target (RELSIZ), target's public company status, method of payment 
and acquirer high-tech status. The relevant statistics are reported in Table 7-1. There 
are 285 acquisitions in the sample period 1993-1997 (Panel A), among which 124 are 
high-tech, high-risk acquisitions and 161 are low-tech, low risk acquisitions. The 
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average target industry R&D intensity (TRD) for high-tech acquisitions is around 5.3% 
(median around 4.5%). It is on average 3.5% (median 2.8%) higher than low-tech 
acquisitions. The differences are significant at the 1% level. There are 165 high-tech 
acquisitions and 128 low-tech acquisitions in the sample period 1998-2000. The mean 
and median target industry R&D intensity is also significantly (at the 1% level) larger 
with high-tech acquisitions. Thus the high-tech versus low-tech classification as 
defined by the Securities Data Company M&A database is largely reflective of the 
underlying R&D intensity of the target firms in these two broad industry groups. 
For the 1993-1997 sample, the average high-tech acquisition transaction size 
(TV) is approximately £89 million and the median is £3.1 million. Low-tech 
acquisitions are on average around £62 million smaller than high-tech acquisitions but 
the median target size in low-tech acquisitions is about £1 million larger than in high- 
tech acquisitions. However neither the mean nor the median is significantly different 
between the two target groups. Similarly the mean and median values of the acquirer 
size (MV) in the high-tech acquisition group are very close to those of the acquirer size 
in the low-tech acquisition group. This however is not by coincidence because acquirer 
size is one of the criteria used to find the matching low-tech acquisition for each high- 
tech acquisition. The average acquirer size is about £0.5 billion and the median size is 
£60 million to £90 million. In the high-tech acquisition group, the relative size of 
acquirer to target (RELSIZ) on average is about 74 with a median of 23, whereas in the 
low-tech acquisition group, the ratio has an average of 93 and a median of 23. 
In the 1998-2000 sample (Panel B), the average high-tech acquisition transaction 
size (TV) is approximately £73 million and the median is £5.1 million. The mean and 
median of low-tech acquisition size are smaller than they are for high-tech acquisitions. 
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The average market capitalisation of acquirers (MV) in the high-tech acquisition group 
in the 1998-2000 sample is around £1 billion, twice the size of those acquirers in the 
1993-1997 sample. The medians are also twice the size. While both mean and median 
of acquirer size are larger in high-tech acquisition group than those in low-tech 
acquisition group, the differences are not statistically significant. In the high-tech 
acquisition group, the relative size of acquirer to target (RELSIZ) on average is about 
369 (median 34). The ratio drops to 92 and 22 respectively in the low-tech acquisition 
group. However, the difference neither in mean nor median is statistically significant. 
For both sample periods, pure cash financing (CASH) is used less frequently in 
the high-tech acquisitions than it is in low-tech acquisitions, particularly in the 1998- 
2000 sample which corresponded to the peak of the bull stock market. The difference is 
significant at the 1% level. This is consistent with the Martin (1996) argument that 
managers tend not to offer pure cash but to pay with equity when they are buying 
targets with high growth opportunities. Interestingly, the proportion of acquirers using 
pure stock offers (STOCK) or offers including stock (MIX) to buy high-tech targets 
rises from about 60% in 1993-97 to 73% in 1998-2000. On the other hand, the 
corresponding proportions for acquirers which bought low-tech targets are 55% and 
47%. It appears that acquirers of high-tech targets capitalised on their highly valued 
stocks as the stock market was hitting the peak to buy real assets, whereas the acquirers 
of low-tech targets had less of an opportunity to do so. Such a strategic use of highly 
valued equity is consistent with the arguments of Shleifer and Vishny (2003). It is also 
in line with the empirical finding of Akbulut (2005) that from 1997-2000 when the 
equity market valuation was historically high, stock-related pay was the dominant mode 
of payment for acquisitions. 
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For acquisitions over the period 1993-1997, around 58% of the target firms in 
the high-tech acquisition group are private firms (TARPRI), 35% subsidiaries 
(TARSUB) and only 6% public firms (TARPUB). For the sample period over 1998- 
2000, the ratios are 73%, 19% and 8% respectively. The low-tech acquisition group has 
a similar composition, since target public or non-public status is one of the criteria for 
identifying a matching low-tech acquisition for each high-tech acquisition. 
For the high-tech acquisition groups in both 1993-1997 and 1998-2000, the vast 
majority (over 70%) of acquirers are in high-tech industries. Similarly over 80% of 
acquirers are in low-tech industries for the low-tech acquisition group. But there are 
more low-tech acquirers in the high-tech acquisition group in 1998-2000 than in 1993- 
1997. In 1993-1997, the total number of low-tech acquirers who buy high-tech targets 
is 22, which is around 18% of the total high-tech acquisitions made during the period. 
The numbers increase to 46 and 28% respectively in 1998-2000. This indicates that 
there was an increasing tendency for low-tech companies to cross the technology divide 
and make high-tech acquisitions. It appears that low-tech acquirers seemed to try and 
cash in on the technology boom of the late 1990s. 
7.2.1 Summary 
Section 7.2 describes acquisition-related characteristics of the high-tech 
acquisitions and low-tech acquisitions over the two sample periods 1993-1997 and 
1998-2000. Overall, target industry R&D intensity is significantly higher in the high- 
tech acquisition group than that in the low-tech acquisition group. There is no 
statistically significant difference between the transaction size, acquirer size, or relative 
size of acquirer to target between the two-acquirer groups. Pure cash financing is used 
less frequently, in high-tech acquisitions than in low-tech acquisitions. particularly in the 
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1998-2000 sample which corresponded to the peak of the bull stock market. Over 90% 
targets are non-public firms. It appears that acquirers are more likely to buy targets of 
similar technology level although in the later period, 1998-2000, there is an increasing 
tendency for companies in the low-tech industries to cross the technology divide and 
make high-tech acquisitions. Low-tech acquirers seemed to try and cash in on the 
technology boom of the late 1990s. 
7.3 Descriptive statistics for risk incentives 
This section discusses the descriptive statistics for risk incentives such as 
managerial wealth components, hubris variables and monitoring mechanisms over the 
two sample periods, 1993-1997 and 1998-2000. In the 1993-1997 sample, stock option 
holdings are not considered in the managerial wealth portfolio due to lack of data as 
discussed in Section 6.4 of Chapter 6. Therefore the reported values of equity delta and 
total wealth may be under-represented in the sample covering this period. 
7.3.1 Wealth incentives 
Table 7-2 presents the descriptive statistics for the components of the wealth 
portfolios of the acquiring companies' board of directors. Panel A reports the data for 
the acquisitions over 1993-1997 and Panel B reports the equivalent data over 1998- 
2000. In each panel, acquirers' data for high-tech acquisitions and low-tech acquisitions 
are reported separately. The overall wealth level for acquirer board of directors in £ 
terms is broadly similar in the high-tech and low-tech acquisitions groups in 1993-1997 
(about £12 million to £14 million). But in 1998-2000 the directors of acquirers who 
conducted low-tech acquisitions have a much higher mean wealth (about £58 million to 
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£38 million) but much lower median wealth (about £9 million to £13 million). The 
median difference is significant at the 5% level. 
For the sample of 1993-1997, both the mean and median fixed compensation 
and annual bonuses (FAB) are significantly (at the 5% level) lower for acquirer 
directors in the high-tech acquisition group, i. e., £210,000 for the mean difference and 
£90,000 for the median difference. Although the mean value of the fixed compensation 
and annual bonuses for acquirer directors in the high-tech acquisition group is nearly 
doubled in 1998-2000, it is still approximately £150,000 lower than acquirer directors in 
the low-tech acquisitions and the difference is significant at the 10% level. For both 
sample periods, fixed compensation and annual bonuses account for a higher proportion 
of the directors' total wealth in the low-tech acquisitions than they do in the high-tech 
acquisitions. The median difference, 5.93%, is significant at the 10% level in the 1993- 
1997 sample period. In the 1998-2000 sample period, both mean difference (7.25%) 
and median difference (3.8%) are significant at the 1% level. The overall weight of 
cash compensation in the directors' total wealth however, drops to less than 20% during 
the period 1998-2000. The drop is as sharp as approximately 10% for acquirer directors 
in the high-tech acquisitions. 
The above finding that cash compensation for board of directors grows over 
time is consistent with the findings from Main et al (1996) and Cosh and Hughes 
(1997). Based on companies in FTSE 100 list, Main et al (1996) find that board of 
directors' cash compensation rose from £1.27 million in 1981 to £2.32 million in 1989. 
Cosh and Hughes (1997) report that the cash compensation for boards of directors in the 
electrical engineering industry rose from £0.25 million to £0.29 million from 1970 to 
1989. 
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For the 1993-1997 sample, the average acquirer directors' LTIP cash award is 
only £1,000 in the high-tech acquisition group and £10,000 in the low-tech acquisition 
group but there is no significant difference between them. LTIP cash awards are 
slightly higher for the 1998-2000 sample, but on average are still less than 0.3% of the 
total wealth portfolio. From a survey of existing literature it appears that this thesis is 
the first to analyse and report the level of LTIP cash awards for directors in the UK. 
The average value of acquirers' LTIP shares is £20,000 in the high-tech 
acquisition group for the 1993-1997 sample, £10,000 less than that is in the low-tech 
acquisition group. In the 1998-2000 sample, the value of LTIP shares increases to 
£260,000 for acquirer directors in the high-tech acquisition group, but is still £490,000 
less than it is for acquirer directors in the low-tech acquisition group. In addition, 
between the two sample periods the proportion of LTIP shares of directors' total wealth 
increases substantially from 0.003% to 1.91% for acquirers which conducted high-tech 
acquisitions, and from 0.21% to 3.21% for acquirers which conducted low-tech 
acquisitions. 
Comparing the weight of LTIPs (LTIP cash and LTIP shares together) with the 
weight of cash compensation (FAB) in the directors' wealth portfolio shows that LTIPs 
fall tar short of cash compensations. This is consistent with the findings of Conyon and 
Murphy (2000) (see Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2) that LTIPs are still a small part of 
executive compensation in the UK. Conyon et al (2000), Conyon and Sadler (2001), 
Stathopoulos et al (2005) also provide similar evidence. For a sample of 200 large UK 
companies, Conyon et al (2000) report that the mean value of LTIP shares granted in 
the 1997 accounting year is £ 115.000 and the median is £0. These values fall far short 
of cash compensation which has a mean value of £451,000 and a median of £390,000. 
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Using a sample of the 510 largest UK companies for the 1997 accounting year, Conyon 
and Sadler (2001) report that LTIP shares constitute on average only 0.02% of 
outstanding shares. Based on 72 UK companies in the retail sector from 1996 to 1999, 
Stathopoulos et al (2005) find that only 13% of directors received LTIP share awards as 
compared to 75% receiving stock options, and 100% receiving cash compensation. 
The average value of managerial shareholdings (Managerial shareholdings) is 
approximately £11 million and £14 million (median around £4 million) in the high-tech 
and low-tech acquisition groups over 1993-1997. Although the average value of 
managerial shareholdings for acquirer directors in the high-tech acquisition group 
(£33.8 million) is less than that for the directors in the low-tech acquisition group 
(£55 million) over the period 1998-2000, the median value of £9.4 million for the 
former is £3.3 million higher (significant at the 5% level) than that for the latter. In 
addition, acquirer directors in the high-tech acquisition group on average have ordinary 
shares in their wealth portfolio around 6% (median around 6%) higher than acquirer 
directors in the low-tech acquisition group. Both mean and median differences are 
significant at the 10% statistical level. Similar patterns are also evident in the 1993- 
1997 sample and the median difference is significant at the 10% level. 
The above statistics show that managerial shareholding is the largest component 
of directors' total wealth, consistent with the literature evidence discussed in Section 
?. 3.1 of Chapter 2. The proportion of managerial shareholdings in directors' total 
wealth decreases from around 86% to around 81% (median) between the two sample 
periods for low-tech acquisitions while it decreases from 93% to 87% for high-tech 
acquisitions. 
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Earlier studies such as Sudarsanam et al (1996) and Kohers and Kohers (2001) 
also report the statistics for managerial shareholdings as a percentage of the company's 
outstanding share capital. To provide results comparable with those studies, this thesis 
also reports this statistics (MANSHR) defined as the % of ordinary shares, beneficial 
and non-beneficial, held by board of directors, in the accounting year prior to an 
acquisition announcement. The statistics are reported in Table 7A-1 in the Appendix to 
this chapter. In both sample periods, managerial shareholdings held by acquirer 
directors in the high-tech acquisition group is higher than those held by acquirer 
directors in the low-tech acquisition group both in terms of the mean and median value, 
but only the median difference in the 1993-1997 sample is statistically significant (at the 
5% level). Kohers and Kohers (2001) report a mean shareholding of 15% (median 9%) 
for acquirer directors for a sample of 304 US high-tech acquisitions from 1984 to 1995. 
This level of managerial shareholding is approximately the same as that found in this 
study (see Table 7A-1 in the Appendix to this chapter). Sudarsanam et al (1996) report 
a mean holding of 10% by acquirer directors for a sample of 429 acquisitions from 1980 
to 1990, about 5% lower than those reported in this study. 
Data for directors' stock option holdings (Options) are only available for the 
1998-2000 sample. As shown in Table 7-2, the average value of stock options is £2.9 
million (median £0.6 million) for acquirer directors who conducted high-tech 
acquisitions as compared to £1.3 million (median £0.3 million) for acquirer directors 
who undertook low-tech acquisitions. Both mean and median differences are 
significant at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
To gain further insight into the difference between the values of stock options of 
the high-tech and the low-tech acquisition groups, I examine the parameters that 
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determine the value of stock options 137. Stock price and stock option exercise price are 
two key parameters. According to the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model, the 
higher the stock price (P) and the lower the exercise price (X), then the greater the value 
of the stock options (C). The ratio of stock price to exercise price of the stock option 
(P/X) is called the `moneyness' of a stock option. When P is higher than X, the stock 
option is `in-the-money'; when P is the same as X, the option is `at-the-money'; when P 
is lower than X, the option is `out-of-the-money' (see Section 2.3.3.1 of Chapter 2). 
Deeply out-of-the-money options are argued to induce managers to engage in excessive 
risk taking (see Section 2.3.2.4 of Chapter 2). 
The moneyness of stock options held by acquirers' directors prior to acquisition 
announcement is reported in Table 7-3. The average stock option moneyness of high- 
tech acquisitions is 13.7 and the median is 2.24. In comparison, the mean and median 
values for acquirers in the low-tech acquisition group are much lower, 2.96 and 1.61 
respectively. The maximum moneyness in the high-tech acquisitions group is 507.5 
while only 12 in the low-tech acquisition group. Those statistics show that acquirers in 
the high-tech acquisition group have far deeper in-the-money stock options than 
acquirers in the low-tech acquisitions. This contradicts the argument that deep out-of- 
the-money stock options encourage managerial risk taking (see Section 2.3.2.4 of 
Chapter 2). 
Why don't those directors cash in those deeply in-the-money options? 
Nialmendier and Tate (2004) and Malmendier and Tate (2005b) offer a possible 
explanation. They attribute this puzzling phenomenon to managerial overconfidence. 
137 See Equation 6-2 in Chapter 6 for the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model which is used to 
calculate the value of stock options. 
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Overconfident managers believe in their ability to improve firm performance and are 
persistently bullish about their companies' future prospects. They engage in risky 
acquisitions and believe that they can further push up the stock price so that they can 
gain even more from their option holdings. These directors, however, never expected 
that the stock market would crash in 2001 and their options became worthless within 
days. 
Table 7-3: Descriptive statistics for moneyness and time to maturity of stock options 
The table lists the descriptive statistics for the moneyness and the time to maturity of 
stock options held by acquirer board of directors prior to acquisition announcement for the 
sample period of 1998-2000. Moneyness is measured as the ratio of the stock price (P) at the 
end of month -2 prior to acquisition announcement month, 0 over the exercise price of a stock 
option (X). Time to maturity (T) is measured as the time difference in years between the expiry 
date of a stock option and the end of the month -2 prior to acquisition announcement month, 0. 
N= number of acquisitions. 
Panel A: Moneyness Panel B. Time to Maturity 
High-tech 
acquisitions 
Low-tech 
acquisitions 
High-tech 
acquisitions 
Low-tech 
acquisitions 
N 165 128 165 128 
Mean 13.70 2.96 5.52 5.21 
Median 2.24 1.61 5.48 5.27 
Minimum 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.13 
Maximum 507.50 54.91 12.00 9.93 
Standard 
Deviation 118.59 5.94 2.60 2.48 
Table 7-3 also reports the time to maturity of stock options. Time to maturity 
(I') is the time remaining in years from the end of month -2 prior to acquisition 
announcement. 0, to the expiry date of a stock option. The longer the T, the more 
valuable the stock option (see Equation 6-2 in Chapter 6). When the time to maturity is 
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long, directors can still have the incentive to engage in risky high-tech acquisitions and 
benefit from the possible rising of the stock price as a result of the acquisition. 
Directors are less likely to have such an incentive when the time to maturity is short 
because high-tech acquisitions have a long payback period (see Section 5.3 of Chapter 5 
for a discussion of the risk profile of high-tech acquisitions). Table 7-3, however, 
shows that time to maturity is similar between the high-tech acquisition group and the 
low-tech acquisition group. 
Table 7-2 shows that in the low-tech acquisition group, the mean option 
holdings as a% of the total wealth of acquirer directors ranks the third highest after 
Managerial shareholdings and cash pay (FAB). The ranking is the same in terms of 
median values. Although options rank only after cash pay, the differences in terms of 
percentage of total wealth is large. The mean value of options holdings is 9% of the 
total wealth, but 19% for cash pay. The difference is even larger when considering the 
median percentages, 2.69% versus 8.25%. The differences however, are much smaller 
in the high-tech acquisition group. Option holdings are on average 11.94% of the total 
wealth of acquirer directors, even higher than cash pay (11.87%). Stock options rank 
the second highest after managerial shareholdings in proportions of managerial total 
wealth. In terms of median values, option holdings still fall behind cash pay, but the 
difference is small (0.61%). 
Table 7-1 has shown that in the high-tech acquisition group, 72% of the 
acquirers are in the high-tech industries while in the low-tech industries only 14% of the 
acquirers are in the high-tech industries. The difference in the option holdings between 
acquirer directors in these two acquisition groups may reflect the difference in stock 
options held by managers of high-tech firms and managers of low-tech firms. If so 
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firms in high-tech industries have substantially higher option rewards than firms in low- 
tech industries. This is consistent with the findings of a group of studies which examine 
the remuneration practice between new economy firms (i. e,. internet, e-commerce or 
dot. com firms) and old economy firms (i. e., low-tech firms). They generally find that 
new economy firms (i. e. high-tech firms) reward managers with much higher levels of 
stock options than old economy firms. Ittner et al (2003) and Murphy (2003) draw their 
conclusions based on US companies. For a sample of 217 firms over the accounting 
year 1998 and 1999, Ittner et al (2003) find that the mean (median) CEO in a new 
economy firm receives 78.2% (86.9%) of compensation from equity grants (stock 
options and restricted stocks), versus 26.9% (19.3%) in an old economy firm. Murphy 
(2003) concludes based on S&P firms that for every year from 1992 to 2000, new 
economy firms are more likely than old economy firms to offer stock options or 
restricted stocks to their top-five executives. Stathopoulos et al (2005) report the same 
evidence based on UK companies. For a sample of 552 directors of 72 UK listed retail 
companies in the financial year of 1999, they find that the average value of the options 
received by each new economy CEO is double that of their old economy counterparts. 
Conyon and Murphy (2000) report that options rank third by value after 
managerial shareholdings and cash pay in the managers wealth portfolios for the CEOs 
of 510 UK large companies for the 1997 accounting year. They therefore conclude that 
stock options and even equity-based compensation as a whole is still a small part of the 
UK managerial compensation (see Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2). My results discussed 
above with regard to stock options show that their conclusion holds for low-tech 
companies but may not apply to high-tech companies. In fact, equity-based 
compensation including LTIP shares and stock options is on average 2% higher than 
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cash pay (FAB) during the telecom and internet boom period of late 1990s. But the 
median level is slightly lower (0.6%) for equity-based compensation. It is true that, 
unlike in the US (see Section 2.3.1), in the UK equity-based compensation does not 
dominate cash pay and is not the major component of executive compensation. 
Having covered acquirer directors' overall wealth level, the discussion will now 
turn to the sensitivity of equity-based wealth to company stock price performance, i. e. 
delta and vega. In 1993-1997, the average equity delta (DELTA) (including deltas of 
LTIP shares, and managerial shareholdings) is £0.11million (median £50,000) for 
acquirer directors in the high-tech acquisition group. This means that a1% change in 
the stock price will on average cause a fluctuation of directors' wealth of £0.11 million. 
The delta is £0.14 million (median £30,000) for acquirer directors in the low-tech 
acquisition group over the same period. The impact of the change of stock price on 
directors' wealth is more substantial in the 1998-2000 sample, where the average delta 
value reaches £0.37 million for acquirer directors in the high-tech acquisition group and 
£0.58 million for acquirer directors in the low-tech acquisition group. The median 
value for the former (£0.13 million) is £50,000 higher than it is for the latter (significant 
at the 5% level). 
A breakdown of equity delta (DELTA) into deltas for LTIP shares (LTIP delta), 
stock options (OPTION DELTA), and for managerial shareholdings (SHARE DELTA) 
is reported in Table 7A-1 in the Appendix to this chapter. Share delta dominates equity 
delta for both sample periods, indicating that the pay-performance incentive from 
directors' equity- based wealth is mainly influenced by managerial shareholdings. Both 
LTIP delta and Share delta are higher in the 1998-2000 sample period than in the 1993- 
1997 sample period. This is consistent with the previous discussion of the values of 
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LTIP shares and managerial shareholdings, which show that both types of equity grow 
over time. This in turn increases the pay-performance link between managers' wealth 
and firm stock performance and thereby increases LTIP delta and Share delta. 
In 1998-2000, stock option delta (OPTION DELTA) on average is about 
£ 15,000 (significant at the 10% level) higher in the high-tech acquisition group than in 
the low-tech acquisition group. The median difference is £4,000 (significant at the 5% 
level). This indicates that for 1% increase (decrease) in a company' stock price, 
acquirer directors in the high-tech acquisition group gain (lose) on average £ 15,000 
more than acquirer directors in the low-tech acquisition group. The wealth of the 
former directors is at more risk than that of the latter directors. This thesis is one of the 
few studies that adopt the approach suggested by Core and Guay (1999) to calculate 
equity delta. Another is Stathopoulos et al (2005). However their statistics are not 
comparable to those presented in this thesis because they report the weighted sum of the 
delta for a stock option in each tranche held by directors, whereas this study reports the 
delta for the whole stock option holdings. 
Panel B of Table 7-2 reports the value of option vega (VEGA). The average 
option vega (VEGA) is £80,000 for acquirer directors in the high-tech acquisition 
group, indicating that a1% increase in stock price volatility can increase directors' 
wealth by £80,000. The vega value for acquirer directors in the low-tech acquisition 
group is only a half of that for acquirer directors in the high-tech acquisition group. The 
median vega value for acquirers in the high-tech acquisition group is £ 10,000 higher 
than that for acquirers in the low-tech acquisition group. Both differences are 
significant at the 5% level. These results indicate that the wealth of acquirer directors in 
the high-tech acquisition group is more sensitive to changes in firm risk. i. e.. stock 
253 
return volatility, than that of their counterparts in the low-tech acquisition group. The 
former directors thus should have stronger incentive to increase firm risk than the latter 
directors. This thesis is the first study to report option vega for UK companies. 
Overall, the findings above show that the wealth of acquirer directors who 
conducted high-tech acquisitions are more closely linked to own firm stock price 
performance and stock return volatilities than that of acquirer directors who initiated 
low-tech acquisitions. In addition, despite the growing importance of equity-based 
compensation, equity-based compensation is still a relatively small part of UK 
directors' compensation packages. 
7.3.2 Behavioural biases 
The descriptive statistics on hubris are reported in Table 7-4. Acquirers which 
bought high-tech targets have significantly better stock performance prior to 
acquisitions than acquirers of low-tech targets in the 1998-2000 sample (in Panel B). 
The total one-year stock returns prior to acquisition announcement (PAST) for the 
former is 138% (median 44%) versus 33% (median 17%) for the latter. Both the mean 
and median differences are significant at the 1% level. The ratios however are not 
significantly different from each other in the 1993-1997 sample. Comparing the two 
sample periods, the mean PAST ratio increases substantially from around 27% to 138%, 
and median from 15% to 44% in the high-tech acquisition group. The increases in the 
ratios over time are not as large as in the low-tech acquisition group. As reported in 
fable 7-1, over 70% of the acquirers in the high-tech acquisition group are high-tech 
acquirers. The superior stock price performance of acquirers in the high-tech 
acquisition group may not be due to the superior value created by those companies. but 
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more to do with, as Ittner et al (2003), Murphy (2003) and Stathopoulos et al (2005) 
describe, the overheated telecom/internet stocks in the late 1990s. The PAST ratios 
reported in this study are higher than those reported by Hayward and Hambrick (1997), 
i. e., an average of 28.7%. The difference reflects the stock performance in the bull 
market of late 1990s which is covered by this study while their sample period covers 
1989 and 1992. 
In the 1993-1997 sample, the average book-to-market ratio (BEME) prior to 
acquisition announcement is about 29.8% for acquirers in the high-tech acquisition 
group, and about 43.8% for acquirers in the low-tech acquisition group. The difference. 
-14%, is significant at the 1% level. The median ratio is also significantly lower for the 
former than for the latter. The same pattern can be observed in the 1998-2000 sample. 
Those results indicate that acquirers of high-tech targets had much higher glamour 
ratings prior to acquisition announcements than acquirers of low-tech targets. 
Comparing the two sample periods, the mean BEME ratios drop substantially from 
around 30% to 21 % and medians drop from 17% to 11 % for acquirers in the high-tech 
acquisition group. Such a phenomenon does not happen to acquirers in the low-tech 
acquisition group. The mean ratios for those acquirers increase even though the median 
decreases. This result shows that the glamour rating of acquirers in high-tech 
acquisition group was greatly enhanced by the bull stock market of the late 1990s. 
The BEME ratios reported above are much lower than those reported by Kohers 
and Kohers (2001), who find an average BEME of 64% and a median of 54%. This 
may be because Kohers and Kohers' sample does not include the peak of the stock 
market in the late 1990s when the stock prices were pushed substantially higher than 
their real asset value, whereas this thesis does. 
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Table 7-4 reports the weighted sum of the media scores (MEDIA), i. e., 3 points, 
2 points, 1 point, 0 point, -1 point and -2 points, given to each media article that 
comments on directors' profile or performance over the three-year period prior to 
acquisition announcement. How a score is awarded to an article is discussed in Section 
6.2.1.3 of Chapter 6 and how the weighted sum of the scores is calculated is shown in 
Equation 6-9 in Chapter 6. If a score is 0, it means that directors of an acquiring 
company do not receive any comments (defined by this thesis) from the media during 
the period examined. If the weighted sum of scores is less than 1 but not equal to zero, 
it means that there are more negative media comments than positive comments. If it is 
equal to 1, it means that there are equally amount of positive and negative comments, 
and if greater than 1, it means that there are more positive comments than negative 
comments. 
The average weighted sum of scores as shown in Table 7-4 for acquirers in the 
high-tech acquisition group remain the same between two periods (all about 0.9) but the 
medians substantially decline (1 versus 0.25) for acquirers in the low-tech acquisition 
group. In 1998-2000, the mean score for acquirers in the high-tech acquisition group is 
0.93 and for acquirers in the low-tech acquisition group is 0.70. The median values for 
both types of acquirers are 1.00 and 0.25 respectively. The differences in mean and 
median values for both types of acquirers are significant at the 5% and 10% level 
respectively. The above results imply that the high-tech boom in the late 1990s resulted 
in top executives of high-tech firms' 38 enjoying a warmer and more flattering media 
limelight than directors in low-tech companies. 
''" As shown in Table 7-1, over 70% of the acquirers in the high-tech acquisition group are high-tech 
companies. 
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To gain more insights in to the media scores, I report the data for the scores 
given to each article in Table 7A-2. It shows the number of articles for each score as a 
percentage of the total number of articles on the directors of acquirers 3 years prior to 
the acquisition announcement. Only a few articles make mostly negative comments 
about acquirers, while most of the articles are either favourable to directors or contain a 
only small amount of negative comments. During the period of 1993-1997, both 
acquirers in the high-tech acquisition group and in the low-tech acquisition group enjoy 
a similar amount of media attention, i. e., both have similar amount of newspaper articles 
making comments on them as shown in `Total coded articles. By contrast, in the 1998- 
2000 sample period, the number of newspaper articles for acquirers in the high-tech 
acquisition group, 581 articles, is more than double that of the articles on acquirers in 
the low-tech acquisition group. This again shows that the media was favourable toward 
top-executives in high-tech firms during the high-tech boom period of the late 1990s. 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) report a mean score of media praise for acquirers 
of 0.17 which is lower than that reported in this thesis. This can be because inter alia, 
that their sample period does not include the bull stock market of late 1990s. It may 
also because of the difference in judgement over rating an article. As pointed out in 
Section 6.2.1.3 of Chapter 6, the coding of articles is highly subjective to the reader's 
judgement. It is possible that I offer more positive scores to those articles than 
Hayward and Hambrick. Section 9.3 of Chapter 9 suggests ways to reduce the 
subjectivity in the coding process. 
Collectively, the data show that acquirers that conducted high-tech acquisitions 
have significantly better past stock performance, higher glamour status, and receive 
more positive media comments prior to acquisition announcements than acquirers that 
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conducted low-tech acquisitions. The difference widens as the high-tech boom 
progressed during the 1990's and become strongly significant during 1998-2000. 
7.3.3 Monitoring mechanisms 
Descriptive statistics for monitoring mechanisms are reported in Table 7-5. In 
the 1993-1997 sample, the average sum of external blockholdings (LARSHR) is around 
28% in the high-tech acquisition group and about 32% in the low-tech acquisition 
group. The medians are 24% and 30% respectively. The differences in mean and 
median values are significant at the 10% level. In the 1998-2000 sample, the mean 
value is significantly lower but the median is about 0.28% higher in the high-tech 
acquisition group than that in the low-tech acquisition group. The sum of institutional 
shareholdings (INSTSHR) is lower in the high-tech acquisition group than that in the 
low-tech acquisition group both in terms of mean and median in the two sample periods. 
However, the differences are not statistically significant. Overall, these results indicate 
that there is more external shareholder control in acquirers that conducted low-tech 
acquisitions than acquirers that initiated high-tech acquisitions. 
Sudarsanam et al (1996) report an average external blockholdings of 11 % over 
1980-1990. Frank et al 2001 document a holding of around 15% between 1990 and 
1993. Weir et al (2002) find external blockholdings of around 11% from 1994 to 1996. 
Weir and Laing (2000) report a ratio of around 22% 1992 and 1995. This study reports 
an average ratio around 30%. It appears that UK corporate governance is 
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getting stronger over time with more external blockholder control in companies'39 
During 1998-2000, acquirers in both high-tech and low-tech acquisition 
groups have the same ratio (44%) for the percentage of non-executive directors on the 
board (NEXE). The ratio is about 3% lower for acquirers in the high-tech acquisition 
group than acquirers in the low-tech acquisition group during 1993-1997, indicating 
weaker corporate control of directors in the high-tech acquisition group. Weir et al 
(2002) report a ratio of 47% for all UK listed non-financial companies from 1994- 
1996. Weir (1997) finds even higher ratios (around 60%) in his sample of 94 UK 
takeovers during 1990-1993. Dahya et al (2003) report board compositions of over 
50% non-executive directors for 700 companies listed in London Stock Exchange 
from 1993 to 1999. All of these results show that UK boards generally adhere to the 
Cadbury (1992) recommendations that non-executive directors should dominate the 
board. 
For both sample periods, over 70% of the acquirers have a separate CEO and 
chairman (NONDUAL). This is consistent with the findings of Weir and Laing 
(2000) who report 71% in 1992 and 85 % in 1995, and by Weir et al (2002) who 
report 84% over the period 1994-1996. Those results indicate good compliance with 
the recommendation of the Cadbury Report (1992) that the roles of CEO and COB 
should be separated. 
For both high-tech and low-tech acquisition groups in the 1993-1997 sample 
period, about 87% of the acquirers have a remuneration committee. The ratio 
139 There may also exist some other reasons why the external blockholdings reported in this study are 
higher than those in the others. For instance, firm examined in this study may be smaller than those 
examined by the other studies. Smaller firms are more likely to have concentration of ownership than 
larger firms. 
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increases to above 92% in the 1998-2000 sample period. There appears to be no 
differences in the ratios between acquirers in the high-tech and low-tech acquisition 
groups. Weir and Laing (2000) report similarly high ratios. Conyon et al (1995) 
summarise UK compensation papers and report that the proportion of listed UK 
companies that have remuneration committees reached 94% by 1993. All of these 
results show that UK boards have a high level of compliance with the 
recommendations made in the Cadbury Report (1992) that company boards should 
establish a remuneration committee to determine the compensation level of directors. 
Taken together, the above results show that there appears to be less external 
blockholder or institutional blockholder control associated with acquirer boards in the 
high-tech acquisition group. Little difference is found between the two acquirer 
groups with regard to board independence, CEO-COB nonduality, and the presence of 
a remuneration committee 
7.3.4 Other incentives 
Section 6.2.1.4 of Chapter 6 describes that financial leverage, acquirer size and 
the relative size of acquirer to target also influence managers' decision of acquisition 
risk. There is not much difference in the leverage ratio (Table 7-6) between acquirers 
in high-tech acquisition and low-tech acquisition groups over the two sample periods. 
The means and the medians are all between 55%-58%. Acquirer size (MV) and the 
relative size of acquirer to target (RELSIZ) have been discussed in Section 7.2.1 
which shows no statistically significant differences between the high-tech acquisition 
group and low-tech acquisition group in both sample periods. 
'Table 7-6: Summary descriptive statistics for leverage ratio 
This table lists the descriptive statistics for acquire leverage ratio prior to acquisitions. 
Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for acquisitions over 1993-1997 and panel B reports 
the statistics for acquisitions over 1998-2000. LEV =% of an acquirer's total liability over 
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total assets in the accounting year prior to the acquisition announcement. N= number of 
acquisitions. In parentheses are the t statistics (mean difference) or Wilcoxon rank sum test z 
statistic (median difference). All the tests are based on two-tailed tests. a, b and c indicate the 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Panel A. Acquisitions over 1993-1997 
High-tech acquisitions Low-tech acquisitions Group difference 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Meant stat) Median (z stat) 
LEV 57.05 57.87 124 55.46 55.11 161 1.59 (0.7) 2.76(1.00) 
Panel B: Acquisitions over 1998-2000 
Low-tech Group difference 
High-tech acquisitions 
acquisitions 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Meant stat) Median (z stat) 
LEV 58.34 57.77 165 57.69 56.83 128 0.65 (0.2) 0.94(0.6) 
7.3.5 Summary 
Section 7.3 lists the descriptive statistics for risk incentives including wealth 
incentive, managerial behavioural biases, corporate monitors and other incentives for 
acquirers in the high-tech acquisition group and the low-tech acquisition group over 
the two sample periods 1993-1997 and 1998-2000. In summary, Section 7.3 reports 
that fixed compensation and annual bonuses are significantly higher in the low-tech 
acquisition group for both sample periods. While there is little difference in equity- 
based wealth or overall wealth between the two acquirer groups in the 1993-1997 
sample period, both are significantly larger for acquirers of high-tech targets in the 
1998-2000 sample period in terms of the median values. The growing importance of 
stock options appears more in high-tech companies than in low-tech companies. 
Equity-based compensation (excluding managerial shareholdings) still ranks behind 
cash compensation in executive compensation in the UK. 
Factors that encourage managerial overconfidence/over-optimism/hubris such 
as good past stock performance, glamour status, and media praise are significantly 
more apparent for acquirers of high-tech targets than for acquirers of low-tech targets, 
particularly, in 1998-2000. 
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In both sample periods, acquirers in the high-tech acquisition group are subject 
to less external blockholder or institutional blockholder control than acquirers in the 
low-tech acquisition group. Acquisition groups for both sample periods show few 
differences in corporate monitoring from non-executive directors, the separate roles of 
CEO and COB, as well as the presence of a remuneration committee. 
In addition, no significant financial leverage difference, acquirer size 
difference, or relative size acquirer to target difference can be seen between acquirers 
that conducted high-tech acquisitions and acquirers that initiated low-tech 
acquisitions. 
7.4 Determinants of acquisition risk 
This section reports results derived from the empirical risk model (Model 6-1) 
which aims to identify key factors in managers' selection of risky acquisitions. Table 
7-7 and Table 7-8 are for the sample period 1993-1997, and Table 7-9 and Table 7-10 
are for the sample period 1998-2000. Table 7-7 and Table 7-9 are logistic regression 
models where the dependent variable is proxied by target high-tech industry status. 
The sample is divided into 2 risk groups: high-tech acquisitions and low-tech 
acquisitions. The former acquisitions are considered riskier than the latter 
acquisitions. A dummy variable separating the two groups is coded as 1 if a target is 
in a high-tech industry and 0 if it is in a low-tech industry. Both coefficients and odds 
ratios are reported in the tables (see Section 6.5.1.3 of Chapter 6 for a discussion on 
logistic regressions). Table 7-8 and Table 7-10 are OLS regression models 
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Table 7-7: Logistic regressions of target high-tech status over 1993-1997 
Dependent variable is 0 if a target is in a low-tech industry and 1 if in a high-tech 
industry. FAB = fixed compensation and annual bonus in £million. LTIPCASH = LTIP cash 
awards in £million. DELTA=the sum of the delta values of LTIP shares, options and 
ordinary shares in £million. DELTA2 = the squared term of DELTA. DELTA*WEALTH = 
interaction of DELTA and WEALTH. WEALTH is measured as the sum of fixed 
compensation, annual bonuses, LTIP cash, LTIP shares, and managerial shareholdings in 
£million. PAST =% of acquirer stock returns of month -2 versus month -12 (month 0 is 
acquisition announcement month). BEME =% of acquirer book value of equity to acquirer 
market value of equity. MEDIA= the weighted sum of the scores for newspaper articles that 
comment on acquirer directors over 3 years prior to acquisition announcement. LARSHR = 
% of large external shareholdings. NEXE =% of non-executive directors on an acquirer 
board. NONDUAL =1 if acquirer CEO and COB are different people and 0 otherwise. REM 
=I if an acquirer has a remuneration committee and 0 otherwise. LEV =% of acquirer's total 
liability over total assets. MV = natural logarithm of acquirer market value of equity. 
RELSIZ = natural logarithm of the ratio of the size of an acquirer to the size of its target. N= 
Number of acquisitions. The outliers of the variables are winsorised to 2nd standard deviation 
from the sample mean. Odds ratio is the probability of a high-tech acquisition happening to it 
not happening. In parentheses are the Wald statistics. a, b and c indicate significance level at 
the 1 %, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficients Odds Coefficients Odds Coefficients Odds 
Intercept 1.73(5.41) 1.57(4.29) 1.57(4.29) 
FAB -0.35(1.14) 0.70 -0.35(1.12) 0.70 -0.35(1.10) 0.71 
LTIP CASH -3.16(0.21) 0.04 -3.66(0.28) 0.03 -3.63(0.27) 0.03 
DELTA -0.83(1.11) 0.44 0.98(0.25) 2.66 0.96(0.23) 2.60 
DELTA 2 -2.28(0.97) 0.10 
DELTA*WEALTH -0.02(0.94) 0.98 
PAST -0.00(0.01) 1.00 -0.00(0.02) 1.00 -0.00(0.02) 1.00 
BEME -0.02(14.27) a 0.98 -0.02(13.30) a 0.98 -0.02(13.31) a 0.98 
MEDIA 0.13(0.97) 1.14 0.13(1.01) 1.14 0.13(1.02) 1.14 
LARSHR -0.01(3.07)' 0.99 -0.01(2.63) 0.99 -0.01(2.64) 0.99 
NEXE -0.01(1.49) 0.99 -0.01(1.26) 0.99 -0.01(1.26) 0.99 
NONDUAL 0.11(0.48) 1.23 0.12(0.57) 1.26 0.11(0.57) 1.26 
REM 0.19(0.79) 1.45 0.19(0.83) 1.47 0.19(0.83) 1.47 
LEV 0.00(0.20) 1.00 0.00(0.20) 1.00 0.00(0.20) 1.00 
MV -0.110.63) 0.90 -0.11(0.68) 0.89 -0.11(0.68) 0.89 
RELSIZ -0.02(0.05) 0.98 -0.02(0.07) 0.98 -0.02(0.07) 0.98 
N 285 285 285 
Log likelihood 33.37a 34.98 a 34.94 a 
Pseudo-R2 11.05% 11.55% 11.54% 
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Table 7-8: OLS regressions of target industrial R&D intensity over 1993-1997 
The dependent variable target industry R&D intensity is measured by target industry 
R&D expenditure/sales in the accounting year prior to acquisition announcement. FAB = 
fixed compensation and annual bonus in £million. LTIPCASH = LTIP cash award in 
£million. DELTA= the sum of the delta values of LTIP shares, options and ordinary shares in 
£million. DELTA2 = the squared term of DELTA. DELTA*WEALTH = interaction of 
DELTA and WEALTH. WEALTH is measured as the sum of fixed compensation, annual 
bonuses, LTIP cash, LTIP shares, and managerial shareholdings in £million. PAST =% of 
acquirer stock returns of month -2 versus month -12 (month 0 is announcement month). 
BEME _% of acquirer book value of equity to acquirer market value of equity. MEDIA= the 
weighted sum of the scores for newspaper articles that comment on acquirer directors over 3 
years prior to acquisition announcement. BEME =% of acquirer book value of equity to 
acquirer market value of equity. LARSHR =% of large external shareholdings. NEXE =% 
of non-executive directors on acquirer board. NONDUAL =1 if acquirer CEO and COB are 
different people and 0 otherwise. REM =1 if an acquirer board has a remuneration 
committee and 0 otherwise. LEV =% of acquirer's total liability over total assets. MV = 
natural logarithm of acquirer market value of equity. RELSIZ = natural logarithm of the ratio 
of the size of an acquirer to the size of its target. N= number of acquisitions. The outliers of 
the variables are winsorised to 2nd standard deviation from the sample mean. In parentheses 
are the t statistics. a, b and c indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 4.16(4.27)a 3.63(3.70) a 3.63(3.69) a 
FAB -0.34 (-0.86) -0.28(-0.71) -0.27(-0.69) 
LTIP CASH -3.50(-0.54) -4.97(-0.78) -4.93(-0.77) 
DELTA -0.24(-0.24) 6.17(2.55) a 6.19(2.54) a 
DELTA 2 -7.17(-2.67) a 
DELTA*WEALTH -0.07(-2.66) a 
PAST -0.00(-0.59) -0.00(-0.81) -0.00(-0.81) 
BEME -0.01(-2.49) a -0.01(-2.19) 
b -0.01(-2.19) 
b 
MEDIA -0.19(-1.14) -0.18(-1.10) -0.18(-1.10) 
LARSHR -0.01(-1.03) -0.01(-0.73) 
NEXE -0.02(-1.34) -0.01(-1.11) 
NONDUAL 0.53(1.35) 0.57(1.50) 
REM 0.15(0.29) 0.17(0.34) 
LEV 0.02(1.32) 0.01(1.28) 
MV 0.05(0.31) 0.03(0.20) 
RELSIZ -0.13(-1.11) -0.14(-1.23) 
N 285 285 
F statistics 1.44 1.88 b 
Adjusted R2 1.98% 4.15% 
-0.01(-0.73) 
-0.01(-1.11) 
0.57(1.50) 
0.17(0.34) 
0.01(1.29) 
0.03(0.19) 
-0.14(-1.23) 
285 
1.87 b 
4.12% 
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Table 7-9: Logistic regressions of target high-tech status over 1998-2000 
Dependent variable is 0 if a target is in a low-tech industry and I if in a high-tech 
industry. FAB = fixed compensation and annual bonus in £million. LTIPCASH = LTIP cash 
awards in £million. DELTA=the sum of the delta values of LTIP shares, options and ordinary 
shares in £million. DELTA2 = the squared term of DELTA. DELTA*WEALTH = interaction 
of DELTA and WEALTH. WEALTH is measured as the sum of fixed compensation, annual 
bonuses, LTIP cash, LTIP shares, stock options and managerial shareholdings in £million. 
VEGA = stock option vega in £million. VEGA*WEALTH = interaction of VEGA and 
WEALTH. PAST =% of acquirer stock returns of month -2 versus month -12 (month 0 is 
acquisition announcement month). BEME =% of acquirer book value of equity to acquirer 
market value of equity. MEDIA= the weighted sum of the scores for newspaper articles that 
comment on acquirer directors over 3 years prior to acquisition announcement. LARSHR = 
% of large external shareholdings. NEXE =% of non-executive directors on an acquirer 
board. NONDUAL =1 if acquirer CEO and COB are different people and 0 otherwise. REM 
=I if an acquirer has a remuneration committee and 0 otherwise. LEV =% of acquirer's total 
liability over total assets. MV = natural logarithm of acquirer market value of equity. 
RELSIZ = natural logarithm of the ratio of the size of an acquirer to the size of its target. N= 
Number of acquisitions. The outliers of the variables are winsorised to 2"d standard deviation 
from the sample mean. Odds ratio is the probability of a high-tech acquisition happening to it 
not happening. In parentheses are the Wald statistics. a, b and c indicate significance level at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficients Odds Coefficients Odds Coefficients Odds 
Intercept 0.52(0.48) 0.47(0.39) 0.40(0.28) 
FAB -0.27(3.93) 
b 0.77 -0.26(3.91) 
b 0.77 -0.35(4.54) 
b 0.70 
LTIP CASH -0.44(0.20) 0.64 -0.31(0.10) 0.73 -0.07(0.01) 0.93 
DELTA -0.14(0.62) 0.87 0.49(0.89) 1.64 0.11(0.04) 1.12 
DELTA 2 -0.12(1.58) 0.89 
DELTA*WEALTH -0.00(2.01) 1.00 
VEGA 1.09(0.43) 2.98 1.75(0.19) 2.10 -1.67(0.59) 0.19 
VEGA*WEALTH 0.05(2.62) 1.05 
PAST 0.004(6.94)' 1.00 0.004(6.62) a 1.00 0.004(6.48) a 1.00 
BEME -0.01(6.72) a 0.99 -0.01(6.24) a 0.99 -0.01(5.71) a 0.99 
MEDIA 0.27(3.86) b 1.30 0.26(3.55) ' 1.30 0.28(3.91) b 1.32 
LARSHR -0.00(0.13) 0.99 -0.00(0.0) 1.00 -0.00(0.00) 1.00 
NEXE -0.00(0.01) 0.99 -0.00(0.00) 1.00 -0.00(0.00) 1.00 
NONDUAL -0.16(0.81) 0.73 -0.16(0.80) 0.73 -0.16(0.84) 0.72 
REM -0.46(1.95) 0.40 -0.50(2.26) 0.37 -0.51(2.35)` 0.36 
LEV -0.00(0.10) 1.00 -0.00(0.17) 1.00 -0.00(0.30) 1.00 
MV 0.17(2.29) 1.18 0.15(1.82) 1.16 0.20(2.91)' 1.23 
RELSIZ -0.06(0.41) 0.95 -0.06(0.47) 0.94 -0.05(0.39) 0.95 
N ? 93 ? 93 293 
Log likelihood 53.41 a 55.17 a 58.42 a 
Pseudo -R2 16.66% 17.16% 18.08% 
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Table 7-10: OLS regressions of target industrial R&D intensity over 1998-2000 
The dependent variable target industry R&D intensity is measured by target industry 
R&D expenditure/sales in the accounting year prior to acquisition announcement. FAB = 
fixed compensation and annual bonus in £million. LTIPCASH = LTIP cash award in 
£million. DELTA=the sum of the delta values of LTIP shares, options and ordinary shares in 
£million. DELTA2 = the squared term of DELTA. DELTA*WEALTH = interaction of 
DELTA and WEALTH. WEALTH is measured as the sum of fixed compensation, annual 
bonuses, LTIP cash, LTIP shares, stock options and managerial shareholdings in £million. 
VEGA = stock option vega in £million. VEGA*WEALTH = interaction of VEGA and 
WEALTH. PAST =% of acquirer stock returns of month -2 versus month -12 (month 0 is 
announcement month). BEME =% of acquirer book value of equity to acquirer market value 
of equity. MEDIA= the weighted sum of the scores for newspaper articles that comment on 
acquirer directors over 3 years prior to acquisition announcement. BEME =% of acquirer 
book value of equity to acquirer market value of equity. LARSHR =% of large external 
shareholdings. NEXE =% of non-executive directors on acquirer board. NONDUAL =1 if 
acquirer CEO and COB are different people and 0 otherwise. REM =1 if an acquirer board 
has a remuneration committee and 0 otherwise. LEV =% of acquirer's total liability over 
total assets. MV = the natural logarithm of acquirer market value of equity. RELSIZ = 
natural logarithm of the ratio of the size of an acquirer to the size of its target. N= number of 
acquisitions. The outliers of the variables are winsorised to 2nd standard deviation from the 
sample mean. In parentheses are the t statistics. The t-statistics in all three models are 
corrected by the White (1980) heteroscedasticity procedure. a, b and c indicate significance 
level at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 2.59(2.80)a 2.61(2.84) a 2.61(2.84) a 
FAB -0.15(-1.61) -0.13(-1.77)" -0.13(-1.55) 
LTIP CASH -0.34(-0.40) 0.05(0.06) -0.00(-0.00) 
DELTA -0.05(-0.31) 1.15(2.51) a 1.19(2.36) 
b 
DELTA 2 -0.21(-3.05) a 
DELTA*WEALTH -0.002(-2.97) a 
VEGA 0.45(0.27) -0.28(-0.18) 0.03(0.02) 
VEGA*WEALTH -0.00(-0.51) 
PAST 0.00(2.50) a 0.003(2.34) b 0.00(2.37) b 
BEME -0.01(-1.73)' -0.01(-1.61) -0.01(-1.61) 
MEDIA -0.03(-0.29) -0.06(-0.53) -0.06(-0.54) 
LARSHR 0.00(0.42) 0.01(1.09) 0.01(1.07) 
NEXE -0.00(-0.07) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.02) 
NONDUAL -0.25(-0.78) -2.64(-0.86) -0.26(-0.84) 
REM -0.24(-0.45) -0.39 (-0.75) -0.39 (-0.74) 
LEV 0.01(1.25) 0.01(1.11) 0.01(1.11) 
MV 0.16(1.71)` 0.12(1.31) 0.12(1.19) 
RELSIZ -0.14(-1.53) -0.14(-1.52) -0.14(-1.51) 
N 293 293 293 
F Statistics 2.20 a 2.64 a 2.45a 
Adjusted RZ 5.42% 7.78% 7.36% 
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where the dependent variable is proxied by target industry R&D intensity (see Section 
6.5.1.2 for a discussion on OLS regression). 
There are three models in each table depending on different combinations of 
wealth component variables. Model 1 only includes the linear term of equity delta 
(DELTA), consistent with Guay (1999), Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), and Coles et al 
(2004). In Model 2, the squared term of equity delta term (DELTA 2) is added to the 
model so that any nonlinear impact of equity delta can be compared with the linear 
assumption in Model 1. In Model 3, the interaction of equity delta and wealth 
(DELTA* WEALTH) is added to Model 2 to further examine the impact of 
managerial wealth on risk incentives provided by equity-based wealth. Given that the 
square of equity delta (DELTA 2) is seriously correlated with the interaction of equity 
delta and wealth (DELTA* WEALTH) according to the multicollinearity detector VIF 
value (the values are higher than 5000 in both sample periods140), the square of equity 
delta (DELTA 2) is excluded in model 3 to avoid a multicollinearity problem. 
The results show that there is no multicollearity problem as detected by VIF 
ratios in any of the models except Model 3 for the 1998-2000 sample (in Table 7-9 
and Table 7-10). DELTA is correlated with DELTA* WEALTH. The VIF ratio for 
DELTA is 11.73, slightly higher than the generally accepted cut off point for a VIF 
ratio, i. e., 10. Given that the ratio is quite close to the cut off point and it is within 
the normal range for the 1993-1997 sample period, this moderately high ratio of 11.73 
could be sample-dependent. Future studies are recommended to investigate the 
wealth variable using different datasets. 
140 The cut off point of the VIF ratio is 10. The higher a reported VIF ratio is above 10, the more 
serious the multicollearity problem. 
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Following the discussions in Sections 6.5.1.2 and 6.5.1.3 of Chapter 6.1 
winsorize the variable outliers situated beyond the 2nd standard deviation from the 
sample mean to the 2 "d standard deviation in all the models. The White (1980) 
heteroscedasticity test is conducted for all of the OLS regression models in Table 7-8 
and Table 7-10 (see Section 6.5.1.2 of Chapter 6 for a discussion about the 
heteroscedasticity problem). The null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity is not 
rejected at the 10% level for all the three models in the Table 7-8 but is rejected for all 
the three models in Table 7-10. Therefore, the test statistics for the models in Table 
7-10 are corrected for heteroscedasticity by using the approach suggested by White 
(1980). 
The following subsections discuss separately the association between the risk 
level of acquisitions and wealth incentives, behavioural biases, as well as monitoring 
mechanisms. 
7.4.1 Wealth incentive 
This section discusses the results for all the wealth-related variables. 
Fixed compensation and annual bonus 
The regression coefficients for fixed income and annual bonus (FAB) range 
from values of -0.13 to -0.35. Take Model 3 in the OLS regression over 1998-2000 
(in Table 7-10) for example, the coefficient -0.13 means that for every million 
increase in acquirer directors' cash compensation, those directors decrease their 
criterion for the target R&D intensity by 0.13% in searching for an acquisition target. 
This indicates that cash compensation induces acquirer managers to undertake 
acquisitions that decrease their firm risk. The negative impact on managerial risk 
taking is more obvious with the higher pay levels of 1998-2000 as compared to 1993- 
1997. The results provide some support to the hypothesis Hl. that acquisition risk is 
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negatively related to the level of cash compensation. This finding is consistent with 
those argument presented by Gray and Cannella (1997), Narayanan (1996) and 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004, Part III) that fixed compensation and annual bonus provide 
managers with few incentives to undertake risky projects to improve firm 
performance. Instead, as suggested by Lewellen et al (1987) and Bizjak et al (1993) a 
high level of cash pay seems to encourage managerial risk avoidance. 
Equity delta 
When a linear relationship is assumed between managerial risk taking and 
equity delta (DELTA) in Model 1 from Table 7-7 to Table 7-10, the coefficients of 
equity delta are negative but insignificant for both sample periods, indicating that 
equity delta has no significant impact on encouraging managerial risk taking. This is 
consistent with the conclusions of Rogers (2002), and Coles et al (2004)141. Model 2 
allows for a nonlinear relationship between acquisition risk and equity delta. 
Interestingly, the coefficients of DELTA become positive and significant at the 1% 
level when the dependent variable is target industry R&D intensity for both sample 
periods. Similarly, the squared term of equity delta (DELTA2) that captures the 
nonlinear relationship is negative across all the regression models and is significant at 
the 1% level in OLS regressions. To interpret the results, I take the OLS regression 
over the sample period 1998-2000 as an example (in Table 7-10). When the pay- 
performance sensitivity, i. e., equity delta, is low, £1 million increase in equity delta 
can make acquirer directors increase their criterion for target firm R&D intensity by 
1.15%, indicating that they will choose riskier firms as their acquisition targets. 
"I See Section 2.3.4.2 of Chapter 2 for a discussion of these two papers. 
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However, when the pay-performance sensitivity, i. e., equity delta is high, £1 million 
increase in equity delta can make directors decrease their criterion for target R&D 
intensity by 0.21 %, indicating that they prefer to buy low-risk firms. These results 
strongly indicate that a concave relationship exists between acquisition risk and equity 
delta. Therefore hypothesis H2 is supported 142 
The above finding suggests that when equity delta is low, it can drive directors 
to undertake risky acquisitions since directors can benefit from the success of projects, 
and the failure of the acquisitions will not substantially reduce the value of their 
equity holdings in their firms. However, as equity delta gets bigger, acquisition 
failure will have larger impact on directors' wealth. They then become more risk 
averse in their selection of acquisition risk. This finding supports those of Mishra et 
al (2000) who also document that the incentive provided by equity delta is nonlinear 
(see Section 2.3.4.2 of Chapter 2). This finding may also explain why empirical 
studies that ignore such a relationship, such as Coles et al (2004) and Roger (2002), 
do not find any significant effect from equity delta. See Section 2.3.4.2 of Chapter 2 
for a discussion of these papers. 
Interaction of equity delta and wealth 
142 1 acknowledge that the logistics regressions in Table 7-7 and Table 7-9 do not show statistically 
significant results. However, I suggest that the OLS regressions give a more robust result than the 
logistic regressions because the former allows for R&D intensity differences across target firms while 
the latter classifies all the acquisitions into two groups regardless how different each target firm is from 
the others. 
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The coefficients of equity delta (DELTA) are still positive and significant in 
OLS regression models (Model 3) when the cross term of equity delta and wealth 
(DELTA* WEALTH) is added to the models for both sample periods (see Table 7-8 
and Table 7-10). The coefficients for the cross term are negative and are significant at 
the 1% level in OLS regressions whose dependent variable is target industrial R&D 
intensity. This result again shows that low equity delta does encourage managers to 
seek high-risk, high-tech acquisitions. This positive effect diminishes as managers' 
total wealth increases until it is totally dominated by the risk aversion effect from a 
high level of total wealth. 
Robustness checks 
One may argue that the wealth variable considered here which includes cash 
compensation, managerial shareholdings, LTIP cash and share awards, and stock 
options, overstates the actual assets at managers' disposal and therefore exaggerates 
the risk aversion effect arising from the wealth. LTIP cash and share awards as well 
as stock options are contingent in nature. Managers may not be able to cash them in if 
they fail to meet the conditions attached to those compensation plans (see Section 
2.3.2 of Chapter 2 for a discussion of the vesting criteria of long-term incentive 
plans). Therefore adding LTIP cash and shares, and stock options to the managerial 
wealth portfolio may not add to managerial risk aversion 143. I therefore reconstruct 
the measure for managerial wealth by excluding LTIP cash and shares, and stock 
options and run the same regressions as those are performed on the alternative 
measure for wealth. The results are reported in Table 7A-3. 
143 Some other studies argue that LTIP shares and stock options increase managerial risk aversion 
because they accentuate the concentration of managers' wealth in one firm. See Section 2.4 of Chapter 
2 for a discussion of this argument. 
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The interaction of equity delta and wealth (DELTA* WEALTH) is negative 
across all the models in both sample periods and is significant at the 1% in the OLS 
regressions whose dependent variable is target industry R&D intensity. This indicates 
that a high level of managerial wealth, which enhances a managerial risk aversion 
effect, can diminish or even override the risk incentive provided by equity holdings 144. 
This finding is the same as when the measure of wealth includes all types of long-term 
incentive plans. Taken together, the above results support hypothesis H4 that 
acquisition risk is not positively related to equity delta at a high level of managerial 
wealth. This finding provides empirical support to the theoretical argument presented 
by Ross (2004) that no incentive scheme can by itself make managers more or less 
risk averse since their attitude also depends upon their personal utility functions at 
different wealth levels. 
It is also worth noting that equity-based wealth, managerial shareholdings in 
particular, is the major part of managerial wealth (see Table 7-2). Table 7A-1 also 
shows that the major component of equity delta is the delta for managerial 
shareholdings (SHARE DELTA). Section 6.2.1.2 of Chapter 6 explains that the delta 
for managerial shareholdings is in fact the value of managerial shareholdings divided 
by 100. Therefore, it appears that in this study, managerial wealth is seriously 
"' Note that in the sample of this thesis, the major component of managerial wealth is managerial 
shareholdings. Equity delta is also dominated by managerial shareholdings. See Section 7.3 for 
discussions of the components of managerial wealth. Excluding long-term incentive plans from 
managerial wealth makes managerial wealth closer in value to managerial shareholdings. The negative 
impact of a high level of wealth on equity incentive may to a large extent come from the negative 
impact of managerial shareholdings at a high level. The nonlinear impact of managerial shareholdings 
on managers risk taking is discussed below. 
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correlated with equity delta and it is not surprising that regression Model 2 and Model 
3 in Table 7-7 to Table 7-10 are very similar in terms of their coefficients and model 
explanatory power. Therefore the data in this study does not demonstrate a significant 
difference between the risk aversion impact of a high level of pay performance 
sensitivity and risk disincentive effect coming from a high level of managerial wealth. 
In reality, managers' equity ownership of their employer firms may not constitute 
such a large part of their personal wealth (see Section 2.3.1 for a discussion of 
managerial wealth). It is recommended that further studies should look into these 
matters when data on managerial wealth become available. 
What this study can do is to examine how managerial wealth discourages the 
risk incentives provided by LTIP shares and stock options. I decompose equity delta 
into LTIP delta (LTIP DELTA), option delta (OPTION DELTA), and share delta 
(SHARE DELTA) and run the same regressions as those performed on equity delta 
(DELTA). The results are provided in Table 7A-4 to Table 7A-7 in the Appendix to 
this chapter. 
LTIP delta (LTIP DELTA) has either insignificant coefficients in the 
regressions over 1993-1997 or significantly negative coefficients in the regressions 
over 1998-2000. Referring back to Table 7-2 for the descriptive statistics for LTIP 
shares, it is clear that they grew substantially between the 1993-1997 period and the 
1998-2000 period. This is perhaps why a negative impact of LTIP delta is detected in 
the 1998-2000 sample period but not in the 1993-1997 sample period. Due to a 
multicollinearity problem between LTIP delta and the squared term of LTIP delta (see 
those tables in the appendix), the data does not allow me to test the concave 
relationship between acquisition risk and LTIP delta. Based on existing analysis of 
LTIP delta. I conclude that LTIP shares do not encourage managers to undertake risky 
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acquisitions. In fact they may discourage managers from undertaking risky 
acquisitions. This finding provides empirical support to the argument of Smith and 
Stulz (1985) that the linear payoff structure of LTIP shares induces managerial risk 
aversion (see Section 2.3.2.3 for a discussion of this argument). This finding is 
consistent with that of Ryan and Wiggins (2002) who study the impact of LTIP shares 
on firm R&D investment, using the value term of LTIP shares rather than LTIP delta 
as a measure for the incentive provided by LTIP shares. However, the finding of this 
thesis is inconsistent with that of Richardson and Waegelein (2003) who find that 
following the adoption of LTIP share plans, firms increases their R&D investments. 
However, Richardson and Waegelein's approach is equivalent to the use a 
dichotomous variable for the presence of LTIP shares, which, as discussed in Section 
2.3.3 of Chapter 2, is far too simplistic and does not fully capture managers' incentive 
to alter firm risk. 
The coefficients of the cross term of LTIP delta and managerial wealth 
(LTIP DELTA* WEALTH) are insignificant in all Model 3s from Table 7A-4 to 
Table 7A-7. This means that the risk aversion effect from a high-level of total wealth 
does not affect the incentive provided by LTIP shares. LTIP shares hardly provide 
any incentives for managers to take risk in 1993-1997 (in Table 7A-4 and Table 7A-5) 
because of their low levels in both value and percentage of managers' total wealth 
(see Section 7.3.1). It is thus not surprising that a high level of managerial wealth 
does not have any disincentive effect on the incentive provided by LTIP shares over 
this period. In the 1998-2000 sample period (in Table 7A-6 and Table 7A-7), LTIP 
shares are found to discourage managerial risk taking 1 45 The insignificant 
145 This supports the argument of Smith and Stulz (1985) that LTIP shares increase managerial risk 
aversion (see Section 2.3.2.3 of Chapter 2). 
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provided by LTIP shares. Summarising the results for LTIP delta, I conclude that in 
the case of LTIP shares, the hypothesis (H4) that acquisition risk is not positively 
related to equity delta at a high level of managerial wealth is not rejected. 
Option delta (OPTION DELTA) has both statistically and economically 
insignificant coefficients across all the models in the sample period of 1998-2000 as 
reported in Table 7A-6 and Table 7A-7. The squared term of option delta (OPTION 
DELTA2), and the cross term of option delta and total wealth (OPTION* WEALTH) 
are also insignificant. These results show that the pay-performance relationship from 
stock options hardly has any effect on the riskiness of acquisitions pursued by 
managers. The risk aversion effect of managers' total wealth thus does not affect the 
incentive from stock options. Therefore in the case of stock options, hypotheses H2 
which suggests a concave relationship between acquisition risk and equity delta is not 
supported, and H-I which states that acquisition risk is not positively related to equity 
delta at a high level of managerial wealth is not rejected. 
According to Table 7A-4 to Table 7A-7, the coefficients for share delta exhibit 
a similar pattern to those of equity delta (in Table 7-7 to Table 7-10), indicating that 
the risk incentive effect of equity-based wealth is mainly contributed to by managerial 
shareholdings. The OLS regressions for both sample periods (in Table 7A-5 and 
Table 7A-7) demonstrate a significant (at the 1% level) nonlinear relationship 
between acquisition risk as measured by target industry R&D intensity and share delta 
as shown in the coefficients of SHARE DELTA and SHARE DELTA2 . 
Table 7A-5 
and Table 7A-7 show significant (at the 1% level) coefficients for the cross term of 
share delta and managers total wealth (SHARE DELTA*WEALTH), indicating that a 
high level of managerial total wealth negatively affects the incentive alignment effect 
of managerial shareholdings and induces managers to choose low-risk target firms. 
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However as in the case of equity delta, the data in this study does not demonstrate a 
significant difference between the risk aversion impact of a high level of share delta 
and the risk disincentive effect from a high level of managerial total wealth14'. 
Although statistically share delta has a significant effect on managers' pursuit 
of acquisition risk, the impact of the economic term is trivial. When the share delta 
level is low, an increase of £1,000,000 in share delta makes managers increase their 
criterion for target firm R&D intensity by less than 0.01% during the period of 1993- 
1997. When the share delta is high, the same increase in share delta makes managers 
reduce their criterion for target firm R&D intensity by less than 0.005%. The 
economic impact remains the same even during the high-tech boom period of 1998- 
2000. Therefore, it appears that although the pay-performance sensitivity of LTIP 
delta and stock options alone does not have much effect on managers' preference of 
target firms' technology level because of their low levels both in terms of value and 
their percentages of managerial total wealth, combining them with the pay- 
performance sensitivity of managerial shareholdings can produce a both statistically 
and economically significant impact (see Table 7-7 to Table 7-10 for the evidence of 
equity delta). Overall, in the case of managerial shareholdings, the two hypotheses 
H2 and H-I are both supported. 
As discussed in Section 2.3.4.2 of Chapter 2, it is common for existing studies 
to use the percentage of shares held by managers as a proxy for the incentive provided 
by managerial shareholdings. To provide comparable results with those studies, I use 
the percentage of the ordinary shares held by boards of directors in the accounting 
year prior to the acquisition announcement as a proxy for the risk incentive provided 
145 To distinguish the difference between these two effects, one needs to combine Model 2 and Model 3 
which as discussed in the beginning of this chapter, causes a serious muticollinearity problem. 
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by managerial shareholdings. The results are reported in Table 7A-8 - Table 7A- 11. 
Strong evidence is found for a concave relationship between acquisition risk and the 
percentage of shares held by directors in the 1993-1997 sample period (in Table 7A-8 
and Table 7A-9) but not in the 1998-2000 sample period (in Table 7A-10 and Table 
7A-11). Therefore this study provides some results consistent with the finding of 
Wright et al (1996) that the impact of managerial equity ownership on managerial 
firm risk taking is nonlinear. In addition, Model 3 of the logistic regression model 
over the sample period of 1993-1997 (in Table 7A-8) reports a significantly negative 
(at the 5% level) coefficient for the cross term of percentage of share holdings and 
total wealth (MANSHR* WEALTH), indicating that a high level of total wealth can 
weaken the incentive provided by directors' equity ownership of their firms. To sum 
up, the alternative measure of managerial shareholdings provides some evidence that 
the impact of managerial shareholdings on managerial risk taking is concave, and that 
a high level of managerial total wealth diminishes the incentive alignment effect of 
managerial shareholdings. 
Option vega 
The signs of the coefficients of the sensitivity of managers' stock option 
holdings to stock volatility (VEGA) are mixed in the six regression models for the 
1998-2000 sample period as shown in Table 7-9 and Table 7-10. None of the 
coefficients, however, is statistically significant. This means that although stock 
options protect managers' wealth from being affected by the reduced stock price as a 
result of highly risk}, projects, stock options do not drive managers to make more 
risky acquisitions. Therefore hypothesis H3 that acquisition risk is positively related 
to the level of option vega is not supported. 
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Combined with the findings for option delta (OPTION DELTA) discussed 
earlier in this section, it appears that stock options have no impact on managers' 
pursuit of risky acquisitions. This finding is not in line with the findings of Guay 
(1999), Datta et al (2001), Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) and Coles et al, (2004) who 
state that stock options encourage managerial risk taking. Among those studies, the 
analysis conducted by Datta et al (2001) is closer to the one by this thesis. They 
examine how stock options affect managers' decision of buying targets of higher 
growth opportunities as measured by targets' book-to-market ratio. For a sample of 
1,719 completed acquisitions during the period 1993 to 1998, they report that 
acquirers with a higher level of stock options granted to their top five executives in 
the year prior to acquisition announcement buy targets with higher growth 
opportunities. Therefore, Datta et al conclude that stock options encourage corporate 
executives to undertake riskier acquisitions. Datta et al, however, use the value of 
stock options rather than stock option delta, or vega to measure the stock option 
incentives, which as criticised by Core and Guay (1999) and Guay (1999) as an 
inappropriate representative as the incentive provided by stock options (see Section 
2.3.3 of Chapter 2). 
Moreover, the finding of this thesis that stock options do not provide risk 
incentives to managers also does not support the argument put forward in Section 
2.3.2.4 of Chapter 2 that the excessive grant of stock options in the 1990s drove 
managers to engage in excessive risk taking. A possible explanation for this could be 
that the level of stock option compensation in the UK is too low to have any effect on 
managers' investment behaviour, as suggested by Conyon and Murphy (2000) (see 
Section 2.3.1 for a discussion of Conyon and Murphy's findings). Mehran ei al 
(1998) also address a similar issue. By examining voluntary corporate liquidations b` 
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managers, they state that stock option compensation should be large enough to 
motivate managers to forego the present value of future compensation and the 
consumption of perks in their current firm 146 
Interaction of option vega and wealth 
The coefficients for the interaction between vega and wealth 
(VEGA*WEALTH) are insignificant in both Table 7-9 and Table 7-10. Using an 
alternative measure of wealth which does not include the contingent wealth such as 
LTIP cash, LTIP shares and stock options, the coefficient for VEGA* WEALTH in 
the logistic regression model is positive and significant at the 10% level (see Table 
7A-3 in the Appendix to this chapter), indicating that a high level of wealth does not 
diminish the risk seeking effect of stock options. This evidence however is not found 
in the OLS regression model. Overall, three out of four models in Table 7A-3 show 
that a high level of total wealth has no impact on the risk-seeking incentive offered by 
stock options. With the pay-risk relationship of stock options, i. e., vega, not 
providing any significant risk incentive as discussed above, it is not surprising that a 
high level of managerial total wealth does not affect the risk incentive embedded in 
stock options. Therefore hypothesis H5 that acquisition risk is not positively related 
to stock option vega at a high level of managerial wealth, is not supported by this 
study. However, this does not mean that managers' wealth does not affect the risk 
incentive provided by stock options at all. It would be valuable for future studies to 
investigate the impact of wealth on vega using US data, where option grants are far 
X46 See section 4.2.2.1 of Chapter 4 for a discussion of Mehran et al (1998). 
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more popular than they are in the UK, or with more recent UK data reporting an 
increase in option grants. 
LTIP cash 
For both sample periods, the coefficients of LTIP CASH are negative across 
all the regression models, but they are all statistically insignificant. Therefore 
hypothesis H6, that acquisition risk is positively related to the level of LTIP cash, is 
not supported. The results show that LTIP cash awards do not encourage managers to 
undertake risky acquisitions. Table 7-2 shows that the average value of LTIP cash is 
no more than £ 10,000 for the whole board of directors of both types of acquirers and 
the median value is less than £1,000 in both sample periods. Such a low level of LTIP 
cash is unlikely to have much of an effect on directors' investment behaviour. 
Robustness checks: regressions of size-deflated wealth variables 
Earlier literature such as Cosh and Hughes (1975) suggests that compensation 
levels varies across firms. Therefore empirical studies such as Williams and Rao 
(2000) and Guay (1999) generally adjust compensation level by a firm size variable 
such as total assets. Coles et al (2004) use the value term for the compensation 
variables instead of a ratio like Williams and Rao (2000) and Guay (2000) because 
firm size is a variable in their regression models, which, they argue, captures the 
cross-sectional firm differences in compensation level. The wealth variables in the 
regression models discussed so far follow Coles et al's approach, i. e., all based on 
value terms, since size is also a variable in the empirical risk model (Model 6-1 in 
Chapter 6). Nevertheless I also adopt the other authors' approach and deflate all the 
wealth variables such as cash compensation (FAB), LTIP cash (LTIP CASH). equity 
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delta (DELTA), vega (VEGA), and total wealth by acquirers' total assets in the 
accounting year prior to acquisition announcement. The same regression models are 
run as those performed on unadjusted wealth variables. The results are reported in 
Table 7A- 12 -Table 7A- 15 in the Appendix to this Chapter. 
Comparing with the outputs of Table 7-7 to Table 7-10, which are based on 
the unadjusted wealth variables, the findings with regard to the effect of the 
components of directors' wealth on the acquisition risk pursued by managers are 
generally similar. Both show that cash compensation does not encourage managerial 
risk taking. LTIP cash does not have much of an impact on managers' pursuit of 
acquisition risk. The pay-performance sensitivity, i. e., equity delta has a concave 
impact on managerial risk taking. The regression models based on the adjusted 
wealth variables show this pattern but do not achieve statistical significance. They 
however provide significant evidence that a high level of managerial wealth 
diminishes the risk seeking incentive from pay-risk sensitivity from stock options, i. e., 
option vega (in Table 7A-14 and Table 7A-15). Therefore hypothesis H5 that 
acquisition risk is not positively related to stock option vega at a high level of 
managerial wealth, is supported when the option vega is adjusted for firm size. 
Summary 
Taken together, the analysis of the impact of the components of managerial 
wealth on acquisition risk pursued by directors show the following results: 
" Fixed compensation and annual bonus provide few incentives for managers to 
undertake risky acquisitions. On the contrary, it can discourage managers from 
conducting risky, high-tech acquisitions. 
" I. "I'IP cash also does not provide any incentives for managers to take risk. 
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" The pay-performance link embedded in managers' equity-based wealth and 
measured by equity delta has a nonlinear impact on managers risk preference for 
high-tech or low-tech acquisitions. At a low level, equity delta aligns the interests 
of managers and shareholders and encourages managers to buy high-technology 
targets to quickly achieve technological breakthroughs. However when equity 
delta is already high, an increase in its value intensifies managerial risk aversion 
and diverts managers away from high-tech acquisitions which have more 
uncertain outcomes than low tech acquisitions. 
9 The detected nonlinear impact of equity delta is due to a large extent to 
managerial shareholdings which are the dominant component of managers equity- 
based wealth. This result is robust when an alternative measure of managerial 
shareholdings, i. e., the percentage of share held by directors, is used. 
9 The level of LTIP shares and stock options held by directors are generally too low 
to have much of an impact on managers' selection of acquisition risk, although 
evidence is found in the 1998-2000 period that LTIP shares discourage managers 
to pursue high risk acquisitions. The insignificant effect on managerial risk taking 
found with stock options shows that the broad criticism of excessively granted 
stock options inducing managerial excessive risk taking in the US in the 1990s 
does not apply to the UK. 
" Evidence is found that a high level of managers' wealth diminishes the incentives 
provided by equity-based wealth to undertake risky projects that enhance firm 
value. The above conclusion is robust when an alternative measure of total 
wealth, which excludes all the contingency compensation plans, is used. It is also 
recommended that future studies should explore this area with more complete data 
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for total wealth including the wealth components related to firms other than 
managers' employment firms. 
9 The above conclusions are consistent when all those variables are adjusted by the 
total assets of acquirers prior to acquisitions to capture the cross sectional 
difference in compensation levels related to firm size. 
Overall, the findings of this thesis are more consistent with the asset 
concentration argument discussed in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2, i. e., that compensation 
contracts actually lead managers to reduce the risk profile of the firms they manage so 
as to protect their own personal wealth tied to the firms. As the model by Marcus 
(1982) states, this seemingly suboptimal behaviour is in fact optimal given the non- 
diversification of managerial wealth based on executive compensation. 
Discussion 
The above findings for the various components of managerial equity-based 
wealth indicate that equity-based wealth is an ineffective means of encouraging 
managerial risk taking. Existing studies provide a variety of explanations for why this 
might be so in addition to the argument that in the UK, option holdings by board of 
directors are far to low have any significant impact on managers' investment 
behaviour as discussed in the previous section. 
Firstly, the strongest argument lies in management manipulation of 
compensation schemes. Many researchers argue that senior directors have substantial 
influence over their own pay, with little oversight from shareholders (Healy, 1985; 
Yermack, 1997: Campbell and Wasley, 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001: 
Murphy, 2001; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004, Chapter 7 and Chapter 14). Some 
researchers discover that members of the board of directors (some of whom are 
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members of the compensation committee) serve at the discretion of the CEO 
(Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Baker et al, 1988). 
Yermack (1997) finds that managers are more likely to receive an option grant 
prior to significant improvements in the market performance of the firm. He suggests 
that managers who become aware of favourable information about the firm try to 
influence the board to grant more performance-related pay. Aboody and Kasznik 
(2000) show that managers which delay disclosure of good news and accelerate the 
release of bad news prior to stock option grant dates, presumably do so in an attempt 
to lower the option exercise price. Carpenter and Remmers (2001) find that managers 
exploit inside information to time their option exercises and firms experience 
significantly positive abnormal returns before they exercise their stock options. Bens 
et al (2002) suggest that managers cut research and development expenditure to fund 
share repurchases for option plans so as to avoid EPS dilution. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004, Part II) provide a systematic analysis of executive 
compensation. They propose a `managerial power' hypothesis. They claim that 
board of directors who have been nominated by management, are sympathetic to 
executives, are insufficiently motivated to bargain over compensation, or are simply 
ineffectual in overseeing compensation. Essentially managers set their own 
compensation. As a result, executive pay greatly exceeds the levels that would prevail 
if directors were loyal to shareholder interests. Bebchuk and Fried state that even 
though directors are under a fiduciary duty to maximise shareholder wealth, executive 
compensation arrangements often fail to provide executives with proper incentives to 
do so and may even cause executive and shareholder interests to diverge. Overall, 
Bebchuk and Fried conclude that existing compensation schemes are a failure. They 
therefore advocate a radical reform in the structure of compensation practice with 
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strong emphasis on making them more transparent to investors and less easy to be 
manipulated by managers. 
Secondly, firms issue stock options for purposes other than aligning the 
interests of managers and shareholders, for instance, to reduce reported accounting 
expense (Hall and Murphy, 2002). Bender (2004) conducted an interview-based 
research to determine why companies use performance-related pay. Her study, based 
on interviews at 12 UK companies with 35 individuals involved in setting directors' 
remuneration, finds that firms believe that money does not actually motivate 
executives and they adopt performance-related pay only to follow the market practice. 
By following the market practice in structuring their executive packages, companies 
do not stand out from the crowd, and are likely therefore to draw support from 
relevant constituencies, in particular institutional shareholders. 
The third explanation is from a methodology perspective. The Black-Scholes 
(1973) option pricing model overstates the value of options to risk averse executive 
recipients (Conyon and Murphy, 2000). The reasons are as follows. Firstly, 
executive share options are subject to forfeiture if the executive leaves the firm prior 
to vesting. In this case, stock options are worthless. Secondly, the value of options to 
both the company and its directors will also be affected by the presence of 
performance criteria that determine whether the share options will vest or not. 
Conyon and Murphy (2000) observe that share options granted in the UK typically 
vest only upon attainment of some performance criteria, often based on earnings-per- 
share growth. Moreover, (Murphy, 1999) state that the Black-Scholes model ignores 
the possibility of early exercise, which may have either a positive or negative effect 
on the value of the option. Furthermore, Conyon and Sadler (2001) state that even if 
Black-Scholes (1973) model is an accurate way of measuring executive incentives. 
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there still exists an under/over-estimation of the size of the risk incentive of options 
due to incomplete disclosure about option related information in both UK and US 147. 
This suggests that existing evidence with regard to the option incentive may be 
distorted. 
Taken together, the existing studies show that executive compensation could 
be ineffective due to a number of reasons, such as top management power, inadequate 
measurement in empirical studies, insufficient information disclosure with regard to 
the director's pay, etc. 
7.4.2 Behavioural biases variables 
As shown in Table 7-9 and Table 7-10, the regression coefficients of the terms 
representing past stock performance (PAST) are positive and are highly significant at 
the 1% level in the 1998-2000 sample period when the stock market peaked. In the 
logistics regression models as reported in Table 7-9, the odds ratio for PAST is 1 in all 
the three models. This means that a stock performance increase of 1% over the past 
year can increase the probability that managers will select a high-tech acquisition 
versus a low-tech acquisition by 1%. In the OLS regressions as reported in Table 7- 
10, the coefficients for PAST are 0.003 across all the models, meaning that a 1% 
increase in companies stock return over one year can make managers increase their 
147 See Section 6.2.1.2 for a discussion of this issue. The Greenbury Report (1995) states that UK 
companies can adopt two types of disclosure for directors' holding of stock options, namely complete 
disclosure and concise disclosure. A complete disclosure reports all the parameters in the Black- 
Scholes (197-33) option pricing model. A concise disclosure may only report the weighted average 
excise price for the unexercised options held by directors instead of the exercise price for each tranche 
of stock options. Researchers have to make assumptions about some parameters if a company adopts 
the concise disclosure method. 
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criterion for the R&D intensity of a target firm by about 0.003%. Using both 
regressions thus gives us, for a given improvement in acquirers' stock returns, the 
likelihood that directors may choose a high-tech acquisition versus a low-tech 
acquisition, as well as the magnitude of the technology level of a target firm that 
affects acquirer directors' decisions to buy a target. 
The above result indicates that good past performance which gives directors 
overconfidence in their management skills increases the probability that managers 
will buy high-risk target firms. This is particularly true during the bull stock market 
of late 1990s when firms achieved hyper stock performance possibly leading directors 
of those firms to believe that they are capable of doing anything. This finding is 
consistent with the argument of Hayward and Hambrick (1997) and other studies 
discussed in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3 and Section 5.5 of Chapter 5, that good past 
performance can encourage managerial overconfidence/hubris which then makes 
managers seek risk. 
The coefficients of acquirers' glamour status (BEME) are significantly 
negative across all the models except in two OLS regression models for the 1998- 
2000 sample period when the proxy for acquisition risk used is target industry R&D 
intensity. Even in those two models, the coefficients are close to the 10% significance 
level. The odds ratio for BEME in the logistic regressions in the 1993-1997 sample 
period is 0.98 (in Table 7-7), meaning that a 1% decrease in the book-to-market ratio, 
i. e., the market views the acquirer firm as more of a rising star (a glamour firm) than 
as a mature firm lacking growth opportunities (a value firm), can increase the 
probability that acquirer directors will choose a high-tech target over a low-tech target 
by 0.98%. This shows that acquirers with a high glamour rating in the stock market 
make more risk}, acquisitions. This finding is consistent with that of Kohers and 
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Kohers (2001). The impact of glamour rating on directors' selection of risky 
acquisitions is more dramatic in the 1998-2000 sample period which covers the bull 
stock market. This is reflected in a higher odds ratio, 0.99 (in Table 7-9), implying 
that over-optimism/overconfidence engendered by firms' glamour rating is more 
prevalent during telecom bubble period. 
The coefficients for media praise (MED) have mixed signs across all the 
regression models. However they are significantly positive in the 1998-2000 sample 
period when the proxy for risk is target high-tech industry status. This indicates that 
media praise drives managers to take more risks when the stock markets are riding 
high. This finding is consistent with the descriptive statistics reported in Table 7-4 
which show that the media portrays acquirers in the high-tech acquisition group 
substantially more favourably than acquirers in low-tech acquisition group in the 
telecom and internet bubble period of late 1990s. The flattering media profile 
enhances directors' perceptions of self-importance and self-esteem, and leads them to 
undertake high-risk, high-tech acquisitions. By contrast, directors of firms who 
receive fewer flattering media comments are more cautious about their ability to 
manage risky projects and therefore go for low-risk, low-tech acquisitions. The 
mixture of signs across the different regression models, however, may be due to noise 
associated with the process of the construction of the variable for media praise, which 
is quite subjective. A more objective approach is recommended for future studies, 
such as involving more researchers in the coding process, or involving the assistance 
of computer software for content analysis. 
The conclusions for those three behavioural bias variables are the same in the 
robustness check models reported in Table 7A-3-Table 7A-16 in the Appendix to this 
chapter. In summary. the above analysis finds strong evidence that behavioural biases 
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such as overconfidence, over-optimism and hubris, encouraged by acquirers' good 
past performance, glamour status and high media profile drive managers to undertake 
risky high-tech acquisitions. More significant evidence is found in the 1998-2000 
sample period which corresponds to when the stock market was bullish, a condition 
likely to strengthen the behavioural biases. This supports hypothesis H7 that 
acquisition risk is positively related to behavioural biases. Compared with the 
findings for the wealth variables, it appears that managers' decisions regarding the 
undertaking of risky high-tech acquisitions in the UK in the 1990s is mainly driven by 
behavioural biases rather than the equity-based wealth such as stock options which are 
supposed to be `designed' to promote managerial risk taking. 
This study, along with other behavioural finance studies such as Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997), Heaton (2002), Malmendier and Tate (2004) and Malmendier and 
Tate (2005a) 148 provide empirical evidence for how directors' behavioural biases can 
affect firm strategy. This thesis advances the studies of Hayward and Hambrick 
(1007) and Malmendier and Tate (2004) in that it examines to what extent managerial 
behavioural biases contribute to managerial risk taking, an issue not covered by those 
two studies. In fact, those studies examine the impact of managerial behavioural 
biases and post-acquisition performance assuming that managerial risk taking 
influenced by behavioural biases leads to negative firm performance. This thesis also 
considers the other influence of managerial wealth and corporate monitoring 
mechanisms on managers' risk taking behaviour, which again is not highlighted in 
those two studies. 
118 See Section 3.3 of Chapter 3 for a discussion of these studies. 
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The evidence presented in this thesis that managers' project selection is largely 
influenced by their behavioural biases found also implies that studies attempting to 
predict the optimal investment risk within the traditional agency framework, such as 
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), Rogers (2002), Coles et al, (2004), may be subject to 
model misspecification problems as a result of ignoring behavioural variables. 
Discussion 
The above analysis of the impact of behavioural biases is not without 
shortcomings. Psychological biases are difficult to quantify. Although the measures 
for behavioural biases do generate significant results, whether or not stock price 
momentum, book-to-market ratio, and/or media comments can boost 
overconfidence/over-optimism/hubris in managers is an issue worth further 
investigation. Table 7-1 shows that for both sample periods, over 70% of the 
acquirers in the high-tech acquisition group are in high-tech industries and over 80% 
of the acquirers in the low-tech acquisition group are in low-tech industries. It is 
likely that the selection of high-risk technology-rich acquisitions may have little to do 
with the behavioural biases driven by good past performance and glamour status but 
rather because firms are more likely to buy targets with similar characteristics to 
themselves, i. e., firms in the same industry as themselves. 
In addition, the content analysis conducted to obtain values for the media 
praise variable is quite subjective. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) have two 
researchers independently read and code each of the 138 articles. Any disagreements 
regarding the coding were discussed until both researchers reached consensus. Due to 
the large number of articles identified for acquirers in the sample of this thesis (14,053 
articles read in total and 1,287 read in detail and coded), it was difficult for me to find 
volunteers to assist in the task of coding and follow Hayward and Hambrick's 
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approach. Further empirical studies are recommended to examine the robustness of 
these variables and to investigate the effect of managerial behavioural biases on firm 
strategy. 
7.4.3 Monitoring mechanisms 
This section provides results for monitoring mechanisms. 
External blockholders 
The sign of the regression coefficients for external blockholding (LARSHR) is 
not consistent across the range of models and the coefficients are insignificant both 
economically and statistically for most of the models, indicating that that external 
blockholders do not perform a strong monitoring of the managers' pursuit of 
acquisition risk. They neither curb managerial risk avoidance nor managerial 
excessive risk taking through acquisitions. Therefore hypothesis H8 that the higher 
the level of external blockholdings the more likely the acquisition risk is at an optimal 
level, is not supported. This is inconsistent with the findings of Hill and Sneil (1988) 
who suggest that external blockholdings influence firm R&D investment, and by 
Tufano (1996) who documents that external blockholders can curb managerial risk 
avoidance and make managers hedge gold price risk less. The finding in this thesis 
also does not support the view of Hayward and Hambrick (1997) that external 
blockholders can prevent overconfidence/hubris infected directors from seeking 
excessive risk and conducting value destroying acquisitions. However, these two 
studies are both based on US data. Compared with UK based studies, this thesis 
draws a conclusion about monitoring by external blockholders similar to those of 
Sudarsanam et al (1996), Franks et al (2001) and Weir et al (200? ) who all state that 
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external blockholders are ineffective monitors in the UK (see Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 
4 for discussions of the above studies). 
Institutional blockholders 
To gain further insight into the monitoring by external blockholders, I examine 
the role of institutional blockholders, which are the major type of external 
blockholder. The same regressions are run on institutional blockholders as those 
performed on external blockholders. Regression results are reported in Table 7A-16 
in the Appendix to this chapter. Note that only Model 3 performed on external 
blockholders (see Table 7-7 - Table 7-10) is reported because the other two models 
produce very similar results to Model 3 for institutional blockholders. The 
coefficients for institutional blockholders (INSTSHR) are insignificant both 
statistically and economically across all the four models, indicating that institutional 
blockholders do not exert any disciplinary impact on either managers' risk avoidance 
or excessive risk seeking through acquisitions. Therefore institutional blockholders 
are equal to external blockholders as a whole in their ineffectiveness as serving 
corporate monitors. 
The above finding is not in line with that of Zahra (1996) who finds that 
institutional shareholders encourage entrepreneurial risk activities in a firm, or in line 
with the finding of Wright et al (1996) that institutional shareholders can encourage 
managerial risk taking which in turn affects firm risk levels and make analysts' 
forecasts of firm performance more volatile. The finding of this thesis does not 
support the view of Malmendier and Tate (2005a) who find that external blockholders 
prevent overconfidence/hubris affected directors from conducting corporate activities 
that are not in the best interest of shareholders. 
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However, this study draws the same conclusion as Cosh and Hughes (1997) 
who find that institutional blockholders in the UK are ineffective monitors. This 
finding on institutional shareholders, together with those on UK external 
blockholders, and the finding of Franks et al (2001) that the main source of large 
shareholder control comes from the shareholdings which lie in the hands of inside 
managers and which are used to entrench rather than to discipline management, all 
advocate an improvement in shareholder monitoring in the UK. 
Board composition 
The coefficients of board composition measured by the percentage of non- 
executive directors on the board (NEXE) are also both economically and statistically 
insignificant in all the regression models. Therefore hypothesis H9, that the higher 
the proportion of non-executive directors on the board the more likely the acquisition 
is at an optimal level is not supported by the empirical results of this study. 
The above finding adds to the division of views with regard to the monitoring 
role of non-executive directors. It supports the argument of Mace (1971) that non- 
executive directors may be little more than a `rubber stamp', and is also consistent 
with the empirical findings of Cosh and Hughes (1997), Weir (1997), Weir and Laing 
(2000), Franks et al (2001) and Weir et al(2002) (see Section 4.2.2 of Chapter 2 for a 
discussion of these studies). 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) find that a higher percentage of non-executive 
directors can prevent hubris stricken directors from seek excessively risky and value 
destroying acquisitions. This study, however, does not find evidence that non- 
executive directors can prevent managers' excessive risk taking arising from 
behavioural biases. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) suggest that good past performance 
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achieved by executive directors can make non-executive directors believe that 
strategies pursued by the executives are correct even if those strategies have come 
about as a result of executive directors' hubris. This may be one of the explanations 
for why this study does not find monitoring by non-executive directors to be effective. 
Another explanation may be that UK non-executive directors are more like `advisors' 
than `controllers' because the powers to enforce fiduciary responsibilities on directors 
in the UK are weak (Franks et al, 2000) (see Section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4 for a more 
detailed discussion). A number of other possible explanations are presented in 
Section 4.2.2 of Chapter 4. 
Overall, the findings of this thesis together with those of other empirical 
studies that find that non-executive directors do not effectively perform their 
disciplinary role on executive directors call for an improvement in the corporate 
governance by UK non-executive directors. 
CEO-COB non-duality 
The coefficients of the CEO-COB non-duality variable (NONDUAL) are 
insignificant across all the models. Therefore, separation of the roles of CEO and 
chairman (NONDUAL) appears not to have any impact on managers' preferences 
regarding acquisition risk. Therefore, hypothesis H10 that when there is non-duality 
of CEO and COB it is more likely that the acquisition risk is at an optimal level, is not 
supported by this study. This parallels the findings of Brickley et al (1997), Coles 
and Jarrell, 1997, Weir et al (2002) and Dahya (2003) that duality has little impact on 
firm performance. 
Remuneration committee 
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The coefficients for remuneration committee (REM) are insignificant in all of 
the regression models. They also have mixed signs. Therefore hypothesis HII that 
when there is a remuneration committee of the company board it is more likely that 
the acquisition risk is at an optimal level, is not supported. It is concluded that 
remuneration committees generally have no impact on managerial risk taking. This is 
in contrast to the findings of Main and Johnson (1993), Klein (1998), and Weir and 
Laing (2000), who state that the presence of remuneration committee has a positive 
impact on firm performance, i. e. remuneration committees are good corporate 
monitors. In a separate analysis that links firm performance to the presence of 
remuneration committees, such as studies by Main and Johnson (1993), Klein (1998), 
Weir and Laing (2000), 1 still find that the presence of remuneration committees has 
no impact on acquirer post-acquisition performance. See Section 8.6 of Chapter 8 for 
the result of this analysis. Overall, this thesis finds that remuneration committees are 
ineffective corporate monitors. My results however are consistent with the view of 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004, Part II) that managers essentially set their own 
compensation, the remuneration committee only serving as a `rubber stamp'. 
Taken together, none of the monitoring mechanisms outlined above has a 
strong disciplinary influence on managers with regard to their pursuit of acquisition 
risk. This conclusion supports the argument put forward by Bebchuk and Fried (2004, 
Chapter 16) that a radical reform is needed to improve corporate monitoring systems. 
Discussion 
Empirical studies have provided many explanations why external monitors 
might be ineffective. Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4 suggests that different types of 
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external blockholders have different attitudes towards their monitoring roles. Family 
and individual shareholders may only hold shares as a passive investment. 
Institutional shareholders however are themselves agents and are subject to agency 
conflicts of their own. Therefore it is not surprising that this study find that external 
blockholders have no impact on managerial risk taking. 
With regard to non-executive directors or a non-executive chairman, Section 
4.2.2 of Chapter 4 states that they may actually be under the control of executive 
directors, and that different types of non-executive directors may perform different 
monitoring roles. For example, representatives of financial institutions or major 
customers are likely to have more power than representatives from universities, civil 
rights groups, etc. Methodologically, Byrd and Hickman (1992) find that a two way 
classification of directors (i. e., outside and inside classification without taking 
affiliation into account) misses important empirical relationships because they mis- 
specify the director categories. They therefore propose a three-way categorisation: 
inside directors, affiliated outside directors and independent outside directors. 
Therefore, a further research into this area will necessitate an appropriately detailed 
level of classification of non-executive directors. 
As with non-executive directors, the members of a remuneration committee 
may also under the control of executive directors thereby having little monitoring 
power (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004, Chapter 7 and Chapter 14). As discussed in Section 
7.4.1 above, it appears that executive directors essentially set their own incentive 
schemes. If this is the case, it is not surprising that this study does not find evidence 
that the presence of remuneration committees controls directors' acquisition 
decisions. 
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7.4.4 Other incentives 
The coefficients for leverage (LEV) are both economically and statistically 
insignificant in all of the regression models, indicating that financial leverage does not 
create incentives for managers to assume risky projects, either to efficiently use the 
free cash flows in the firm (Jensen, 1986; Novaes, 2003) or to transfer the wealth from 
debt holders to shareholders (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Leland, 1998; Rajgopal and 
Shevlin, 2002). 
The coefficients for acquirer size (MV) have mixed signs across the range of 
models. Therefore it is not certain whether bigger companies are more likely to take 
more risks than smaller companies. This does not support the size argument proposed 
by Moeller et al (2004) that firm size affects the risk an acquirer will bear. This study 
suggests that big acquirers are not necessarily more keen to go for riskier projects. 
The coefficients for the relative size of acquirer to target (RELSIZ) are 
insignificant across all the regression models. This finding neither supports nor 
rejects the argument that when target firms are small relative to acquirers, the 
acquiring firms are more likely to buy the target even if the risk of the acquisition 
failure is high. 
7.4.5 Overview of models results 
The results from the models suggest that directors' pursuit of high-risk, high- 
tech acquisitions in the UK in 1990s is mainly driven by their behavioural biases, such 
as overconfidence/over-optimism/hubris rather than being driven by managers' 
equity-based wealth incentives, such as stock options which are `designed' to promote 
managerial risk taking. None of the monitoring mechanisms has much impact on 
disciplining managers' decisions on acquisition risk. 
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Comparing the regression models for the 1993-1997 sample with those based 
on the 1998-2000 sample, the latter period appears to exhibit more managerial 
overconfidence/over-optimism/hubris than the former. It is not surprising given that 
1998-2000 contains the peak of the bull market during which equity was overly 
valued by the market and managerial overconfidence/hubris/over-optimism drove 
M&A activities to a historic high. Examples of such acquisitions include the mega 
merger of AOL and Time Warner in 2000, which aimed to take a traditional media 
company into a brand new area, online media services. The acquisition failed after 
one year. One of the reasons is because Steve Case, the chairman of the merged 
company, overestimated the technology capabilities Time Warner could offer to AOL 
(BBC News, 13 January 2003). Vivendi Universal is another example. Jean-Marie 
Messier, the CEO of Vivendi Universal, conducted a series of acquisitions to establish 
a world's leading media empire based on a 150-year-old French water company 
within 8 years from 1994 (Johnson and Orange, 2003). The media empire did not 
survive for long and Jean-Marie Messier was convicted of fraud. 
From the overall model perspective, Model 2 and Model 3 have much higher 
explanatory power (see Pseudo R2 or adjusted R2) than Model 1 in each of the 
regressions of acquisition risk. Due to the multicollinearity problems in this study, it 
has not been possible to combine Model 2 with Model 3, although the combined 
model would be more predictive than the two separate models. In this study, only 
regression Model 3 is used as the prediction model for optimal acquisition risk levels 
due to the fact that Model 3 accounts for the effect of managerial wealth on equity 
incentives. However, I did also try Model 2 as a prediction model. The results 
appear to be the same as those based on regression Model 3 in generating the optimal 
risk level for acquisitions. It is recommended, if data allows, that future studies use a 
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combination of Model 2 and Model 3, which includes both the squared term of equity 
delta and the cross term of equity delta and total wealth as the prediction model. 
Comparing the prediction power of the logistic regression and OLS regression 
models, OLS regression is arguably more reliable because it captures the cross- 
sectional difference in target firm technology levels, whereas logistic regression by 
categorising all the acquisitions into either high-tech acquisitions or low-tech 
acquisitions, misses out a large amount of information that distinguishes individual 
acquisitions from one another149. This thesis uses target industry R&D level to proxy 
for acquisition risk in the OLS regressions. This is because firm level data is 
unavailable (see Section 6.2.1.1 of Chapter 6). 1 acknowledge that using industry 
level data misses out the different R&D levels cross target firms. It is recommended 
that future studies use firm level data. 
7.5 Summary 
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics for each of the variables in the 
sample and reports the results produced by the empirical risk model (Model 6-1). 
Target industry R&D intensity is significantly higher for high-tech 
acquisitions than it is for low-tech acquisitions. There is no significant difference 
between the transaction sizes, acquirer sizes or the relative sizes of acquirer to target 
between the two acquirer groups. Pure cash financing is used less frequently in high- 
tech acquisitions than in low-tech acquisitions Over 90% of the targets are non-listed 
firms. 
Fixed compensation and annual bonuses are significantly higher for acquirers 
in the low-tech acquisition group for both sample periods. Equity-based wealth or 
149 OLS regression and logistic regression are discussed in Section 6.5.1. 
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overall wealth is significantly larger for acquirers in the high-tech acquisition group in 
the 1998-2000 sample period. Stock options are just a small part of UK directors' 
wealth. 
Factors that encourage managerial overconfidence/over-optimism/hubris such 
as good past stock performance, glamour status and media praise are significantly 
more influential with acquirers that conducted high-tech acquisitions than with 
acquirers that undertook low-tech acquisitions, particularly in the 1998-2000 sample 
period. 
Acquirers of high-tech targets have less external blockholder or institutional 
blockholder control. There is little difference in other corporate monitoring 
mechanisms (such as the percentage of non-executive directors on the board, 
separation of the roles CEO and Chairman, and the presence of a remuneration 
committee) between acquirers of high-tech targets and acquirers of low-tech targets. 
No significant financial leverage difference prior to acquisitions can be seen to 
distinguish acquirers conducting high-tech acquisitions from acquirers initiating low- 
tech acquisitions. 
In the regression models, none of the components of managerial wealth 
portfolios encourages managerial risk seeking, except for a low level of equity delta. 
however when equity delta is high, it induces managerial risk aversion. A high level 
of managerial wealth can in fact diminish the incentives produced by managers' 
equity holdings. Fixed compensation and annual bonuses do not encourage 
managerial risk taking. In fact they can discourage managers fro pursuing risky high- 
tech acquisitions. Managerial overconfidence/over-optimism/hubris induced by good 
past performance, glamour status and media praise drives managers to undertake 
high-risk, high-tech acquisitions, particularly in the 1998-2000 sample period which 
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corresponds to when the bull market is at its peak. None of the monitoring 
mechanisms has much impact on disciplining managers regarding their acquisition 
risk choices. Financial leverage, acquirer size or relative size of acquirers to target 
does not have any impact on managers' choice of risky acquisitions. 
The next chapter examines the effect that managerial risk taking in 
acquisitions has on company performance, where Model 3 in Table 7-7 to Table 7-10 
is used as the prediction model for the optimal level of acquisition risk. 
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Appendix 
Table 7A-1: Summary descriptive statistics for the deltas of LTIP shares, stock 
options and managerial shareholdings 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the deltas for LTIP shares, stock options 
and managerial shareholdings of acquirers' boards of directors prior to acquisition 
announcement. Panel A reports the data for the acquisitions over 1993-1997 and Panel B 
reports data for the acquisitions over 1998-2000. LTIP delta = the delta value of LTIP shares 
in £thousand. Share delta = the delta value of managerial shareholdings in £thousand. See 
Section 6.2.1.1 for calculation approaches for those delta values. MANSHR = the percentage 
of shares, beneficial and non-beneficial, held by acquirer board of directors in the accounting 
year prior to acquisition announcement. N= number of acquisitions. In parentheses are the t 
statistics (mean difference) or Wilcoxon rank sum test z statistic (median difference). All the 
tests are based on two-tailed tests. a, b, c indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
Panel A: Acquisitions 1993-1997 
High-tech 
acquisitions 
Low-te ch acquisi tions Group difference 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
(t stat) (z stat) 
LTIP DELTA 0.24 0.00 124 0.31 0.00 161 -0.07 0.00 (-0.3) (-0.5) 
SHARE 114.59 47.22 124 135.84 33.86 161 -21.24 13.3 6 DELTA (-0.6) (0.7) 
MANSHR 15.22 8.93 124 13.37 4.67 161 1.85 4.26b (1.0) (2.1) 
Panel B: Acquisitions 1998-2000 
LTIP DELTA 2.73 0.00 165 9.42 0.00 128 -6.68 (-1.8)c 
0.00 
(-3.0)a 
OPTION 
DELTA 33.54 8.24 165 18.58 4.20 128 
14.95 
(1.8)' 
4.04 
(2.2)b 
SHARE 337 95 94 42 165 550.40 61.61 128 -212.45 
32.81 
b DELTA . . (-0.9) (2.1) 
1.39 3.51 
MANSHR 14.66 9.44 165 13.27 5.93 128 (0.7) (1.4) 
3 04 
Table 7A-2: Descriptive statistics for the coding of the media praise variable 
The table lists the descriptive statistics for the scores given to each article to construct 
the media praise variable (MEDIA). See Section 6.2.1.3 for a discussion of the coding process 
and criteria. Unless otherwise specified, the statistics given in the table are the number of 
articles with a given score, e. g., 3 points, 2 points, etc as a% of the total number of articles 
coded for an acquirer. `Total read articles' refers to the total number of articles initially 
produced by Factiva. `Total coded articles' refers to those relevant articles identified for 
coding. 0 point is given to those acquirers which have no relevant articles. 
Panel A. Acquisitions over 1993-1997 
Hig h-tech Acq uisitions Low-tech Acquisitions 
Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max 
3 points 34.83 10 0 100 18.72 0 0 100 
2 points 8.06 0 0 100 3.75 0 0 100 
1 point 49.10 50 0 100 72.51 100 0 100 
-1 point 2.74 0 0 100 2.36 0 0 100 
-2 point 5.18 0 0 100 2.65 0 0 100 
52 out of 124 acquisitions have 0 0 point points 
Total coded 211 
articles 
Total read 2277 
articles 
63 out of 161 acquisitions have 0 points 
280 
3688 
Panel B. Acquisitions over 1998-2000 
3 points 28.01 0 0 100 
2 points 13.46 0 0 100 
I point 47.07 41.43 0 100 
-1 point 6.14 0 0 100 
-2 point 5.25 0 0 100 
55 out of 165 acquisitions have 0 0 point points 
Total coded 581 
articles 
Total read 4541 
articles 
21.34 0 0 100 
3.78 0 0 50 
69.64 100 0 100 
4.17 0 0 100 
1.17 0 0 42.86 
61 out of 128 acquisitions have 0 points 
215 
3547 
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Table 7A-3: Regressions of acquisition risk with an alternative wealth measure 
This table reports the regression results of acquisition risk over 1998-2000. It 
distinguishes from the Table 7-7 to Table 7-10 in that WEALTH is measured as the sum of 
fixed compensation, annual bonuses, and managerial shareholdings in £million. Panel A reports 
the results for the logistics regression whose dependent variable is target high-tech industry 
status. Refer to Table 7-7 to Table 7-10 for variable definitions. N= number of acquisitions. 
The outliers of the variables are winsorised to 2nd standard deviation from the sample mean. In 
parentheses are Wald statistics for logistic regressions and t statistics for OLS regressions. The 
t-statistics in model 1 are corrected by the White (1980) heteroscedasticity procedure. a, b and c 
indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Panel A: Acquisitions over 1993-1997 1 Panel B: Acquisitions over 1998-2000 
Logistic regression 
I OLS I Logistic regression 
I OLS 
regression regression 
Coefficients Odds Coefficients Odds 
Intercept 1.57(4.29) 3.63(3.69) a 0.38(0.25) 2.62(3.37) a 
FAB -0.35(1.10) 0.71 -0.27(-0.69) -0.35(4.58)b 0.71 -0.12(-1.15) 
LTIP CASH -3.64(0.27) 0.03 -4.94(-0.77) -0.11(0.01) 0.89 -0.02(-0.02) 
DELTA 0.95(0.23) 2.60 6.19(2.54) a 0.09(0.02) 1.01 1.10(2.32) b 
DELTA 
-0.02(0.94) 0.98 -0.07(-2.66) a -0.00(1.95) 1.00 -0.002(-2.65) 
a 
WEALTH 
VEGA -0.77(0.16) 0.47 -0.14(-0.09) 
VEGA 0.05(2.68)` 1.05 -0.00(-0.30) *WEALTH 
PAST -0.00(0.02) 1.00 -0.00(-0.81) 0.004(6.38) 
a 1.00 0.003(2.74) a 
BEME -0.02(13.32) a 0.98 -0.01(-2.19) 
b 
-0.01(5.57) 
b 1.00 -0.01(-1.55) 
MEDIA 0.13(1.02) 1.14 -0.18(-1.10) 0.28(3.91) 
b 1.32 -0.07(-0.52) 
LARSHR -0.01(2.63) 0.99 -0.01(-0.73) -0.00(0.00) 
1.00 0.01(l. 03) 
NEXE -0.01(1.26) 0.99 -0.01(-1.11) -0.00(0.00) 
1.00 -0.00(-0.00) 
NONDUAL 0.11(0.57) 1.26 0.57(1.50) -0.16(0.83) 0.72 -0.25(-0.77) 
REM 0.19(0.83) 1.47 0.17(0.34) -0.51(2.35) 0.36 -0.38(-0.64) 
LEV 0.00(0.20) 1.00 0.01(1.29) -0.00(0.27) 1.00 0.01(1.45) 
MV -0.11(0.68) 0.89 0.03(0.20) 
0.21(2.88)' 1.22 0.12(l. 13) 
RELSIZ -0.02(0.07) 0.98 -0.14(-1.23) -0.05(0.38) 
0.95 -0.14(-1.73) 
N 285 285 293 293 
Log 34.35a 58.44 a likelihood 
Pseudo -R2 11.35% 
18.08% 
F statistics 1.87 
b 2.40' 
0 
Adjusted R2 4.12% 7.13% 
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Table 7A-4: Logistic regressions of target high-tech status over 1993-1997 with a 
breakdown of equity delta 
This table reports the results for the regressions of acquisitions risk over 1993-1997. It 
is the same as Table 7-7 except that it reports the results for LTIP delta, share delta (as 
highlighted in the table) rather than equity delta as a whole. The squared term of the delta 
for LTIP shares is dropped from the models because it is seriously correlated with the 
delta for LTIP shares (LTIP DELTA). The VIF ratio, 52, is far above the cut off point, 
10. LTIP DELTA= delta value of LTIP shares in £million. LTIP DELTA*WEALTH = the 
interaction of LTIP DELTA and wealth. Wealth is the sum of fixed compensation and annual 
bonuses, LTIP cash, LTIP shares and managerial shareholdings in £million. SHARE DELTA= 
delta value of managerial shareholdings in £million. SHARE DELTA2 = the squared term of 
the delta for managerial shareholdings. SHARE DELTA*WEALTH = the interaction term of 
SHARE DELTA and wealth. The rest variable definitions can be found in Table 7-7. N= 
Number of acquisitions. The outliers of the variables are winsorised to 2°d standard deviation 
from the sample mean. In parentheses are Wald statistics. a, b and c indicate significance level 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficients Odds Coefficients Odds Coefficients Odds 
Intercept 1.78(5.65) )b 1.58(4.30) 
FAB -0.40(1.42) 0.67 -0.42(1.48) 0.66 -0.43(1.53) 0.65 
LTIP CASH -3.84(0.28) 0.02 -4.62(0.37) 0.01 -4.35(0.34) 0.01 
LTIP DELTA 0.12(0.56) 1.13 0.15(0.79) 1.16 -0.09 (0.11) 0.91 
LTIP DELTA 0.01(1.31) 1.00 
*WEALTH 
SHARE DELTA -0.00(1.43) 1.00 0.00(0.26) 1.00 0.00(0.51) 1.00 
SHARE DELTA 2 -0.00(1.19) 1.00 
SHARE DELTA 
-0.00(1.91)) 0.98 *WEALTH 
PAST -0.00(0.01) 1.00 -0.00(0.03) 1.00 -0.00(0.04) 1.00 
BEME -0.02(14.70) a 0.98 -0.02(13.85) 
a 0.98 -0.02(13.43) a 0.98 
MEDIA 0.12(0.87) 1.13 0.13(0.92) 1.10 0.11(0.73) 1.12 
LARSHR -0.01(2.80) ° 0.99 -0.01(2.26) 0.99 -0.01(2.38) 
0.99 
NEXE -0.01(1.65) 0.99 -0.01(1.43) 0.99 -0.01(1.31) 
0.99 
NONDUAL 0.11(0.48) 1.23 0.12(0.58) 1.26 0.13(0.67) 1.29 
REM 0.18(0.76) 1.44 0.19(0.80) 1.46 0.19(0.77) 1.45 
LEV 0.00(0.23) 1.00 0.00(0.24) 1.00 0.00(0.22) 1.00 
MV -0.10(0.56) 0.90 -0.11(0.59) 0.90 -0.10(0.55) 
0.90 
RELSIZ -0.02(0.07) 0.98 -0.03(0.09) 0.97 -0.03(0.08) 
0.97 
N 285 285 285 
Log likelihood 33.92a 35.16 a 36.58 a 
Pseudo-R2 11.22% 11.61% 12.05% 
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Table 7A-5: OLS regressions of target industrial R&D intensity over 1993-1997 with a 
breakdown of equity delta 
This table reports the results for the regressions of acquisitions risk over 1993-1997. It 
is the same as Table 7-8 except that it reports the results for LTIP delta, share delta (as 
highlighted in the table) rather than equity delta as a whole. The squared term of the delta for 
LTIP shares is dropped from the models because it is seriously correlated with the delta for 
LTIP shares (LTIP DELTA). The VIF ratio, 52, is far above the cut off point, 10. LTIPCASH 
= LTIP cash award in £million. LTIP DELTA= delta value of LTIP shares in £million. LTIP 
DELTA*WEALTH = the interaction of LTIP DELTA and wealth. Wealth is the sum of fixed 
compensation and annual bonuses, LTIP cash, LTIP shares and managerial shareholdings in 
£million. SHARE DELTA= delta value of managerial shareholdings in £million. SHARE 
DELTA2 = the squared term of the delta for managerial shareholdings. SHARE 
DELTA*WEALTH = the interaction term of SHARE DELTA and wealth. Refer to Table 7-8 
for the rest of the variable definitions. N= Number of acquisitions. The outliers of the 
variables are winsorised to 2nd standard deviation from the sample mean. In parentheses are t 
statistics. The t-statistics in Model 1 are corrected by the White (1980) heteroscedasticity 
procedure. a, b and c indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Model 11 Modelt Model 3 
Intercept 4.18(4.65) a13.66(3.71) a13.65(3.70) a 
FAB -0.36 (-0.75) -0.31(-0.78) -0.30(-0.75) 
LTIP CASH -3.49(-1.03) -4.98(-0.78) -5.01(-0.78) 
LTIP DELTA 0.05(0.25) 0.08(0.44) 0.04(0.12) 
LTIP DELTA 
-0.00(-0.53) *WEALTH 
SHARE DELTA 0.00(0.16) 0.01(2.53) a 0.00(2.58) a 
SHARE DELTA 2 -0.00(-2.69) a 
SHARE DELTA 
-0.00(-2.70) a *WEALTH 
PAST -0.00(-0.60) -0.00(-0.81) -0.00(-0.83) 
BEME -0.01(-2.38)b -0.01(-2.23)b -0.01(-2.18)b 
MEDIA -0.19(-1.28) -0.19 (-1.13) -0.19(-1.17) 
LARSHR -0.01(-1.01) -0.01(-0.68) -0.01(-0.70) 
NEXE -0.01(-1.22) -0.01(-1.14) -0.01(-1.12) 
NONDUAL 0.52(1.38) 0.57(1.49) 0.58(1.51) 
REM 0.15(0.33) 0.17(0.33) 0.16(0.32) 
LEV 0.01(1.44) 0.01(1.30) 0.01(1.28) 
MV 0.06(0.23) 0.04(0.22) 0.04(0.23) 
RELSIZ -0.13(-0.96) -0.12(-1.25) -0.15(-1.26) 
N 285 285 285 
F statistics 1.31 1.76 
b 1.66 b 
Adjusted R2 1.64% 3.87% 3.60% 
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Table 7A-6: Logistic regressions of target high-tech status over 1998-2000 with a 
breakdown of equity delta 
This table reports the results for the regressions of acquisitions risk over 1998-2000. It is the 
same as Table 7-9 except that it reports the results for LTIP delta, option delta, share delta (as highlighted 
in the table) rather than equity delta as a whole. The squared term of the delta for LTIP shares, option 
vega (VEGA) and the interaction of option vega and wealth (VEGA*WEALTH) are dropped from the 
models because the squared term of the delta for LTIP shares is seriously correlated with the delta for 
LTIP shares (LTIP DELTA); option vega (VEGA) and the interaction of vega and wealth 
(VEGA*WEALTH) are both seriously correlated with option delta (OPTION DELTA) and the 
interaction of option delta and wealth (OPTION DELTA*WEALTH). The VIF ratio for the squared term 
of LTIP delta is 15 and for the VEGA and VEGA*WEALTH is all above 50. OPTION DELTA = delta 
value of stock options in £million. OPTION DELTA2 = the squared term of option delta. OPTION 
DELTA*WEALTH = the interaction of option delta and wealth. Wealth is the sum of fixed compensation 
and annual bonuses, LTIP cash, LTIP shares, stock options, and managerial shareholdings in £million. 
See Table 7A-5 for definitions of LTIP DELTA, LTIP DELTA*WEALTH, SHARE DELTA, SHARE 
DELTA2, SHARE DELTA* WEALTH. Refer to Table 7-9 for the rest of variable definitions. The outliers 
of the variables are winsorised to 2°d standard deviation from the sample mean. In parentheses are Wald 
statistics. a, b and c indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficients Odds Coefficients Odds Coefficients Odds 
Intercept 0.26(0.12) 0.14(0.03) 0.01(0.02) 
FAB -0.24(2.97)° 0.79 -0.24(3.00) ' 0.79 -0.31(3.61) 
b 0.73 
LTIP CASH -0.32(0.09) 0.73 -0.09(0.00) 0.92 0.19(0.03) 1.21 
LTIP DELTA -0.02(4.05 )b 0.98 -0.02(4.25) 
b 0.98 -0.02(1.55) 0.98 
LTIP DELTA 0.00(0.22) 1.00 
*WEALTH 
OPTION DELTA 0.00(0.46) 1.00 0.01(0.33) 1.00 -0.01(0.71) 1.00 
OPTION DELTA2 -0.00(0.13) 1.00 
OPTION DELTA 0.00(2.31) 1.00 
*WEALTH 
SHARE DELTA -0.00(0.33) 1.00 0.00(1.50) 1.00 0.00(0.28) 1.00 
SHARE DELTA 2 -0.00(2.16) 1.00 
SHARE DELTA 
-0.00(2.45) 1.00 *WEALTH 
PAST 0.004(6.66) a 1.00 0.04(6.10) a 1.00 0.004(6.29) a 1.00 
BEME -0.01(6.44)a 0.99 -0.01(5.48)b 0.99 -0.01(5.35)b 
0.99 
MEDIA 0.30(4.60) b 1.35 0.29(4.24) b 1.34 0.31(4.80) b 1.37 
LARSHR -0.00(0.31) 1.00 -0.00(0.03) 1.00 -0.00(0.02) 
1.00 
NEXE 0.00(0.01) 1.00 0.00(0.03) 1.00 0.00(0.05) 1.00 
NONDUAL -0.16(0.85) 0.72 -0.17(0.89) 0.71 -0.17(0.85) 
0.72 
REM -0.47(2.03) 0.39 -0.52(2.45) 0.36 -0.53(2.56)` 
0.35 
LEV -0.00(0.00) 1.00 -0.00(0.01) 1.00 -0.00(0.07) 
1.00 
MV 0.18(2.62) 1.20 0.16(2.06) 1.18 0.21(3.00)` 1.24 
RELSIZ -0.04(0.19) 0.96 -0.04(0.22) 0.96 -0.03(0.14) 
0.97 
N 293 293 293 
Log likelihood 57.59 a 60.27 a 63.00 a 
Pseudo -R` 17.84% 18.59% 
19.35% 
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Table 7A-7: OLS regressions of target industrial R&D intensity over 1998-2000 
with a breakdown of equity delta 
This table reports the results for the regressions of acquisitions risk over 1998-2000. It is the 
same as Table 7-10 except that it reports the results for LTIP delta, share delta (as highlighted in the 
table) rather than equity delta as a whole. The squared term of the delta for LTIP shares, option vega 
(VEGA) and the interaction of option vega and wealth (VEGA*WEALTH) are dropped from the models 
because the squared term of the delta for LTIP shares is seriously correlated with the delta for LTIP 
shares (LTIP DELTA); option vega (VEGA) and the interaction of vega and wealth (VEGA*WEALTH) 
are both seriously correlated with option delta (OPTION DELTA) and the interaction of option delta and 
wealth (OPTION DELTA*WEALTH). The VIF ratio for the squared term of LTIP delta is 15 and for the 
VEGA and VEGA*WEALTH is all above 50. All of these ratios are far above the cut off point, 10. 
OPTION DELTA = delta value of stock options in £million. OPTION DELTA2 = the squared term of 
option delta. OPTION DELTA*WEALTH = the interaction of option delta and wealth. Wealth is the 
sum of fixed compensation and annual bonuses, LTIP cash, LTIP shares, stock options, and managerial 
shareholdings in £million. See Table 7A-5 for definitions of LTIP DELTA, LTIP DELTA*WEALTH, 
SHARE DELTA, SHARE DELTA2, SHARE DELTA*WEALTH. Refer to Table 7-10 for the rest of 
variable definitions. The outliers of the variables are winsorised to 2"d standard deviation from the sample 
mean. In parentheses are t statistics. The t-statistics in the three models are corrected by the White (1980) 
heteroscedasticity procedure. a, b and c indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 2.44(2.60)a 2.41(2.57) a 2.39(2.58) a 
FAB -0.10(-1.09) -0.09(-1.14) -0.10(-1.24) 
LTIP CASH -0.22(-0.28) 0.20(0.26) 0.30(0.41) 
LTIP DELTA -0.02(-2.32)b -0.. 02(-2.27) 
b 
-0.02(-2.61) a 
LTIP DELTA 0.00(1.08) 
*WEALTH 
OPTION DELTA 0.00(0.40) 0.00(0.53) 0.00(0.60) 
OPTION D LTA 2 -0.00(-0.45) 
OPTION DELTA 
-0.00(-1.08) *WEALTH 
SHARE DELTA -0.00(-0.14) 0.00(2.66) a 0.001(2.71) a 
SHARE DELTA 2 -0.00(-3.15) a 
SHARE DELTA 
-0.00(-3.51) a *WEALTH 
PAST 0.003(2.3 8) b 0.002(2.13) b 
BEME -0.01(-1.69)c -0.01(-1.46) 
MEDIA -0.02(-0.19) -0.05(-0.44) 
LARSHR 0.00(0.27) 0.01(0.89) 
NEXE 0.00(0.09) 0.00(0.21) 
NONDUAL -0.25(-0.79) -0.27(-0.86) 
REM -0.25(-0.46) -0.41 (-0.78) 
LEV 0.01(1.45) 0.01(1.36) 
MV 0.16(1.65)` 0.12(1.24) 
RELSIZ -0.13(-1.39) -0.13(-1.37) 
N 293 293 
F Statistics 1.41 a 22.5 7a 
Adjusted R" 2.19% 8.35% 
0.002(2.30) b 
-0.01(-1.43) 
-0.05(-0.43) 
0.01(1.00) 
0.00(0.19) 
-0.28(-0.89) 
-0.43 (-0.82) 
0.01(1.31) 
0.12(1.24) 
-0.12(-1.34) 
293 
2.53a 
8.62% 
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Table 7A-8: Logistic regressions of target high-tech status over 1993-1997 with an 
alternative measure for managerial shareholdings 
This table reports the results for the regressions of acquisitions risk over 1993-1997. It 
is the same as Table 7-7 except that it reports the results for LTIP delta and % of shares held by 
acquirer directors (as highlighted in the table) rather than equity delta. The squared term of the 
delta for LTIP shares is dropped from the models because it is seriously correlated with the 
delta for LTIP shares (LTIP DELTA). The VIF ratio, 52, is far above the cut off point, 10. 
MANSHR =% of shares, beneficial and non-beneficial, held by board of directors prior to 
acquisition announcement. MANSHR2 = the squared term of the % of MANSHR. 
MANSHR*WEALTH = the interaction of MANSHR and wealth. Refer to Table 7A-4 for the 
variable definition of WEALTH, LTIP DELTA, LTIP DELTA*WEALTH. Refer to Table 7-7 
for the rest of the variable definition. N= Number of acquisitions. The outliers of the variables 
are winsorised to 2nd standard deviation from the sample mean. In parentheses are Wald 
statistics. a, b and c indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficients Odds Coefficients Odds Coefficients Odds 
Intercept 2.07(5.35) 1.47(2.33) 1.41(2.24) 
FAB -0.38(1.24) 0.68 -0.39(1.25) 0.68 -0.53(2.25) 0.59 
LTIP CASH -3.40(0.22) 0.03 -3.24(0.20) 0.04 -3.65(0.26) 0.03 
LTIP DELTA 0.07(0.21) 1.08 0.06(0.15) 1.06 -0.00 (0.00) 1.00 
LTIP DELTA 0.00(0.16) 1.00 
*WEALTH 
MANSHR -0.01(0.67) 0.99 0.03(1.73) 1.03 0.01(1.06) 1.00 
MANSHR 2 -0.00(3.01)` 1.00 
MANS LH 
-0.00(4.26)b 1.00 WEA 
PAST -0.00(0.00) 1.00 0.00(0.00) 1.00 -0.00(0.02) 1.00 
BEME -0.02(14.14) a 0.98 -0.02(12.88) a 0.98 -0.02(15.3 8) 
a 0.98 
MEDIA 0.13(0.94) 1.14 0.12(0.85) 1.13 0.11(0.61) 1.11 
LARSHR -0.01(2.69)" 0.99 -0.01(2.26) 0.99 -0.01(2.03) 
0.99 
NEXE -0.01(1.27) 0.99 -0.01(0.81) 1.00 -0.01(1.78) 
0.99 
NONDUAL 0.09(0.33) 1.19 0.08(0.26) 1.17 0.13(0.69) 1.29 
REM 0.16(0.61) 1.39 0.18(0.69) 1.42 0.22(1.09) 1.56 
LEV 0.00(0.18) 1.00 0.00(0.18) 1.00 0.00(0.25) 1.00 
MV -0.18(1.49) 0.84 -0.12(0.70) 0.88 -0.10(0.03) 
0.97 
RELSIZ -0.03(0.09) 0.97 -0.03(0.08) 0.97 -0.03(0.09) 
0.97 
N 285 285 285 
Log likelihood 33.118 36.28 a 38.57 a 
Pseudo-R2 10.97% 11.95% 12.66% 
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Table 7A-9: OLS regressions of target industrial R&D intensity over 1993-1997 with an 
alternative measure for managerial shareholdings 
This table reports the results for the regressions of acquisitions risk over 1993-1997. It 
is the same as Table 7-8 except that it reports the results for LTIP delta, % of shares held by 
acquirer directors (as highlighted in the table) rather than equity delta. The squared term of the 
delta for LTIP shares is dropped from the models because it is seriously correlated with the 
delta for LTIP shares (LTIP DELTA). The VIF ratio, 52, is far above the cut off point, 10. 
MANSHR =% of shares, beneficial and non-beneficial, held by board of directors prior to 
acquisition announcement. MANSHR2 = the squared term of the % of MANSHR. 
MANSHR*WEALTH = the interaction of MANSHR and wealth. Refer to Table 7A-5 for the 
definitions of WEALTH, LTIP DELTA, LTIP DELTA*WEALTH. Refer to Table 7-8 for the 
rest of the variable definitions. N= Number of acquisitions. The outliers of the variables are 
winsorised to 2°d standard deviation from the sample mean. In parentheses are t statistics. The t- 
statistics in model I are corrected by the White (1980) heteroscedasticity procedure. a, b and c 
indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Modell 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 4.29(3.69) a13.02(2.43) b13.78(3.04) a 
FAB -0.37 (-0.91) -0.37(-0.93) -0.45(-1.10) 
LTIP CASH -3.58(-0.55) -3.65(-0.57) -3.88(-0.60) 
LTIP DELTA 0.06(0.32) 0.03(0.18) 0.14(0.44) 
LTIP DELTA 
-0.00(-0.29) *WEALTH 
MANSHR -0.00(-0.15) 0.08(2.42) 
b 0.01(0.68) 
MANSHR 2 -0.00(-2.68) a 
MANSHR 
-0.00(-1.12) *WEALTH 
PAST -0.00(-0.55) -0.00(-0.47) -0.00(-0.58) 
BEME -0.01(-2.54) a -0.01(-2.25) 
b -0.01(-2.63) 
b 
MEDIA -0.20(-1.18) -0.21 (-1.27) -0.21(-1.22) 
LARSHR -0.01(-1.02) -0.01(-0.72) -0.01(-0.87) 
NEXE -0.02(-1.40) -0.01(-1.12) -0.02(-1.50) 
NONDUAL 0.52(1.36) 0.50(1.31) 0.57(1.48) 
REM 0.14(0.26) 0.21(0.40) 0.21(0.39) 
LEV 0.01(1.34) 0.01(1.39) 0.01(1.40) 
MV 0.05(0.29) 0.16(0.89) 0.14(0.73) 
RELSIZ -0.13(-1.11) -0.13(-1.13) -0.13(-1.12) 
N 285 285 285 
F statistics 1.34 1.76 
b 1.25 
Adjusted R2 1.64% 3.84% 1.41% 
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Table 7A-10: Logistic regressions of target high-tech status over 1998-2000 with an 
alternative measure for managerial shareholdings 
This table reports the results for the regressions of acquisitions risk over 1998-2000. It 
is the same as Table 7-9 except that it reports the results for LTIP delta, Option delta, and % of 
shares held by acquirer directors (as highlighted in the table) rather than equity delta. The 
squared term of the delta for LTIP shares, option vega (VEGA) and the interaction of option 
vega and wealth (VEGA*WEALTH) are dropped from the models because the squared term of 
the delta for LTIP shares is seriously correlated with the delta for LTIP shares (LTIP DELTA): 
option vega (VEGA) and the interaction of vega and wealth (VEGA*WEALTH) are both 
seriously correlated with option delta (OPTION DELTA) and the interaction of option delta and 
wealth (OPTION DELTA*WEALTH). The VIF ratio for the squared term of LTIP delta is 15 
and for the VEGA and VEGA*WEALTH is all above 50. MANSHR =% of shares, beneficial 
and non-beneficial, held by board of directors prior to acquisition announcement. MANSHR2 = 
the squared term of the % of MANSHR. MANSHR* WEALTH = the interaction of MANSHR 
and wealth. Refer to Table 7A-6 for the definitions of WEALTH, LTIP DELTA, LTIP 
DELTA* WEALTH, OPTION DELTA, OPTION DELTA2 , OPTION DELTA* WEALTH. See Table 7-9 for the rest of the variable definitions. N= Number of acquisitions. The outliers of 
the variables are winsorised to 2"d standard deviation from the sample mean. In parentheses are 
Wald statistics. a, b and c indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficients Odds Coefficients Odds Coefficients Odds 
Intercept 0.69(0.62) 0.56(0.37) 0.65(0.49) 
FAB -0.25(3.17)' 0.78 -0.24(3.09)' 0.79 -0.27(3.56) 
b 0.77 
LTIP CASH -0.32(0.10) 0.72 -0.37(0.13) 0.69 -0.23(0.05) 0.80 
LTIP DELTA -0.02(4.43 )b 0.98 -0.02(4.39) 
b 0.98 -0.02(2.50) 0.98 
LTIP DELTA 
-0.00(0.09) 1.00 *WEALTH 
OPTION DELTA 0.00(0.40) 1.00 0.01(0.35) 1.00 -0.00(0.01) 1.00 
OPTION DELTA 2 -0.00(0.15) 1.00 
OPTION DELTA 0.00(0.88) 1.00 
*WEALTH 
MANSHR -0.01(0.79) 1.00 0.00(0.01) 1.00 -0.01(0.28) 
1.00 
MANSHR2 -0.00(0.20) 1.00 
MANSHR *WEALTH -0.01(0.59) 1.00 
PAST 0.004(6.83)' 1.00 0.004(6.53) 8 1.00 0.004(6.53)' 1.00 
BEME -0.01(6.75)8 0.99 -0.01(6.16)a 0.99 -0.01(6.94)8 
0.99 
MEDIA 0.31(4.67)b 1.36 0.31(4.09) b 1.36 0.31(4.80) b 1.37 
LARSHR -0.01(0.81) 0.99 -0.01(0.93) 0.99 -0.01(0.84) 
0.99 
NEXE 0.00(0.04) 1.00 0.00(0.10) 1.00 0.00(0.09) 1.00 
NONDUAL -0.16(0.86) 0.72 -0.15(0.74) 0.73 -0.15(0.69) 
0.74 
REM -0.50(2.22) 0.37 -0.54(2.37) 0.34 -0.48(1.98) 
0.39 
LEV -0.00(0.0) 1.00 0.00(0.00) 1.00 0.00(0.01) 
1.00 
MV 0.13(1.22) 1.14 0.13(1.26) 1.14 0.13(1.15) 1.14 
RELSIZ -0.03(0.16) 0.97 -0.04(0.20) 0.96 -0.03(0.12) 
0.97 
N 293 293 293 
Log likelihood 58.05' 58.40 8 59.278 
Pseudo -R2 17.97° 0 18.07% 
18 . 31 °'o 
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Table 7A-11: OLS regressions of target industrial R&D intensity over 1998-2000 
with an alternative measure for managerial shareholdings 
This table reports the results for the regressions of acquisitions risk over 1998-2000. It 
differs from Table 7-10 in that it reports the results for LTIP delta, % of shares held by acquirer 
directors (as highlighted in the table) rather than equity delta. The squared term of the delta for 
LTIP shares, option vega (VEGA) and the interaction of option vega and wealth 
(VEGA*WEALTH) are dropped from the models because the squared term of the delta for 
LTIP shares is seriously correlated with the delta for LTIP shares (LTIP DELTA); option vega 
(VEGA) and the interaction of vega and wealth (VEGA*WEALTH) are both seriously 
correlated with option delta (OPTION DELTA) and the interaction of option delta and wealth 
(OPTION DELTA*WEALTH). The VIF ratio for the squared term of LTIP delta is 15 and for 
the VEGA and VEGA*WEALTH is all above 50. MANSHR =% of shares, beneficial and 
non-beneficial, held by board of directors prior to acquisition announcement. MANSHR2 = the 
squared term of the % of MANSHR. MANSHR*WEALTH = the interaction of MANSHR and 
wealth. Refer to Table 7A-6 for the definitions of WEALTH, LTIP DELTA, LTIP 
DELTA*WEALTH, OPTION DELTA, OPTION DELTA2, OPTION DELTA*WEALTH. 
Refer to Table 7-10 for the rest of the variable definitions. The outliers of the variables are 
winsorised to 2°d standard deviation from the sample mean. In parentheses are White (1980)- 
adjusted t statistics for heteroscedasticity. a, b and c indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 2.58(2.88)a 2.48(2.70) a 2.65(2.79) a 
FAB -0.11(-0.95) -0.10(-0.93) -0.11(-0.97) 
LTIP CASH -0.22(-0.23) -0.25(-0.26) -0.28(-0.30) 
LTIP DELTA -0.02(-1.77)' -0.02(-1.78)' -0.02(-1.71) 
LTIP DELTA 0.00(0.31) 
*WEALTH 
OPTION DELTA 0.00(0.54) 0.00(0.52) 0.00(0.96) 
OPTION DELTA 2 -0.00(-0.34) T 
OPTION DELTA 
-0.00(-0.95) *WEALTH 
MANSHR -0.00(-0.31) 0.01(0.26) -0.01(-0.48) 
MANSHR 2 -0.00(-0.40) 
MANSHR *WEALTH 0.00(0.53) 
PAST 0.003(2.81) a 0.003(2.77) a 0.003(2.90) a 
BEME -0.01(-1.71)C -0.01(-1.56) -0.01(-1.61) 
MEDIA -0.04(-0.17) -0.02(-0.15) -0.02(-0.15) 
LARSHR 0.00(0.13) 0.00(0.08) 0.00(0.08) 
NEXE 0.00(0.14) 0.00(0.23) 0.00(0.15) 
NONDUAL -0.25(-0.77) -0.24(-0.72) -0.26(-0.80) 
REM -0.26(-0.44) -0.31 (-0.51) -0.30 
(-0.49) 
LEV 0.01(1.84) 0.01(1.83) 0.01(1.85) 
MV 0.14(1.33) 0.15(1.33) 0.13(1.16) 
RELSIZ -0.13(-1.57) -0.13(-1.59) -0.13(-1.53) 
N 293 293 293 
F Statistics 2.29 2.02 8 1.95 a 
Adjusted R2 6.21% 5.62% 5.5% 
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Table 7A-12: Logistic regressions of target high-tech status over 1993-1997 with 
deflated wealth variables 
This table differs from Table 7-7 in that all the wealth variables defined in Table 7-7 are 
deflated by acquirers' total assets in the accounting year prior to acquisition. N= number of 
acquisitions. The outliers of the variables are winsorised to 2nd standard deviation from the 
sample mean. In parentheses are t statistics. a, b and c indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficients Odds Coefficients Odds Coefficients Odds 
Intercept 1.71(3.45) b 1.59(2.75) ` 1.56(2.66)` 
FAB 0.02(0.04) 1.02 0.03(0.11) 1.03 0.03(0.14) 1.03 
LTIP CASH -20.61(0.25) 0.00 -20.12(0.24) 0.00 -20.00(0.24) 0.00 
DELTA 0.05(0.02) 1.05 0.32(0.20) 1.38 0.38(0.28) 1.46 
DELTA 2 -0.14(0.20) 0.87 
DELTA*WEALTH -0.00(0.29) 0.98 
PAST -0.00(0.00) 1.00 -0.00(0.00) 1.00 -0.00(0.00) 1.00 
BEME -0.02(12.18) a 0.99 -0.02(11.36) a 0.98 -0.02(11.25) 
a 0.98 
MEDIA 0.12(0.85) 1.13 0.13(0.94) 1.14 0.13(0.97) 1.14 
LARSHR -0.01(2.16) 0.99 -0.01(2.02) 0.99 -0.01(2.01) 0.99 
NEXE -0.01(0.57) 0.99 -0.01(0.47) 0.99 -0.01(0.46) 
0.99 
NONDUAL 0.07(0.22) 1.15 0.07(0.20) 1.14 0.07(0.20) 1.14 
REM 0.18(0.73) 1.45 0.18(0.67) 1.42 0.17(0.65) 1.42 
LEV 0.00(0.05) 1.00 0.00(0.02) 1.00 0.00(0.02) 1.00 
MV -0.23(4.35) 
b 0.80 -0.21(3.67)' 0.81 -0.21(3.57)- 0.81 
RELSIZ -0.02(0.05) 0.98 -0.02(0.06) 0.98 -0.02(0.07) 
0.98 
N 285 285 285 
Log likelihood 31.04a 31.24 a 31.33 a 
Pseudo-R2 10.32% 10.38% 10.41% 
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Table 7A-13: OLS regressions of target industrial R&D intensity over 1993-1997 
with deflated wealth variables 
This table differs from Table 7-8 in that all the wealth variables defined in Table 7-8 are 
deflated by acquirers' total assets in the accounting year prior to acquisition announcement. N 
= number of acquisitions. The outliers of the variables are winsorised to 2nd standard deviation 
from the sample mean. In parentheses are t statistics. The t-statistics in model I are corrected 
by the White (1980) heteroscedasticity procedure. a, b and c indicate significance level at the 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
3.42(2.71) a 
Modell 1 Modelt 1 Model 3 
Intercept 
FAB 
LTIP CASH 
DELTA 
DELTAZ 
DELTA*WEALTH 
PAST 
BEM 
MEDIA 
3.79(3.11)a 
-0.03 (-0.29) 
-12.62(-0.30) 
0.52(-1.10) 
-0.00(-0.72) 
-0.02(-2.16) 
b 
-0.21(-1.22) 
LARSHR 
NEXE 
NONDUAL 
REM 
-0.01(-0.64) 
-0.01(-1.23) 
0.52(1.36) 
0.24(0.46) 
0.01(0.10) 
-11.44(-0.28) 
1.45(1.57) 
-0.48(-1.17) 
3.41(2.70) a 
0.02(0.15) 
-11.37(-0.27) 
1.49(1.61) 
-0.00(-1.22) 
-0.00(-0.78) 
-0.01(-1.90) 
-0.18(-1.05) 
-0.01(-0.51) 
-0.01(-1.06) 
0.50(1.29) 
0.18(0.35) 
-0.00(-0.78) 
-0.01(-1.89) 
-0.18(-1.04) 
-0.01(-0.52) 
-0.01(-1.05) 
0.50(1.29) 
0.18(0.34) 
LEV 0.01(1.44) 0.01(1.25) 0.01(1.24) 
MV 0.02(0.14) 0.02(0.17) 0.03(0.19) 
RELSIZ -0.12(-1.06) -0. I3(-1.13) -0.13(-1.14) 
N 285 285 285 
F statistics 1.44 1.44 1.45 
Adjusted R2 1.98% 2.11% 2.16% 
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Table 7A-14: Logistic regressions of target high-tech status over 1998-2000 with 
deflated wealth variables 
This table differs from Table 7-9 in that all the wealth variables defined in Table 7-9 are 
deflated by acquirers' total assets in the accounting year prior to acquisition announcement. N 
= number of acquisitions. The outliers of the variables are winsorised to 2"d standard deviation 
from the sample mean. In parentheses are Wald statistics a, b and c indicate significance level at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Model 11 Model 21 Model 3 
Coefficients Odds Coefficients Odds Coefficients Odds 
Intercept 0.80(0.89) 0.69(0.65) 0.57(0.43) 
FAB -0.05(0.60) 0.95 -0.06(0.89) 0.94 -0.07(1.11) 0.93 
LTIP CASH 0.18(0.04) 1.20 0.22(0.05) 1.24 0.21(0.05) 1.24 
DELTA 0.12(1.45) 1.13 0.34(2.05) 1.41 0.16(0.34) 1.17 
DELTA 2 -0.04(1.14) 0.98 
DELTA*WEALTH 0.00(0.53) 1.00 
VEGA 0.25(0.11) 1.29 0.20 (0.06) 1.22 2.24(2.76)' 9.43 
VEGA*WEALTH -0.01(3.00) ` 1.00 
PAST 0.004(5.53) b 1.00 0.004(4.78) b 1.00 0.004(404) b 1.00 
BEME -0.01(8.35) a 0.99 -0.01(7.92) 
a 0.99 -0.01(7.58) a 0.99 
MEDIA 0.22(2.68)' 1.25 0.23(2.84) ' 1.26 0.23(2.77) ° 1.26 
LARSHR -0.00(0.01) 1.00 -0.00(0.0) 1.00 
0.00(0.03) 1.00 
NEXE 0.00(0.03) 1.00 -0.00(0.03) 1.00 0.00(0.02) 1.00 
NONDUAL -0.14(0.64) 0.76 -0.14(0.64) 
0.75 -0.16(0.81) 0.73 
REM -0.46(1.84) 0.40 -0.44(1.69) 
0.42 -0.32(0.81) 0.53 
LEV -0.00(0.14) 1.00 -0.00(0.17) 
1.00 -0.00(0.14) 1.00 
MV 0.04(0.14) 1.04 0.04(0.17) 1.00 0.04(0.21) 1.05 
RELSIZ -0.06(0.55) 0.94 -0.06(0.57) 
0.94 -0.08(0.79) 0.93 
N 293 293 293 
Log likelihood 49.06 a 50.11 a 56.04 a 
Pseudo -R2 15.42% 
15.72% 17.41% 
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Table 7A-15: OLS regressions of target industrial R&D intensity over 1998-2000 
with deflated wealth variables 
This table differs from Table 7-10 in that all the wealth variables defined in Table 7-10 
are deflated by acquirers' total assets in the accounting year prior to acquisition announcement. 
N= number of acquisitions. The outliers of the variables are winsorised to 2nd standard 
deviation from the sample mean. The t-statistics in all the three models are corrected by the 
White (1980) heteroscedasticity procedure. In parentheses are Wald statistics. a, b and c 
indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 2.85(2.74)a 2.73(2.57) a 2.50(2.37) b 
FAB -0.06(-1.12) -0.07(-1.34) -0.07(-1.25) 
LTIP CASH 0.06(0.12) 0.09(0.19) 0.10(0.21) 
DELTA 0.09(1.63)C 0.29(1.39) 0.23(1.16) 
DELTA 2 -0.01(-1.15) 
DELTA*WEALTH -0.00(-0.14) 
VEGA 0.21(0.40) 0.15(0.29) 1.16(1.49) 
VEGA*WEALTH -0.00(-2.31) 
b 
PAST 0.002(2.16) b 0.002(l. 66)' 0.002(1.52) 
BEME -0.01(-1.92) ` -0.01(-1.86) 
b -0.01(-1.78)- 
MEDIA -0.06(-0.50) -0.05(-0.44) -0.06(-0.47) 
LARSHR 0.01(0.77) 0.01(0.93) 0.01(0.93) 
NEXE 0.00(0.05) 0.00(0.09) 0.00(0.07) 
NONDUAL -0.20(-0.61) -2.21(-0.64) -0.24(-0.74) 
REM -0.36(-0.63) -0.32 (-0.53) -0.19 
(-0.27) 
LEV 0.01(1.27) 0.01(1.21) 0.01(1.23) 
MV 0.08(0.92) 0.09(0.94) 0.10(1.05) 
RELSIZ -0.14(-1.57) -0.14(-1.54) -0.14(-1.62) 
N 293 293 293 
F Statistics 2.21 a 2.15 a 2.21 a 
Adjusted R2 5.50% 5.60% 6.24% 
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Table 7A-16: Regressions on acquisition risk with institutional shareholdings 
This table reports the regression results on acquisition risk. It distinguishes from the 
Table 7-7 to Table 7-10 in that institutional blockholdings (INSTSHR) are included in the 
regression models rather than external blockholdings. INSTSHR =% of shares, greater than 
3%, held by institutional shareholders. Panel A reports the results for the logistics regression 
whose dependent variable is target high-tech industry status. The dependent variable is coded 
as 0 if targets are in low-tech industries and 1 if in high-tech industries. N= number of 
acquisitions. The outliers of the variables are winsorised to 2nd standard deviation from the 
sample mean. In parentheses are Wald statistics for logistic regressions and t statistics for OLS 
regressions. The t-statistics in OLS regression over 1998-2000 are corrected by the White 
(1980) heteroscedasticity procedure. a, b and c indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. 
Panel A: Acquisitions over 1993-1997 Panel B: Acquisitions over 1998-2000 
Logistic regression 
OLS 
Logistic regression 
OLS 
regression regression 
Coefficients I Odds Coefficients I Odds 
Intercept 1.36(3.29) c 3.75(3.87) a 0.33(0.20) 2.63(3.37) a 
FAB -4.3(1.74) 0.65 
1 
-0.34(-0.88) 
1 
-0.35(4.44)b 0.71 
1 
-0.12(-1.16) 
LTIP CASH -3.05(0.19) 0.05 -4.76(-0.75) -0.04(0.00) 0.96 -0.00(-0.00) 
DELTA 1.32(0.46) 3.76 6.00(2.47)a 0.17(0.09) 1.19 1.18(2.47)a 
DELTA 
-0.03(1.18) 0.98 -0.07(-2.63) a -0.00(2.25) 1.00 -0.002(-2.72) 
a 
*WEALTH 
VEGA -1.65(0.57) 0.19 0.09(0.05) 
VEGA 0.05(2.58) 1.05 -0.00(-0.38) *WEALTH 
PAST -0.00(0.12) 1.00 -0.00(-0.93) 0.004(6.47) 
a 1.00 0.003(2.79) a 
BEME -0.02(12.85) a 0.99 -0.01(-2.14) 
b 
-0.01(6.02) a 0.99 -0.01(-1.46) 
MEDIA 0.14(1.09) 1.15 -0.19(-1.17) 0.28(4.00)b 1.32 -0.06(-0.50) 
INSTSHR -0.01(0.80) 1.00 -0.01(-1.22) 0.00(0.26) 
1.00 0.01(0.99) 
NEXE -0.01(2.03) 0.99 -0.01(-1.22) -0.00(0.00) 
1.00 0.00(0.06) 
NONDUAL 0.12(0.60) 1.27 0.59(1.54) -0.18(0.97) 0.70 -0.25(-0.76) 
REM 0.21(1.00) 1.52 0.22(0.42) -0.55(2.89)' 0.33 -0.33(-0.58) 
LEV 0.00(0.32) 1.00 0.01(1.27) -0.00(0.33) 1.00 0.01(1.44) 
MV -0.08(0.40) 0.92 0.05(0.31) 
0.21(3.10)" 1.23 0.10(0.97) 
RELSIZ -0.03(0.12) 0.97 -0.14(-1.24) -0.06(0.40) 
0.95 -0.14(-1.68)° 
N 285 285 293 293 
Log 32.47a 58.68 a 
likelihood 
Pseudo -R2 10.77% 
18.15% 
1.95 b 44a F statistics 
° Adjusted R2 4.46% 7.30% 
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Chapter 8 
Acquisition Risk and Value Creation in Acquisitions 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to answer research question Q2 raised in Chapter 5, which is: 
Q2: To what extent is firm performance related to the optimal and 
suboptimal risk level of an investment project? 
In the case of acquisitions, the purpose of research question Q2 is to explore the 
association between acquirer post-acquisition performance and the optimal/suboptimal 
risk levels of acquisitions. Section 6.5.2 of Chapter 6 explains the optimal level of 
acquisition risk can be derived based on the prediction of the empirical risk model. 
Both logistic regression and OLS regression are used to estimate the empirical risk 
model (see Table 7-7 to Table 7-10 in Chapter 7). Which type of regression is used 
(logistic or OLS) depends on whether the measure of the dependent variable, acquisition 
risk, is a continuous data type or a categorical data type. The three models are then run 
for either the logistic or OLS regressions, with different combinations of independent 
variables (see Table 7-7 to Table 7-10 in Chapter 7). Out of these three models, Model 
3 is the most appropriate model for predicting the optimal acquisition risk (see Section 
7.4.5 of Chapter 7). 
When the actual acquisition risk is more or less than the predicted acquisition 
risk, the acquisition is classified as a suboptimal-risk investment, i. e., as either an over- 
risk acquisition or an under-risk acquisition. Section 5.8 of Chapter hypothesizes that 
both types of suboptimal-risk acquisitions lead to negative post-acquisition 
performance. 
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To test the above hypothesis, as per Model 6-2 and Model 6-3 in Chapter 6, 
acquisitions are divided into three categories, i. e., under-risk, optimal-risk, or over-risk. 
The results are reported in Section 8.2. Section 8.3 then analyses the post-acquisition 
performance of acquirers in the high-tech acquisition group and the low-tech acquisition 
group separately in a manner corresponding to the event study methodology introduced 
in Section 6.5.3 of Chapter 6. The post-acquisition performance of each acquisition risk 
group is discussed in Section 8.4. In addition to this univariate analysis, a multiple 
regression analysis is also conducted to examine the association between post- 
acquisition performance and optimal/suboptimal acquisition risk. The results are 
reported in Section 8.5. 
So far I have described how this chapter will report the results of the analyses to 
answer research question Q2, which is the second stage of the two-stage analysis of the 
relationship between post-acquisition performance and factors that affect managers' risk 
incentive. Section 8.7 of Chapter 8 reports results based on a one-stage analysis of such 
a relationship. The one-stage model is described in Model 6-5 in Chapter 6. The one- 
stage model directly examines the association between post-acquisition performance 
and factors that influence managers' risk incentive without considering managers' 
selection of acquisition risk. As discussed in Section 6.5.6 of Chapter 6, this one-stage 
analysis is common in the existing finance literature. The purpose of reporting the 
results for the one-stage analysis is to show how the two-stage analysis proposed by this 
thesis differs from, and is superior to the one-stage analysis. The chapter summary and 
a discussion of the limitations of the two-stage model are in Section 8.7. 
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8.2 Optimal/suboptimal- risk acquisitions 
How to derive optimal/suboptimal acquisition risk is described in Section 6.5.2 
of Chapter 6. Model 3 in Table 7-7 to Table 7-10 (in Chapter 7) are used to predict the 
optimal acquisition risk. Model 3 in Table 7-7 and Table 7-9 are logistic regressions. 
Lachenbruch holdout procedure is adopted in logistic regressions to estimate the 
probability of a sample acquisition belonging to a high-tech or low-tech acquisition (see 
Section 6.5.2 of Chapter 6). The acquisition is classified as a high-tech acquisition if 
the predicted probability of it being a high-tech acquisition is greater than 50%. 
Otherwise it is categorized as a low-tech acquisition. Comparing this predicted 
acquisition group with the actual acquisition group generates three investment 
categories: under-risk investment (UNDINV), optimal-risk investment (OPTINV) and 
over-risk investment (OVEINV) (see Mode 6-2 in Chapter 6). 
Model 3 in Table 7-8 and Table 7-10 (in Chapter 7) are OLS regressions. 
Following Model 6-3 in Chapter 6 only generates two investment categories, under-risk 
investment and over-risk investment because none of the target industry R&D 
intensities is exactly the same as predicted. There is no optimal-risk investment group. 
However, to allow for the prediction errors of the OLS regressions, I consider all the 
acquisitions whose target industry R&D intensity is within the range of (-90%, 
+110%) 150 of the predicted target industry R&D intensity to be optimal-risk 
acquisitions, and these acquisitions are allocated to the optimal-risk investment group. 
150 1 acknowledge that these cut off points are subjective. However, they only affect the results of 
univariate analysis, but not multiple regression analysis because in multiple regression analysis the 
residuals of the OLS regressions are used rather than the three investment categories to explain the post- 
acquisition performance. See Model 6-4 in Chapter 6. 
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Thus, the OLS regressions are forced to yield three investment categories just like the 
logistic regressions. 
Table 8-1 reports the distributions of acquisitions in the three investment 
categories. Panel A reports the result for the period 1993-1997 and Panel B shows the 
result for the period 1998-2000. When acquisition risk is proxied by target high-tech 
industry status, about 64% of acquisitions belong to the optimal-risk category 
(OPTINV) in the 1993-2000 sample period. About 16% of acquisitions are in the 
under-risk category (UNDINV), and 20% are in the over-risk category (OVEINV). In 
the 1998-2000 sample period, the proportion of acquisitions assigned to the optimal-risk 
group (OPTINV) is 62%, 22% are assigned to the under-risk group (UNDINV), and 
16% to the over-risk group (OVEINV). 
When acquisition risk is measured by target industry R&D intensity, in the 
1993-1997 sample period, about 18% of acquisitions fall into the optimal-risk group 
(OPTINV), 49% of acquisitions are in the under-risk category (UNDINV), and 33% are 
in the over-risk category (OVENV). In the 1998-2000-sample period, the proportion 
of acquisitions assigned to the optimal-risk group drops to 14%. Acquisitions in the 
under-risk group are also reduced (UNDINV), to 44%. In contrast, acquisitions in the 
over-risk acquisition group (OVEINV) increase to 42%. This classification shows that 
over-risk acquisitions increase in the period when the stock market is bullish. This 
corresponds to the findings reported in Chapter 7 that during the bull market of the late 
1990s many acquisitions are driven by managerial risk seeking induced by 
overconfidence/over-optimism/hubris. 
It is worth noting that the increase in over-risk acquisitions in the period 1998- 
2000 as compared to the period 1993-1997 is not found when acquisition risk is 
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measured by target high-tech status. Moreover, there are also far more acquisitions in 
the optimal-risk group when acquisition risk is measured by target high-tech status than 
when it is measured by target industry R&D intensity. There could be two reasons for 
this. First, a measure of acquisition risk by target high-tech industry status categorises 
all acquisitions into two categories, which misses out technology differences across 
firms and leads to biased predictions of acquisition risk levels. In contrast, there is less 
loss of information when acquisition risk is proxied by target industry R&D intensity, 
such a measure can therefore have more accurate predictions than the two-category 
measure. 
The second reason is that the cut off points for determining the optimal-risk 
group when acquisition risk is measured by target industry R&D intensity is subjective. 
A change of the cut off points may change the number of acquisitions in the each risk 
group. Luckily, as discussed in footnote 150, the cut off point problem does not affect 
multiple regression analysis. Overall, as addressed in Section 7.4.5 of Chapter 7, the 
prediction based on the OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is target 
industry R&D intensity is more reliable than that based on the logistic regressions in 
which the dependent variable is target high-tech status. 
8.3 Long-term post-acquisition performance 
To analyse the relationship between acquirer post-acquisition performance and 
the level of optimal/suboptimal acquisition risk, the thesis first calculates acquirer post- 
acquisition performance . This thesis examines acquirers' 
buy-and-hold-abnormal- 
returns (BHARs) three years after acquisition effective month. The event study 
methodology is discussed Section 6.5.3 of Chapter 6. The three-year BHARs for 
acquirers are presented in Table 8-2, in Panel A for the sample period 1993-1997 and in 
325 
Ö c'' ÖC 
v 't7 2 
a) v 
cý -C 
C, Oý"v 
4-4 
u 
N ce Nk 
`A 
ac0Ü 
73 
U C> -p 
pÖ 
22 
0 "V rA CA C) 
CUUU 
Q vi 3 ý+ > 
cd 
UU p Ut 
'd .5 
iý O si vUi 
N"- 
c4 
cdC cd +" ý. + O 
"LýQ cCi výUj 
C >> UCv äU + 
MO= &». o 
EC2 
I A" 'C=U 9) 't3 CC p- -- C 
N cd C Cý N ce rvO 4" 
ö 
:. 
CC v1 
x 
. 
(4 m 'j 
º+ý C vii O ýL 
O 'O 
Zp a) ä. 
A cu N -2 U ýCl "C 
p 00 cýIJ iC 'm cCd 
0 -10 . 
LA Cý 
. 
ýU rU r- N 
l -v 0 
,- <' 
r_ o 
:ýE r- o 42 
e 
N 
ý- pOU ,2v, .v 
7 ö. -v 
E-W ö. ? -p cE 
° 6 
V1 p^p O t-- 
"M 
N 
clý 
k r) 00 
C- 0 
ýy -- C Mp ýC O 
0 0 ýC 
ON O 
Qý O 
O 
N 
IM 
u0 
. 
oc 
.0 .0 U V 
,n N O kn ON 00 O1) O\ Iý N v^ 
.,, . "" Oý lý 00 cal N U1 
~ 1 ' ' " a .ý 
ö 
.aä 
4- [^ - 0ý0 - 
- 00 O^ (v ^ IND ; 
.y ' 
O "- ON ýO 
0M ýD 00 
u _ ý-ý OO . -- MÖ ; N 
° 
. 
i , u U 
VI) 00 V-) Ö Ö N Cýl 
Itt C> r- C) "-- 
- 
M 
_; N 
O" i. 
M 
ON 
ON 
ti 
4 
v * - ý `C ýN C OO N 00 I T 
MO 6O (= 14 C5 N - 
.ý au 
r 
CCM 
Z4 
OO I- O O NO O b0 , 
CC 
CM fi r- co C c, 
ýO 
N 
M 
Panel B for the 1998-2000 sample period. The benchmark firm is matched on 
acquirer's industry, size, book-to-market ratio and stock price momentum prior to 
acquisition announcement month. 
For the 1993-1997 sample period and compared with industry, size, book-to- 
market and momentum matched firms, the average three-year post-acquisition 
performance of acquirers who bought high-tech targets is insignificantly different from 
0, but the median (15.63%) is significant at the 5% level for the Wilcoxon signed rank 
test. Kohers and Kohers (2001) examine post-acquisition performance by using 
industry adjusted BHARs, and size and BEME adjusted BHARs. They report 
significantly negative 3-year post-acquisition BHARs for acquirers that conducted high- 
tech acquisitions. Comparing their finding with those of this thesis, it appears that UK 
acquirers seem to outperform their US counterparts when buying high risk high-tech 
target firms in the period of 1993-1997. However, as discussed below, for the 1998- 
2000 sample period, this better performance of UK acquirers disappears. 
The findings presented in this thesis are similar to that of Conn et al (2005). 
Based on 197 UK high-tech as well as private acquisitions, i. e., acquisitions of privately 
held high-tech targets, during 1984-1998, Conn et al find that on average acquires 
achieve insignificant calendar time abnormal returns (CTARs) relative to firms of their 
similar size and book-to-market ratio 3 years after acquisitions. Expanding their sample 
to 308 acquisitions of both privately held-targets and publicly-held targets, they still 
lind insignificant post-acquisition CTARs. 
Conn et al's study is similar to this thesis in that both studies examine high-tech 
as well as private acquisitions; both use a control firm approach, both sample periods 
covering 1993 to 1997, and both study UK domestic acquisitions. Although Conn et al 
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report CTARs and this study reports BHARs, Conn et al actually use both approaches 
and find that the results produced by CTARs for private acquisitions are quite similar to 
BHARs both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. Nevertheless, I 
acknowledge that there still exist differences between these two studies. Their 
definition of high-tech industries, although also based on firms' technology level, is 
broader than that used in this study (see footnote 53). Moreover, they define high-tech 
acquisitions as acquisitions in which acquirer and target are both in high-tech industries, 
whereas this thesis defines high-tech acquisitions as acquisition whose targets are in 
high-tech industries 151 This thesis uses industry and firm stock momentum in addition 
to size and book-to-market as matching criteria to find a matching firm, whereas they 
only use the latter two. 
Table 8-2 reports that the average 3-year BHARs for acquirers that bought low- 
tech targets is significantly negative with a value of -25.5% and an insignificant median 
of -10.3%. The average stock returns of acquirers in the high-tech acquisition group are 
43.2% higher than those of acquirers in the low-tech acquisition group, although the 
difference is not statistically significant. However, the median return of the former type 
of acquirers is 25.9% higher than the latter type and this difference is significant at the 
10% level. Thus there is evidence that acquirers that conducted high risk high-tech 
acquisitions outperformed acquirers that undertook low-risk low-tech acquisitions 
during the period 1993-1997. 
'S' This thesis argues that regardless the industry classification of acquirers, buying high-tech targets is 
always riskier than buying low-tech targets. This line of argument has been made in Section 5.2 of 
Chapter 5 and Section 6.2.1.1 of Chapter 6. 
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In contrast, Conn et al (2005) report insignificant average 3-year CTARs for 
non-high-tech, private acquisitions for 2,368 UK domestic acquisitions over the period 
1984-1998. They reach the same conclusion when they expand the sample to 2,896 
acquisitions including both public acquisitions and private acquisitions. The difference 
between the Conn et al study and this thesis may be due to the difference in the sample 
selections used by these two studies. The low-tech acquisitions examined in this thesis 
are selected according to the characteristics of their matching high-tech acquisitions so 
that the results for high-tech acquisitions and low-tech acquisitions are comparable. 
Conn et al however do not set such a constraint but include most of the acquisitions that 
happened during their sample period into their sample. 
In this thesis, for the sample period 1998-2000, the average 3 year BHARs for 
acquirers that bought high-tech targets is -13.8% with a median of -8.6% (significant at 
the 1% level). Therefore, it appears that companies that bought high-tech targets during 
the high-tech boom experienced significant value destruction. In comparison, firms that 
bought low-tech targets experienced more value loss three years after making 
acquisitions. For these acquirers, the average BHAR is -23.7% (significant at the 5% 
level) and the median BHAR is around -13% (significant at the 10% level) for the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test. Although acquirers of high-tech targets outperform 
acquirers of low-tech targets, neither mean nor median difference is statistically 
significant. 
Acquirer 1-year and 2-year BHARs are also reported to give further insight into 
acquirer performance after acquisitions. In the 1993-1997 sample period, acquirers of 
high-tech targets have BHARs that improve year by year in terms of median value. In 
terms of mean value, the BHAR is insignificantly negative at around -12°-ö at the end of 
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year 2, but turns positive, although still insignificant, at around 18% at the end of year 
3. Acquirers of low-tech targets have negative BHARs for the whole 3-year period 
except for a median BHAR for the first year of 0.06%. Both mean and median BHARs 
get lower and lower year by year, indicating that the performance of acquirers in the 
low-tech acquisition group deteriorates year by year. Overall, the above results show 
that acquirers of high-tech targets performed better year by year but acquirers of low- 
tech targets performed worse year by year. 
However, acquirers of high-tech targets did not perform as well in the peak of 
the bull market of 1998-2000 as they did in the 1993-1997. Their BHARs are negative 
in each of the 3 periods both in terms of mean and median values. On average the 
negative BHARs got worse and worse year by year. Acquirers of low-tech targets have 
the same performance pattern as the acquirers of high-tech targets, but to an even 
greater magnitude. As in the 1993-1997 sample period, firms that bought low-tech 
targets in the 1998-2000 sample period never outperformed their benchmark firms in 
any of the years. 
An issue worth mentioning here is the reliability of the tests reported in 
Table 8-2. Lyon et al (1999) state that the problem of biased test statistics caused by 
cross-sectional dependence of stock returns is more serious with long-term event studies 
because overlapping event windows which cause cross-section dependence of stock 
returns, are more likely with long-term event windows. Table 8-2 reports results for 
event windows from 1 year up to 3 years and the patterns of BHARs remain similar 
across different event windows. To illustrate, during the 1998-2000 sample period, 
acquirers of high-tech targets have insignificant mean BHARs, while acquirers of low- 
tech targets have significantly negative mean BHARs in all three event windows, (0. +1 
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year), (0, +2 years) and (0,3 years). The former acquirers thus outperform the latter 
acquirers regardless the length of the event windows. It therefore appears that cross- 
sectional dependence of firm stock returns has little impact on the conclusions drawn in 
this thesis with regard to the performance of acquirers in the high-tech acquisition group 
relative to the performance of acquirers in the low-tech acquisition group. 
Lyon et al (1999) state that calendar-time-abnormal-returns (CTARs) can 
eliminate cross-sectional dependence of stock returns by aggregating the returns on 
sample firms into a single portfolio thus avoiding the problem of the correlation of 
returns (see Footnote 130). Conn et al (2005) use both CTARs and BHARs for 
privately-held acquisitions and find that results produced by CTARs are quite similar to 
the results produced by BHARs both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. 
Nevertheless, I acknowledge that long-term event study has of methodological 
shortcomings. I summarise the areas for improvement in this thesis in Section 9.3 of 
Chapter 9. 
In addition to using the control firm approach to identify a benchmark to 
calculate abnormal returns for acquirers, I also use the control portfolio approach based 
on acquirer industry classification to provide a robustness check on the conclusion 
drawn on acquirer post-acquisition performance. How the control portfolios are 
constructed is discussed in the text following Table 8A-1 in the appendix to this chapter, 
and BHARs calculated based on the control portfolios are reported in Table 8A-1. 
Similar results for 3-year BHARs are found when this alternative approach is used. 
Acquirers in the low-tech acquisition group on average experience value destruction 3 
years after acquisitions have taken place. By contrast, acquirers in the high-tech 
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acquisition group, although they do not gain significantly positive abnormal returns 
relative to their industry peers, outperform acquirers in the low-tech acquisition group. 
The above results with regards to acquirer post-acquisition performance are 
generally consistent with the abundant empirical evidence that shows M&As on average 
destroy shareholder value. The following studies provide US evidence. Malatesta 
(1983) finds statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of -7.6% one- 
year after mergers. Jensen and Ruback (1983) who surveyed seven studies, report an 
average CAR of -5.5% one-year after mergers. Magenheim and Mueller (1988) report a 
significant CAR of -2.4% three-year after mergers. In a comprehensive analysis of 
post-merger stock performance based on a large sample of mergers over a 30-year 
period, Agrawal et al (1992) find that acquiring firms suffer a statistically significant 
wealth loss of approximately -10% over a five-year post-merger period. Anderson and 
Mandelker (1993) also find significant average five-year CARs of around -9.5%. 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) report a statistically significant five-year BHAR of -15.9% 
following mergers relative to a size and book-to-market adjusted benchmark. Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) use a size and book-to-market adjustment method and report a 
statistically significant -4% for three-year CARs. In their 
literature review paper, 
Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) conclude that long-run post-acquisition stock performance is 
significantly negative regardless whether BHARs or CARs are used to calculate post- 
acquisition stock returns. Firth (1980), Frank and Harris (1989), Limmack (1991), 
Kennedy and Limmack (1996), and Gregory (1997) draw similar conclusions using 
UK 
data. For instance, Franks and Harris (1989) use a large comprehensive sample of 1,800 
UK acquisitions between 1955-1985 and find that acquiring firms suffer significant 
wealth loss 2 years (CAR = -12.6%) after acquisition. 
Limmack (1991) uses three 
332 
benchmarks, and finds that all benchmarks produce significantly negative CARS in the 
2-year period following acquisitions, with an average CAR of -9%. Gregory (1997) 
uses six benchmarks and finds that the 2-year CARs are significant and between -11.8% 
to -18%. 
A growing body of literature, e. g., Chang (1998) and Fuller et al (2002), reports 
that acquirers experience positive returns when buying non-public targets. This finding 
however is not supported by this study. As reported in Table 7-1 in Chapter 7. more 
then 90% of the sample in this study consists of non-public targets. Except for the 
median 3-year BHAR for the acquirers of high-tech targets in the 1993-1997 sample 
period, none of the mean or median BHARs during the 3 years following acquisition are 
significantly positive. The conclusion remains robust when an alternative benchmark to 
industry, size, book-to-market and momentum matched firms, i. e., industry control 
portfolios, is used (see Table 8A-1 in the appendix to this chapter). 
The finding of this study is similar to that of Conn et al (2005) who conduct a 
broad study into UK acquisitions between 1984 and 1998. After using a variety of 
approaches suggested by the long-term event study literature including CARs, BHARs, 
and CTARs, they conclude that UK domestic acquisitions for privately held target firms 
on average do not bring acquirer shareholders any significant returns 3 years after 
acquisitions, but they also do not significantly destroy acquirer shareholder value. This 
thesis however does find that buying a privately-held, low-tech company destroy 
acquirer' shareholders' value 3 years following the acquisition. This difference 
in 
findings between this thesis and the Conn et al (2005) study was discussed earlier in this 
section. 
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Overall, this thesis finds that firms that bought high-tech targets either have 
significantly negative performance 3 years after acquisitions or their performance is 
insignificantly different from zero during the bull stock market of 1998-2000. In the 
1993-1997 sample period, acquirers that bought high-tech targets on average do not 
have significantly negative returns. This indicates that the realisation of the expected 
growth options depends on market conditions. This study also shows that firms that 
bought high-tech targets in general do not underperform firms that acquired low-tech 
targets, and may even significantly outperform them. This indicates that high risk 
acquisitions do not necessarily destroy more value than low risk acquisitions. Indeed 
they may even create more value even though the difference is not always significant. 
This conclusion also holds for post-acquisition periods shorter than 3 years as shown in 
Table 8-2 and Table 8A-1 (in the appendix to this chapter). 
8.4 Univariate analysis of 3-year BHARs on acquisition risk types 
Table 8-3 reports the means and medians of the 3-year BHARs of each of the 
acquisition risk groups generated based on the prediction of Model 3 in Table 7-7 to 
Table 7-10. Table 8-4 shows the mean and median differences between these three 
acquisition risk groups and their significance levels. 
For the sample period 1993-1997, the mean 3-year BHAR of the under-risk 
group (UNDINV) is -37% (number rounded up) when the proxy 
for acquisition risk is 
target high-tech industry status, whereas the median value is about -20% and significant 
at the 10% level based on Wilcoxon signed rank test. The average BHAR of the 
optimal-risk group (OPTINV) is around 15% and the median is about 1%. 
However 
neither of them is statistically significant. The mean (median) of the over-risk 
acquisition group (OVEINV) is around -52%(22%), both of which are statistically 
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Table 8-3: Acquirer 3-year BHARs in different acquisition risk groups 
This table shows the mean and median BHARs of each acquisition risk group generated 
following Model 6-2 or Model 6-3 in Chapter 6. Model 3 in Table 7.7 to 7.10 is used as the 
prediction model for optimal acquisition risk. Panel A reports results for acquisitions over 1993- 
1997 and Panel B report results for acquisitions over 1998-2000. N= number of acquisitions. 
UNDINV = under-risk acquisitions. OPTINV = optimal-risk acquisitions. OVEINV = over- 
risk acquisitions. Figures in parentheses are t statistic for student's t test and z statistic for 
Fisher's sign test or Wilcoxon signed-rank test, all based on two-tailed tests. Fisher's sign test 
(s) and Wilcoxon signed-rank test (w) are both tests for median. The lower test statistics 
between these two tests are reported. However, if one test shows a significant result while the 
other does not, the significant z statistic is reported and the sign for this test is written behind the 
test statistic. a, b and c represent for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Proxy for Acquisition 
acquisition risk risk group 
N Mean Median 
Panel A: acq uisitions over 1993-1997 
UNDINV 47 -37.07 -20.12 (-1.59) -1.66 ` 
Target high-tech OPTINV 182 14.96 0.65 Industry status (1.08) (0.07) 
OVEINV 56 -51.62 22.42 (-0.61) (0.94) 
-25.01 -12.24 UNDINV 141 (-2.0 1b (-1.65)'w 
Target industry 7.12 -10.31 
R&D intensity OPTINV 51 (0.24) (-0.77) 
13.48 26.92 OVEINV 93 (0.25) (-2.28) b 
Panel A: acq uisitions over 1998-2000 
-36.84 -33.31 UNDINV 64 (-2.22)b (-1.88)c 
Target high-tech OPTINV 182 -24.49 -10.89 b Industry status (-2.29) b (-3.72) 
31.92 9.49 
OVEINV 47 (1.54) (0.88) 
-26.95 -12.90 UNDINV 130 (-2.61) a (420) b 
Target industry OPTINV 40 -27.79 -13.68 b R&D intensity (-1.71)' -1.96 
-5.69 -5.63 OVEINV 123 (-0.44) (-1.62) 
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Table 8-4: Group differences of acquirer 3-year BHARs 
This table shows group differences in the mean and median 3-year BHARs. 
Acquisition risk groups are generated following Model 6-2 or Model 6-3 in Chapter 6. Model 3 
in Table 7.7 to 7.10 is used as the prediction model for optimal acquisition risk. Panel A reports 
results for acquisitions over 1993-1997 and Panel B report results for acquisitions over 1998- 
2000. N= number of acquisitions. I NDINV = under-risk acquisitions. OPTINV = optimal- 
risk acquisitions. OVEINV = over-risk acquisitions. Figures in parentheses are t statistics for 
student's t test and z statistic for Wilcoxon rank sum test, all based on two-tailed tests. a, b and 
c represent for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Proxy for 
Acquisition risk group Mean difference Median difference acquisition Risk 
Panel A: Acquisitions over 1993-1997 
Target high-tech UNDINV vs OPTINV 
-52.03 
(-1.75) b 
-20.77 
(-1.64)` 
industry status OVEINV vs OPTINV -66.58 
21.77 
(-0.77) (0.84) 
UNDINV vs OPTINV -32.13 -1.93 
Target industry (-0.99) (-0.16) 
R&D intensity 6 36 23 37 OVEINV vs OPTINV . (0.10) . (2.37)b 
Panel A: Acquisitions over 1998-2000 
UNDINV vs OPTINV -12.35 -22.42 Target high-tech (-0.69) (-0.88) 
industry status OVEINV vs OPTINV 
56.41 20.38 
(2.50) a (2.90) a 
UNDINV vs OPTINV 
0.83 0.78 
Target industry (0.04) (0.33) 
R&D intensity 22.1 8.05 OVEINV vs OPTINV (1.07) (1.19) 
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insignificant. The large difference between the mean and the median value in the over- 
risk acquisition group indicates that over-risky acquisitions have verti, uncertain 
outcomes. They can have large positive returns such as 22%, they may also have 
returns as low as -52%. 
With target industry R&D intensity as the independent variable, the average 3- 
year BHAR for the under-risk acquisition group (UNDINV) is -25% (significant at the 
5% level) and the median is -12% (significant at the 10% level according to Wilcoxon 
signed rank test). This indicates that under-risk acquisitions destroy shareholder value 
over the long-run. Optimal-risk acquisitions (OPTINV) have a mean BHAR of 7% and 
a median BHAR of -10%, both are statistically insignificant. Interestingly, over-risk 
acquisitions (OVEINV) appear to have the best performance out of the three acquisition 
groups. Its median value is around 27% and significant at the 10% according to the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test. This means that acquisitions initiated by 
overconfident/over-optimistic/hubris-ridden directors can actually create value for 
shareholders. 
In the 1998-2000 sample period, the under-risk group based on the logistic 
regression has a mean BHAR value of -37% (significant at the 5% level) and a median 
value of -33% (significant at the 10% level). This again shows that under-risk 
acquisitions destroy shareholder value. The average BHAR of the optimal-risk group 
(OPTINV) is -25% (significant at the 5%) and the median is -11% (significant at the 
5% level). The only group which does not destroy shareholders' value is the over-risk 
acquisition group. It has mean and median values which are both insignificantly 
different from zero. These results again show that directors' pursuit of high-risk high- 
tech acquisitions, even though driven by their misjudgement of acquisition risk. may at 
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least not destroy shareholder value, whereas directors who are conservative in selecting 
risky projects can make their firms lose their competitive advantage and cause their 
shareholder value loss over the long run. The same evidence is found when acquisition 
risk is measured by target industry R&D intensity. 
Summarising Table 8-3 and Table 8-4, it appears that BHARs monotonically 
increase from UNDINV to OVEINV except the mean values in Panel A of Table 8-3. 
The most value destroying acquisitions are under-risk acquisitions and the least value 
destroying are over-risk acquisitions. Over-risk acquisitions also often significantly 
enhance shareholder wealth. This finding however, is not fully consistent with 
hypothesis H12 that both under-risk and over-risk acquisitions lead to negative post- 
acquisition performance. 
Taken together, the univariate analysis presented here shows that optimal-risk 
acquisitions outperform under-risk acquisitions but underperform over-risk acquisitions. 
Evidence is found that under-risk acquisitions significantly underperform industry peers 
that have similar size, book-to-market and stock price momentum 3 years after 
acquisitions. Optimal-risk acquisitions predicted by the empirical risk model based on 
managerial wealth incentives, managers' behavioural biases and corporate monitoring, 
have similar performance as firms of the same industry and of similar size, book-to- 
market ratio and stock price momentum 3 years following acquisitions in the period of 
1993-1997. However, in the 1998-2000 period, the predicted optimal-risk acquisitions 
under-perform their benchmarks. By contrast, acquirers in the over-risk acquisition 
group generally have the same performance as their benchmark firms. They even 
significantly outperform their benchmark firms. In addition, over-risk acquisitions 
generally have better performance than both under-risk acquisitions and optimal-risk 
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acquisitions 152. These results imply that UK directors display excessive risk avoidance 
and thereby forgo value-enhancing projects. Behavioural biases however can drive 
them to make risky acquisitions that result in shareholder value enhancement. To 
further examine the robustness of the results from the univariate analysis, multiple 
regression analysis is presented in the following section. 
8.5 Multiple regressions of long-run post-acquisition value gains 
Table 8-5 reports the OLS regression results on 3-year BHARs for acquisitions 
during 1993-1997 and 1998-2000. Under-risk acquisitions (UNDINV) and over-risk 
acquisitions (OVEINV) are generated following Model 6-2 of Chapter 6. Model 3 of 
the binary logistic regressions reported in Table 7-7 and Table 7-9 is used to predict the 
optimal acquisition risk in Model 6-2. How UNDINV and OVEINV are coded has been 
discussed in Section 6.2.2.2 of Chapter 6. Briefly, a dummy variable is allocated to 
indicate a UNDINV acquisition with a value of 1 for such an acquisition and 0 
otherwise. The OVEINV group is similarly coded. To avoid perfect collinearity 
(Gujarati, 2003, Chapter 6), the optimal-risk acquisition group (OPTINV) is used as the 
reference group. 
152 This holds except in Panel A of Table 8-3 where the average BHAR (-51.62%) of over-risk 
acquisitions is lower than those of under-risk acquisitions and optimal-risk acquisitions. 
However, none 
of the mean values is statistically significant, meaning that they are all insignificantly 
different from zero. 
The mean difference between the over-risk acquisition group and the optimal-risk acquisition group 
reported in Panel A of Table 8-4 is also insignificantly different from zero. 
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Table 8-5: OLS regressions of acquirer 3-year BHARs 
This table reports the OLS regression results of 3-year BHARs for acquisitions over 
1993-1997 (Panel A) and over 1998-2000 (Panel B). UNDINV = under-risk acquisition. 
OVEINV = over-risk acquisition. Optimal-risk acquisition group is used as the reference group. 
The acquisition risk groups are generated following Model 6-2 and using Model 3 in Table 7.7 
and Table 7.9 as the prediction model for optimal acquisition risk. RESID = the lev el of 
suboptimal acquisition risk. It is generated following Model 6-3 and using Model 3 in Table 7.8 
and Table 7.10 as the prediction model for optimal acquisition risk. NONCASH =1 if 
acquisition currency includes stock and 0 otherwise. In parentheses are t statistics. None of the 
models is subject to heteroscedasticity according to the White (1980) heteroscedasticity test. a, b 
and c represent for the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. 
Panel A: Acquisitions over Panel B: Acquisitions over 
1993-1997 1998-200 
Target high- Target 
tech industry 
Target industry Target high-tech industry 
R&D intensity industry status R&D status intensity 
Intercept 31.67 
22.57 
-19.51 -10.57 
(1.71 ' (1.33) -1.53 
(-1.00) 
UNDINV -48.48 -12.87 
(-1.57) (-0.78) 
OVINV -0.60 47.13 
(-0.02) (2.60) a 
RESID 9.81 
9.46 
71) a (2 (2.22) b . 
NONCASH -30.72 (-1.36) -28.56 
-6.85 
(-0.50) 
-13.03 
(-0.96) (-1.27) 
N 285 285 293 293 
F-statistic 1.60 3.59 b 3.03 b 3.77 b 
Adjusted R2 0.63% 1.79% 2.04% 1.86% 
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The level of suboptimality of acquisition risk (RESID) is generated following 
Mode 6-3 of Chapter 6. Model 3 of the OLS regressions reported in Table 7-8 and 
Table 7-10 is used as the prediction model for optimal acquisition risk. Unlike 
UNDINV and OVEINV which are dummy variables, RESID is a continuous variable. 
None of the regressions are subject to the heteroscedasticity problem according to the 
White (1980) heteroscedasticity test. 
The coefficients for under-risk acquisitions (UNDINV) are negative but 
insignificant in both sample periods. Take the 1998-200 sample period for example. 
The coefficient of UNDINV is around -13%, indicating that the change from an 
optimal-risk acquisition to an under-risk acquisition makes acquirer shareholders lose 
13% of their stock value three years after the acquisition completion benchmarked on 
the stock returns of the acquirer's industry peer which does undertake any acquisitions 
but has a similar size, book-to-market ratio and stock price momentum as the acquirer. 
The coefficient for over-risk acquisitions (OVEINV) is around 47% (significant 
at the 1% level) in the 1998-2000 sample period, but is only -0.6% and statistically 
insignificant in 1993-1997. This means that in 1998-2000, the change from an optimal- 
risk acquisition to an over-risk acquisition made acquirer shareholders gain 47% of their 
share value three years after the acquisition. However, if the same thing had happened 
during the 1993-1997 period, acquirer shareholders would not have benefited from it at 
all 
The coefficients for suboptimal risk level, RESID, are around 9.5% and 
significant at the 5% in both sample periods. This means that the riskier the acquisition, 
the more the acquirer shareholders can gain from it. 
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The above multiple regression analysis results are not fully consistent with 
hypothesis H12 that both under-risk and over-risk acquisitions lead to negative post- 
acquisition performance. In line with the finding based on the univariate analysis 
reported in the last section, the finding based on multiple regression analysis shows that 
under-risk acquisitions destroy acquirer shareholders' value, but over-risk acquisitions 
can sometimes bring value to shareholders even though they are driven by managerial 
overconfidence/over-optimism/hubris. This implies that that during 1993-2000, UK 
acquirer managers destroyed shareholder value by being too risk averse rather than 
being adventurous in their acquisition risk choices. 
The coefficients of NONCASH are negative and insignificant across all the 
models, indicating that the noncash payment method do not destroy more value than 
pure cash offers in acquisitions. This finding does not support the overvaluation 
hypothesis which states that acquirer managers utilize their overvalued stock to buy 
target firms' real assets, but the overvaluation is corrected by the market after 
acquisitions (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The finding also does not support the argument 
of Martin (1996) that equity-involved pay for acquisitions can increase acquirer 
shareholders' value by making targets share the acquisition risk with acquirers. The 
finding of this study is not consistent with those of Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998), Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), Akbulut (2005) and Conn et al 
(2005) who all find that noncash payment destroy more acquirer shareholder value than 
cash payment. 
Taken together, the multiple regression analysis shows that from 1993 to 2000, 
UK acquirer managers destroyed shareholder value by being too risk averse rather than 
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being adventurous in their acquisition risk choices. Noncash payment method does not 
destroy more shareholder value than cash offers in acquisitions. 
8.6 Post-acquisition performance and risk incentives 
Up until this point, all the previous sections report the results based on the two- 
stage analysis of the relationship between firm performance and factors that influence 
mangers' incentives for risky acquisitions. As discussed in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2 and 
Section 5.2 of Chapter 5, existing finance research generally ignores managers' choice 
on project risk while directly investigating the relationship between firm performance 
and factors that influence managers' risk incentives. Even those studies examining 
managers' risk-seeking behaviour induced by their behavioural biases, such as 
overconfidence/over-optimism/hubris, also do not establish a link between managers 
behavioural biases and managerial risk taking, but simply assume that managers, under 
the influence of their behavioural biases, undertake projects that destroy shareholder 
value 153. This assumption is not always true according to my examination of the post- 
acquisition performance of high-tech and low-tech acquisitions based on the varied 
analyses discussed in the previous sections of this chapter. Overall, existing finance 
studies generally ignore the importance of managers' selection of project risk in 
examining the determinants of firm performance. 
To provide a comparable analysis with those studies and to show that it is 
important to bring the managers' selection of project risk into the study of the 
relationship between firm performance and factors that affect managers' risk choices, 
this section reports the results of the regressions of acquirer post-acquisition 
'53 See Section 3.3 of Chapter 3 for discussions about these studies. 
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performance, measured by 3-year BHARs, on risk incentives (see Table 8-6 and 
Table 8-7). The White (1980) heteroscedasticity test shows that heteroscedasticity 
problems occurred in Model 1 and Model 3 over the sample period 1993-1997 (Table 8- 
6), therefore the t-statistics are adjusted using the approach suggested by White (1980). 
The coefficients of fixed pay and annual bonus (FAB) are insignificantly, 
negative across all of the regression models, indicating that cash pay provides little 
incentive for managers to improve firm performance. In fact, it may have a negative 
influence on firm performance. This is consistent with the findings of Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2001), Dial and Murphy (1991), Mehran (1995), and Conyon et al (1995) 
who conclude that cash compensation is not a strong incentive mechanism. 
The finding based on the two-stage model proposed in this thesis suggests that 
fixed compensation and annual bonus may discourage managers to undertake risky 
acquisitions (see Section 7.4 of Chapter 7) and under-risk acquisitions destroy 
shareholder value (see Section 8.4 and Section 8.5). Therefore, the two-stage model 
explains how fixed compensation and annual bonus affect firm performance, unlike the 
one-stage model in Table 8-6 and Table 8-7. 
The coefficients for LTIP cash (LTIP CASH) are positive across all the 
regression models but are only significant at the 5% level in Model 1 and Model 3 in the 
1993-1997 sample period. These results provide some weak evidence that LTIP cash 
may contribute to the improvement of acquirers' performance. The two-stage model, 
however, does not demonstrate such evidence. As discussed in Section 7.4 of Chapter 
7, LTIP cash generally has a negative but statistically insignificant impact on 
acquisition risk. Therefore the two-stage model implies that LTIP cash should not have 
an impact on acquirer post-acquisition performance. 
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Table 8-6 Regressions of acquirer 3-year BHARs on determinants of acquisition 
risk over 1993-1997 
This table reports the OLS regression results on 3-year BHARS for acquisitions over 
1993-1997. FAB = fixed compensation and annual bonus in £million. LTIPCASH = LTIP cash 
award in £million. DELTA= delta value of LTIP shares, and ordinary shares in £million. 
DELTA2= the square root of DELTA. DELTA*WEALTH = the interaction of DELTA and 
WEALTH. WEALTH is the sum of fixed compensation, annual bonuses, LTIP cash, LTIP 
shares and ordinary shares in £million. PAST =% of acquirer stock returns of month -2 versus 
month -12 (month 0 is the announcement month). BEME =% of acquirer book value of equity 
to acquirer market value of equity. MEDIA= media praise for acquirer board of directors. 
LARSHR =% of large external block shareholdings. NEXE =% of non-executive directors on 
the board. NONDUAL =I if an acquirer's CEO and board chairman are different people and 0 
otherwise. REM =1 if an acquirer board has a remuneration committee and 0 otherwise. LEV 
_% of an acquirer's total liability over total assets. MV = the natural logarithm of acquirer 
market value of equity. RELSIZ the natural logarithm of the size of acquirer to target. 
NONCASH= 1 if acquisition currency includes stock and 0 otherwise. The outliers of the 
variables are winsorised to 2"d standard deviation from the sample mean. In parentheses are t 
statistics. The t-statistics in Model 1 and Model 3 are corrected by the White (1980) 
heteroscedasticity procedure. a, b and c indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 150.13(2.32) 140.01(1.98) 140.46(2.09) 
FAB -33.65(-1.11) -32.44(-1.20) -32.37(-1.08) 
LTIP CASH 612.79(1.82)` 585.38(1.32) 587.25(1.77) 
DELTA -49.36(-0.66) 54.88(0.33) 60.30(0.30) 
DELTA 2 -158.78(-0.68) 
DELTA*WEALTH -1.19(-0.62) 
PAST 0.21(0.68) 0.19(0.71) 0.19(0.62) 
BEME -0.30(-0.77) -0.27(-0.70) -0.27(-0.68) 
MEDIA 25.28(2.1 9)b 25.39(2.22) b 25.39(2.18) b 
LARSHR 0.63(1.10) 0.68(1.06) 0.68(1.16) 
NEXE -2.20(-1.96)b -2.14(-2.48) a -2.15(-1.94) 
b 
NONDUAL 0.30(0.01) 1.31(0.05) 1.27(0.05) 
REM 0.05(0.00) 0.35(0.01) 0.32(0.01) 
LEV 0.34(0.50) 0.33(0.53) 0.33(0.49) 
MV -1.13(-0.09) -1.50(-0.13) -1.49(-0.12) 
RELSIZ -13.62(-1.34) -13.74(-1.66) ' -13.74(-1.34) 
NONCASH -54.44(-2.34)b -53.29(-2.25)b -53.35(-2.26)b 
N 285 285 285 
F Statistics 1.85b 1.76 b 1.75 b 
Adjusted R2 4.03% 3.83% 3.82% 
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Table 8-7 Regression of acquirer 3-year BHARs on determinants of acquisition 
risk over 1998-2000 
This table reports the OLS regression results on 3-year BHARs for acquisitions over 
1998-2000. FAB = fixed compensation and annual bonus in £million. LTIPCASH = LTIP cash 
award in £million. DELTA= delta value of LTIP shares, and ordinary shares in £million. 
DELTA2= the square root of DELTA. DELTA*WEALTH = the interaction of DELTA and 
WEALTH. WEALTH is the sum of fixed compensation, annual bonuses, LTIP cash, LTIP 
shares and ordinary shares in £million. VEGA = Stock option vega £million. 
VEGA*WEALTH = interaction of vega and wealth. PAST =% of acquirer stock returns of 
month -2 versus month -12 (month 0 is the announcement month). BEME _% of acquirer 
book value of equity to acquirer market value of equity. MEDIA= media praise for acquirer 
board of directors. LARSHR =% of large external block shareholdings. NEXE =% of non- 
executive directors on the board. NONDUAL =I if an acquirer's CEO and board chairman are 
different people and 0 otherwise. REM =1 if an acquirer board has a remuneration committee 
and 0 otherwise. LEV =% of an acquirer's total liability over total assets. MV = the natural 
logarithm of acquirer market value of equity. RELSIZ the natural logarithm of the size of 
acquirer to target. NONCASH= 1 if acquisition currency includes stock and 0 otherwise. The 
outliers of the variables are winsorised to 2"d standard deviation from the sample mean. In 
parentheses are t statistics. None of the models are subject to heteroscedasticity according to the 
White (1980) heteroscedasticity test. a, b and c indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -23.73(-0.55) -23.47(-0.54) -22.20(-0.51) 
FAB -0.62(-0.11) -0.52(-0.09) -0.65(-0.12) 
LTIP CASH 42.3 8(0.87) 44.83(0.91) 51.62(1.04) 
DELTA 2.65(0.32) 10.14(0.43) -0.30(-0.01) 
DELTA 2 -1.34(-0.34) 
DELTA*WEALTH -0.01(-0.35) 
VEGA -64.67(-0.92) -69.22(-0.91) -132.27(-1.47) 
VEGA*WEALTH 0.69(1.31) 
PAST -0.05(-1.02) -0.05(-1.03) -0.05(-1.12) 
BEME 0.25(1.23) 0.26(1.25) 0.25(1.22) 
MEDIA -5.19(-0.78) -5.37(-0.80) -5.18(-0.77) 
LARSHR 0.39(0.95) 0.42(1.01) 0.44(1.04) 
NEXE -0.75(-1.40) -0.75(-1.29) -0.78(-1.46) 
NONDUAL 23.14(1.35) 23.03(1.34) 21.98(1.28) 
REM 52.08(1.67) 51.14(l. 64)' 50.63(1.62) 
LEV -0.39(-1.28) -0.40(-1.30) -0.39(-1.29) 
MV -3.61(-0.66) -3.86(-0.70) -2.64(-0.47) 
RELSIZ 1.26(0.28) 1.26(0.28) 0.98(0.22) 
NONCASH -0.91(-0.06) -1.06(-0.07) -1.45(-0.10) 
N 293 293 293 
F Statistics 1.47 1.38 1.41 
Adjusted R2 2.37% 2.06% 2.31% 
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The coefficients for equity delta (DELTA) are insignificantly negative for 
Model I in both tables, indicating that equity delta provides little incentive for managers 
to improve firm performance. This is consistent with the literature summary presented 
by Ittner et al (2003). When the square of equity delta (DELTA2) is included in the 
model (see Model 2), the coefficients of equity delta (DELTA) turn positive and the 
coefficients of the square of equity delta (DELTA2 ) are negative. This indicates a 
nonlinear relationship between firm performance and equity delta. When the equity 
delta is low, it encourages managers to increase firm performance. When it is high, it 
causes managerial risk aversion which negatively affects firm performance. Mishra et 
al (2000) also suggest this nonlinear impact of equity delta on firm performance in their 
study (see Section 2.3.4.2 of Chapter 2). However, the results from this study lack 
statistical power because none of the coefficients are statistically significant. Therefore 
they do not provide strong support to the argument of Mishra et al (2000). Mishra et 
al's argument in fact implicitly explains the relationship between managerial risk taking 
and equity delta (see Section 2.3.4.2 for a detailed explanation). The empirical risk 
models (Model 2) reported in Table 7-7 to Table 7-10 provide better support for the 
argument of Mishra et al (2000). Those models demonstrate a significant concave 
relationship between acquisition risk and equity delta. 
As is the case in the empirical risk models reported in Table 7A-4 to Table 7A- 
7,1 also decompose equity delta into a delta for LTIPs (LTIP DELTA), a delta for stock 
options (OPTION DELTA), and a delta for managerial shareholdings (SHARE 
DELTA). The results are reported in Table 8A-2 and Table 8A-3. None of the deltas is 
shown to have any significant impact on acquirers' post acquisition performance. 
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As discussed in Section 7.4 of Chapter 7, existing studies, such as Morck et al 
(1988)154, and McConnell and Servaes (1990) 155 tend to use the percentage of shares 
held by managers as a measure for the incentive provided by managerial shareholdings 
and find that there exist a concave relationship between firm performance and 
managerial shareholdings. Therefore, I use the same proxy for managerial 
shareholdings and report the results in Table 8A-4156 The coefficients for the 
percentage of shares held by acquirer board directors (MANSHR) and its squared term 
(MANSHR2) have mixed signs for two regression models over the two sample periods, 
all of which are statistically insignificant. These results again suggest that managerial 
equity ownership has no impact on acquirer post-acquisition performance, which is 
inconsistent with the argument put forward by Morck et al (1988), McConnell and 
Servaes (1990). 
Therefore, this one-stage analysis shows that viewing each component of equity- 
based compensation separately, produces the effect that none of them has any influence 
on firm performance. This is inconsistent with the findings of Datta et al (2001) who 
find that stock options and restricted stocks encourage directors to conduct acquisitions 
154 Morck et al (1988) investigate the relationship between management ownership and market valuation 
of a firm, as measured by Tobin's Q. They find evidence of a significant nonmonotonic relationship 
between these two. Tobin's Q first increases, then declines at the point where managers own 5%, and 
finally rises slightly as the ownership rises at 25%. 
iss McConnell and Servaes (1990) report a significant curvilinear relation between Tobin's Q and the 
fraction of common stock owned by corporate insiders. The curve slopes upward until insider ownership 
reaches approximately 40% to 50% and then slopes slightly downward. 
156 "I'he empirical risk models that use this proxy for managerial shareholders are in Table 7A-8 to 
Table 
7A-1 I. 
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that create value. By contrast, the two-stage analysis shows that out of all the equity- 
based wealth components, at least managerial shareholdings have a nonlinear impact on 
managers' selection of acquisition risk, which in turn affects post-acquisition 
performance. This conclusion is robust when two different measures are used, share 
delta and the percentage of shares held by managers (see Section 7.4 of Chapter 7 for a 
detailed discussion) 
In Table 8-6 and Table 8-7, the coefficients of the cross term of equity delta and 
total wealth (DELTA* WEALTH) are both insignificantly negative. As discussed 
earlier, the impact of equity delta on post-acquisition performance is also insignificant. 
Therefore it is hard to draw any inference from these results with regard to the impact of 
wealth on the incentive provided by equity delta in the one-stage model. 
The coefficients for option vega (VEGA) are insignificantly negative in all of 
the models in Table 8-7, meaning that the convexity of stock options does not 
encourage managers to take more risk to improve firm performance. The two-stage 
analysis discussed (see Section 7.4 of Chapter 7) shares the same conclusion for option 
vega. The interaction of vega and wealth (VEGA*WEALTH) is also statistically 
insignificant in Model 3 of Table 8-7. As is the case with the impact of total wealth on 
equity delta, it is hard to tell how total wealth influences the incentive provided by 
option vega because option vega is shown to produce very little risk-taking incentive. 
As with Table 7A- 15 and Table 7A- 16 in the Appendix to Chapter 7,1 use 
deflated wealth variables in the regression models. All the wealth variables are deflated 
by firm size as measured by acquirer total assets (in the accounting year prior to 
acquisition) to capture the difference in the compensation level of firms of different 
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sizes. I run the same regressions157 as those whose outputs are reported in Table 8-6 
and Table 8-7 and report the results in Table 8A-6 and Table 8A-7 in the Appendix to 
this Chapter. The results are similar to those in Table 8-6 and Table 8-7. None of the 
components of managerial wealth appear to have any significant impact on acquirer 
post-acquisition performance . 
Overall, one-stage analysis on the relationship between post-acquisition 
performance and various components of managerial wealth suggests that none of the 
components of managerial wealth has any significant impact on post-acquisition 
performance. This does not support the traditional agency argument that equity based- 
compensation and managerial shareholdings can align the interests of managers and 
shareholders. It is inconsistent with the findings of Mehran et al (1998), Datta et al 
(2001) and Hanlon et al (2003) who find that stock options contribute to a better firm 
performance, and with McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Morck et al (1988) who 
suggest a nonlinear impact of managerial shareholdings on firm performance. 
Regarding the three behavioural bias variables, all of them have mixed signs 
across the models. Media praise (MEDIA) is the only variable that achieves statistically 
significant coefficient in the 1993-1997 sample period, but such significance disappears 
in the 1998-2000 sample period. The significantly positive coefficients of media praise 
(MEDIA) in the 1993-1997 sample period mean that managers' overconfidence/hubris 
which is inflated by a high and flattering media profile, can drive managers to make 
value creating acquisitions. This is contradictory to the argument put forward by 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) that managerial hubris can only lead to value destroying 
157 The other difference between these groups of tables is that institutional blockholdings (INSTSHR) are 
included in the model rather than external blockholdings. 
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acquisitions. The two-stage analysis can explain why directors' behavioural biases can 
lead to value creating acquisitions. The empirical risk models reported in Table 7-7 to 
Table 7-10 in Chapter 7 show that managerial behavioural biases induce managers to 
take more risks. This is consistent with the argument of Hayward and Hambrick 
(1997). What Hayward and Hambrick fail to account for in their models is that such 
managerial risk taking can actually increase firm performance because otherwise risk- 
averse managers may forego value-enhancing projects. This is shown in Table 8-3 to 
Table 8-5. Therefore, the two-stage analysis proposed by this thesis gives greater 
insights than the one-stage analysis. The insignificant coefficients for the behavioural 
variables again indicate that the one-stage analysis is not able to `discover' the impact of 
behavioural biases on firm performance. 
Table 8-6 and Table 8-7 do not report any significant results for the coefficients 
for external blockholders (LARSHR), meaning that external blockholders do not 
discipline managers to bring value to shareholders. Table 8A-6 and Table 8A-7 also do 
not report significant results for institutional shareholders (INSTSHR), indicating that 
the existence of institutional shareholders does not help increase shareholder value by 
monitoring managers' behaviour. These findings therefore are consistent with 
Sudarsanam et al (1996), Frank et al (2001), and Weir et al (2002)158 who all find that 
UK external blockholders exert little disciplining effect on managers. 
Table 8-6 and Table 8-7 report that the coefficients for the board composition 
variable (NEXE) are negative and only statistically significant in 1993-1997, showing 
that a high proportion of non-executive directors on the board if not destructive to 
shareholder value, has no impact on firm performance. This finding supports the 
158 See Section 4.2.1 for a discussion of these studies. 
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argument of Mace (1971) that non-executive directors are literally under the control of 
executive directors and is consistent with the empirical findings of Weir (1997), Weir 
and Laing (2000), Frank et al (2001) and Weir et al (2002) 159 
Table 8-6 and Table 8-7 show that the coefficients for CEO-COB nonduality 
(NONDUAL) are not significant in any of the models, indicating that the supervision of 
a non-executive chairman does not necessarily cause a CEO to undertake value creating 
acquisitions. This finding is broadly consistent with Brickley et al (1997), Weir et al 
(2002), and Dahya (2003) who find that the nonduality of CEO and COB has no 
influence on corporate performance' 60 
The existence of remuneration committees also has no impact on acquirers' long- 
term post-acquisition performance as shown in Table 8-6 and Table 8-7. This supports 
the view of Bebchuk and Fried (2004, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) that remuneration 
committees could be ineffective due to the control held on them by managers. 
Overall, the one-stage analysis shows corporate monitors such as external 
blockholders, non-executive directors, the separate roles of CEO and COB, and the 
presence of a remuneration committee on the board, are all ineffective in disciplining 
managers. The two-stage analysis also produces the same conclusion (see Section 7.6 
of Chapter 7). 
The coefficients for both financial leverage (LEV) and relative size of acquirer 
to target (RELSIZ) have mixed signs for the two sample periods. It is therefore, 
difficult to draw a clear conclusion regarding these two variables. Acquirer size (MV) 
is negatively related to acquirer 3-year BHARs across all of the regression models. 
159 See Section 4.2.2 for a discussion of these studies. 
160 See Section 4.2.3 for a discussion of these studies. 
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However, all of the coefficients are statistically insignificant. Therefore it is hard to tell 
whether large companies conduct more value destroying acquisitions than small 
companies. The two-stage analysis also is not clear on the impact that acquirer financial 
leverage, the relative size of acquirer to target, and acquirer size have on managerial 
pursuit of acquisition risk, and therefore it is not able to reveal how those factors 
influence the acquirer post-acquisition performance as a result of managers' pursuit of 
acquisition risk. 
Stock-mixed payment (NONCASH) is negatively associated with acquirer long- 
term post-acquisition performance. The coefficients are significant at the 5% level in 
the 1993-1997 sample period. This indicates that noncash payments destroy more 
shareholder value than cash offers. This result is the same as that reported in Table 8-7. 
Overall, the direct examination of post-acquisition performance and various risk 
incentives show that most of the risk incentives cannot explain acquirers' long-term 
post-acquisition performance. On the other hand, the two-stage analysis employed in 
this thesis better demonstrates how those risk incentives influence managers' pursuit of 
acquisition risk, which in turn affects acquirer performance after acquisitions. 
8.7 Summary 
This chapter focuses on the examination of the relationship between firm 
performance and the optimal/suboptimal acquisition risk predicted by the empirical risk 
models reported in Model 3 in Table 7-7 to Table 7-10 in Chapter 7. i. e, stage two of the 
two-stage analysis. The first stage of the analysis investigates to «hat extent these 
factors are associated with the level of acquisition risk pursued by managers. This has 
been discussed in Chapter 7. The existing literature generally directly examines post- 
acquisition performance and the factors that influence managers' corporate investment 
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decisions. I call this `one-stage' analysis to distinguish it from the two-stage analysis 
adopted in the thesis. To identify the differences between these two approaches. as well 
as to provide comparable results with those studies that adopt one-stage analysis. I also 
conduct a one-stage analysis, examining the relationship between acquirer 3-year 
BHARs and the factors that influence managers to select acquisition risks. The 
following summarises the findings in this chapter. 
All of the acquisitions in the sample of this thesis are categorized into under- 
risk, optimal-risk or over-risk acquisitions based on the predictions of Model 3 in Table 
7-7 to table 7-10. The results of this process shows that the percentage of acquisitions 
in the over-risk acquisition category increases in the bull market of late 1990s when 
acquisition risk is measured as target R&D industry intensity. 
Estimates of 3-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns in the post-acquisition period 
show that high-risk high-tech acquisitions do not necessarily destroy more acquirer 
shareholder value than low risk acquisitions. 
acquisition periods shorter than 3 years. 
This conclusion also holds for post- 
A univariate analysis of the 3-year post-acquisition performance of each risk 
group shows that the optimal-risk acquisitions outperform under-risk acquisitions but 
underperform over-risk acquisitions. While under-risk acquisitions always destroy 
shareholder value, over-risk acquisitions often enhance shareholder value. 
Multiple regression analysis shows that during both sample periods UK acquirer 
managers destroyed shareholder value by being too risk averse rather than by being 
adventurous in their acquisition risk choices. It also shows that that noncash offers may 
not destroy more shareholder value than pure cash offers. 
354 
A comparison against the one-stage analysis of the determinants of post- 
acquisition performance shows that the two-stage analysis which includes managers' 
selection of acquisition risk, can better explain post-project firm performance. This 
suggests that in future studies researchers should consider a two-stage analysis rather 
than trying to directly establish a link between firm performance and various risk 
incentives. The two-stage analysis provides richer insights into the linkage among risk 
incentives provided by managers' wealth, managerial risk taking and the subsequent 
corporate performance. It also allows us to examine how managerial behavioural biases 
affect this linkage. 
I acknowledge that the conclusion drawn in this thesis that risky high-tech 
acquisitions which are mainly driven by managerial behavioural biases, can create value 
for shareholders is sample-specific and time-dependent. As discussed in Section 7.3 of 
Chapter 7, stock options have not yet outweighed cash compensation and become the 
dominant component of executive compensation in the UK. Therefore the prevalent 
criticisms that excessive grants of stock options encourage managerial excessive risk 
taking in the US are not applicable to the UK. If an analysis the same as the one 
adopted by this thesis is conducted based on the US data, the finding with regard to the 
incentive effect of stock options may be different from that of this thesis. Therefore, the 
conclusion by this study is sample-dependent. 
The conclusion is also time-dependent because it is drawn upon the data from 
the unique telecom/technology/internet bubble period in the history, during which 
equity in telecom, internet or other technology-related sectors was overvalued. One 
effect of overvalued equity is that it inflated directors' overconfidence/hubris in their 
managerial capability, which in turn induced managers to relentlessly seek after target 
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firms in these high-tech sectors so that they could quickly expand into these `new' areas 
ahead of (or at least not behind of) their industry peers. An example is Jean Marie 
Messier who turned Vivendi Universal from a water company into a large modern 
media company through a series of acquisitions. During this period, internal corporate 
monitors seemed ineffective because companies as well as the mass media, worshipped 
`superstar' CEOs. 
Combing those observations, it is not hard to understand why this study finds 
that managerial behavioural biases are the major driving force behind high-risk high- 
tech acquisitions. Same evidence may not be apparent in the years following the stock 
market crash in early 2000 because the whole of society turned negative toward the 
roles of directors and criticised that those directors took far too much risk, jeopardising 
company survival. More corporate governance rules such as recommended by the 
Turnbull Report in the UK, and Sarbanes-Oxley Act were published in an attempt to 
more tightly monitor company directors' risk taking behaviour (Bennett, 2004; 
Crawford, 2005). Merger activities in the post-crash period mainly focused on cost 
reduction to reduce the overcapacity of the telecom and internet sectors. Therefore, if 
the post-bubble period would have been included in the sample, this thesis probably 
may not have been able to find that the major driving force behind high-tech 
acquisitions was managerial overconfidence/over-optimism/ hubris. 
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Industry matched control portfolios are formed based on the most detailed 
industry classification in Datastream, INDC6 (see Section 6.5.3 of Chapter 6 for a 
discussion of Datastream industry classifications). Each sample firm is allocated to a 
benchmark portfolio based on the INDC6 of the sample firm. There are 2 sample firms 
matched on a more general industry classification, INDC4 since no portfolio could be 
formed using INDC6 or INDC5. Same as the matched firm approach discussed in 
Section 6.5.3 of Chapter 6, for each sample firm, the benchmark portfolio is rebalanced 
once a year. 
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Table 8A-2: OLS regressions of 3-year BHARs over 1993-1997 with a breakdown of equity 
delta 
This table reports the results for the regressions of acquirer 3-year BHARs over 1993- 
1997. It differs from Table 8-6 in that it reports the results for LTIP delta, share delta 
(highlighted in the table) rather than equity delta as a whole. The squared term of the delta for 
LTIP shares is dropped from the models because it is seriously correlated with the delta for 
LTIP shares (LTIP DELTA). The VIF ratio, 52, is far above the cut off point, 10. LTIP 
DELTA= delta value of LTIP shares in £million. LTIP DELTA*WEALTH = the interaction of 
LTIP DELTA and wealth. Wealth is the sum of fixed compensation and annual bonuses, LTIP 
cash, LTIP shares and managerial shareholdings in £million. SHARE DELTA= delta value of 
managerial shareholdings in £million. SHARE DELTA2 = the squared term of the delta for 
managerial shareholdings. SHARE DELTA*WEALTH = the interaction term of SHARE 
DELTA and wealth. See Table 8-6 for the rest of the variable definitions. N= Number of 
acquisitions. The outliers of the variables are winsorised to 2nd standard deviation from the 
sample mean. In parentheses are t statistics. The t-statistics in model 1 are corrected by the 
White (1980) heteroscedasticity procedure. a, b and c indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 151.92(2.19) 141.72(2.00) 143.16(2.02) 
FAB -35.19(-1.27) -34.18(-1.23) 
LTIP CASH 613.14(1.39) 584.74(1.31) 
LTIP DELTA 3.67(0.27) 4.27(0.31) 
LTIP DELTA 
*WEALTH 
SHARE DELTA -0.05(-0.80) 0.05(0.31) 
SHARE DELTA 2 -0.00(-0.70) 
SHARE DELTA 
*WEALTH 
PAST 0.21(0.76) 0.19(0.69) 
BEME -0.30(-0.82) -0.28(-0.78) 
MEDIA 25.01(2.18) b 25.07(2.18) b 
LARSHR 0.65(1.10) 0.70(1.09) 
NEXE -2.22(-2.57) a -2.17(-2.50) 
a 
NONDUAL 0.26(0.01) 1.30(0.05) 
REM -0.23(-0.01) 0.03(0.00) 
LEV 0.35(0.56) 0.34(0.55) 
MV -0.93(-0.08) -1.29(-0.11) 
RELSIZ -13.73(-1.66)' -13.87(-1.67) 
NONCASH -54.59(-2.31) 
b -53.42(-2.25) 
b 
N 285 285 
F statistics 1.73 b 1.65 
b 
Adjusted R2 3.70% 3.52% 
-34.20(-1.23) 
593.06(1.33) 
20.75(0.97) 
-0.35(-0.99) 
0.01(0.08) 
-0.00(-0.27) 
0.20(0.72) 
-0.31(-0.80) 
25.98(2.25)b 
0.72(1.12) 
-2.21(-2.54) 
b 
0.57(0.02) 
0.20(0.01) 
0.37(0.59) 
-1.52(-0.13) 
-13.76(-1.66) 
-53.25(-2.24) 
b 
285 
1.60 
3.49% 
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Table 8A-3: OLS regressions of 3-year BHARs over 1998-2000 with a breakdown of 
equity delta 
This table differs from Table 8-7 in that it reports the results for LTIP delta, option delta 
share delta rather than equity delta as a whole. The squared term of the delta for LTIP shares, 
option vega (VEGA) and the interaction of option vega and wealth (VEGA*WEALTH) are 
dropped from the models because the squared term of the delta for LTIP shares is seriously 
correlated with the delta for LTIP shares (LTIP DELTA); option vega (VEGA) and the 
interaction of vega and wealth (VEGA*WEALTH) are both seriously correlated with option 
delta (OPTION DELTA) and the interaction of option delta and wealth (OPTION 
DELTA*WEALTH). The VIF ratio for the squared term of LTIP delta is 15 and for the VEGA 
and VEGA*WEALTH is all above 50. OPTION DELTA = delta value of stock options in 
£million. OPTION DELTA2 = the squared term of the delta for stock options. OPTION 
DELTA*WEALTH = the interaction of OPTION DELTA and wealth. See Table 8A-2 for 
definitions of LTIP DELTA, LTIP DELTA*WEALTH, SHARE DELTA, SHARE DELTA2, 
and SHARE DELTA*WEALTH. See Table 8-7 for the definitions of the rest of the variables. 
The outliers of the variables are winsorised to 2"d standard deviation from the sample mean. In 
parentheses are t statistics. None of the models are subject to the heteroscedasticity problem 
according to the White (1980) heteroscedasticity test. a, b and c indicate significance level at the 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -20.08(-0.47) -8.24(-0.42) -17.76(-0.41) 
FAB -1.61(-0.28) -1.50(-0.26) -1.07(-0.18) 
LTIP CASH 40.14(0.82) 45.85(0.92) 43.08(0.86) 
LTIP DELTA 0.3 5(0.71) 0.41(0.80) 0.60(l. 05) 
LTIP DELTA 
-0.00(-0.73) *WEALTH 
OPTION DELTA -0.15(-0.88) -0.37(-0.82) -0.33(-1.57) 
OPTION DELTA 2 0.00(0.51) 
OPTION DELTA 0.00(1.38) 
*WEALTH 
SHARE DELTA 0.00(0.25) 0.01(0.49) 0.00(0.01) 
SHARE DELTA ? -0.00(-0.42) 
SHARE DELTA 
-0.00(-0.20) *WEALTH 
PAST -0.05(-1.02) -0.05(-1.01) -0.06(-1.16) 
BEME 0.25(1.21) 0.24(1.15) 0.23(1.12) 
MEDIA -5.51(-0.82) -5.63(-0.83) -5.54(-0.82) 
LARSHR 0.42(1.02) 0.48(1.13) 0.45(1.07) 
NEXE -0.79(-1.46) -0.80(-1.48) -0.80(-1.48) 
NONDUAL 23.01(1.35) 23.06(1.34) 22.46(1.30) 
REM 52.05(1.67)` 51.01(1.63) 51.21(1.64) 
LEV -0.43(-1.39) -0.45(-1.45) -0.43(-1.41) 
MV -3.59(-0.66) -3.57(-0.64) -3.19(-0.56) 
RELSIZ 1.01(0.23) 1.02(0.23) 0.87(0.19) 
NONCASH -0.82(-0.06) -0.86(-0.06) -0.41(403) 
N 293 293 293 
F Statistics 1.41 1.27 1.33 
Adjusted R2 2.20% 1.66% 2.08% 
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Table 8A-4: OLS regressions of 3-year BHARs with an alternative measure for 
managerial shareholdings 
This table reports the results for the regressions of 3-year BHARs. It differs from 
Model 2 in Table 8A-2 and Table 8A-3 in that it uses the % of share held by acquirer board of 
directors as a proxy for managerial shareholdings (MANSHR), and it includes institutional 
blockholdings (INSTSHR) in the regressions rather than external blockholdings. MANSHR = 
% of ordinary shares, beneficial and non-beneficial, held by acquirer board of directors in the 
accounting year prior to acquisition announcement. MANSHR2 = the squared term of 
MANSHR. INSTSHR =% of institutional blockholdings. See Table 8A-2 and Table 8A-3 for 
the definitions of the rest of variables. N= Number of acquisitions. The outliers of the variables 
are winsorised to 2nd standard deviation from the sample mean. In parentheses are t statistics. 
None of the models are subject to heteroscedasticity problem according to the White (1980) 
heteroscedasticity test. a, b and c indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
Panel A: Acquisitions over Panel A: Acquisitions over 
1993-1997 1998-2000 
Intercept 140.46(1.60) -50.62(-1.01) 
FAB -26.72(-0.97) -1.09(-0.19) 
LTIP CASH 595.17(1.35) 42.65(0.87) 
LTIP DELTA 0.39(0.03) 0.42(0.84) 
OPTION DELTA -0.33(-0.74) 
OPTION DELTAS 0.00(0.45) 
MANSHR -0.14(-0.07) 1.99(1.46) 
MANSHR2 0.01(0.26) -0.03(-1.24) 
PAST 0.22(0.82) -0.05(-1.07) 
BEME -0.31(-0.80) 0.30(1.47) 
MEDIA 26.47(2.29) b -5.07(-0.75) 
INSTSHR 0.87(1.11) 0.45(1.01) 
NEXE -1.94(-2.30) 
b -0.73(-1.34) 
NONDUAL -1.32(-0.05) 26.62(1.55) 
REM -2.5(-0.07) 50.67(1.60) 
LEV 0.29(0.46) -0.45(-1.45) 
MV -3.91(-0.32) -0.65(-0.12) 
RELSIZ -13.50(-1.63) 
0.64(0.14) 
NONCASH -53.53(-2.24)b -0.11(-0.01) 
N 285 293 
F Statistics 1.56` 1.36 
Adiusted R2 3.08% 2.18% 
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Table 8A-5 Acquirer 3-year BHARs on determinants of acquisition risk, 1993-1997 
with deflated wealth variables 
This table reports the results for the regressions of acquirer 3-year BHARs over the 
sample period of 1993-1997. It differs from Table 8-6 in that all the wealth variables defined in 
Table 8-6 are deflated by acquirers' total assets in the accounting year prior to acquisition 
announcement. In addition, it includes institutional blockholdings (INSTSHR) in the 
regressions rather than external blockholdings. INSTSHR =% of institutional blockholdings. 
See Table 8-6 for the rest of the variable definitions. N= Number of acquisitions. The outliers 
of the variables are winsorised to 2nd standard deviation from the sample mean. In parentheses 
are t statistics. None of the models are subject to the heteroscedasticity problem according to 
the White (1980) heteroscedasticity test. a, b and c indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 128.10(1.47) 127.71(1.40) 125.87(l. 38) 
FAB -0.62(-0.09) 
0.66(0.09) 0.84(0.12) 
LTIP CASH 2776.48(0.97) 2777.07(0.97) 2780.01(0.97) 
DELTA 19.29(0.62) 20.13(0.31) 24.06(0.38) 
DELTA Z -0.43(-0.01) 
DELTA*WEALTH -0.02(-0.09) 
PAST 0.23(0.83) 0.23(0.83) 0.23(0.83) 
BEME -0.23(-0.58) -0.23(-0.54) -0.22(-0.53) 
MEDIA 24.60(2.11)b 24.62(2 . 09) 
b 24.74(2.10) b 
INSTSHR 0.92(1.26) 0.92(1.25) 0.93(1.26) 
NEXE -1.69(-2.09)b -1.69(-2.07) a -1.68(-2.06) 
b 
NONDUAL -3.70(-0.14) -3.73(-0.14) -3.82(-0.14) 
REM 0.02(0.00) -0.04(0.00) -0.33(-0.01) 
LEV 0.26(0.41) 0.26(0.40) 0.25(0.39) 
MV -9.70(-1.05) -9.66(-1.00) -9.47(-0.98) 
RELSIZ -12.58(-1.52) -12.59(-1.52) -12.61(-1.52) 
NONCASH -53.03(-2.23)b -53.00(-2.22) 
b -52.88(-2.22) 
b 
N 285 285 285 
F Statistics 1.71 b 1.59' 1.59 c 
Adjusted R2 3.37% 3.01% 3.01% 
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Table 8A-6 Acquirer 3-year BHARs on determinants of acquisition risk, 1998-2000 
with deflated wealth variables 
This table reports the results for the regressions of acquirer 3-year BHARs over the 
sample period of 1998-2000. It differs from Table 8-7 in that all the wealth variables defined in 
Table 8-7 are deflated by acquirers' total assets in the accounting year prior to acquisition 
announcement. In addition, it includes institutional blockholdings (INSTSHR) in the 
regressions rather than external blockholdings. INSTSHR =% of institutional blockholdings. 
See Table 8-7 for the rest of the variable definitions. N= Number of acquisitions. The outliers 
of the variables are winsorised to 2°d standard deviation from the sample mean. In parentheses 
are t statistics. None of the models are subject to the heteroscedasticity problem according to 
the White (1980) heteroscedasticity test. a, b and c indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -11.23(-0.23) -7.73(-0.16) -6.68(-0.13) 
FAB -2.00(-0.62) -1.74(-0.53) -1.78(-0.55) 
LTIP CASH 17.21(0.40) 16.19(0.37) 16.10(0.37) 
DELTA 0.59(0.17) -5.00(-0.52) -4.60(-0.47) 
DELTA z 0.40(0.62) 
DELTA*WEALTH 0.00(0.44) 
VEGA 9.55(0.32) 11.00(0.36) 5.66(0.13) 
VEGA*WEALTH 0.01(0.17) 
PAST -0.06(-1.19) -0.05(-0.95) -0.05(-0.94) 
BEME 0.27(1.33) 0.27(1.30) 0.27(1.29) 
MEDIA -5.46(-0.82) -5.63(-0.84) -5.61(-0.84) 
INSTSHR 0.27(0.63) 0.23(0.54) 0.22(0.52) 
NEXE -0.67(-1.23) -0.68(-1.25) -0.68(-1.25) 
NONDUAL 25.92(1.49) 26.28(1.51) 26.45(1.52) 
REM 50.61(1.60) 49.19(1.55) 48.44(1.51) 
LEV -0.40(-1.27) -0.39(-1.24) -0.39(-1.24) 
MV -5.76(-1.18) -5.79(-1.19) -5.86(-1.20) 
RELSIZ 1.03(0.23) 0.99(0.22) 1.04(0.23) 
NONCASH -0.93(-0.06) -0.64(-0.04) -0.42(-0.03) 
N 293 293 293 
F Statistics 1.38 1.31 1.23 
Adiusted R2 1.91% 1.69% 1.34% 
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Chapter 9 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATONS 
9.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis as stated in Chapter 1, is to examine managerial risk 
taking behaviour, and more particularly to identify the factors that influence managers' 
decisions on taking risky projects and to examine the impact of managerial risk taking 
on shareholder value. In light of this, as described in Section 5.2 of Chapter 5, the 
following two research questions are raised: 
Q1: What are the factors that drive managers to undertake risky projects? 
Q2: To what extent is firm performance related to the optimal or 
suboptimal risk level of an investment project? 
Combining the views of traditional agency theory and of behavioural finance 
theory, I identify three major categories of factors that influence managerial risk taking. 
These three categories are: the components of managerial wealth, behavioural biases 
and corporate monitoring mechanisms. This thesis mainly investigates how these risk 
incentives influence managers' selection of project risk and how the selected project 
affects firm performance. This is done via the formulation of a two-stage analysis of the 
relationship between firm performance and the aforementioned risk incentives. Existing 
studies generally only conduct a one-stage analysis, i. e., they directly examine the 
association between firm performance and the risk incentives without considering 
managers' selection of project risk. One reason for this is that those studies are either 
located in the domain of traditional agency studies, which assume that managers are risk 
averse and managers' risk taking behaviour can reduce agency costs and enhance 
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shareholder value, or although they might be located in the domain of behavioural 
finance, these studies take for granted that managerial risk taking induced by managers' 
overconfidence/over-optimism/hubris can only lead to value destruction for 
shareholders. Therefore, it appears that managers' selection of project risk has not 
received much attention in the existing finance literature. When bringing the traditional 
agency view and behavioural agency view together and allowing for both managerial 
risk avoidance and excessive risk taking, one can not simply assume that managerial 
risk taking will for sure increase firm value. The importance of examining managerial 
risk taking is therefore self-evident. This is the reason why this thesis conducts a two- 
stage analysis of the relationship between firm performance and risk incentives. 
This thesis employs managers' choice of high-risk high-tech acquisitions as a 
proxy for managerial risk taking. Acquisitions are large and visible corporate 
investments that can significantly alter the acquirers' risk profile. They may accentuate 
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders (see Section 5.2 Chapter 5 for a 
discussion). While diversifying acquisitions are thought to be driven by managerial 
preference for risk reduction (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Amihud et al, 1986; May, 1995), 
acquisitions of targets rich in intangible assets such patents or R&D, obviously ratchet 
up the risk of the acquirers (Kohers and Kohers, 2001). There is extensive evidence that 
acquirer firm shareholders do not gain from acquisitions in the short term and 
experience value losses in the longer term (Sudarsanam, 2003, chapter 4; Moeller et al, 
2004; Conn et al, 2005). Whether such value losses are due to skewed risk incentives 
that managerial wealth components provide or are encouraged by managerial 
behavioural biases is an interesting question to resolve empirically. In this thesis 
therefore acquisitions are considered to be an appropriate corporate decision-making 
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context in which to explore the relationship among managerial wealth, behavioural 
biases, corporate monitoring mechanisms, investment risk profiles and shareholder 
value gains. The two research questions thus can be readdressed as: 
Q F: What are the factors that drive managers to undertake risky acquisitions? 
Q2': To what extent is acquirers' post acquisition performance related to the 
optimal- or suboptimal-risk of acquisitions? 
Sections 5.4,5.5 and 5.6 of Chapter 5 hypothesize the relationship between 
acquisition risk and the components of the managerial wealth portfolio, behavioural 
biases and various corporate monitoring devices. Section 5.8 of Chapter 5 hypothesizes 
the relationship between acquirer post-acquisition performance and the levels of 
optimal/suboptimal acquisition risk. To test the hypotheses, this thesis conducts a five- 
step analysis: 1) estimating the empirical risk model to identify factors that determine 
acquisition risk; 2) identifying optimal- and suboptimal-risk acquisition classifications 
based on the predictions of the empirical risk model; 3) calculating long-term post- 
acquisition performance; 4) evaluating the post-acquisition performance for each 
acquisition risk group by conducting univariate and multiple regression analysis; 5) 
conducting one-stage analysis of the relationship between acquirers' post-acquisition 
performance and risk incentives to compare the difference between the one-stage 
analysis and the two-stage analysis. Those analyses are based on a sample of 589 UK 
domestic acquisitions over the period 1993-2000. 
The results of the analyses are summarised in Section 9.2. The implications of 
these results are discussed in Section 9.3. The issues for further research are presented 
Section 9.4. 
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9.2 Summary of results and conclusions 
This section summarizes the results of the analyses. Section 9.2.1 is the 
summary for Chapter 7 which aims to answer research question QI and Section 9.2.2 is 
the summary for Chapter 8 that provides answers to research question Q2. 
9.2.1 Determinants of acquisition risk 
Chapter 7 examines the determinants of the riskiness of acquisitions pursued by 
managers. In line with existing empirical evidence regarding the incentive effect of 
fixed compensation and annual bonuses, the thesis finds that these types of 
compensation provide few incentives for managers to conduct risky acquisitions and 
that, they can even discourage managers from pursuing high-risk high-tech acquisitions. 
LTIP cash also does not provide any incentives for managers to take risk. 
The findings of this study with regard to equity-based wealth challenge existing 
empirical evidence. This thesis finds significant evidence that equity-based wealth 
which links managers' wealth with firm performance has a nonlinear incentive effect on 
managerial risk taking. It uses the partial derivative of the value of managers' equity 
holdings relative to 1% change in firm stock price (indicating the association between 
firm performance and managers' wealth) as a measure of the incentive provided by 
managers' equity holdings. It finds that a small equity delta, meaning a low association, 
encourages managers to buy high-tech targets because the technology brought by target 
firms can enhance the competitive advantage of acquirers, and thus improve the value of 
the acquiring firms as well as the value of managers' equity holdings. However, if 
acquisitions fail, it will not make managers suffer a great loss because their wealth is 
not closely linked to firm performance. This positive association between managerial 
risk taking and equity delta however diminishes and turns negative as delta becomes 
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large. This is because when equity delta is high, managers' wealth is highly exposed to 
firm stock price variations while managers do not want to expose their wealth to too 
much risk. A further increase in the association between managerial wealth and firm 
performance can only intensify managers' risk aversion and divert them away from 
high-risk high-tech acquisitions. 
Various robustness checks show that the significant incentive effect of equity 
delta is mainly from managerial equity ownership, not from LTIP shares or stock 
options. Unlike many US studies which report that stock options can reduce managerial 
risk aversion because through them managers can always benefit from rising stock 
prices, but are protected from wealth loss as a result of plunging stock prices. Stock 
options therefore have a convex payoff structure. The convexity of stock options is 
measured by vega, which is the partial derivative of the value of stock options relative 
to 1% change in stock return volatility. The convexity of stock options therefore should 
contribute to managerial risk taking. Many studies even argue that the convexity of 
stock option can induce managers to engage in excessive risk taking (see Section 2.3.4.2 
of Chapter 2). This thesis however does not find any significant effect of stock options 
on managers' selection of acquisition risk. 
The limited impact of compensation on managerial risk preference is consistent 
with the argument put forward by Ross (2004) that managerial risk preferences cannot 
easily be altered by compensation contracts. Ross suggests that managerial risk 
propensity is affected by managers' individual utility functions, which can have a 
greater or lesser risk aversion depending on factors such as managers' total wealth. 
Managers are more risk averse at a high level of wealth than at a low level of wealth. 
A high level of managerial wealth therefore weakens the incentive alignment effect of 
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equity-based compensation. This argument is supported by this thesis which finds that 
when managers' wealth level is high, the incentive alignment effect of managerial 
equity holdings is weakened. Managers tend to select low-risk acquisitions 161 
The limited impact of equity-based compensation on managerial risk taking may 
be due to the low level of equity-based compensation in the UK. Unlike in the US 
where executive compensation was dominated by stock options in the 1990s, this thesis 
shows that UK directors' stock option holdings and the holdings of LTIP shares fall 
behind or are at most close to the value of cash compensation in the 1990s. It is 
therefore not hard to understand why no strong evidence is found with regard to the 
incentive effects of LTIP shares and stock options. The broad criticism of excessive 
stock option grants inducing managerial excessive risk taking in the US in the 1990s 
does not apply to the UK. 
I acknowledge that in this thesis a less than ideal design of the empirical test 
may also bias conclusions regarding the incentive effects of the components of 
managerial wealth. Detailed discussions with regard to this can be found in Section 9.3 
below. Moreover, executive compensation in companies can be manipulated by 
executive directors and thus is unlikely to provide proper incentives (see Section 7.4.1 
of Chapter 7). 
Overall the results suggest that the components of managerial wealth induce 
more managerial risk aversion than managerial risk seeking. In fact, what drove UK 
161 1 acknowledge in Section 7.4.1 of Chapter 7 that the data in this study is not able to demonstrate a 
significant difference between the risk aversion impact of a high level of managerial equity holdings and 
the risk disincentive effect arising from a high level of managerial wealth. This is because the major 
component of managerial wealth is managerial equity holdings. 
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directors in the 1990s to pursue high-risk high-tech acquisitions was their behavioural 
biases, which caused them to overestimate their own capability but underestimate 
acquisition risk. 
This thesis finds fairly strong evidence that managerial overconfidence/over- 
optimism/hubris boosted by good past performance, glamour rating by the stock market. 
and flattering media profile induces managers to engage in risky high-tech acquisitions. 
These effects are stronger during stock market booms than at other times. This is 
consistent with the argument put forward by behavioural finance theory that managers 
can be risk seeking even without the inducement of stock options. 
In line with empirical evidence presented in Chapter 4 that corporate control 
devices are generally ineffective because managers are in effective control of companies, 
this study finds that monitors such as external blockholders or institutional investors 
generally do not have any impact on managers' selection of acquisition risk. Board 
structure variables such as board independence, separation of the roles of CEO and 
COB, and the existence of a remuneration committee have no strong impact on 
managers' choices of acquisition risk. 
In addition to factors above (the main focus of this thesis), I also find that 
acquirer financial leverage, acquirer size, and relative size of acquirer to target, which 
are factors argued by existing literature to have an impact on managerial risk taking 
have no impact on managers' pursuit of acquisition risk. 
In summary, this thesis finds that what makes managers take risky acquisitions 
appears to be internal factors, i. e., factors that work within managers' inner selves and 
give them more confidence that they can controlling risks. External factors, such as 
corporate governance devices that try to control managers' behaviour, do not 
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necessarily boost managers' confidence in their risk managing capabilities. These 
results imply that managers who do not have good past performance or who do not 
receive flamboyant media praise, are likely to remain risk averse and demonstrate risk 
avoidance behaviour. 
9.2.2 Post-acquisition performance and acquisition risk 
Having empirically modelled the determinants of acquisition risk in Chapter 7, 
in Chapter 81 derive the level of optimal/subopitmal acquisition risk and examine the 
association between acquirer post-acquisition performance and the level of 
optimal/subopitmal acquisition risk in Chapter 8. This is done to address research 
question Q2. 
An examination of acquirers' buy-and-hold-abnormal-returns shows that high- 
tech acquisitions in the UK during the 1990s destroyed shareholder value up to three 
years after acquisition completion. This is inconsistent with the findings of Conn et al 
(2005) who find that high-tech acquisitions of privately-held targets162 neither create nor 
destroy shareholder value. This thesis does not find strong or consistent evidence that 
high-risk high-tech acquisitions destroyed more value than low-risk, low-tech 
acquisitions. On the contrary acquirers which bought low-tech targets underperformed 
firms that acquired high-tech targets, although the difference was not always statistically 
significant. 
This thesis also show that acquirer post-acquisition performance can be partially 
explained by the risk level of acquisitions even though the relationship is not predicted 
exactly in Section 5.8 of Chapter 5. Specifically, over the period 1993 to 1997, 
162 More than 90% of the target firms in the sample of this thesis are non-listed companies. 
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acquisitions that are identified as being at an optimal-risk level perform much better and 
generate much more value for acquirer shareholders than acquisitions that are classified 
as under-risk acquisitions. Such a clear picture however, is not found in the 1998-2000 
sample, during which time, optimal-risk acquisitions perform only slightly better than 
under-risk acquisitions. Indeed more shareholder value is created in acquisitions that 
are over-risk acquisitions than in either optimal-risk or under-risk acquisitions during 
that period. This perhaps unexpected result is in fact consistent with the findings of the 
empirical risk model. With the exception of overconfident/over-optimistic/hubris 
managers, UK managers are likely to exhibit risk aversion, particularly when corporate 
governance is not effective in encouraging them to take more risks (see previous 
section). These findings suggest that during the sample period UK acquirer managers 
may have foregone valuable but high risk growth opportunities and destroyed or failed 
to create shareholder value by being excessively risk-averse rather than by being 
adventurous in their risk choices. 
In addition, this thesis does not find any significant evidence that non-cash 
offers destroy more shareholder value than cash offers do in acquisitions. 
So far I have discussed findings based on the two-stage analysis of the 
relationship between post-acquisition performance and the factors that influence 
managers' choices of acquisition risk. To provide a study comparable with the 
commonly published one-stage analysis of such a relationship, I run regressions of 
acquirer 3-year buy-and-hold-abnormal-returns directly on risk incentives (i. e., the one- 
stage analysis) and conduct various robustness checks just as I do with the two-stage 
analysis. The results show that none of the risk incentive factors strongly explain post- 
acquisition performance. and the explanatory powers of the regression models are weak. 
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Therefore, it appears that a two-stage analysis, which considers managers' selection of 
acquisition risk, can explain post-acquisition performance more fully than a one-stage 
analysis. The two-stage analysis provides insight into the linkage among risk incentives 
provided by managers' wealth, managerial risk taking and the consequent firm 
performance. It also allows us to examine how managerial behavioural biases affect 
this linkage. 
9.3 Implications 
The findings of this thesis have several implications not only for empirical 
finance research but also existing corporate governance designs. Firstly, this thesis 
challenges the view of the traditional agency model that managers are naturally risk 
averse. Consistent with the view of the behavioural agency model, it suggests that 
managers can be risk seeking as well as risk averse. The implication is that classical 
finance research needs to include behavioural bias variables into empirical models when 
assessing managerial risk taking. 
Secondly, this thesis suggests that a one-stage analysis of the relationship 
between firm performance and factors that influence managers' investment behaviour is 
not as good as a two-stage analysis which considers managers' selection of project risk. 
A two-stage analysis provides insight into such a relationship and explains firm 
performance more fully than a one-stage analysis. 
Thirdly, this study shows that managerial equity holdings which link managers' 
wealth to firm stock performance, can have a concave impact on managers' risk taking 
behaviour. When the managerial equity holdings are low, they encourage managers to 
take risky acquisitions. However when they are high, they divert managers away from 
high-risk acquisitions. This evidence is found when the risk incentives provided by 
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managerial equity holdings are measured by the sensitivity of managers' equity 
holdings to 1% change in firm stock price. Further, this study shows that the concave 
impact of managerial equity holdings comes mainly from managerial shareholdings, 
rather than LTIP shares and stock options since the grants of these two compensation 
plans far too low to significantly influence UK directors' investment behaviour in the 
1990. It is suggested that future studies should further examine the nonlinear impact of 
managers' equity holdings. 
Fourthly, this thesis shows that a high level of managerial wealth which 
intensifies managerial risk aversion can diminish the incentive alignment effect of 
managerial equity holdings. Empirical studies should not neglect this when examining 
the incentives provided by managerial equity holdings. 
This thesis also has implications for corporate governance practices. It suggests 
that executive compensation in the UK induces more managerial risk aversion than 
managerial risk seeking. Stock options which should encourage managerial risk taking 
are too low as a proportion of executive compensation to have any strong incentive 
effect on managers. However, an excessive amount of stock options or other equity- 
based compensation may not be all good because it appears that they bring about both a 
risk-seeking effect and a risk-aversion'63 effect simultaneously. The tradeoffs between 
163 Ross (2004) argues that increased stock option grants also increase managers' total wealth. Managers 
are more risk averse when their total wealth level is high than when it is low (see Section 2.4.2). This 
thesis provides empirical support that a high level of managerial wealth weakens the incentive alignment 
effect embedded in managers' equity-based wealth (see previous section for a summary of the findings of 
this thesis). 
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these two effects may mean that equity-based compensation is not usefully but brings 
more agency costs to shareholders. 
In addition, this thesis finds that UK boards generally adhere to the 
recommendations in the Cadbury Report (1992) that the roles of chief executive officer 
and chairman of board should be separated, that the board should have a remuneration 
committee, and that boards should be dominated by non-executive directors. However 
this thesis still finds that corporate control by those monitors is largely ineffective, 
therefore it advocates a re-think of corporate monitoring systems in the UK. 
9.4 Issues for further research 
Throughout the course of this work a number of issues were encountered which 
may compromise to a greater or lesser degree the conclusions drawn using the models 
presented in this thesis. These issues and recommendations to future researchers are 
listed below. 
Firstly, the risk model is purely empirically based. In the absence of a theory 
specifying the relevant observable variables, the empirical risk model may be subject to 
an omitted-variable problem. Further research, therefore, should investigate any other 
variables that might have been neglected from the empirical risk model presented in this 
thesis. 
A second issue is that compensation designs may be endogenous. Empirical 
literature suggests that the design and structure of executive compensation can be 
determined by firm size, past performance, tax, leverage, growth opportunities, cash 
flow, etc (Baker et al, 1988; Jensen and Murphy, 1988; Scholes, 1991; Long, 1992: 
Smith and Watts, 1992; Graver and Graver, 1993: John and John, 1993; Yermack, 1995-, 
Core and Guay, 1999; Mishra et al, 2000; Hanlon et al. 2003, Ittner et al. 2003). 
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Moreover, equity ownership is exogenously determined by size, monitoring difficulty, 
etc (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Board composition is also argued to be determined by 
firm performance, CEO turnover, and changes in ownership structure (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003). A better risk model should include simultaneous equations for all of 
these endogenously determined variables. However, this is a large area of research and 
it is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider all of these endogenous variables when 
constructing the risk model. It is therefore left for the future development of this thesis. 
The third issue is that the acquisition risk proxied by the target high-tech 
acquisition status or target industry R&D intensity cannot fully quantify acquisition 
risk. A better measure is likely to be target firm level data. Given that more than 90% 
of the target firms in the sample of this thesis are unlisted companies whose accounting 
information on intangible assets is not available from public sources, it is impossible to 
employ a target firm level data (see Section 6.2.1.1 of Chapter 6). Further research 
should use target firm level data. Future studies should also use some other risk 
measures for sample, the stock volatility change of acquirers after acquisitions, and 
other types of investment projects. 
In addition, the definitions of high-tech and low-tech industries based on the 
definitions of Securities Data Company (SDC) are subject to more robustness checks, 
although as shown in Table 7-1 in Chapter 7, high-tech targets defined by SDC have 
substantially higher industry R&D intensity than low-tech targets. Conn et al (2005) 
use R&D expenditure to industry output to define high-tech industries and low-tech 
industries (see Section 6.2.1.1 of Chapter 6). Future studies are recommended to use 
different measures for high-tech industries. 
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The fourth issue is that long-run post-acquisition stock returns may be a noisy 
performance measure. Stock-based performance measures rely on the assumption of 
efficient markets to properly assess the gains arising from an acquisition (Heal`, et al, 
1997). A violation of this assumption will lead to a wrong estimation of the outcome of 
an acquisition. An alternative approach is to use accounting-based performance 
measures although such an approach is also biased because accounting data can be 
manipulated by managers to give the impression of better firm performance. 
This thesis uses a control firm approach164 to identify benchmarks firms. This 
approach can alleviate new listing, rebalancing, and skewness biases (see Section 
6.5.3.3). The control firm approach, however, is not without any problems. For 
example, like any other benchmark models, it is subject to model misspecification 
problem (Lyon et al, 1999). If the benchmark model is not properly specified, for 
instance, some important pre-event characteristics are not included in the benchmark, 
the resulting abnormal returns could still be spurious. Therefore, future research should 
use different firm characteristics, and different benchmarks such as asset pricing models 
for robustness checks. 
Fama (1998) argue that bad model problems are more acute with long-term buy- 
and-hold-abnormal returns (BHARs) because of the compounding effect of the BHAR 
approach (see Section 6.5.3.4 of Chapter 6). If a benchmark model is not appropriate, 
i. e., a bad model, compounding the expected returns can exacerbate the error. Further 
research should use cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) or calendar time abnormal 
164 A control portfolio approach is also used in this thesis. However, Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that a 
control portfolio approach is subject to new listing, rebalancing and skewness biases, so is an asset 
pricing model. See Section 6.5.3 of Chapter 6 for discussions of those problems. 
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returns (CTARs), both of which do not compound abnormal returns, for robustness 
checks' 65 
Cross-sectional dependence166 of stock returns which lead to mis-specified test 
statistics for abnormal returns exists in the BHARs reported in this thesis because of the 
overlapping event windows of the sample acquisitions. 41% of the sample acquisitions 
(235 acquisitions out of 578 acquisitions) are multiple acquisitions 167. Conn et al 
(2005) report 87% (3340 out of 3842 acquisitions) of their sample acquisitions are 
multiple acquisitions and find that CTARs and BHARs produce similar results. 
Although the percentage of multiple acquisitions in the sample of this thesis is much 
lower than that in the study by Conn et al (2005), it is still recommended that further 
research should use CTARs for robustness checks. 
The fifth issue is as mentioned in Section 7.4.1 Chapter 7, the Black and Scholes 
(1973) formula may overstate the value of options to risk averse executive recipients. 
In addition, the insufficient information disclosure' 68 for executive stock options in the 
UK also distorts the true value of the option holdings of UK directors. It is not only 
stock options that have measurement problems, the pay-performance sensitivity of LTIP 
165 CARs and CTARs also have problems. See Section 6.5.3.4 for a discussion. 
166 See Section 6.5.3 of Chapter 6 for discussions of those problems. 
167 Multiple acquisitions in this thesis refer to acquisitions conducted by the same acquirer within 3 years. 
168 UK companies can adopt two types of disclosure of directors' holdings of stock options, complete 
disclosure and concise disclosure. A complete disclosure reports all the parameters in Black-Scholes 
(1973) option pricing model. A concise disclosure may only report the weighted average exercise price 
for the unexercised options held by directors instead of the exercise price for each tranche of stock 
options. Researchers have to make some assumption about those parameters if a company follows a 
concise disclosure. See Section 6.2.1.2 for more discussion. 
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shares (i. e., LTIP delta) is also calculated based on the assumption that LTIP shares 
have a delta of 1 while the true value may actually vary from 0 to 1169 Further research 
should employ different option pricing models that can incorporate the characteristics of 
executive stock options, such as an option pricing model for American-Style stock 
options, and should use a better approach for estimating LTIP delta. 
The sixth issue is that although the measure of managers' total wealth includes 
the managerial wealth associated with their employment firms, it does not include 
managers' wealth invested outside of their firms. Therefore, in this study, the risk 
aversion effect from total wealth may be underestimated. Future research should 
include as much information about the total wealth of managers as is reasonably 
possible. 
The seventh issue is that as discussed in Section 7.4.2, psychological biases are 
difficult to quantify. In general, the proxies for managerial behavioural biases are noisy 
and subjective. Further empirical studies are recommended to examine the robustness 
of the measures used in this thesis and to suggest more proxies. Regarding the content 
analysis conducted for the media praise variable, it is recommended that future studies 
should use more than one researcher to read and identify the relevant articles. The 
coding of identified relevant articles can be conducted by both researchers and computer 
software to achieve better accuracy than by only one researcher like in this study. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Section 8.7 of Chapter 8, the conclusion drawn in 
this thesis that risky high-tech acquisitions which are mainly driven by managerial 
behavioural biases, can create value for acquirer shareholders is sample-specific and 
time dependent. Using a US sample which includes a period of excessive stock option 
169 See Section 2.3.3 of Chapter 2 for discussions of LTIP delta. 
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grants, researchers will probably find that stock options are one of the driving forces for 
high-risk high-tech acquisitions. If the post-2000 period after the stock market crashed 
is included in the sample, the strong evidence for managerial overconfidence'over- 
optimism/hubris inflated by their firms' superior stock performance and flattering media 
profiles may not be found. 
Despite these areas for improvement in this thesis, it is the first piece of 
empirical research that combines the views of traditional agency theory and behavioural 
agency theory to examine managerial risk taking behaviour. This study draws upon and 
contributes to agency literature, executive compensation literature, corporate 
governance literature, and M&A literature. This exploratory study will serve as a useful 
foundation for future research into the understanding of what factors influence 
managerial risk taking, and how, in turn, it influences corporate performance. 
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